Interpretation and Intention: The Debate between Hypothetical and Actual Intentionalism

Regarded for decades as a fallacy, intentionalist interpretation is beginning to attract a following among philosophers of art. Intentionalism is the doctrine that the actual intentions of artists are relevant to the interpretation of the artworks they create – just as actual intentions are relevant to the interpretation of the everyday words and deeds of other people. Although there are several forms of actual intentionalism, I defend the form known as modest actual intentionalism, which holds that the correct interpretation of an artwork is compatible with the author's actual intention, which itself must be supported by the artwork. Looking at literary works specifically, I consider criticisms of actual intentionalism – for example, the contention that such a stance substitutes paraphrase for a reading of the text. In particular, I argue against hypothetical intentionalism, which maintains that the correct interpretation of an artwork is constrained by the best hypotheses of the artist's intentions. As I show, the methodology of this position is in fact designed to track the author's actual intentions, and furthermore, hypothetical intentionalism does not accurately depict existing interpretive practices.     

Proximal Intentions,Non-executed Proximal Intentions and Change of Intentions

This paper investigates the conceptual and empirical possibility of non-executed, non-conscious proximal intentions, i.e., non-conscious proximal intentions to act that do not turn into a final act, but perhaps are vetoed or overcome by an alternative action. It constructs a conceptual framework in which such cases are justifiably considered ‘proximal intentions’. This is achieved by combining Alfred Mele’s notion of non-conscious proximal intentions together with the notion of trying or striving taken from Brian O’Shaughnessy’s model of action. With this framework in hand we analyze empirical electroencephalography (EEG) findings regarding ‘change of intention’ scenarios. Prior to EEG development (and other brain imaging techniques), one would never consider non-executed, non-conscious proximal intentions a case of intention at all. However, with technological and interpretable development of EEG, a whole group of so called ‘intentions’ appears, and the main aim of the paper is to justify this expanded usage.     

Utterance timing and childhood stuttering

Articulatory speaking rate and response time latency are believed by many to be important factors in determining whether stuttering will occur in a given utterance. Currently, however, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that these measures of utterance timing are directly related to stuttering. This study examined the relationship between articulatory speaking rate and response time latency in the conversational speech of 12 boys who stutter (mean age = 55.2 months; SD = 8.8 months) who participated in 30-min conversational interactions with their mothers. Discriminant function analyses were conducted on 75 utterances drawn from each child's speech sample to determine if the articulatory speaking rate or response time latency of a specific utterance was related to the likelihood that the child would stutter on that utterance. No significant relationships between these measures of utterance timing and stuttering were found for any of the 12 subjects, and there were no significant relationships between these two measures of utterance timing. Findings do not provide support for many current theories of stuttering and suggest that the role of these measures of utterance timing in predicting the occurrence of stuttering in conversational speech in these theories may need to be reexamined.     

目标性意图与执行性意图调节情绪反应的效果比较

目标性意图和执行性意图作为目标的不同形式,对情绪调节的影响有待探讨。本研究试图考察目标性意图和执行性意图与表达抑制相结合之后,在调节情绪反应方面的作用。实验采用主观报告和生物反馈的方法对58名大学生进行测试。结果发现：（1）执行性意图组被试在观看负性和中性图片时对自身情绪唤醒度的评价均显著低于目标性意图组,在观看负性图片时其情绪唤醒度也显著低于控制组。（2）执行性意图组被试在各项生理反应指标上均显著低于目标性意图组和控制组,主要表现为形成执行性意图的个体在皮肤电导增加量、皮温降低量和指脉增加量上均显著低于形成目标性意图或不形成任何意图的个体。上述结果表明,相较于仅仅给出情绪体验下调目标的目标性意图,与表达抑制结合在一起的执行性意图能有效下调个体的负性情绪反应。     

Utterance at a distance

In this paper I defend Kaplan’s claim that the sentence “I am here now” is logically true. A number of counter-examples to the claim have been proposed, including occurrences of the sentence in answerphone messages, written notes left for later decoding, etc. These counter-examples are only convincing if they can be shown to be cases where the correct context with respect to which the utterance should be evaluated is the context in which it is decoded rather than encoded. I argue that this is not the case, and draw on the distinction between force and content to suggest an alternative account of how information is communicated in these cases that is consistent with Kaplan’s semantic theory.

Fiction,Meaning, and Utterance

A Gricean preamble concludes that though utterances have unintended meanings, those cannot be considered apart from their intended meanings. Intention distinguishes artworks from natural phenomena. To allocate an artwork to a genre, to accept its normal authorial boundaries and that its content is not random but chosen, is to concede intention's centrality. Wimsatt and Beardsley were right that meaning is public. But they think 'intention' is 'private' or 'unavailable'. However, it too is public, in the work. Fictions are utterances of a curious kind. They may mimic, but are not meant to be taken for, veridical reports. Neither are they 'pseudo-statements' (Richards) nor 'pretended illocutionary acts' (Searle). Their logical form is actually this: 'I [author] invite you [reader] to imagine that S [content].' This prescribes no response, nor claims to describe the 'real' world, even though it may elicit a response appropriate to real-life events. One reason for imagining fictional situations may be to strengthen the perceptions necessary for (civilized) real life.     

《公羊传》“以义解经”的意图探析

一般史家眼中的《春秋》是一部简单的历史著作,可公羊家视阈中的《春秋》却是蕴涵“微言大义”的经学宝典。《公羊传》“以义解经”,以为“义”之所在可从作者意图、文本意图和读者意图来窥探。一方面《公羊传》有还原倾向,旨在探求作者意图和文本意图,表现为尊圣宗经原道;另一方面又有生成倾向,多“非常异义可怪之论”,旨在阐述自己的政治、历史、道德理想。     

Reconsidering Intentions

This paper argues that the principles of instrumental rationality apply primarily to extended action through time. Most philosophers assume that rational requirements and principles govern in the first instance momentary mental states, as opposed to governing extended intentional actions directly. In the case of instrumental rationality, the relevant mental states or attitudes would typically be preferences, decisions, or intentions. In fact, even those who recognize the extended nature of our agency still assume that rational requirements apply primarily to mental states at a moment in time. Such views try to do justice to the extended nature of our agency by postulating rational requirements that apply in the first instance to plans, policies, and intentions more generally. The paper focuses on the central case of requirements and reasons governing the reconsideration of intentions and argues that these requirements or reasons are either superfluous or invalid. I argue that a proper conception of instrumental reasoning that applies directly to actions turn out to have surprising consequences. In fact, this conception allows us to see that policies, projects and the like are best understood as instances of extended actions, and that the instrumental requirements that apply to projects and policies are exactly the same as the instrumental requirements that apply to ordinary extended actions. Finally, I argue that the resulting theory of instrumental rationality is a significant improvement over theories that rely on principles governing intentions.     

Questionable Intentions

Philosophical Studies -     

Logic of Knowledge and Utterance and the Liar

We extend the ordinary logic of knowledge based on the operator K and the system of axioms S₅ by adding a new operator U, standing for the agent utters , and certain axioms and a rule for U, forming thus a new system KU. The main advantage of KU is that we can express in it intentions of the speaker concerning the truth or falsehood of the claims he utters and analyze them logically. Specifically we can express in the new language various notions of lying, as well as of telling the truth. Consequently, as long as lying or telling the truth about a fact is an intentional mode of the speaker, we can resolve the Liar paradox, or at least some of its variants, turning it into an ordinary (false or true) sentence. Also, using Kripke structures analogous to those employed by S. Kraus and D. Lehmann in [3] for modelling the logic of knowledge and belief, we offer a sound and complete semantics for KU.     

Attitudes, Intentions and Employment

A study of midwives' employment decisions was undertaken to identify whether and how they alter their employment plans at certain times relative to training. The research aimed to provide data which would help midwife managers to control the then widely perceived shortage of midwives, attributable partly to the non-retention of newly-qualified midwives in the maternity services. An attitude scale, devised for this study, is shown to be a valid predictor of midwifery employment.