The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

Post-decision consolidation in large group decision-making

Decision-makers tend to change the psychological attractiveness of decision alternatives in favor of their own preferred alternative after the decision is made. In two experiments, the present research examined whether such decision consolidation occurs also among individual group members in a large group decision-making situation. High-school students were presented with a decision scenario on an important issue in their school. The final decision was made by in-group authority, out-group authority or by majority after a ballot voting. Results showed that individual members of large groups changed the attractiveness of their preferred alternative from a pre- to a post-decision phase, that these consolidation effects increased when decisions were made by in-group members, and when participants identified strongly with their school. Implications of the findings for understanding of group behavior and subgroup relations are discussed.     

The decoy effect as a covert influence tactic

The purpose of this research was to determine whether individuals could use the decoy effect to influence others' choices. In study 1, undergraduates (n = 50) and executive master's of business administration (EMBA) students (n = 24) read an employee selection scenario in which they were randomly assigned to prefer one of two candidates that were equal in overall attractiveness, but that had different strengths and weaknesses. They were then asked to choose one of three inferior candidates to add to the choice set that would make their preferred candidate more likely to be chosen by other decision makers. The “correct” inferior candidate was asymmetrically dominated—dominated by one of the two existing candidates, but not the other. Participants chose the “correct” decoy candidate at better than chance levels. In study 2, undergraduates and EMBA students (total n = 66) completed a set of four decision tasks, in which they were asked to choose from potential decoy alternatives that would highlight their preferred job candidate or the product they preferred to sell to a customer. Participants again chose the correct option at better than chance levels. When participants provided free‐response reasons for their choices, these responses indicated a fairly strong recognition of the influential nature of creating a dominating relationship. Implications for understanding this effect and how it may be used by hiring managers, sales personnel, and others who attempt to influence others people's decisions at work, are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Even better than the real thing: Alternative outcome bias affects decision judgements and decision regret

Three experiments demonstrated that decisions resulting in considerable amounts of profit, but missed alternative outcomes of greater profits, were rated lower in quality and produced more regret than did decisions that returned lesser (or equal) amounts of profit but either did not miss or missed only slightly better alternatives. These effects were mediated by upward counterfactuals and moderated by participants’ orientation to the decision context. That decision evaluations were affected by the availability and magnitude of alternative outcomes rather than the positivity of actual outcomes is counter to the outcome bias effect—a bias in which decisions are rated more positively when they led to more positive outcomes (despite a priori probabilities associated with the decision outcomes). Experiment 3 demonstrated that these effects represent a bias that occurs even when it is clear that the process by which decisions were made followed rational decision processes. This research suggests that when alternative worlds are even better than the desirable outcomes experienced, affect and cognition may be more strongly linked to the magnitude of alternative realities than to obtained outcomes.     

Rethinking the focusing effect in decision-making

According to Legrenzi et al. [Cognition 49 (1993) 37], in making a choice people consider only the alternatives explicitly represented in their mental model of the decision situation. Their idea has found empirical support in the "focusing effect": Individuals focus on the alternatives explicitly stated in the problem context, and do not take into account other possibilities. In their original study, Legrenzi and colleagues considered only one factor to account for the explicit representation of an alternative--i.e., its explicit verbal formulation in the decision problem. Recent theories of relevance and information gain can help articulate their original idea, suggesting that individuals explicitly represent relevant alternatives, whether or not they are explicitly formulated in the decision problem. In three experiments we first replicated Legrenzi et al.'s original experiment, and then showed that the explicit verbal mention of an alternative is neither sufficient nor necessary to focus on it. The results suggest that individuals are able to consider relevant alternatives, even when they are not made explicit in the verbal formulation of a decision problem.     

Fatigue biases the decoy effect in males but not females

Individuals often need to make critical decisions even when they are in a fatigued state. Mental fatigue may lead to increased susceptibility to distraction and poor information processing but it is unclear exactly how fatigue shapes individuals' decision‐making. We studied how mental fatigue influences sensitivity to contextual information, indexed as decoy bias. Mental fatigue was induced using a multi‐source interference task, and decoy bias was assessed using a gambling task, in 124 young adults. Results showed that mental fatigue increased decoy bias through enhanced perceptual salience of contextual cues, but only in males. The findings provide insight into a gender‐specific relationship between fatigue and poor judgments. This study extends the current literature on links between fatigue and poor decision‐making by documenting a possible mechanism of the association. The results may have practical implications for designing optimal working hours and safeguarding people from suboptimal decisions.     

社会压力与决策角色对不同人际敏感性个体助人决策的影响

本研究基于人格的交互作用理论,通过时间与金钱两种助人决策情景,设计两个实验考察了人际敏感性特质对个体助人决策的影响,以及决策角色与社会压力两种情境因素在其中的作用。结果发现：(1)相比低人际敏感性,高人际敏感性个体更容易做出助人决策;(2)相比低社会压力,高社会压力下,高人际敏感性比低人际敏感性个体捐助的金钱更多; (3)高社会压力下,相比低人际敏感性个体,高人际敏感性个体为朋友与陌生人决策时会捐助更多的金钱。研究表明：人际敏感性影响个体的助人决策,决策角色与社会压力会对不同人际敏感性个体的助人决策有不同程度的影响。     

解释水平视角下的自己-他人决策差异

研究基于解释水平理论, 考察自己决策和为他人提供建议是否存在认知和偏好上的差异。实验一采用2(自己决策/为他人建议)×2(价值：高/低)×2(可行性：高/低)被试间设计, 165名被试代表自己或他人评价选项的吸引力。实验二采用3×2混合设计, 81名被试代表自己、相似或不相似他人, 为“高价值-低可行”和“低价值-高可行”两选项出价。结果支持了“自己-他人决策差异”：自己决策比为他人提建议在更大程度上受可行性高低的影响, 更为偏爱可行性高的选项; 人际相似性能在一定程度上缩小上述差异。     

Information about expert decision and post‐decision distortion of facts of own decision

Cognitive representations of decision problems are dynamic. During and after a decision, evaluations and representations of facts change to support the decision made by a decision maker her‐ or himself (Svenson, 2003). We investigated post‐decision distortion of facts (consolidation). Participants were given vignettes with facts about two terminally ill patients, only one of whom could be given lifesaving surgery. In Study 1, contrary to the prediction, the results showed that facts were distorted after a decision both by participants who were responsible for the decisions themselves and when doctors had made the decision. In Study 2 we investigated the influence of knowledge about expert decisions on a participant's own decision and post‐decisional distortion of facts. Facts were significantly more distorted when the participant's decision agreed with an expert's decision than when the participant and expert decisions disagreed. The findings imply that knowledge about experts' decisions can distort memories of facts and therefore may obstruct rational analyses of earlier decisions. This is particularly important when a decision made by a person, who is assumed to be an expert, makes a decision that is biased or wrong.     

Conflict and Loss Aversion in Multiattribute Choice: The Effects of Trade-Off Size and Reference Dependence on Decision Difficulty

Two experiments assess the type and amount of conflict influencing decision difficulty in hypothetical scenarios where subjects chose between two alternatives made to appear relatively attractive (approach–approach conflicts) or relatively unattractive (avoidance-avoidance conflicts), each involving attribute trade-offs across alternatives (embedded approach–avoidance conflicts). In Experiment 1, independent of information processing demands, decisions are more difficult when alternatives are unattractive and/or attribute trade-offs are large. Reference states that change the relative attractiveness of the alternatives increase or decrease decision difficulty in a manner consistent with loss aversion: Superior reference states increase decision difficulty more than inferior reference states reduce it. Experiment 2 further tests the reference dependence of decision difficulty by varying the nature of the reference state (stated comparators, as in Experiment 1, or endowments) as well as its extremity. Endowed reference states affect decision difficulty more than reference states that are stated comparators. Moreover, consistent with loss aversion, inferior reference states that are twice as extreme as superior reference states reduce decision difficulty about as much as the superior reference states increase it. The results demonstrate that decisions can be made easier or harder by way of reference dependence, and that the loss aversion so prevalent in preference formation generalizes to perceptions of decision difficulty in multiattribute settings.     

Protecting the self from the negative consequences of risky decisions.

Three experiments tested the idea that a motive to protect self-esteem (SE) from the threat of regret can influence decision making. Threat to SE was manipulated by varying whether people expected to know the outcome of their decisions. Study 1 showed that when Ss expected feedback about their decisions, only Ss low in SE made regret-minimizing choices. Study 2 showed that when Ss did not expect to know the outcome of their decisions, SE differences in choice strategies disappeared. Study 3 manipulated expectations about feedback on chosen and unchosen alternatives and showed that the more feedback that was expected, the more likely low but not high SE Ss were to make regret-minimizing choices. These studies suggest that people base decisions not only on objective attributes of choice alternatives, but also on the damage to SE that is perceived to result from a poor-decision outcome.     

From individual preference construction to group decisions: Framing effects and group processes

Two choice tasks known to produce framing effects in individual decisions were used to test group sensitivity to framing, relative to that of individuals, and to examine the effect of prior, individual consideration of a decision on group choice. Written post-decision reasons and pre-decision group discussions were analyzed to investigate process explanations of choices made by preexisting, naturalistic groups. For a risky choice problem, a similar framing effect was observed for groups and individuals. For an intertemporal choice task where consumption was either delayed or accelerated, naïve groups (whose members had not preconsidered the decision) showed a framing effect, less discounting in the delay frame, opposite to that observed in individuals. Predecided groups showed a non-significant effect in the other, expected direction. In all cases, process measures better explained variability in choices across conditions than frame alone. Implications for group decision research and design considerations for committee decisions are addressed.     

认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

The Effects of Cognitive Restructuring and Decision-Making Training on Career Indecision

The authors designed a cognitive restructuring intervention for individuals having difficulty with career decision making and compared the intervention to a decision skills intervention and a no-treatment control. The cognitive restructuring intervention was more effective than were both decision-making training and the control condition in reducing anxiety about career decision making and in encouraging vocational exploratory behavior. Cognitive restructuring clients also reported more use of the skills they had learned, were more satisfied with the decisions they made, and found the treatment program more useful in making career decisions than did clients in the other two groups.     

Using Judgments to Understand Decoy Effects in Choice

Students were presented choice triads from several different domains, with alternatives described along two dimensions. In Experiment 1, the decoy alternative in each set was dominated by only one of the two other alternatives in the set. In Experiment 2, the decoy alternative was dominated by both of the other alternatives in the set. Within different blocks of trials, participants rated (a) overall attractiveness of each alternative, (b) importance of the different dimensions, (c) attractiveness of each attribute value, and (d) the justifiability of each alternative. Significant effects of manipulating the decoy were found for justifiability ratings and value ratings, with these combining to predict effects on attractiveness ratings. Results argued against a weight-change model of decoy effects and supported value-shift and value-added models.     

Group vs individual information processing: The effects of outcome feedback on decision making

Recent theories of individual decision making have emphasized the role of environmental feedback on decision performance and confidence. However, in relation to group decision making, feedback has received only minor attention. This study compared individual and group decision performance and confidence on a multicue personnel decision task under three different feedback conditions. Individuals and five-person groups decided whether to promote 48 different job candidates, and rated how confident they were in each of their decisions. Feedback as to the correctness of their decisions was provided after (a) every decision (Total Feedback), (b) only those decisions to promote the candidate (Partial Feedback), or (c) after none of the decisions (No Feedback). Results indicated that groups performed best under total feedback, while individuals performed best under partial feedback. In addition, greater amounts of feedback reduced individuals' confidence but had little effect on group member confidence. Implications for both current theory in decision making and group vs individual information processing are discussed.     

Examining Models of Nondominated Decoy Effects across Judgment and Choice

Three experiments explored cognitive models of inferior, compromise, and phantom decoy effects in both judgment and choice. Participants made judgments of attractiveness, justifiability, and evaluation anxiety associated with each alternative in the set, along with judgments of the attractiveness of each alternative's dimensional values. In another session, they also chose the alternative they most preferred. Results were analyzed in terms of the degree to which decoy effects reflected shifts in dimensional values or reflected emergent values based on relationships with other alternatives in the set. Both emergent-value and value-shift models of inferior decoy effects were supported, but only the emergent-value model of compromise decoy effects was supported. Results for the phantom decoy indicated that this effect was choice-based and did not occur in judgment. Thus, although decoy effects were largely similar in choice and judgment, they also differed in important ways.     

An Approach to Multi‐Criteria Decision Problems Under Severe Uncertainty

Solving complex decision problems is a demanding task; it requires determining and evaluating the consequences of decision alternatives. To this end, uncertain factors that can only partly be influenced by the decision makers, and their interdependencies need to be considered. Scenarios focus on this part of the decision problem; they enable a systematic exploration of a multitude of possible future developments that are relevant for the decision including external events and decisions made. Scenarios are particularly useful when the problem is pervaded by severe uncertainties that cannot be quantified. For the evaluation of alternatives, multiple objectives and the potentially diverging preferences of the involved actors need to be respected. Multi‐criteria decision analysis aims at structuring the problem, evaluating the alternatives and supporting decision makers pursuing multiple goals. We propose an approach integrating scenarios and multi‐criteria decision analysis that focuses on the robustness of alternatives in complex, dynamic, uncertain and time‐bound situations. In this integrated framework, the scenarios provide the basis for evaluating a set of alternatives. Ideally, the set of scenarios considered captures all possible future developments. To appropriately explore this set, formal or analytical approaches to scenario construction generate a large number of scenarios. This challenges the decision makers' information‐processing capacity. To support them in managing the richness of information, a two‐fold approach that uses selection and aggregation is presented. By using a selection method, the scenarios that are deemed most relevant are identified, and their evaluations are presented in detail to decision makers. This approach is complemented by an aggregation of scenario evaluations on the basis of the decision makers' preferences. We present two approaches to facilitate the preference elicitation process. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.