The Pakistan Experience

This article featuring Pakistan constitutes one of five articles in a collection of essays on local capacity-building in research ethics by graduates from the University of Toronto’s Joint Centre for Bioethics MHSc in Bioethics, International Stream programme funded by the Fogarty International Center for Advanced Study in the Health Sciences (FIC). Research ethics in Pakistan is an emerging field seeking to articulate best ethical standards for research practices. It is best understood as the initiation of a dialogue. Still, there are weak mechanisms for research ethics and there is an absence of mechanisms for monitoring ongoing research, particularly for assessing compliance with the recommendations of ethics review committees. Further, there are few qualified individuals in research ethics in both the private and public sectors. There are multiple challenges associated with research ethics, many of them stemming from issues around development and democratization, which cannot be addressed by guidelines and regulatory processes alone.     

Experience as art

Chinese philosophy views experience as intrinsically aesthetic. This world view could be elucidated through a consideration of John Dewey's aesthetics and features of Chinese art. Dewey's philosophy of art starts with an understanding of experience as ‘live processes’ of living creatures interacting with their environment. Such processes are autopoietic in being self‐sustaining, ever‐changing, capable of increasing complexity, capable of generating novelty, direction and progress on its own. Its autopoietic character is a precondition of the aesthetic in the process of experience. An aesthetic experience is rhythmic, focused, consummatory, and reaches beyond the transitory boundaries of concrete existence. The aesthetic is not confined to what is conventionally identified as art. Most important, the ethical‐political, the natural and the cosmic all have an aesthetic aspect, as the paper attempts to show by examining classical Confucianism.     

The Experience of Underemployment

The authors conducted an exploratory study of male college graduates who experienced underemployment to discover significant events occurring during this experience and the feelings attached to those events.     

Intersubjectivity and Receptive Experience

Wilfrid Sellars's iconic exposé of the ‘myth of the given’ taught us that experience must present the world to us as normatively laden, in the sense that the contents of experience must license inferences, rule out and justify various beliefs, and rationalize actions. Somehow our beliefs must be governed by the objects as they present themselves to us. Often this requirement is cashed out using language that attributes agent‐like properties to objects: we are described as ‘accountable to’ objects, while objects ‘hold us’ to standards, and so forth. But such language is either deeply anti‐naturalistic or trades on a set of metaphors in need of a literal translation. We offer an explanation of how the material features of the world, as received in experience, can rationally constrain our beliefs and practices—one that makes no recourse to this imagery. In particular, we examine the structure of ostensive practices (that is, practices of directing one another's attention to objects and features of the world) and the distinctive role they play in making us jointly beholden to how things actually are.     

An Hawaiian Near-Death Experience

This paper is a case report of an Hawaiian near-death experience (NDE) from the early 1900s, which was uncovered in a turn-of-the-century monograph of Hawaiian folk tales (Thrum, 1907). The account differs from others in the same volume because it appears to be a real-life account rather than a folk tale. I describe similarities and differences from other Pacific area accounts, with particular attention to the only other Polynesian NDE account in the literature, a Maori NDE reported by Michael King in 1985.     

Pictorial Experience and Intentionalism

This article examines the compatibility of intentionalism (also called ‘representationalism’) in the philosophy of perception with the thesis that we can visually experience an object by looking at a picture of that object (the pictorial experience thesis, or PET). I begin by presenting three theses associated with intentionalism and various accounts of depiction that uphold PET. Next, I show that pictures sometimes depict an object indeterminately, thereby rendering the alleged visual experience of the depicted object partly nonintentional. I then argue that if PET is true, explaining pictorial indeterminacy on intentionalist premises is problematic. I conclude that PET is incompatible with intentionalism.     

Corrective Emotional Experience Remembered

The paper examines on the one hand the influence of the Berlin Institute in the 1920s on Franz Alexander's training and on his later work, as it was a workshop aiming to test the possibilities of a large utilization of psychoanalytic therapy in an institutional framework. On the other hand, the spirit of experimentation of Sándor Ferenczi and the endeavor to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of psychoanalysis by the use of countertransference and emotional exchange also became important for Alexander. A glimpse of recent researches on Freud's timetable gives background information with possible comparisons between Freud's technique and that of Alexander.     

Imagination as Expansion of Experience

This paper proposes a developmental view on imagination: from this perspective, imagination can be seen as triggered by some disrupting event, which generates a disjunction from the person’s unfolding experience of the “real” world, and as unfolding as a loop, which eventually comes back to the actual experience. Examining recent and classical theorization of imagination in psychology, the paper opposes a deficitary view of imagination to an expansive notion of imagination. The paper explores Piaget, Vygotsky, Harris and Pelaprat & Cole consider: 1) What does provoke a “rupture” or disjunction? 2) What are the psychological processes involved in the imaginary loop? 3) What nourishes such processes? 4) What are the consequences of such imaginary loop, or what does it enable doing? The paper proposes to adopt an expansive view of imagination, as Vygotsky proposed—a perspective that has been under-explored empirically since his seminal work. To stimulate such sociocultural psychology of imagination, two empirical examples are provided, one showing how children make sense of metaphor in an experimental setting, the other showing a young person using a novel met at school as symbolic resource.     

Transformations of Emotional Experience

In this paper the author approaches mental pain and the problems in a psychoanalytic treatment of patients with difficulties in the psychic transformation of their emotional experiences. The author is interested in the symbolic failure related to the obstruction of development of phantasies, dreams, dream‐thoughts, etc. She differentiates symbolization disturbances related to hypertrophic projective identification from a detention of these primitive communications and emotional isolation. She puts forward the conjecture that one factor in the arrest of this development is the detention of projective identifications and that, when this primitive means of communication is re‐established in a container–contained relationship of mutual benefit, this initiates the development of a symbolization process that can replace the pathological ‘protection’. Another hypothesis she develops is that of inaccessible caesuras that, associated with the detention of projective identification, obstruct any integrative or interactive movement. This caesura and the detention of projective identifications affect mental functions needed for dealing with mental pain. The personality is left with precarious mental equipment for transforming emotional experiences. How can a psychoanalytical process stimulate the development of creative symbolization, transforming the emotional experiences and leading towards mental growth? The author approaches the clinical problem with the metaphor of the psychic birth of emotional experience. The modulation of mental pain in a container–contained relationship is a central problem for the development of the human mind. For discovering and giving a meaning to emotional experience, the infant depends on reverie, a function necessary in order to develop an evolved consciousness capable of being aware, which is different from the rudimentary consciousness that perceives but does not understand. The development of mature mental equipment is associated with the personality's attitude towards mental pain. The differentiation between psychotic, neurotic or autistic functioning depends on what defences are erected to avoid mental pain. The primary link between infant and mother is where the building of mental equipment takes place, through communicational forms that, to begin with, are not verbal. The author suggests the need for the development of an ideo‐grammar (in gestures, paralinguistic forms, etc.) in primary relations, as the precursor forms that will become the matrix for the mental tools for dealing with emotional experiences in a mature way. The paper stresses the significance of the parental containing function for the development of symbolization of prenatal emotional experiences. This containment develops ideograms, transformations of sense impressions into proto‐symbols, instruments that attenuate the traumatic experiences of helplessness. The author takes Bion's ideas about extending the notion of dream‐work to an alpha function that goes on continually, day and night, transforming raw emotional experiences in a ‘dream’. In order to acquire a meaning, facts need to be ‘dreamed’ in this extended sense. Meaning and truth are the nurture of the mind. Mental growth, the development of adequate tools – including reverie – for dealing with mental pain, seen from a psychoanalytic perspective including reverie, implies that the object becomes a provider of meanings. Analysis begins to aim primarily at the generation or expansion of the mental container, instead of predominantly working on unconscious contents as such.     

In Defense of Experience

This article studies our philosophical understanding of experience in order to question the current political and theoretical dismissal of experiential accounts in feminist theory. The focus is on Joan Scott's critique of experience, but the philosophical issues animating the discussion go beyond Scott's work and concern the future of feminist theory and politics more generally. I ask what it means for feminist theory to redefine experience as a linguistic event the way Scott suggests. I attempt to demonstrate that the consequences that she draws from such a theoretical move are both philosophically and politically problematic. A critical study of the evidence of experience does not have to imply metaphysical or epistemological foundationalism, as Scott claims, but on the contrary, such a study is indispensable for challenging them. We must hold onto experience as an important resource for contesting sexist discourses and oppressive conceptual schemas.     

The Experience of Magic

Despite its enduring popularity, theatrical magic remains all but ignored by art critics, art historians, and philosophers. This is unfortunate, since magic offers a unique and distinctively intellectual aesthetic experience and raises a host of interesting philosophical questions. Thus, this article initiates a philosophical investigation of the experience of magic. Section I dispels two widespread misconceptions about the nature of magic and discusses the sort of depiction it requires. Section II asks, “What cognitive attitude is involved in the experience of magic?” and criticizes three candidate replies; Section III then argues that Tamar Szabó Gendler's notion of “belief‐discordant alief” holds the key to a correct answer. Finally, Section IV develops an account of the experience of magic and explores some of its consequences. The result is a philosophically rich view of the experience of magic that opens new avenues for inquiry and is relevant to core issues in contemporary aesthetics.     

Unconscious Experience: Relational Perspectives

In this paper I review key principles of contemporary Kleinian technique and relate them to their source in the theories of Klein and Bion. I note that the analyst's subjectivity is undertheorized in this approach. I then present a detailed account of my use of technique in work with a patient who was lacking in affect and found it difficult to engage in the process. I describe how she evoked a flat response in me initially and how we worked together to form an engagement. Her vivid dreams are given as examples of shifts in her state.     

Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience

Whether perceptual experience represents high-level properties like causation and natural-kind in virtue of its phenomenology is an open question in philosophy of mind. While the question of high-level properties has sparked disagreement, there is widespread agreement that the sensory phenomenology of perceptual experience presents us with low-level properties like shape and color. This paper argues that the relationship between the sensory character of experience and the low-level properties represented therein is more complex than most assume. Careful consideration of mundane examples, like looking at a coin from an oblique angle, show that the low-level properties represented in experience do not necessarily figure in the sensory character of the experience. Furthermore, the sensible properties invoked when characterizing the sensory character of a perceptual experience are not necessarily included in the sensible properties represented in a perceptual experience. On this basis it is argued that perceptual experience has a disunified metaphysics, consisting in distinct sensory and cognitive components. The account is developed in relation to existing unified and disunified accounts, and discussed in terms of its implications for cognitive penetration, the reliability of introspection, the transparency of experience, and cognitive phenomenology.     

科技时代的替代经验与道德的个人亲证问题

人对自己生活于其中的科技时代的批判,是与人的自我意识一同发生的。当今世界,科技已越来越被当作自主的、异在于人的并沿着非人性化的惯性而展开的过程。如何对这一过程重新进行人化?如何使现代人具有科技进步时代的人的内容的清醒意识?这是每一个人文学者必须给予严肃关注的问题。从道德本性的角度视之,科技社会所制造的大量的替代经验对道德实践基础的蚕食和颠覆,具有根本的决定性的作用。因此,在科技社会中如何确立实践智慧、个人亲证在道德领域里的独立性,对于避免当代人的“道德孤儿”的命运,便具有头等重要的意义。     

Religious Experience as an Observational Epistemic Practice

William Alston proposed an understanding of religious experience modeled after the triadic structure of sense perception. However, a perceptual model falters because of the unobservability of God as the object of religious experience. To reshape Alston’s model of religious experience as an observational practice we utilize Dudley Shapere’s distinction between the philosophical use of ‘observe’ in terms of sensory perception and scientists’ epistemic use of ‘observe’ as being evidential by providing information or justification leading to knowledge. This distinction helps us to understand how religious experience of an unobservable God can be an epistemic practice that satisfies our epistemic obligations and justifies religious belief.     

Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion.     

Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability

This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low‐level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low‐level properties (textures, shapes, colors), ‘high‐level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high‐level properties (functional properties, causal relations, etc.), while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high‐level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high‐level view.     

Embodied Experience in Educational Practice and Research

The intention of this article is to make an educational analysis of Merleau-Ponty??s theory of experience in order to see what it implicates for educational practice as well as educational research. In this way, we can attain an understanding what embodied experience might mean both in schools and other educational settings and in researching educational activities. The analysis will take its point of departure in Merleau-Ponty??s analysis and criticism of empiricist and neokantian theories of experience. This will be followed up by an introduction of some central concepts in Merleau-Ponty??s own understanding of experience with emphasis on their relevance for educational analysis. This way of presenting the theory of embodied experience has the advantage of being able to indicate the difference it makes in the field of theories of experience.