WHY DO PEOPLE USE FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE?

Abstract— In this article, we examine the discourse goals that are accomplished by the use of eight forms of figurative language: hyperbole, idiom, indirect request, irony, understatement, metaphor, rhetorical question, and simile. Subjects were asked to provide reasons why they would use a particular figure of speech. Based on their responses, a discourse goal taxonomy that includes each of the eight figures was developed. The goal taxonomy indicates that each figure of speech is used to accomplish a unique constellation of communicative goals. The degree of goal overlap between the eight forms was also calculated, and the results provide support for theoretical claims about the relatedness of certain figures. Taken together, the goal taxonomy and overlap scores broaden our understanding of functional and theoretical differences between the various kinds of figurative language.     

WHY PRACTICE PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE?

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement mitigate the factors that prevent us from living in accordance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life.     

WHY IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY WORTH OUR STUDY?

Abstract: Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where “doing philosophy” refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of “authorial” propositions, that is, propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments for thinking that doing history of philosophy is valuable—specifically, valuable in such a way that its value does not reduce to the value of doing philosophy. Most such arguments proffered by historians of philosophy fail, as I show. I then offer a proposal about what makes doing history of philosophy uniquely valuable, but it is one that many historians will not find agreeable.     

HOW IS APPLIED PHILOSOPHY TO BE APPLIED?*

Without in the least teaching common reason anything new, we need only to draw its attention to its own principle, in the manner of Socrates, thus showing that neither science nor philosophy is needed in order to know what one has to do in order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous.     

USING COMPUTERS TO DELIVER TRAINING: WHICH EMPLOYEES LEARN AND WHY?

Compared to traditional instructor-led training, computer-delivered training typically offers learners more control over their instruction. In learner-controlled environments, learner choices regarding practice level, time on task, and attention are expected to be critical determinants of training effectiveness. To examine the effect of learner choices in computer-based training, a study was conducted with 78 employees taking an Intranet-delivered training course. Learner choices were assessed and predicted with goal orientation (mastery and performance) and learning self-efficacy, as well as age, education, and computer experience. Results indicate considerable variability among trainees in practice level and time on task, which both predict knowledge gain. Performance orientation interacted with learning self-efficacy to determine practice level, and mastery orientation had an unexpected negative effect. Implications for the use of computers to deliver training and for future research are discussed.     

WHY AREN'T DUTIES RIGHTS?

The best analyses of the concept 'rights' maintain that Hohfeldian claims, privileges, powers, immunities, liabilities, and clusters of these positions, all qualify as rights when they satisfy some further condition, such as serving their holder's interests, or fulfilling some alternative function. But duties, disabilities and no-rights can also satisfy this further condition. For example, many duties, disabilities and no-rights serve their holder's interests, and fulfil 'right-like' functions. Why, then, do we disallow such duties, disabilities and no-rights from qualifying as rights?     

HOW DID MORALITY EVOLVE?

Abstract. This paper presents and criticizes. Alexander's evolutionary theory of morality (1987). Earlier research, on which Alexander's theory is based, is also reviewed. The propensity to create moral systems evolved because it allowed ancestral humans to limit conflict within cooperating groups and thus form larger groups, which were advantageous because of intense between-group competition. Alexander sees moral codes as contractual, and the primary criticism of his theory is that moral codes are not completely contractual but also coercive. Ways of evaluating Alexander's theory as well as modified versions of it are discussed.     

TO WAIT OR TO RESPOND?

Emitting a certain response and waiting for a specified time without making that response had the same consequence. In Experiment 1, food-deprived pigeons were as likely to wait as to respond only if waiting provided food at a much higher frequency than did pecking. In Experiment 2, the consequence for humans was a brief light flash and tone. People were not biased for responding over waiting. Instead, their choices suggested crude payoff maximization. In Experiment 3, pigeons again obtained food, but they were not food deprived and could eat freely at each opportunity. Their behavior was more like that of the humans of Experiment 2 than that of food-deprived pigeons given small quantities of food at each feeding opportunity. The three experiments together showed that biases for responding over waiting were neither inherent characteristics of species nor inevitable outcomes of particular schedules. Choice between active search and waiting depended on ecological–motivational factors even when species and schedules were held constant.     

WHY NO GUIDELINES FOR BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION?

This paper reviews the guidelines for behavioral programs published by the National Association of Retarded Children. The review discusses a number of reasons why guidelines should not be enunciated for behavior modification, e.g., the procedures of behavior modification appear to be no more or less subject to abuse and no more or less in need of ethical regulation than intervention procedures derived from any other set of principles and called by other terms. The review recommends alternative methods for protecting the rights of clients who participate in behavioral programs. Specifically, behavioral clinicians, like other therapists, should be governed by the ethics codes of their professions; also, the ethics of all intervention programs should be evaluated in terms of a number of critical issues.     

IS SCIENCE PERSISTENCE A MATTER OF VALUES?

This study investigates the hypothesis that congruence in value perspectives distinguishes science-able students who persist in science from those who do not (nonpersisters). A science values measure was administered to 173 undergraduates with high levels of commitment and ability in the sciences. On each of six hypothetical dilemmas from everyday science, respondents rated the importance of three justice and three care considerations for self and for science, using a Likert-type 7-point scale. A significant three way interaction involving sex, persistence, and point of view (self/sience) emerged, with persisters generally demonstrating congruence between self and science on the value perspectives; female persisters, however, were more likely to combine justice and care perspectives than were males. Nonpersisters' self/science ratings of justice and care were sharply dissimilar, with females demonstrating the most incongruence. In all groups, justice was the prominent perspective attributed to science.