What I Really Said about Secularisation

The author sets out the different elements in his approach to secularization over forty years from a conceptual critique to an empirical general theory, initially covering Europe and America and later global Christianity, taking into account different historical inflections to secularization as a component of master narratives. The author presents his interest in secularization as strongly linked to his interest in religion and politics, faith and violence.     

I'll Know What You're Like When I See How You Feel: How and When Affective Displays Influence Behavior-Based Impressions

ABSTRACT— Accumulating evidence suggests that targets' displays of emotion shape perceivers' impression of those targets. Prior research has highlighted generalization effects, such as an angry display prompting an impression of hostility. In two studies, we went beyond generalization to examine the interaction of displays and behaviors, finding new evidence of augmenting effects (behavior-correspondent inferences are stronger when behavior is accompanied by positive affect) and discounting effects (such inferences are weaker when behavior is accompanied by negative affect). Thus, the same display can have different effects on impressions depending on the behavior it accompanies. We found evidence that these effects are mediated by ascribed intentions and that they have a boundary: When behaviors and affective displays are repeated, the augmenting and discounting power of displays appears to wane.     

What Lenny Bruce Really Died For

Book reviewed in this article:
Ronald K. L. Collins and David M. Skover, The Trials of Lenny Bruce: The Fall and Rise of an American Icon     

Interpreting What Speakers Say and Implicate

The traditional view in pragmatic theory is that a distinction exists between what speakers say and what they mean, communicate, or implicate in context. For example, when uttering Jane has three children, a speaker might only say that "Jane has three children but may have more than three," but the speaker implicates that "Jane has exactly three children." Under this view, pragmatics plays only a small role in determining what speakers say and has a primary part in interpreting speaker's intended messages. My aim in this article is to challenge this view. I describe empirical work showing that pragmatics has a fundamental role in determining both what speakers say and implicate. Thus, when a speaker utters Jane has three children, enriched pragmatic information is used to infer that the speaker says "Jane has exactly three children" and that in specific contexts, the speaker can go on to express additional pragmatic meanings, such as "Jane is married" or "Jane is very busy because she has three children." I also describe work on the importance of complex pragmatic, metarepresentational reasoning in understanding irony and metaphor. Finally, I briefly discuss the relevance of these new developments in pragmatics for neurolinguistic research.     

What New Wave Materialists Can't Say

Most phenomenal concept strategists, or concept dualists, trace the explanatory gap to “thin” phenomenal concepts that fail to represent phenomenal properties as physical entities. New Wave Materialists, a subgroup of concept dualists, claim that our physical and phenomenal concepts each represent experience completely and accurately, but nevertheless so differently that a priori links don't (and can't) hold between them. This paper argues that you can't have two distinct but nevertheless complete and accurate representations of the same thing. One (or both) of the representations must misrepresent, or the two representations must represent different things. The paper then puts its arguments in a wider context. It notes that our phenomenal concepts must be transparent, translucent, mildly opaque, or radically opaque (in senses reviewed in the paper). It canvasses arguments that a posteriori physicalists can't consider our phenomenal concepts opaque. Then it shows how its own arguments against New Wave Materialism have the result that a posteriori physicalists can't consider phenomenal concepts transparent or translucent. The paper thus advances its arguments as part of a broad‐based case against a posteriori physicalism.     

Careful What You Wish

Dilip Ninan has raised a puzzle for centered world accounts of de re attitude reports extended to accommodate what he calls “counterfactual attitudes.” As a solution, Ninan introduces multiple centers to the standard centered world framework, resulting in a more robust semantics for de re attitude reports. However, while the so-called multi-centered world proposal solves Ninan’s counterfactual puzzle, this additional machinery is not without problems. In Section 1, I present the centered world account of attitude reports, followed by the extension to counterfactual attitudes which Ninan targets with his puzzle. In Section 2, I pose the counterfactual puzzle and present Ninan’s multi-centered world solution, emphasizing similarities and differences between multi-centered and centered world accounts of attitude reports. In Section 3, I argue the counterfactual attitude wishing falls under the purview of the multi-centered proposal, but that the proposal generates false predictions for wish reports concerning unsatisfiable content. I canvass responses, ultimately concluding Ninan’s proposal requires substantial revisions.     

Tell Us What Your Drawings Say

A projective evaluation tool is used in occupational therapy to evaluate short-term inpatient psychiatric clientele to gather information for treatment planning is described. Areas of assessment covered in the evaluation include: (1) cognitive performance, (2) affect and mood, (3) insight, (4) motivation, and (5) situational components. A case illustration showing results of the use of the tool is presented, and the value of information gathered for occupational therapy treatment planning is discussed.     

What I Think and Feel: A Revised Measure of Children's Manifest Anxiety

The 1956 adaptation for children of Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale, the Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, was revised to meet current psychometric standards. A 73-item revision draft was administered to 329 school children from grades 1 to 12. Based on item-analysis criteria for r _bis .4 and .30 p .70, 28 anxiety items were retained along with 9 of the original 11 Lie scale items. A cross-validation sample of 167 children from grades 2, 5, 9, 10, and 11 produced a KR₂₀ reliability estimate of .85. Anxiety scores did not differ across grade or race. Females scored significantly higher than males. For the Lie scale, significant differences appeared by grade and race. No sex differences were obtained on the Lie scale. The resulting scale appears useful for children in grades 1 to 12 and may aid in future studies of anxiety as well as assisting the clinician in the understanding of individual children.