Feyerabend’s well-ordered science: how an anarchist distributes funds

To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For Feyerabend, it is often thought, science is an anarchic practice with no discernible structure. Against this trend, I elaborate the groundwork that Feyerabend has provided for the beginnings of an approach to organizing scientific research. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend’s pluralism, once suitably modified, provides a plausible account of how to organize science. These modifications come from C.S. Peirce’s account of the economics of theory pursuit, which has since been corroborated by empirical findings in the social sciences. I go on to contrast this approach with the conception of a ‘well-ordered science’ as outlined by Kitcher (Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), Cartwright (Philos Sci 73(5):981–990, 2006), which rests on the assumption that we can predict the content of future research. I show how Feyerabend has already given us reasons to think that this model is much more limited than it is usually understood. I conclude by showing how models of resource allocation, specifically those of Kitcher (J Philos 87:5–22, 1990), Strevens (J Philos 100(2):55–79, 2003) and Weisberg and Muldoon (Philos Sci 76(2):225–252, 2009), unwittingly make use of this problematic assumption. I conclude by outlining a proposed model of resource allocation where funding is determined by lottery and briefly examining the extent to which it is compatible with the position defended in this paper.

     

Towards a Unitary Case for Russellian Panpsychism

One of the most pressing challenges that occupy the Russellian panpsychist’s agenda is to come up with a way to reconcile the traditional argument from categorical properties (Seager Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 129–145, 2006; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015) with H. H. Mørch’s dispositionalism-friendly argument from the experience of causation (2014, Topoi, 39, 1073–1088, 2018, 2020) — on the way to a unitary, all-encompassing case for the view. In this regard, Mørch claims that, via the commitment to the Identity theory of properties, one can consistently hold both panpsychist arguments without contradiction (2020: 281) — I shall refer to such proposal as Reconciliation. In my paper, I shall argue that this is not the case. To this extent, I will first consider H. Taylor’s argument that the Identity theorists have the exact same resources as the dispositionalists (as, after careful enquiry, their views on the metaphysics of properties turn out to coincide (Philosophical Studies, 175, 1423–1440, 2018: 1438)), and thus contend that Reconciliation fails to obtain. Then, I will suggest that one can avoid the problem and reconcile the arguments by adopting a different version of the powerful qualities view, namely the Compound view — and thus advance a reformulated version of the claim, i.e. Reconciliation*. Finally, even though pursuing my proposed solution might expose Russellian panpsychism to the risk of epiphenomenalism, I shall conclude that such specific form of epiphenomenalism is a rather benign one, and thus that, via Reconciliation*, the constitution of a unitary case for panpsychism as a positive proposal (and not as a mere alternative to dualism and physicalism) can be achieved.

     

Metaphysical and absolute possibility

It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is “absolute” possibility (Kripke in Naming and necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980; Lewis in On the plurality of worlds, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986; van Inwagen in Philos Stud 92:68–84, 1997; Rosen, in: Gendler and Hawthorne (eds) Conceivability and possibility, Clarendon, Oxford, 2002, p 16; Stalnaker, in: Stalnaker (ed) Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 201–215; Williamson in Can J Philos 46:453–492, 2016). Kripke calls metaphysical necessity “necessity in the highest degree” (1980, p. 99). Van Inwagen claims that if P is metaphysically possible, then it is possible “tout court. Possible simpliciter. Possible period…. possib(le) without qualification (1997, p. 72).” And Stalnaker writes, “we can agree with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense (2003, p. 203).” What exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to? Is it true? In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith. I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it.

     

Defending the Democratic Argument for Limitarianism: A Reply to Volacu and Dumitru

In this paper, I argue that limitarian policies are a good means to further political equality. Limitarianism, which is a view coined and defended by Robeyns (2017), is a partial view in distributive justice which claims that under non-ideal circumstances it is morally impermissible to be rich. In a recent paper, Volacu and Dumitru (2018) level two arguments against Robeyns’ Democratic Argument for limitarianism. The Democratic Argument states that limitarianism is called for given the undermining influence current inequalities in income and wealth have for the value of democracy and political equality. Volacu and Dumitru’s Incentive Objection holds that limitarianism places an excessive and inefficient burden on the rich in ensuring political equality. The Efficacy Objection holds that even if limitarianism limits excessive wealth it still fails to ensure the preservation of political equality. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections fail, but on separate grounds. I argue that the Incentive objection fails because one could appeal to limitarian policies that are different from the ones discussed by Volacu and Dumitru and which escape the problem of reduced productivity. I argue against the Efficacy Objection that limitarian policies are a partial but highly valuable step towards establishing political equality, and that they can and should complement or be complemented by other strategies.

     

On the paradox of reversible processes in thermodynamics

This paper discusses an argument by Norton (in: European Philosophy of Science—Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Viennese Heritage, Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 17, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 197–210, 2014, 2016) to the effect that reversible processes in thermodynamics have paradoxical character, due to the infinite-time limit. For Norton, one can “dispel the fog of paradox” by adopting a distinction between idealizations and approximations, which he himself puts forward. Accordingly, reversible processes ought to be regarded as approximations, rather than idealizations. Here, we critically assess his proposal. In doing so, we offer a resolution of his alleged paradox based on the original work by Tatiana Ehrenfest-Afanassjeva on the foundations of thermodynamics.

     

Does vision extract absolute distance from vergence?

Since Kepler (1604) and Descartes (1637), ‘vergence’ (the angular rotation of the eyes) has been thought of as one of our most important absolute distance cues. But vergence has never been tested as an absolute distance cue divorced from obvious confounding cues such as binocular disparity. In this article, we control for these confounding cues for the first time by gradually manipulating vergence and find that observers fail to accurately judge distance from vergence. We consider several different interpretations of these results and argue that the most principled response to these results is to question the general effectiveness of vergence as an absolute distance cue. Given that other absolute distance cues (such as motion parallax and vertical disparities) are limited in application, this poses a real challenge to our contemporary understanding of visual scale.

     

Proof-theoretic pluralism

Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall (Logical pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theoretic pluralism—is much broader in scope than the one discussed in Beall and Restall’s book.

     

Military Moral Injury: An Evidence-Based and Intercultural Approach to Spiritual Care

How can spiritual care help veterans struggling with military moral injury? An evidence-based, intercultural approach to spiritual care is proposed. Evidence-based care uses research on military moral injury and religious and spiritual struggles to understand when religious and spiritual practices, beliefs, and values are helping or harming veterans. Intercultural spiritual care recognizes the complex, distinctive ways veterans’ values, beliefs, coping, and spiritual practices are shaped by interacting cultural systems, especially military training and cultures. Pastoral theologian Larry Graham’s (Sacred Spaces: The E-Journal of the American Association of Pastoral Counselors 5, 146–171, 2017) writing on moral injury and lamentation is used to develop two spiritual care strategies: sharing anguish and interrogating suffering. Spiritual care begins with lamenting the shared anguish of moral injury using intrinsically meaningful spiritual practices to help veterans compassionately accept the emotions arising from moral injury so intensely felt in their bodies. The second strategy is sharing the lament of interrogating suffering through exploring values, beliefs, and coping arising from moral injury. A literary case study of a young female veteran based on Cara Hoffman’s (2014) novel Be Safe, I Love You illustrates this evidence-based intercultural approach to spiritual care of military moral injury.

     

Using Response Times to Model Not-Reached Items due to Time Limits

Missing values at the end of a test typically are the result of test takers running out of time and can as such be understood by studying test takers’ working speed. As testing moves to computer-based assessment, response times become available allowing to simulatenously model speed and ability. Integrating research on response time modeling with research on modeling missing responses, we propose using response times to model missing values due to time limits. We identify similarities between approaches used to account for not-reached items (Rose et al. in ETS Res Rep Ser 2010:i–53, 2010) and the speed-accuracy (SA) model for joint modeling of effective speed and effective ability as proposed by van der Linden (Psychometrika 72(3):287–308, 2007). In a simulation, we show (a) that the SA model can recover parameters in the presence of missing values due to time limits and (b) that the response time model, using item-level timing information rather than a count of not-reached items, results in person parameter estimates that differ from missing data IRT models applied to not-reached items. We propose using the SA model to model the missing data process and to use both, ability and speed, to describe the performance of test takers. We illustrate the application of the model in an empirical analysis.

     

Adolescents’ Endorsement of Communal and Agentic Conflict-Management Strategies with Friends and Romantic Partners

To investigate contextual influences on gender differences and similarities, we compared adolescents’ endorsement of gender-typed communal/other-focused and agentic/self-focused conflict-management strategies in three relationship contexts: same-gender friends, other-gender friends, and other-gender heterosexual romantic partners. Our 2 Participant Gender (between-subjects) × 3 Relationship Context (within-subjects) mixed factorial design addressed whether findings of prior research (Keener and Strough 2017) with college-aged participants would generalize to adolescents. Participants (n?=?103; 47 male adolescents; 56 female adolescents, 14–17 years-old) from the U.S. South Atlantic and Middle Atlantic regions read nine hypothetical conflict scenarios (three per each relationship context) and rated their likelihood of using gender-typed strategies. Young women and men endorsed communal and agentic strategies significantly more in same- and other-gender friendships than in romantic relationships. Across all three relationship contexts, young women reported using significantly more agentic strategies than young men did. In contrast to previous research on college students (Keener and Strough 2017), the predicted Participant Gender x Relationship Context interaction was not significant in the present study. Our findings suggest that developmental processes such as age differences in gender socialization and lack of experience with romantic relationships might explain why findings from college students did not generalize to adolescents.

     

Two Sexes,Two Genders Only: Measuring Attitudes toward Transgender Individuals in Poland

Transphobia is an under-examined but important type of prejudice to study in Polish culture. Poland is a country where a majority of transgender people feel discriminated against. There is a need for a more evidence-based measures for researchers and practitioners to better understand transphobia. The main purpose of the present three studies (n?=?300 participants for each study) was to validate the Genderism and Transphobia Scale (GTS; Hill and Willoughby 2005) and the Transphobia Scale (TS; Nagoshi et al. 2008) in Polish culture and to identify the possible psychological and demographic factors that matter in forming attitudes toward transgender individuals. The results confirm that Polish versions of both the GTS and the TS are reliable instruments to measure attitudes toward transgender individuals. Moreover, the studies revealed that both traditional and modern homonegativity, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, religious fundamentalism, attitudes toward gender roles, and biological and cultural beliefs about the origins of gender differences were significant predictors of transphobia. As in previous studies, men were more prejudiced toward gender nonconformists in comparison to women. These studies contribute well-adapted tools for measuring transphobia and data-driven collection of significant predictors of transphobia.

     

Can Happiness Apps Generate Nationally Representative Datasets? - a Case Study Collecting Data on People’s Happiness Using the German Socio-Economic Panel

In the last few years, apps have become an important tool to collect data. Especially in the case of data on people’s happiness, two projects have received substantial attention from both the media and the scientific world: “Track your happiness” from Killingsworth and Gilbert (Science, 330, 932-932, 2010), and “Mappiness,” from MacKerron (2012). Both happiness apps used the experience sampling method to ask people a few times per day how they feel, what they do, with whom, and where. The collected data are then displayed for the participants in simple graphs to help them understand what makes them happy and what does not. Both studies have collected considerable data without giving participants any financial rewards. But quantity is not everything that matters with respect to data collection, and thus, understanding whether nationally representative datasets can be collected using such happiness apps is crucial. To address this question, we built a new happiness app and ran a case-study with over 4000 participants of the innovation sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel (Richter and Schupp in Schmollers Jahrbuch, 135(3), 389–399, 2015). Participants were informed that the app collects data on everyday happiness after a household interview and asked whether they would like to use the app. In the first year (2015), participants did not receive any reward, and in the second year (2016), a different group of participants received a 50 Euro Amazon voucher for their participation. The results showed that our happiness app cannot generate nationally representative datasets if it is not controlled that all demographic sub-groups have access to a smartphone, are highly motivated with a sufficient reward and data is collected with quota sampling.

     

Expressivism,Moral Fallibility,and the Approved Change Strategy

Blackburn’s “quasi-realism” aims to show that expressivism can accommodate the sorts of claims about moral truth, facts, objectivity, and the like that are found in ordinary moral thought and discourse. Egan (2007) argues that expressivists cannot accommodate certain claims about the possibility that one’s own fundamental moral commitments are mistaken. He criticizes what I call the approved change strategy, which explains that judgment in terms of the belief that one might change one’s mind as a result of favored processes such as getting more information. Egan targets a simple version of that strategy; I raise objections to a more sophisticated expressivist alternative. I argue against Horgan and Timmons’ (2015) claim that quasi-realists need not accommodate certain thoughts about moral fallibility on the grounds that they are metaethical rather than first-order moral claims, and that the implied orientation toward others that results is not objectionably smug. I also argue that the sophisticated strategy problematically commits the expressivist to an ideal observer or advisor theory (or coextensive theory) in first-order ethics.

     

A Comparison of Psychopathic Trait Latent Profiles in Service Members

This study used latent profile analysis (LPA) to identify differing classes of psychopathic traits in a large sample of military personnel (90.7% Army National Guard) and examined how membership across profiles can be differentiated by mean scores on external correlates relevant to psychopathy and/or to military service (e.g., aggression, posttraumatic stress symptoms, impulsivity). Psychopathy was operationalized via the three-factor model of the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scales (LSRP; Brinkley et al. 2008; Levenson et al. 1995). LPA revealed optimal fit for a four-profile solution. Three profiles had roughly equivalent within-profile means across the three factors, characterized by below average, average, and above/high average LSRP scores. The fourth profile emerged as qualitatively different: high on LSRP-Callous but below average on LSRP-Egocentricity and LSRP-Antisocial. The four profiles were differentiable based on their mean scores on external correlates, suggesting varied implications for externalizing and internalizing features across psychopathic trait configurations in a military sample. Implications for studying psychopathy in military and other novel samples are discussed.

     

The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons

Epistemic reasons are meant to provide justification for beliefs. In this paper, I will be concerned with the requirements that have to be met if reasons are to discharge this function. It is widely recognized, however, that only possessed reasons can justify beliefs and actions. But what are the conditions that have to be satisfied in order for one to possess reasons? I shall begin by motivating a particular condition, namely, the ‘treating’ requirement that has been deemed to be necessary for possessing reasons. In Sect. 1, I explain and criticize some of the existing accounts of the treating requirement for reason-possession. In Sect. 2, I will suggest a dispositional account of reason-possession in which the treating condition features prominently. Section 3 will deal with the some of the consequences of this account for such issues as the structure of epistemic defeat, the immediacy of perceptual justification and logical knowledge.

     

Dreams,agency, and judgement

Sosa (Proc Addresses Am Philos Assoc 79(2): 7–18, 2005) argues that we should reject the orthodox conception of dreaming—the view that dream states and waking states are “intrinsically alike, though different in their causes and effects” (2005: p. 7). The alternative he proposes is that “to dream is to imagine” (2005: p. 7). According to this imagination model of dreaming, our dreamt conscious beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and intentions are not “real” insofar as they are all merely imagined beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and intentions. This paper assesses the epistemic implications of Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming. Section 1 outlines and assesses the reasons Sosa gives for thinking that his imagination model of dreaming introduces a new dimension to debates about dream scepticism. Sosa argues that his imagination model of dreaming invites a more radical version of dream scepticism, and also makes available a novel and more powerful response to dream scepticism. Objections are raised to both of those claims. This leads to a challenge to Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming. This is the concern that Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming lacks the resources to accommodate the intuition that there is something illusory or misleading about one’s situation when one is dreaming, and as a result his account of dreams fails to accommodate the common intuition that there is a sceptical problem about dreaming but not about dreamless sleep. Section 2 of the paper elaborates a version of the imagination model of dreaming that can overcome that challenge. This version of the imagination model of dreaming goes beyond what Sosa explicitly commits to when he outlines his view of dreams, however, it exploits ideas that are integral to a key theme in Sosa’s recent writings on virtue reliabilism—namely his proposal that epistemic agency should be accorded a central place in that approach to knowledge, and his related proposal that agency is exercised in conscious judgement. An implication of this version of the imagination model of dreaming is that an elucidation of a connection between the wakeful condition and our capacity to exercise agency over our mental lives should be central to an account of the nature, and epistemic significance of, wakeful consciousness. The final section of the paper considers whether this version of the imagination model of dreaming has anything novel to contribute to debates about dream scepticism.

     

Personality,Luck Beliefs,and (Non-?) Problem Lottery Gambling

This study offers both the first systematic investigation of the relationship between the five-factor personality model and general (ostensibly non-problem) lottery gambling, and the first application of Thompson and Prendergast’s (2013) bidimensional model of luck beliefs to gambling behavior. Cross-sectional analyses (N = 844) indicate the bidimensional model of luck beliefs significantly accounts for variance in lottery gambling that is discrete from and greater than that of the five-factor personality model. Moreover, the broad pattern of relationships we find between presumably harmless state-sponsored lottery gambling and both personality and luck beliefs tend to parallel those found in studies of problem gambling, suggesting implications for quality of life and public policy in relation to lottery gambling.

     

Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge

In a series of works Sosa (in: Knowledge in perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991; A virtue epistemology: apt belief and reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Reflective knowledge: apt belief and reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; ‘How Competence Matters in Epistemology’, Philos Perspect 24(1):465–475, 2010; Knowing full well, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; Epistemology, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2017) has defended the view that there are two kinds or ‘grades’ of knowledge, animal and reflective. One of the most persistent critics of Sosa’s attempts to bifurcate knowledge is Kornblith (in: Greco (ed) Ernest sosa and his critics, Wiley, Hoboken, 2004; ‘Sosa in Perspective’, Philos Stud 144(1):127–136, 2009; On reflection, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012). Our aim in this paper is to outline and evaluate Kornblith’s criticisms. We will argue that, while they raise a range of difficult (exegetical and substantive) questions about Sosa’s ‘bi-level’ epistemology, Sosa has the resources to adequately respond to all of them. Thus, this paper is a (qualified) defence of Sosa’s bi-level epistemology.

     

A note on mathematical pluralism and logical pluralism

Mathematical pluralism notes that there are many different kinds of pure mathematical structures—notably those based on different logics—and that, qua pieces of pure mathematics, they are all equally good. Logical pluralism is the view that there are different logics (consequence relations), which are, in an appropriate sense, equally good. Some, such as Shapiro (Varieties of logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), have argued that mathematical pluralism entails logical pluralism. In this brief note I argue that this does not follow. There is a crucial distinction to be drawn between the preservation of truth (simpliciter) and the preservation of truth-in-a-structure; and once this distinction is drawn, this suffices to block the argument. The paper starts by clarifying the relevant notions of mathematical and logical pluralism. It then explains why the argument from the first to the second does not follow. A final section considers a few objections.

     

Subtle Discrimination Overtakes Cognitive Resources and Undermines Performance

Meta-analyses demonstrate that the negative effects of subtle forms of discrimination on a range of work-related outcomes can be worse than those of overt discrimination (Dhanani et al. Personnel Psychology, 71(2), 147–179, 2018; Jones et al. Journal of Management, 42(6), 1588–1613, 2016). Yet, these syntheses and the primary studies on which they are based offer little insight into how or why these effects emerge. In the current study, we examine consequences of both of these types of discrimination on task performance and citizenship intentions via cognitive resource depletion. A total of 131 women experienced (a) overt discrimination, (b) subtle discrimination, (c) overt and subtle discrimination, or (d) no discrimination and were then asked to conduct a series of in-basket performance tasks. Results revealed that subtle (but not overt) discrimination significantly impaired measures of task performance and that cognitive resource depletion mediated these relationships. By pinpointing cognitive resource depletion as the mechanism that transmits the negative consequences of subtle discrimination, this work sheds new light onto this detrimental psychological experience and further opens up new opportunities for its remediation.