Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of the theory. Interestingly, there is only one source in the defeasibilist literature for a precise account of this crucial feature of the theory: one of the most neglected passages in Peter Klein's work on the issue. That crucial feature is put under the spotlight here. Our response to three major objections to the defeasibility theory requires a brief introduction to the theory as an anti-Gettier weapon, an introduction aimed at countering the numbing simplicity that characterizes most introductions to the topic. Following this brief introduction, those three objections are tackled. We conclude, on that basis, that anybody who fails to notice how resilient the defeasibility theory has proven to be for the last fifty years has a seriously deficient understanding of the current state of play in the debate over the Gettier Problem.     

The Making of Argumentation Theory: A Pragma-dialectical View

In ‘The making of argumentation theory’ van Eemeren and van Haaften describe the contributions made to the five components of a full-fledged research program of argumentation theory by four prominent approaches to the discipline: formal dialectics, rhetoric/pragmalinguistics, informal logic, and pragma-dialectics. Most of these approaches do not contribute to all components, but to some in particular. Starting from the pragma-dialectical view of the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness – the crucial issue in argumentation theory – van Eemeren and van Haaften explain the positions taken by representatives from the approaches discussed and indicate where they differ from the pragma-dialectical approach. It transpires that approaches focusing on dialectical reasonableness are, next to pragma-dialectics, formal dialectics and informal logic; approaches focusing on rhetorical effectiveness are, next to pragma-dialectics, rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, and the informal logician Tindale. When it comes to the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, some interest in it is shown in rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, but only in pragma-dialectics and in Tindale’s work is it a real focus. The main difference between Tindale’s view and the pragma-dialectical view is that in pragma-dialectics the decisive role in deciding about reasonableness is assigned to a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse and in Tindale’s approach this role is assigned to Tindale’s interpretation of the Perelmanian universal audience.

     

The Foundation of an Interpretative Sociology: A Critical Review of the Attempts of George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz

George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz proposed foundations for an interpretative sociology from opposite standpoints. Mead accepted the objective meaning structure a priori. His problem became therefore the explanation of the individuality and creativity of human actors in his social behavioristic approach. In contrast, Schutz started from the subjective consciousness of an isolated actor as a result of a phenomenological reduction. He was concerned with the problem of explaining the possibility of this isolated actor’s perceiving other actors in their existence, their concreteness, and the motives for their behavior. I treat these two approaches and their associated problems as equally relevant. My evaluation is based on their success in solving their specific problems. The aim is to decide which of the two approaches provides the more adequate foundation for an interpretative sociology.

Constructivisms from a Genetic Point of View: A Critical Classification of Current Tendencies

In this paper, we propose a critical classification of contemporary constructivist orientations. Our fundamental theoretical reference is the notion of genesis, understood as the construction of reality in a way that is neither relativist nor positivist-realist. We identify a nucleus of classic, genetic constructivism that revolves around the ideas of Baldwin, Piaget and Vygotsky and discuss two tendencies that distort the spirit of that nucleus: objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism rules out the psychological, constructive activity of the subject, subordinating (or just reducing) it to objective structures either from nature (like genetic endowment or neural functioning), or from culture (like language or social practices). Subjectivism completely detaches the objectivity of knowledge from its construction on the part of the subject, reducing it to the mere product of individual interest, view, or irrationality. Thus, subjectivism is the non-constructive way to conceive the subject. Then, we attempt to show the dialectics that exists between these two tendencies and the scope of our criteria by analysing a representative (non exhaustive) group of authors who are defined as constructivists or who bring important elements to the debate about constructivism.     

Rationality,Reasonableness, and Critical Rationalism: Problems with the Pragma-dialectical View

A major virtue of the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation is its commitment to reasonableness and rationality as central criteria of argumentative quality. However, the account of these key notions offered by the originators of this theory, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, seems to us problematic in several respects. In what follows we criticize that account and suggest an alternative, offered elsewhere, that seems to us to be both independently preferable and more in keeping with the epistemic approach to arguments and argumentation we favor.

Evidence,Defeasibility, and Metaphors in Diagnosis and Diagnosis Communication

Topoi - The paper investigates the epistemological and communicative competences the experts need to use and communicate evidence in the reasoning process leading to diagnosis. The diagnosis and...     

Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Freud's early metapsychology.

Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Freud's early metapsychology, particularly the Project for a Scientific Psychology, show some interesting similarities. In psychological theory, both men stressed the motivated nature of thought and a conception of a "psychological reality" that is superior to "material reality." Both saw consciousness of one's own mental activity as arising retrospectively and having a calming effect on emotions. Both emphasized a process of "judgment" or "reality testing," made possible only by the presence of a strong unity of consciousness of ego. Methodologically, both agreed that the retrospective analysis of subjective experience is the principal tool of psychology. Freud eventually agreed with Brentano that psychology proceeds best when separated from physiology. They applied similar criteria to "proofs" of the unconscious, with Brentano concluding negatively, and Freud, positvely, after considering new evidence. This article considers the similarities and concludes that they suggest some sort of influence of Brentano on Freud.     

International Family Therapy: A View from Kyoto, Japan

"International family therapy" is an emergent field within (or overarching) the field of family therapy. At this stage, it can be described as the collecting and sharing of experiences by family therapists from different countries. Recent publications (7) gather information principally from Western cultures in which systemic family therapy has grown over the past thirty years. Japan is of particular interest to Western practitioners because it is a highly successful, post-industrial culture that differs markedly from the West. Familiar family therapy interventions often work for unfamiliar reasons, and different goals are often needed in order to respond to apparently similar family problems. An expanded sense of choice around strategies for family life and family therapy that such diversity implies is the primary contribution that this maturing, international family therapy movement can make to family therapy.