论Priest对Sorites悖论的模糊解悖方案

G.Priest在1998-2003年之间有一个对sorites悖论的模糊解悖方案,根据该解悖方案,对含混语言的最佳语意论应该是某种的模糊语意论。在这样的模糊语意论中,边界语句是既真且假的语句,而sorites悖论中所涉及的离断律和等同传递律则不是有效的推论步骤。Priest并试图利用这样的语意论去说明：为什么sorites悖论看起来像是有效的论证,以及为什么切割点的存在尽管必然却违反直觉。我在本文中论证：Priest的模糊解悖方案是一个完全失败的方案,因此最好被放弃。我论证,Priest的模糊解悖方案至少有以下几个主要的问题：它与Priest的真理理论以及双面真理论不兼容、它对于sorites悖论的诊断有特设的嫌疑、它对于sorites悖论为何看起来有效的说明不具有可信度、它对于切割点存在何以违反直觉的说明也不具有可信度、它有将高阶含混性崩塌为一阶含混性之虞。     

Vagueness-Adaptive Logic: A Pragmatical Approach to Sorites Paradoxes

Kripke-completeness of every classical modal logic with Sahlqvist formulas is one of the basic general results on completeness of classical modal logics. This paper shows a Sahlqvist theorem for modal logic over the relevant logic Bin terms of Routley-Meyer semantics. It is shown that usual Sahlqvist theorem for classical modal logics can be obtained as a special case of our theorem.     

Sorites Is No Threat to Modus Ponens: A Reply to Kochan

A recent article by Jeff Kochan contains a discussion of modus ponens that among other thing alleges that the paradox of the heap is a counterexample to it. In this note I show that it is the conditional major premise of a modus ponens inference, rather than the rule itself, that is impugned. This premise is the contrapositive of the inductive step in the principle of mathematical induction, confirming the widely accepted view that it is the vagueness of natural language predicates, not modus ponens, that is challenged by Sorites.     

A Three‐Pronged Approach for Overcoming Design Fixation

Earthquakes, lightning, and history‐changing ideas are classic examples of powerful, unpredictable forces of nature. These sorts of phenomena have been difficult to explain and predict, an often frustrating fact as humans try to understand and control the significant influences in our lives. Historically, such phenomena have been attributed to supernatural sources, such as the Muses or various deities. And yet, as scientific inquiry continues to focus on such problems, we begin to make progress, albeit incremental, in comprehending such unpredictable occurrences. Earthquakes and lightning serve as analogies for the phenomenon referred to as insight. As such, these analogies may help us better understand where ideas come from; in each case, the rare, and potentially powerful phenomenon occurs unexpectedly, yet, as we learn more, it becomes better understood. Lightning is an electrical phenomenon, caused by particles colliding, and building up large electrical fields in the clouds. Earthquakes occur at the edges of tectonic plates, as the Earth releases its heat. Thus, we may begin to understand what causes insight, even though we cannot as yet predict specific occurrences of new insights. Analogies may not provide fully developed solutions to problems, but they can help us restructure our thinking about certain problems. Problem restructuring is especially appropriate when fixation obstructs problem solving. In this paper, we will explain a few of the fundamentals about human insight experiences, particularly in relation to what have been termed incubation effects. Putting a fixated problem aside can be helpful, and new ideas encountered during fixation can sometimes trigger new insights, particularly if useful analogies help resolve fixation. How does one overcome the counterproductive effects of fixation? We suggest a three‐pronged approach to this problem: 1. Forgetting fixation, 2. Redefining problems, and 3. Using clues or hints to provoke new ideas. We will explain each of these ideas, in brief, after providing a background for insight, incubation, and fixation.     

Conjunction-based Sorites: A Misguided Objection to Degree-Theoretic (Fuzzy) Solutions to Sorites Paradoxes

In 1987, Crispin Wright argued that degree-theoretic (fuzzy) solutions to the Sorites paradox fail because the solutions do not work when the paradox is restated using a conjunctive major premise. I show that Wright is incorrect: degree-theoretic solutions also work when the paradox is stated with a conjunctive major premise.     

怀疑主义难题的解答

对怀疑主义难题的解决有重要意义.康德把怀疑主义难题的未决看做是"哲学的耻辱"[1],奎因则指出:"休谟的难题就是人类的难题."[2]鉴于怀疑主义难题的重要性、怀疑主义难题批判的必要性以及目前国内研究的相对缺失,本文将对西方知识论中所提出的解决怀疑主义难题的方案进行批判性研究.     

A Wittgensteinian Solution to the Sorites

I develop a solution to the Sorites Paradox, according to which a concatenation of valid arguments need not itself be valid. I specify which chains of valid arguments are those that do not preserve validity: those that pass the vague boundary between cases where the relevant concept applies and cases where that concept does not apply. I also develop various criticisms of this solution and show why they fail; basically, they all involve a petitio at some stage. I criticise the conviction that if every short argument in a long concatenated argument is valid, so is the long argument: it is, I argue, the result of an unjustified generalisation from the case of arguments that do not employ vague concepts (as in mathematics) to arguments that do employ them. My approach is Wittgensteinian in its “leaving everything as it is,” in its claiming that the “beginning” has been searched too far back (see paper's epigraph) and in its claim that the paradox was generated by a misapplication of a partial picture of the behaviour of arguments. I conclude my paper by comparing and contrasting my approach to the few precedents found in the vagueness literature and by answering a few additional objections that were raised there.     

A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox

This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad hoc nor unnatural.     

Re‐Examining Machiavelli: A Three‐Dimensional Model of Machiavellianism in the Workplace

Machiavellianism has been studied extensively over the past 40 years as a personality characteristic that shares features with the manipulative leadership tactics Machiavelli advocated in The Prince. We introduce a new model of Machiavellianism based in organizational settings that is multidimensional, incorporating aspects not previously included in Machiavellianism scales. Our model consists of 3 factors: maintaining power, harsh management tactics, and manipulative behaviors. The results of 3 studies are summarized, discussing the development of these 3 factors and how they relate to individual‐difference and organizational variables.     

Examining the Criterion‐Related Validity of the Employee Screening Questionnaire: A Three‐Sample Investigation

Across three samples (N=475, 358, and 112), the authors examined the criterion‐related validity of the Employee Screening Questionnaire (ESQ), a brief forced‐choice measure of integrity in the workplace. Results suggested that ESQ scores correlate highly with self‐ and other‐reports of counterproductive work behaviors (rs of .59, .50, and .47 on the consolidated scores), as well as self‐reports of job satisfaction (rs of ?.41 and ?.22 on the consolidated scores), and intention to leave the organization (rs of .30 and .21 on the consolidated scores). No predictive bias by gender was found for the ESQ scores. Based on these results, the authors encourage more research on the use of personality‐based (covert), forced‐choice integrity tests in selection contexts.     

Seeing the Forest Beyond the Trees: A Construal‐Level Approach to Self‐Control

Self‐control failure is a ubiquitous and troubling problem people face. This article reviews psychological models of self‐control and describes a new integrative approach based on construal level theory (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003 ). This construal‐level perspective proposes that people's subjective mental construals or representations of events impacts self‐control. Specifically, more abstract, global (high‐level) construals promote self‐control success, whereas more concrete, local (low‐level) construals tend to lead to self‐control failure. That is, self‐control is promoted when people see the proverbial forest beyond the trees. This article surveys research findings that demonstrate that construing events at high‐level versus low‐level construals promotes self‐control. This article also discusses how a construal‐level perspective promotes understanding of self‐control failures.     

A Tripartite Approach to Right‐Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism‐Conservatism‐Traditionalism Model

Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) has been conceptualized and measured as a unidimensional personality construct comprising the covariation of the three traits of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. However, new approaches have criticized this conceptualization and instead viewed these three “traits” as three distinct, though related, social attitude dimensions. Here we extend this approach providing clear definitions of these three dimensions as ideological attitude constructs of Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism. These dimensions are seen as attitudinal expressions of basic social values or motivational goals that represent different, though related, strategies for attaining collective security at the expense of individual autonomy. We report data from five samples and three different countries showing that these three dimensions could be reliably measured and were factorially distinct. The three dimensions also differentially predicted interpersonal behaviour, social policy support, and political party support. It is argued that conceptualizing and measuring RWA as a set of three related ideological attitude dimensions may better explain complex sociopolitical phenomena than the currently dominant unidimensional personality based model.     

A Goal‐Priming Approach to Cognitive Consistency: Applications to Judgment

A fundamental criterion of judgment is consistency among beliefs. To augment traditional methods for studying cognitive consistency, we treat it as a goal and present a priming method for increasing its activation. Three studies use three criteria to validate the method: an increase in the biased evaluation of incoming information, speed in a lexical decision task, and participants' direct reports of greater goal activation. The method is then used to verify the role of the consistency goal in three diverse judgment phenomena. Priming cognitive consistency increases the search for postdecisional supporting information (selective exposure to information), the agreement between preference and prediction (the desirability bias or wishful thinking), and the adjustment of a socially unacceptable implicit attitude to conform to the corresponding explicit attitude. One conclusion is that the cause of these phenomena is not only motivated reasoning (driven directionally by a desired outcome) but also the purely cognitive and nondirectional process of simply making beliefs more consistent. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.