Inwardizing Rilke's dog of ‘divine inseeing’ into itself

The article explores a text of the poet R.M. Rilke in the manner of Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority (PDI). PDI, developed mainly in the writings of Wolfgang Giegerich, refers to the ‘speculative turn’ within analytical psychology. The speculative turn involves an interpretative stance that strictly adheres to Jung's seminal insight into psychology's lack of an empirically‐objective, Archimedean vantage‐point outside of or beyond the psyche. The paper aims to demonstrate that, for all its beauty, the account of interiority that is celebrated in the passage from Rilke is self‐contradictory. This is due to its being naively conceived as the undialectical opposite of an external viewpoint that it is unable to overcome. Whereas Rilke merely imagines interiority by means of the visual image of his getting inside a dog as one passes by, the interpretative approach taken in this article thinks interiority by reflecting Rilke's text into itself in the speculative manner that is provided for and required by Jung's insight into psychology's lack of an Archimedean vantage‐point. If we interpret the text in this way, an understanding of interiority that is truly in accord with its concept is opened up and a main aspect of psychology as the discipline of interiority is performatively demonstrated.     

The Future of Humanistic Psychology: Towards a Self With Expanded Horizons

What is humanistic psychology's most enduring crisis as it looks forward for a positive future? As we attempt to address this question, we argue that humanistic psychology has always neglected the task of theorizing the self. This is, indeed, a great cause of concern, given the concept's centrality to most of its defining tenets and principles. Within this frame, we propose the Galactic Self that can embrace the dichotomies presented by the conflicting theoretical positions of self in psychology, while expanding its horizons to capture its infiniteness. Such a self is dynamic, transformative, expansive, evolving and infinite in nature, and complements humanistic psychology's promise of understanding an ever-evolving human psyche.     

Psychological individuation and spiritual enlightenment: some comparisons and points of contact

In his writings on individuation Jung often references Eastern religions and philosophies such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Hinduism. This essay discusses differences and similarities between analytical psychology's concept of individuation, especially in its advanced stages, and enlightenment as expressed in such texts as Zen (Chan) Buddhism's Ten Ox‐Herding Pictures. I advance the argument that important common features can be found while cultural differences must also be respected. There is here a convergence between West and East that can foster dialogue and mutuality.     

Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ‘must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not’. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can handle counter-examples that undercut four prominent definitions of lying: viz., the traditional intend-to-deceive definition, Thomas Carson's definition, Don Fallis's definition, and Andreas Stokke's definition.     

On the Historical and Conceptual Foundations of a Community Psychology of Social Transformation

We examine historical and conceptual literature in community psychology in order to understand the field's potential to be the socially transformative subdiscipline of psychology to which it aspires. By reviewing papers from two prominent journals and other literature, we conclude that the claim that community psychology is well‐suited to social transformation, because it is a product of Sixties' radicalism and is theoretically equipped, is untenable. Systematic accounts of the subdiscipline's origins suggest that the transformative aspirations of current community psychologists do not correspond to the subdiscipline's reformist past. Furthermore, in analyzing three related concepts currently employed in the field—social justice, power, and praxis—we show that each suffers from conceptual ambiguity and a restricted political scope. These conceptual flaws, coupled with community psychology's historical inclination toward social reform, inhibit the possibility of contributing to radical social transformation. We conclude that neither questionable historical claims nor ambiguous and politically dubious concepts support a community psychology of social transformation. We offer solutions for the historical and conceptual problems we identify and, as a broader solution to the problem of engaging in socially transformative work, propose that community psychologists should seek direct political engagement in solidarity with other citizens as fellow citizens not as psychologists.     

Does Conversation Need Shared Language? Davidson and Gadamer on Communicative Understanding

In a rare discussion of Gadamer's work, Davidson takes issue with Gadamer's claim that successful communication requires that interlocutors share a common language. While he is right to see a difference between his own views and Gadamer's on this point, Davidson appears to have misunderstood what motivates Gadamer's position, conflating it with that of his more familiar conventionalist interlocutors. This paper articulates Gadamer's view of the role of language in communicative understanding as an alternative to both Davidson's and that of the conventionalist writers Davidson critiques. It is argued, first, that Gadamer employs a conception of what individuates a language, and thus of what it means for two speakers to “share” a language, that Davidson never considers. By emphasizing the role of “application” in the historical development of languages, Gadamer develops a view in which languages are distinguished not by their particular semantic or syntactic rules, but by subtle differences between the concepts they express. Second, it is argued that the instances of “asymmetrical” communication—communication between interlocutors who have different sets of concepts at their disposal—that motivate Gadamer's position pose a challenge to Davidson's account of interpretative charity.     

Davidson,correspondence truth and the frege-Gödel—church argument

This paper argues for a conditional claim concerning a famous argument—developed by Church in elucidation of some remarks by Frege to the effect that the bedeutung of a sentence is the sentence’s truth-value—the Frege–Gödel–Church argument, or FGC for short. The point we make is this :if, and just to the extent that, Arthur Smullyan’s argument against Quine's use of FGC is sound, then essentially the same rejoinder disposes also of Davidson's use of FGC against ‘correspondence’ theories of truth. We thus dispute a contention by Professor Davidson that it is coherent to accept that Smullyan’s rejoinder takes away the force of Quine’s version of FGC, while still consistently using FGC to establish that if true sentences (or utterances) correspond to anything, they all correspond to the same thing. We show that the differences between the cases discussed by Smullyan and Davidson’s version of FGC on which Davidson relies for his contention are irrelevant to the point under dispute     

THE BIOLOGIST AS PSYCHOLOGIST: HENRY FAIRFIELD OSBORN'S EARLY MENTAL ABILITY INVESTIGATIONS

In the early 1880s, biologist Henry Fairfield Osborn conducted some of the first questionnaire research in American psychology. This article details how he came to distribute Francis Galton's questionnaire on mental imagery in the United States, as well as how he altered it to suit his own burgeoning psychological research interests. The development and circulation of questionnaires at the very beginning of American scientific psychology, first by Osborn and later by G. Stanley Hall, is discussed in terms of the new psychology's often‐overlooked methodological plurality. Further, Osborn's late nineteenth century interest in individual variation and group differences in mental imagery ability are discussed in relation to his pervasive educational and social concerns, as well as his eventual status as a prominent eugenicist in the twentieth century United States. This research into mental imagery ability foreshadows the eugenic‐oriented intelligence testing that developed in the early twentieth century.     

Assessing the Impact of Western Psychology in Hong Kong

The impact of Western psychology in Hong Kong can be seen in its institutions and practices. Local students however acquire their knowledge of psychology through the medium of at least two foreign languages; English (the medium of instruction) and the technical language of its subject matter, which does not find ready equivalents in Chinese. Some examples of psychological terms in Chinese and English are presented to support this. Problems of translation and of the models implicit in much of psychology's subject matter reduce its impact. Because indigenous beliefs are more likely to shape psychology's development than imported ones, they should be made explicit in psychological practice and reworked into future educational curricula so that the discipline as a whole may benefit.     

I was like a wild wild person: Understanding feelings of anger using interpretative phenomenological analysis

This paper is concerned with illuminating how emotion (anger) and emotion‐related phenomena such as feelings, thoughts and expressions appear to the individual person. In particular, it focuses on the role of feelings in emotion experience. It does this through the qualitative analysis of interview material from a single person case study using interpretative phenomenological analysis. The paper examines how the participant feels and experiences anger, the defining characteristics of anger episodes, and how the typical pattern of these episodes is disrupted by life‐changes. The findings are examined in light of phenomenological ideas and the utility of these ideas for psychology's understanding of emotion argued for.     

Tension within Triangulation

Philosophers disagree about how meaning connects with history. Donald Davidson, who helped deepen our understanding of meaning, even disagreed with himself. As Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig note, Davidson's account of radical interpretation treats meaning as ahistorical; his Swampman thought experiment treats it as historical. Here I show that while Lepore and Ludwig are right that Davidson's views are in tension, they are wrong about its extent. Unbeknownst to them, Davidson's account of radical interpretation and Swampman thought experiment both rely—in different ways—on the same model of triangulation. I revise one of those ways to resolve the tension within Davidson's views. I close by detailing what role history should play in Davidson's views overall.     

Understanding ‘relevance’ in psychology

Since the 1970s, psychologists around the world have questioned the ‘social relevance’ of psychology in their societies. Curiously, the matter of ‘social relevance’ is under-theorized in the discipline, a state of affairs this paper attempts to correct. First, it describes how disagreements about psychology's cognitive interest – and subject matter – create an environment in which accusations of ‘social irrelevance’ can flourish. Second, it asserts that applied psychology's reliance on basic psychology for its scientific authority makes debates about ‘social relevance’ inevitable. And third, it claims that the discipline's longstanding antithesis to the social domain leaves it vulnerable to these debates – particularly in recent decades that have witnessed rapid social change. The paper reflects further on the rise of ‘market relevance’ in the global academy and its significance for psychology today.     

Davidson's Fear of the Subjective

According to Donald Davidson, any philosophy of mind that appeals to propositional content is doomed to become an account of the mind as a private theater. But Davidson's own work on thought‐attribution can be used to make propositional content safe. This paper uses Davidson's negative reaction to Gareth Evans's works on perceptually based demonstrative thought to tease out a way of talking about propositional content that doesn't slide into subjectivism. It also explains why Davidson saw Evans as a mentalist enemy rather than an externalist ally, and suggests that Evans's work could play an important role in furthering Davidson's distinctive externalism.     

Why Metaphors have no Meaning: Considering Metaphoric Meaning in Davidson

Abstract

Since the publication of Donald Davidson’s essay “What Metaphors Mean” (1978) – in which he famously asserts that metaphor has no meaning – the views expressed in it have mostly met with criticism: prominently from Mary Hesse and Max Black. This article attempts to explain Davidson’s surprise-move regarding metaphor by relating it to elements in the rest of his work in semantics, such as the principle of compositionality, radical interpretation and the principle of charity. I conclude that Davidson’s views on metaphor are not only consistent with his semantic theory generally, but that his semantics also depend on these insights. Eventually, the debate regarding Davidson’s views on metaphor should be conducted on the level of his views on the nature of semantics, the relationship between language and the world and the possibility that there is something like conceptual schemes.

Sedert die publikasie van Donald Davidson se opstel What Metaphors Mean (1978) – waarin hy die berugte stelling maak dat metafoor geen betekenis het nie – is sy sieninge meestal begroet met kritiek, ook van prominente figure soos Mary Hesse en Max Black. Hierdie artikel poog om’n verduideliking te vind vir Davidson se verrassende skuif aangaande metafoor, deur sy sieninge hieroor te kontekstualiseer teen die agtergrond van elemente uit die res van sy werk in semantiek, soos die beginsel van komposisionaliteit, radikale interpretasie en die beginsel van rasionele akkomodasie (charity). Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor nie slegs naatloos aansluit by sy algemene sieninge aangaande semantiek nie, maar dat die res van sy semantiese teorie ook athang van sy sieninge aangaande metafoor. Uiteindelik behoort die debat rakende Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor gevoer te word op die vlak van die aard van semantiek, die verhouding tussen taal en die werldikheid en die moontlike bestaan van konseptuele skemas.     

Reply to Louise Antony

In her discussion of Naomi Scheman's “Individualism and the Objects of Psychology” Louise Antony misses the import of an unpublished paper of Scheman's that she cites. That paper argues against token identity theories on the grounds that only the sort of psycho-physical parallelisms that token identity theorists, such as Davidson and Fodor, reject could license the claim that each mental state or event is some particular physical state or event.     

What's Gained from Depression? A Proposal on Theodicy and Epinosic Gains

Abstract: Many depression-sufferers testify to experiences of goodness that arise from their depression, or ‘goodness because of depression’. These realities often inspire efforts to reconcile suffering and divine benevolence. Yet some sufferers who experience ‘goodness because of depression’ reject theodical thinking and therefore seek other frameworks for reflection on their suffering and its accompanying goods. This essay draws from psychology's notion of epinosic gains to propose an analogous framework that aids sufferers in discussing and interpreting instances of ‘goodness because of depression’ apart from theodical justifications. While the proposed framework is grounded in first-person reflections on depression and is articulated in relation to another Christian framework for depression from Tasia Scrutton, this constructive proposal has the potential to serve theological reflection on a wider range of suffering beyond depression.     

And the dish ran away with the spoon: a hodgepodge of reflections,as rigorous as they are rambling,on the true subject

In this article, the topic of ‘the true subject’ is explored in terms of a dialectical mode thinking which is in keeping with Jung's great insight concerning psychology's lack of an Archimedean vantage‐point distinct from its topics and subject matters. Evocative and expository, the emphasis is upon the performative poetics of such thinking within the sphere of our soul‐making. The interpretative mode of practice presented in the article is richly illustrated with examples from Biblical texts, literary images, and proverbial sayings, as well as from the sur‐real of nursery rhyme and the genre of the murder mystery. Essential insights of Jung's concerning the infinite and the finite as dimensions of self are revisited in terms of that contemporary trend of Jungian thought known as psychology as the discipline of interiority.