Can Competition Ever be Fair? Challenging the Standard Prejudice

In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insufficient as a justification of fairness in competition, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of competition is taken into account, competition turns out to be unfair even if the usual fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we call U-fairness, where U stands for the usual fairness notion, and S-fairness, where S stands for the sequential aspect of competition. The sequential unfairness of competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of freedom: first of all, there is an eclipse of preferences in the sense that even perfectly calculating competitors do not carry out a trade-off between effort and ranking; and second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the competitors choices always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction of an increased effort requirements. We argue (1) that competition is S-unfair even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-fairness alone, economists neglect a deeper aspect of unfairness.     

Are Lovers Ever One? Reconstructing the Union Theory of Love

Current analytical philosophies of romantic love tend to identify the essence of such love with one specific element, such as concern for the beloved person, valuing the beloved person or the union between the lovers. This paper will deal with different forms of the union theory of love which takes love to be the physical, psychic or ontological union of two persons. Prima facie, this theory might appear to be implausible because it has several contra-intuitive implications, and yet, I submit, it is more coherent and attractive than it seems to be. I shall distinguish three specific models and thereby offer a differentiated account of the union theory which has not previously been provided in the literature (1). I will claim that two of these models (the strong ontological model and the striving model) should be rejected (2). I shall then defend the third model (the moderate ontological model) against certain possible objections (3); but nevertheless, I shall conclude by showing how this model, too, faces further significant objections which ultimately expose the limits of the union theory of love (4). In conclusion, I will sketch the outlines of a non-reductive cluster theory of love.     

Attitude Comparison: Is There Ever a Bandwagon Effect?1

Will exposure to others' attitudes merely stimulate conformity to the observed norm? We predicted-and observed in an opinion polling experiment-that learning others' attitudes can effect a small, but significant, intensification of attitude responses.     

Forgoing Debriefing in Deceptive Research: Is It Ever Ethical?

The use of deception in research is generally permitted so long as participants are debriefed at the conclusion of their participation. Several authoritative research ethics guidelines allow investigators to omit debriefing under certain circumstances, however. Here we examine various justifications for forgoing debriefing in deceptive research, including concerns about subject pool contamination, the risk that revealing the deception will be harmful or distressing to participants, and issues of practicability. We conclude that, contrary to current practice, omitting debriefing is ethically acceptable only when debriefing is impracticable, the deception is innocuous, and no reasonable person would object to involvement in the research.     

The Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever “Get It”?

In order to update candidate evaluations voters must acquire information and determine whether that new information supports or opposes their candidate expectations. Normatively, new negative information about a preferred candidate should result in a downward adjustment of an existing evaluation. However, recent studies show exactly the opposite; voters become more supportive of a preferred candidate in the face of negatively valenced information. Motivated reasoning is advanced as the explanation, arguing that people are psychologically motivated to maintain and support existing evaluations. Yet it seems unlikely that voters do this ad infinitum. To do so would suggest continued motivated reasoning even in the face of extensive disconfirming information. In this study we consider whether motivated reasoning processes can be overcome simply by continuing to encounter information incongruent with expectations. If so, voters must reach a tipping point after which they begin more accurately updating their evaluations. We show experimental evidence that such an affective tipping point does in fact exist. We also show that as this tipping point is reached, anxiety increases, suggesting that the mechanism that generates the tipping point and leads to more accurate updating may be related to the theory of affective intelligence. The existence of a tipping point suggests that voters are not immune to disconfirming information after all, even when initially acting as motivated reasoners.     

Living Happily Ever After? The Effect of Taiwan’s National Health Insurance on the Happiness of the Elderly

The implementation of Taiwan’s National Health Insurance (NHI) in 1995 has created a quasi-experiment that permits us to draw causal inference for the effect of the NHI on the happiness and life satisfaction. The NHI is expected to have a positive effect on happiness because it not only improves the health and mitigates the uncertainty in financial losses due to health shocks, but also alleviates health inequality in the population through equal access to care. The results show that the NHI has a significant effect on happiness and life satisfaction. The effect ranges from 3 to 30 % depending on the measures of happiness. Nonetheless, the effect of the NHI in narrowing happiness inequality across socioeconomic status (SES) is significant for health and income groups only while its effect on education- and gender-happiness gradients are insignificant. The increase in the probability of being happy or satisfied with life among the least healthy group is 0.08 % points higher than that of the healthier ones. Earlier studies have shown that the effects of health insurance on health and disparity in health across SES groups are small. In contrast, our findings suggest that the welfare impact of the NHI is quite large.     

How Do We Acquire Moral Knowledge? Is Knowing Our Duty Ever Passive? – Two Questions for Martin Sticker

Martin Sticker's discussion of the common moral agent contains much that I find insightful, true and significant. As a response to his paper, I focus on two important issues that nevertheless separate us: (1) Sticker claims that knowing our duty can be mere passive awareness and that it indeed is passive as awareness of the special status of humanity. I deny that knowing our duty is ever passive. (2) He further claims that the common universalization test is the paradigmatic way active agents acquire moral knowledge. I argue that Sticker appears to construe universalization as a formal test that presupposes no moral knowledge and that so construed the test cannot serve for acquiring moral knowledge.     

��Is Getting Well Ever An Art?��: Psychopharmacology and Madness in Robert Lowell��s Day by Day

On the publication of Robert Lowell's Life Studies in 1959, some critics were shocked by the poet's use of seemingly frank autobiographical material, in particular the portrayal of his hospitalizations for bipolar disorder. During the late fifties and throughout the sixties, a rich vein, influenced by Lowell, developed in American poetry. Also during this time, the nascent science of psychopharmacology competed with and complemented the more established somatic treatments, such as psychosurgery, shock treatments, and psychoanalytical therapies. The development of Thorazine was a remarkable breakthrough allowing patients previously thought incurable to leave hospital. In 1955, the release of Miltown, the first 'minor' tranquilizer, was heralded with a media fanfare promising a new dawn of psychological cure-all. These two events blurred the boundary between 'normality' and madness by making treatment in the community more widely possible and by medicalizing more commonplace distress. Lowell's early depictions of madness situate it as emblematic of the cultural malaise of 'the tranquilized fifties.' By his final collection, Day by Day (1977), mental illness had lost its symbolic power. These late poems explore the power of art as a way of representing and remedying suffering in a culture where psychopharmacology has normalized madness.     

Have You Ever Googled a Patient or Been Friended by a Patient? Social Media Intersects the Practice of Genetic Counseling

Patients and healthcare providers are becoming increasingly connected via social media, bringing new opportunities and challenges. Direct connection can occur between patients and providers using online tools such as Facebook and LinkedIn. In addition, providers can gather information about patients using a search engine such as Google, referred to as patient-targeted Googling (PTG). An online 54-item survey was used to gain information on (1) how and to what extent genetic counseling students and genetic counselors connect directly with patients via social media sites, and (2) gather information on providers using PTG. Four hundred genetic counseling students and genetic counselors participated in the survey. The majority of respondents (88.9%; n?=?344/387) find it is never or rarely acceptable to interact with current patients via social media sites; however, 27.7% (n?=?110/397) have visited a patient’s social media site. Gathering information for patient care was the most commonly reported reason (76.8%; n?=?43/56). Thirty-three percent (n?=?130/394) have considered searching online or actually searched online for information about a patient. Curiosity was the most common reason (92.7%; n?=?114/123); although, respondents also used PTG to obtain contact information and to prepare for patient sessions. Our study supports the need for development and dissemination of professional guidelines to serve as a valuable resource for practicing genetic counselors and genetic counseling training programs.     

Can it Ever Be Better Never to Have Existed At All? Person‐Based Consequentialism and a New Repugnant Conclusion

Broome and others have argued that it makes no sense, or at least that it cannot be true, to say that it is better for a given person that he or she exist than not. That argument can be understood to suggest that, likewise, it makes no sense, or at least that it cannot be true, to say that it is worse for a given person that he or she exist than that he or she never have existed at all. This argument is of critical importance to the question of whether consequentialist theory should take a traditional, aggregative form or a less conventional, person-affecting, or person-based form. I believe that, potentially, the argument represents a far more serious threat to the person-based approach than does, for example, Parfit's two medical programmes example. Parfit's example nicely illuminates the distinction between aggregative and person-based approaches and raises important questions. But the example--though not, I think, by Parfit--is sometimes pressed into service as a full-fledged counterexample against the person-based approach. As such, I argue, the example is not persuasive. In contrast, the Broomeian argument, if correct, is definitive. For that argument relies on certain metaphysical assumptions and various uncontroversial normative claims--and hence nicely avoids putting into play the controversial normative claims that lie at the very heart of the debate. The purpose of the present paper, then, is to evaluate the Broomeian argument. I argue that this potentially definitive challenge to a person-based approach does not in fact succeed.     

“I’m More Aware of the Body than Ever”: Old Adults’ Experiences of the Psychosocial Significance of Their Bodies

Psychology theorises about the ageing body in terms of physical losses, and recommends transcending the body for satisfactory ageing. This study explored old adults’ conceptions of the ageing body to identify its relevance for their well-being in personal and interpersonal contexts. Ten retired individuals participated in semi-structured interviews and data was analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Ageing was found to trigger a conflict between the participants’ active self and weakening body. The interviewees defensively attempted to sideline their bodies by preoccupying themselves with mental health and interpersonal issues. However, they realised that their daily experiences (e.g., emotions and interpersonal interactions) depended upon bodily fitness and reciprocally, physical health was affected by lifestyle choices alongside socio-cultural influences. This insight about the biopsychosocial nature of the body empowered the participants to adapt to ageing. Their limitations seemed to motivate them to assume health behaviours, to fight for dignity of self and to empathise with significant others, thus enhancing well-being. Perceptions about the body therefore influenced participants’ health management and relationships. An alternative theorisation of the body as an active contributor to human psychosocial identity will pave way for interventions that sustain quality of life among those experiencing physical decline.     

Will We Ever Again Conduct in-Person Psychotherapy Sessions? Factors Associated with the Decision to Provide in-Person Therapy in the Age of COVID-19

Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy - The COVID-19 pandemic has forced a new reality on the delivery of psychotherapeutic services. Therapists have had to rapidly adapt to telehealth therapy...     

Will Capitalists Live Happily Ever After? – Political Myth: On the Use and Abuse of Biblical Themes – By Roland Boer

What would our world be like if all oppositions to capitalism were to be removed? The author describes a doomsday scenario instead of everlasting plenitude if capitalists have their ways. This conclusion comes from the author's masterful discussion of political myth and analysis of the narrative of Genesis to Joshua as a political myth. The narrative of the Hexateuch constructs and at the same time punishes all sorts of rebels who oppose the theocratic state it wishes to establish. But myth is uncanny in that the rebellion hides what it fears the most, the impossibility of such a state to come true, and needs what it desires to annihilate in order to persist as an unfulfilled fantasy that powers a political movement. The author argues that some politicians in Australia and the USA are abusing the logic of the political myth of the Hexateuch in order to support their capitalistic agendas and, therefore, the Left must tell the ending of the capitalist fantasy of endless production and expansion in order to reveal its contradictions.     

What Is The Most Creative Thing You Have Ever Seen? “Useful” is the New “Valuable” and Dynamic Systems are the Key!

Creativity has been described by many as something which we all can recognize, yet few can completely and sufficiently define. In a discussion of Glăveanu’s (2011) Creating Creativity, further topics and questions, such as pragmatism and neopragmatism as well as the nature of creativity studies are explored. Using the medium of Glăveanu’s research on creativity and Romanian Easter Egg decorating, this article expands the discussion of pragmatism, neopragmatism and the future of research surrounding creativity. This future can be addressed by exploring the nature of the interconnectedness of creativity and cognition via dynamic systems approaches. To enhance this viewpoint, a brief discussion of dynamic systems theory is brought in to supplement the enhanced discussion of pragmatism and the nature of the usefulness of creativity.     

Don’t Ever Do That! Long-term Duties in <Emphasis Type="Italic">PD</Emphasis><Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">e</Emphasis></Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">L</Emphasis>

This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer’s Propositional Deontic Logic (PD _e L), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: “Never do that”, or “Do this someday”. In this paper, we will investigate how to amend PD _e L so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a duality between these two notions. As a consequence, we have provided a new analysis of the long-term obligation by introducing a new atomic proposition I (indebtedness) to represent the condition that an agent has some unfulfilled obligation. Presented by Jacek Malinowski