INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Abstract: This paper examines two recent attempts to articulate a particular relationship between intentionality and phenomenology. Terry Horgan and John Tienson (2002) have argued for what they call the inseparability thesis: that the intentional and the phenomenal are, in a certain sense, inseparable. Brian Loar (2002, 2003) , following on from earlier work, has argued for a kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that is pervasive and more fundamental than ordinary wide content. Problems with both views can be seen once we consider a number of dimensions to intentionality, and reflect more generally on the notion of phenomenal intentionality itself.     

BRIDGING PHYSIOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

R asmussen , E. T ranekjær . Bridging physiology and phenomenology in dynamic psychology. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1961, 2, 161–166.—It is important to distinguish between the immediately experienced (the phenomenological) and the physiological-neurological basis for the phenomenological world, e.g. between beta needs (subjectively experienced states of needing or wanting) and alpha needs (objectively defined, physiological needs). The concept of psychon is introduced and defined as a necessary and sufficient condition in the physiological-neurological system for the existence of a subjective experience; psychon bridges the gap between the physiological and the phenomenological world.     

PHENOMENOLOGY OF DIVINE REVELATION: THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY IN DIALOGUE

Although the relationship between theology and philosophy is a perennial issue in the history of thought, recent debates surrounding the so-called theological turn of continental phenomenology have created a new space in which it can be explored from a fresh perspective. In this vein, I propose three theses concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy of religion, with particular focus on the phenomenon of divine revelation. First, a philosophy of religion that ignores theology's claim about divine self-revelation will remain incomplete and unsatisfactory, at least from the perspective of a Christian theology which begins with the faith in God's self-revelation in one particular human person. Second, a theology that does not acknowledge the possibility of philosophical reflections on the human aspect of divine revelation will not be able to escape blind dogmatism, but rather will isolate itself from the academic community. Third, and finally, despite the concerns of both parties, a dialogue between theology and philosophy centred on the phenomena of revelation can develop into mutually critical and mutually constructive interactions.