Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness,Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature

The central claim of Aristotelian naturalism is that moral goodness is a kind of species-specific natural goodness. Aristotelian naturalism has recently enjoyed a resurgence in the work of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. However, any view that takes moral goodness to be a type of natural goodness faces a challenge: Granting that moral goodness is natural goodness for human beings, why should we care about being good human beings? Given that we are rational creatures who can ‘step back’ from our nature, why should we see human nature as authoritative for us? This is the authority-of-nature challenge. In this essay, I state this challenge clearly, identify its deep motivation, and distinguish it from other criticisms of Aristotelian naturalism. I also articulate what I consider the best response, which I term the practical reason response. This response, however, exposes Aristotelian naturalism to a new criticism – that it has abandoned the naturalist claim that moral goodness is species-specific natural goodness. Thus, I argue, Aristotelian naturalists appear to face a dilemma: Either they cannot answer the authority-of-nature challenge, or in meeting the challenge they must abandon naturalism. Aristotelian naturalists might overcome this dilemma, but doing so is harder than some Aristotelians have supposed. In the final sections of the paper, I examine the difficulties in overcoming the dilemma, and I suggest ways that Aristotelians might answer the authority-of-nature challenge while preserving naturalism.     

Is There a Right to Have Rights? The Case of the Right of Asylum

In dialogue with the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib the author draws on the idea of a right to have rights and raises the question under which political conditions asylum can be a subjective right for political refugees. He argues that mere spontaneous acts of humanitarianism will not suffice to define the institutional commitments of liberal democracies in refugee policy. At the same time, no duty for any particular state to take up refugees can be derived from a right to have rights. The quest for institutional solutions for a timely migration and asylum policy will rather enhance the discourses on the self-understanding of liberal democracies. With a critical eye on German asylum legislation and legal practice, the author contends that it will be a task of any co-ordinated European right of asylum to define political persecution in relation to the first dimension of human rights in order to differentiate the right of asylum from immigration legislation.     

A Right to Understand Injustice: Epistemology and the “Right to the Truth” in International Human Rights Discourse

People's “right to truth” or their “right to know” about their government's human rights abuses is a growing consensus in human rights discourses and a fertile area of work in international and humanitarian law. In most discussions of this right to know the truth, it is commonly seen as requiring the state or international institutions to provide access to evidence of the violations. In this paper, I argue that such a right naturally has many epistemic aspects, and the tools of social epistemology can be helpful in elucidating what such a right entails. As a beginning for this project, I draw on those resources to argue that the right to know the truth is only meaningful if it includes a right to understand the abuses, and that such understanding can only come through the development of community epistemic capacities. Given this, I further argue that the state has a duty to support the development of these capacities, and that a critical place for beginning this process is in public schools.     

Fallen or Unfallen? Christ's Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness

Abstract: Because Christ's sinlessness is a matter of virtual consensus among Christians, debates over whether the human nature he assumed was fallen or unfallen turn on the ontological conditions of his being ‘without sin’ (Heb. 4:15). The claim that Christ assumed a fallen nature can be defended by distinguishing between fallenness and sinfulness as properties of nature and hypostasis, respectively. Moreover, by highlighting the peculiar place of the will in human nature, this christological analysis helps counter the charge that an Augustinian understanding of original sin entails a dualism inconsistent with belief in the goodness of creation and human moral accountability.     

Can the Innate Right to Freedom Alone Ground a System of Public and Private Rights?

The state regulates the way in which social power is exercised. It sometimes permits, enables, constrains, forbids how we may touch others, make offers, draw up contracts, use, alter, possess and destroy things that matter to people, manipulate, induce weakness of the will, coerce, engage in physical force, persuade, selectively divulge information, lie, enchant, coax, convince, … In each of these cases, we (sometimes unintentionally) get others to act in ways that serve our interests. Which such exercises of power should the state forbid? Which should it permit? An intuitively appealing way to answer this question is, with Ripstein and Kant, to point to the role of freedom: exercises of social power can be legitimately prohibited when (and only when) they restrict people's freedom. But this raises a further question: How do we identify when such exercises of power make people unfree in the relevant sense? Ripstein, in defending Kant, draws a crucial distinction between actions that subject others’ wills to our choices (and which it would therefore be presumptively legitimate for the state to forbid) and actions that merely affect the contexts in which others act (and which it would therefore be presumptively illegitimate for the state to forbid). I query that distinction, and argue that the idea of independence cannot bear, on its own, the weight it is expected to bear within the Kantian framework.     

From Nature to Culture? Diogenes and Philosophical Anthropology

This essay is concerned with the central issue of philosophical anthropology: the relation between nature and culture. Although Rousseau was the first thinker to introduce this topic within the modern discourse of philosophy and the cultural sciences, it has its origin in Diogenes the Cynic, who was a disciple of Socrates. In my essay I (1) historically introduce a few aspects of philosophical anthropology, (2) deal with the nature–culture exchange, as introduced in Kant, then I (3) relate this topic to the Ancient Cynic Diogenes. Surprisingly, although we usually identify Critical Theory and Freudian psychoanalysis as theories that have shown that cultural progress should not be comprehended as a development from nature to culture, and that instead it should be conceived as a development from culture against (external as well as internal) nature, I show that Cynicism can be conceived as a vivid example within the history of our culture that reveals a double sense of repression and alienation, which is part of human civilization and mankind.     

From Human–Nature to Cultureplace in Education Via an Exploration of Unity and Relation in the Work of Peirce and Dewey

In outdoor education discourse the notion of relation is often employed to convey basic connections between humanity and nature as human–nature relationships, yet the sense of relation itself is rarely questioned. Drawing on the work of Peirce and Dewey, I explore the ramifications of a more nuanced understanding of relation, specifically how relation works with and within differing senses of unity. These ramifications have consequences for how we understand human–nature relationships, which I argue are better conveyed in terms of culture–place. The various forms of unity described by Peirce inform more nuanced understandings of culture–place as cultureplace, with implications for the notion of transculturality. My specific concern with outdoor education then enables me to show how cultureplace and culture–place may be considered to have relevance pedagogically, especially in relation to dealing with cultural and environmental crises.     

Learning from Animals? Examining the Nature of Human Uniqueness

The Psychological Record -     

Accommodation to What? Univocity of Being,Pure Nature,and the Anthropology of St Irenaeus

Abstract: This article, the author's inaugural lecture for the J.I. Packer chair at Regent College, Vancouver, takes as its starting‐point Karl Barth's penetrating question, ‘Accommodation to what?’ Suggesting that recent evangelical theologies have been too ready to accommodate to the immanentism inherent in postmodern culture, the article traces the roots of that immanentism to Scotus's teaching concerning the univocity of being, and suggests that in St Irenaeus's christologically shaped account of the nature and destiny of human life there is a theologically satisfying preservation of a proper account of transcendence.     

A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of Neutrality in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights1

Abstract

The article examines the strategies the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) employs to apply the concept of neutrality in relation to Article 9 (freedom of religion or belief) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Having explored the theoretical background of the concept of neutrality and its specific application in the case law, the authors argue that neutrality is often used to display a bias towards a particular world view or societal paradigm, rather than representing unbiased perspectives of legal reasoning. The article studies the specific justifications for such biased approaches in the context of relevant ECHR cases and argues that in this way neutrality has discredited itself as a credible legal tool and as a form of legal argumentation. Furthermore the difficulty of handling the complexities of Article 9 claims by applying the principle of neutrality has led to a stronger trend of avoiding Article 9 by dealing with Article 9 claims through other Convention articles. Finally the authors discuss possible new approaches to legal reasoning which could take on board the dynamics of freedom of religion or belief through independent reasoning beyond the myth of neutrality.     

What’s Human Rights Got to Do with It? On the Proposed Changes to SSHRC Ethics Research Policy

What’s human rights got to do with it? That is, what’s human rights got to do with the June 2004 report of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Special Working Committee to the Inter-Agency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics. The disturbing answer is “not enough.” Certain key recommendations of the working committee, it is suggested, would unacceptably weaken the researcher’s legal and moral accountability to research participants. Those particular recommendations rely on misguided references to academic freedom and the nature of the non-medical research context. In fact, universal human rights, and the legal instruments in which they are embodied ought to inform the research endeavor at every stage; from problem selection to analysis and conclusions. This will lead us closer to shared truths rather than simply to the academic elite’s vision of truth. Without sufficient regard for the human rights of research participants academic freedom itself is not possible.     

“In the Face,a Right Is There”: Arendt,Levinas and the Phenomenology of the Rights of Man

This paper examines the differences between the thought of Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas concerning the “Rights of Man”, in relation to stateless persons. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt evinces a profound scepticism towards this ideal, which for her was powerless without being tethered to citizenship. But Arendt’s own idea of the “Right to have Rights” is critiqued here as being inadequate to the ethical demand placed upon states by refugees, in failing to articulate just what states might be responsible for. I argue that the ethical philosophy of Levinas meets this lacuna in Arendt’s thought, via his concept of the Face as the locus of human dignity and to which states can be recalled to responsibility. Levinas wrote several papers on what he called “the phenomenology of the Rights of Man”, and in his phrase, which provides a summation of precisely what is lacking in Arendt’s arguments: “In the face – a right is there”.     

Are Human Rights Redundant in the Ethical Codes of Psychologists?

The codes of ethics and conduct of a number of psychology bodies explicitly refer to human rights, and the American Psychological Association recently expanded the use of the construct when it amended standard 1.02 of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. What is unclear is how these references to human rights should be interpreted. In this article I examine the historical development of human rights and associated constructs and the contemporary meaning of human rights. As human rights are generally associated with law, morality, or religion, I consider to which of forms of these references most likely refer. I conclude that these references in ethical codes are redundant and that it would be preferable not to refer to human rights in codes. Instead, the profession should acknowledge human rights as a separate and complimentary norm system that governs the behavior of psychologists and should ensure that they have adequate knowledge of human rights and encourage them to promote human rights.     

The Nature (and Nurture?) of Plasticity in Early Human Development

ABSTRACT— The effect of early experience is a long-standing concern in developmental psychology. Gaining further insight into the nature of human plasticity is central to efforts to prevent problems in development from arising and promote positive functioning. Evolutionary reasoning suggests that children should vary in their susceptibility to environmental influences, including parenting. Evidence indicates that rather than some children, such as those with negatively emotional temperaments or certain genotypes, being simply more vulnerable to the adverse effects of negative experiences, as commonly assumed, they may actually be more susceptible to both positive and negative experiences. In addition to raising questions about the nature of plasticity in human development, this article highlights unknowns regarding the role of nature and nurture in shaping individual differences in plasticity, including whether recent research linking maternal stress during pregnancy with child behavior problems illuminates a process whereby fetal programming shapes the child's susceptibility to postnatal environmental influences. Throughout this article, we raise concern about the potentially distorting influence that psychology's disproportionate focus on the adverse effect of negative experiences on developmental problems has on our understanding of human plasticity, and we propose that researchers should pay more attention to the positive side of the plasticity equation.