Expert Advice and Argumentation: Some Remarks on the Work of Douglas Walton

Appeal to expert judgement has become a wide-spread and unavoidable element in public debates in modern society. The many and fundamental argumentative complications that they raise have not received proportional attention in argumentation studies so far. A prominent exception is a recent book by Douglas Walton, devoted entirely to arguments involving expert opinion (Walton, 1997). Confronting some examples from the field of Science and Society with Walton's earlier work, the need can be traced for a more elaborate and sophisticated treatment of the many issues involved, particularly for the model of information seeking dialogue and the treatment of source reasoning. With these issues as points of reference, it is examined in what way this challenge has been taken up in the new book. A few further additions are suggested.     

Sex differences in physical aggression to partners: a reply to Frieze (2000), O'Leary (2000), and White, Smith, Koss, and Figueredo (2000)

The following points are made in reply to critical comments on the author's meta-analysis of partner physical aggression (J. Archer, 2000): (a) The theoretical dichotomy used in the review is one clearly identifiable in published articles, and the distinction between acts (aggression) and consequences (violence) is clearer than alternative definitions involving victims' perceptions; (b) despite the database containing many samples of U.S. students, there were sufficient other samples to draw meaningful conclusions; (c) the Conflict Tactics Scale may be limited, but in contrast to suggested alternatives, it involves clearly defined categories; (d) sexual aggression, although forming an important part of partner violence, cannot legitimately be aggregated with nonsexual physical aggression; and (e) there is a marked contrast between sex differences in physical aggression toward partners and toward same-sex opponents.     

Speech Acts and Indirect Threats in Ad Baculum Arguments. A Reply to Budzynska and Witek

The importance of speech acts for analyzing and evaluating argumentation in cases where it is suspected that the ad baculum fallacy has been committed is demonstrated in this paper by using a typical textbook example of this fallacy. It is shown how the argument in the example can be analyzed and evaluated using the devices of Gricean implicature and indirect speech acts. It is shown how these two devices can be applied to extrapolate the evidence furnished by the text and dialectical context of the example.     

Grace and Imagination: From Fear to Freedom

Creative use of our imagination is essential if we are to live a vibrant life. Although our use of imagination is often blocked by various fears, D. W. Winnicott's insights into play, aggression, and the use of transitional objects open up paths towards greater freedom. The sacred texts, symbols, and liturgies of our religious traditions can then become the toys which engage us in profound and re-creating soul play. Through grace and the evocative examples of our teachers, we can find ways to use our imagination more freely to deepen our spiritual life and psychological wholeness.     

How to Distinguish Good and Bad Arguments: Dialogico-Rhetorical Normativity

Deductivism is not merely a logical technique, but also a theory of normativity: it provides an objective and universal standard of evaluation. Contemporary dialectical logic rejects deductive normativity, replacing its universal standard by an intersubjective standard. It is argued in this paper that dialectical normativity does not improve upon deductive normativity. A dialogico-rhetorical alternative is proposed.     

Structured Arguments and Their Aggregation: A Reply to Selinger

Selinger provides a new take on what is being referred to in the computational literature as ‘structured argumentation’. In this commentary the differences and similarities with existing work are highlighted as a way of demonstrating how philosophical and computational approaches to argumentation are increasingly coming together and complementing one another.     

Assessing Fear of Storms and Severe Weather: Validation of the Storm Fear Questionnaire (SFQ)

To date, research on storm phobia has been limited by a lack of validated self-report measures for evaluating the severity of anxiety, phobic avoidance, and distress associated with storms and severe weather. The current research presents the development and validation of the Storm Fear Questionnaire (SFQ), a 15-item self-report questionnaire that assesses the cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects thought to be associated with Storm Phobia in adults. Three studies were conducted to assess 1) the factor structure, internal consistency, and convergent and discriminant validity of the SFQ, 2) the test-retest reliability of the SFQ, 3) the extent that scores on the SFQ were associated with subjective anxiety ratings during a Behavioral Approach Test (BAT) involving exposure to a virtual thunderstorm, and the extent to which SFQ scores distinguished community participants with versus without a fear of storms. Exploratory factor analyses supported a one-factor model with good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α?=?.95), good convergent and discriminant validity with self-report measures of anxiety, worry, depression, and other specific phobias, and acceptable test-retest reliability. Moreover, there was a significant positive association between SFQ scores and anxiety ratings following the BAT involving exposure to a virtual thunderstorm and participants with a high fear of storms reported significantly higher SFQ scores than those with a low fear of storms. In sum, the SFQ has good psychometric properties and appears to be a valuable tool for assessing the severity of fear associated with storms and severe weather. Research evaluating the diagnostic and clinical utility of the SFQ is still needed.     

Mystery and meaning: a reply to Green (2000)

In "George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of Mind" (see Note 1), I sought to explain how and why Miller invested the computer metaphor of mind with such strongly revolutionary, antibehaviorist meanings. In reply, Christopher Green (see Note 2) has argued that the answer to this question has to do with the importance of mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists. In response, I argue that, though mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists, there were several other factors of equal or greater importance: specifically, the fascination of Miller and his cohort with language and communication, their frustration with the narrowness of the disciplinary vision of the behaviorists, and their involvement in a different experimental program than that of mainstream behaviorists.     

A self-presentational view of psychotherapy: reply to Hill, Gelso, and Mohr (2000) and to Arkin and Hermann (2000)

The self-presentational view of psychotherapy challenges current assumptions about the benefits of high levels of clients' openness in therapy (A. E. Kelly, 2000). The author responds to questions about whether clients' discretion really is linked to favorable therapy process ratings and outcomes. She also addresses problems that may emerge if readers apply a narrow definition of self-presentation as a form of deliberate manipulation, rather than the intended definition of consciously or unconsciously showing oneself to be a particular kind of person for audiences. A brief review of the evidence on the role of audience feedback in self-concept change is offered, along with suggestions for explaining self-concept change to clients. The author concludes by clarifying and reasserting her suggestion that it is acceptable for clients to reveal the themes as opposed to details of their problems that seem particularly heinous or humiliating.     

Cultural psychology, A new look: reply to Bond (2002), Fiske (2002), Kitayama (2002), and Miller (2002)

M. H. Bond (2002), A. P. Fiske (2002), S. Kitayama (2002), and J. G. Miller (2002) joined D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) in highlighting limitations of the individualism-collectivism model of culture. Concern is warranted; nevertheless, individualism-collectivism helps structure discourse on the influence of culture on the mind. To avoid level-of-analysis entanglements, Oyserman et al. propose an integrative model that includes distal, proximal, and situated cultural features of societies and internalized models of these features, highlights the importance of subjective construal, and uses evolutionary perspectives to clarify the basic problems cultures address. Framed this way, it is clear that, depending on situational requirements, both individualism- and collectivism-focused strategies are adaptive; thus, it is likely that human minds have adapted to think both ways.     

Etchemendy on Squeezing Arguments and Logical Consequence: a Reply to Griffiths

Owen Griffiths has recently argued that Etchemendy’s account of logical consequence faces a dilemma. Etchemendy claims that we can be sure that his account does not overgenerate, but that we should expect it to undergenerate. Griffiths argues that if we define the relationship between formal and natural language as being dependent on logical consequence, then Etchemendy’s claims are not true; and if we define the relationship as being independent of logical consequence, then we cannot assess the truth of the claims without further information. I argue that Griffiths misconstrues Etchemendy’s theory and overstates the first horn of the dilemma: Etchemendy does see the relationship as being dependent on logical consequence, but that does not mean that his claims are not true.