When do children begin to understand logical inference as a source of knowledge?

Previous research (Sodian & Wimmer, 1987) suggests that it is not until about 6 years of age that children come to recognize that one can gain knowledge through inferential rather than direct means. However, a great deal of research suggests that children have a sophisticated understanding of other aspects of knowledge, such as perception and communication around age 4. Three experiments were carried out in which we made important task information more salient in order to determine whether children's performance in previous research on their understanding of inference had underestimated their abilities. The design included controls to ensure that children's attribution of knowledge to the story character could not be based on an egocentric tendency to attribute their own knowledge. Results indicated that (a) enhancing the salience of important information significantly improved children's performance; (b) by 4 or 5 years of age children begin to understand inference as a source of knowledge, around the same time they evidence an understanding of knowledge gained through perception and communication; and (c) that their performance lagged slightly behind that exhibited on a standard false-belief task.     

Developing organization of mental verbs: Evidence for the development of a constructivist theory of mind in middle childhood

Two experiments examined the development of a theory of mind in middle childhood by examining changes in the organization of mental verbs of knowing. In both experiments, children and adults rated the similarity of pairs of mental verbs in terms of the way they felt they used their mind in each one. Experiment 1 used thirty-six 8- and thirty-four 10-year-olds, and 27 adults. In Experiment 2, 9- and 11-year-old children were classified according to their cognitive monitoring ability (Markman, 1981). Fifteen cognitive monitoring and 15 nonmonitoring children were used, and 33 adults also participated. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses of each group's ratings indicated that participants distinguished mental verbs according to the certainty aspects and information processing aspects of mental activity. Older children and comprehension monitors placed greater emphasis on the certainty aspects of mental activity than younger children and comprehension nonmonitors. It is concluded that important aspects of a constructivist theory of mind develop during middle childhood.     

How to help: Can more active behavioral measures help transcend the infant false-belief debate?

The use of looking time procedures for the claim that infants understand other's false-beliefs has drawn criticism. In response, Buttelmann, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2009) have argued for the use of a more active behavioral measure involving children's willingness to help others. However, the current study challenges Buttelmann et al.’s response on both theoretical and methodological grounds. Theoretically, Buttelmann et al. take a mindreading framework for granted and are thus committed to the same type of “rich” interpretations that have accompanied infant looking procedures more broadly. Methodologically, the current study challenges Buttelmann et al.’s interpretation that children were using the adult's false-belief to determine how to help in this paradigm. To test our alternative perspective, mentalistic and non-mentalistic interpretations of preschooler's helping behavior were compared. In the original study, the adult's false-belief was conflated with the playing of a trick. When these two factors were separated, children's helping behavior was not consistent with the adult's false-belief. Second, when the situation was characterized in terms of a hiding scenario (instead of playing a trick), older children altered their helping behavior accordingly. Together, these results provided evidence that children in the active-helping paradigm did not use the adult's false-belief to determine how to help and that the broader social situation is an important variable for understanding other's actions. In conclusion, the use of more active behavioral measures alone does not resolve the controversy that has played out with respect to infant looking procedures. Instead, any adequate methodological modifications must be accompanied by theoretical considerations as well.     

Infant shy temperament predicts preschoolers Theory of Mind

The aim of this longitudinal study was to investigate the relation between infant temperament at 18 months and early Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities at 3 years of age. Temperament was assessed with the Early Childhood Behavior Questionnaire (ECBQ) and ToM by assessing children's understanding of divergent desires and beliefs, and of knowledge access. Our results are in line with a social-emotional reactivity perspective postulating more sophisticated ToM abilities for children with less reactive more observant temperament. Children with shy temperament at 18 months and at 3 years were better in reasoning about others’ mental states at age 3. Language, siblings and parental education had no effect on ToM. Findings indicate that temperament is related to ToM earlier in development than previously found, and that this relation is thus not unique to false-belief understanding.     

Young Children's Knowledge of the Representational Function of Pictorial Symbols: Development Across the Preschool Years in Three Cultures

Three- to 5-year-old children's knowledge that pictures have a representational function for others was investigated using a pictorial false-belief task. In Study 1, children passed the task at around 4 years old, and performance was correlated with standard false-belief and pictorial symbol tasks. In Study 2, the performance of children from two cultural settings who had very little exposure to pictures during the first 3 years (Peru, India) was contrasted with that of children from Canada. Performance was better in the Canadian than Peruvian and Indian samples on the picture false-belief task and drawing tasks but not on the standard false-belief measure. In all settings, children passed drawing and standard false-belief tasks either concurrently with, or prior to, passing the picture false-belief task. The findings suggest that children's explicit knowledge of the representational function of pictorial symbols matures in the late preschool years and develops more rapidly in cultures that strongly promote the symbolic use of pictures early in life.     

Conflicting desire and the child's theory of mind

We contrast the standard representational theory-of-mind approach to the understanding of mental states with an alternative view that theory-of-mind tasks require executive functioning or the inhibition of more “cognitively salient” information. Two experiments test the hypothesis that 3-year-olds' apparent problems on theory-of-mind tasks are not due to an inability to represent the mental contents of another, but rather lie in the informational structure of the task. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds were tested on their understanding of desire in others either when they themselves held a strong and conflicting desire or when they had no strong desire. Results showed that under the condition of having a strong and conflicting desire, only 5-year-olds were able to recognize that another person may desire something different. In contrast, when the children themselves held no strong desire, even 3-year-olds were able to judge another's desire correctly. Experiment 2 compared 3-year-olds' performance on a standard false-belief task with an equivalently structured desire task in which participants had again to inhibit their own strong and conflicting desire. Results showed similar performance on the traditional false-belief task and the new conflicting-desire task.     

Low-Income Preschoolers' False-Belief Performance

A group of 72 preschoolers (36 African Americans, 36 European Americans) enrolled in Head Start programs and other preschools serving low-income children were asked 3 variations of false-belief questions across 3 scenarios and given a language and cognition subtest. Children's performance varied across the questions and tasks, but after covarying for children's language and cognitive scores, those effects were no longer found to be significant. Age effects were still significant even after differences in children's language and cognitive abilities had been accounted for. Although no language and cognitive differences were found among European Americans and African Americans, the European Americans still outperformed African Americans on 1 of the task scenarios. Those results demonstrate (a) the importance of considering testing procedures and language and cognitive abilities when assessing children's social cognitive skills and (b) that age-related changes in false-belief understanding are associated with social cognitive conceptual changes that are independent of language and cognitive skills.     

Mother–Child Conversation and Children's Social Understanding During Middle Childhood

The authors investigated the relationship between mother–child conversation and children's social understanding during middle childhood. Thirty-eight mother–child pairs participated, including a younger group (5–7 years old) and an older group (8–10 years old). Children completed 2 measures of social understanding and mothers and children discussed 4 stories involving social dilemmas. Results indicated that compared to the younger group, the older group (a) performed better on both measures of social understanding and (b) produced more basic mental talk (i.e., talk about beliefs, emotions, personality traits, and desires), and more advanced mental talk (i.e., talk about contrasting perspectives, recursion and relationship between mental states, and advanced emotions). Mothers of older children also produced more basic and advanced mental talk. Mothers' advanced mental talk predicted both children's social understanding and children's advanced mental talk.     

Preschoolers’ Theory-of-Mind Knowledge Influences Whom They Trust About Others’ Theories of Mind

Two experiments examined whether particular aspects of social-cognitive knowledge predicted how preschoolers would treat informants who displayed a more or less developed understanding of that knowledge. In Experiment 1, children's own success on false-belief measures correlated with the extent to which they endorsed information generated by a confederate with a more developed sense of false belief over a confederate with a less developed sense of false belief. In Experiment 2, preschoolers were assessed for whether they possessed a more action-based or mental state-based understanding of pretense. They were then presented with informants who displayed each kind of knowledge. Children's own knowledge again correlated with which informant they believed was a reliable source of knowledge about novel pretend actions. These results not only extend findings in the “trust in testimony” literature beyond word learning, but also potentially reveal another mechanism by which children learn from others—they might trust others’ information about a specific piece of knowledge based on examination of their own knowledge of that domain.     

Attention to Explicit and Implicit Contrast in Verb Learning

Contrast information could be useful for verb learning, but few studies have examined children's ability to use this type of information. Contrast may be useful when children are told explicitly that different verbs apply, or when they hear two different verbs in a single context. Three studies examine children's attention to different types of contrast as they learn new verbs. Study 1 shows that 3.5-year-olds can use both implicit contrast (“I'm meeking it. I'm koobing it.”) and explicit contrast (“I'm meeking it. I'm not meeking it.”) when learning a new verb, while a control group's responses did not differ from chance. Study 2 shows that even though children at this age who hear explicit contrast statements differ from a control group, they do not reliably extend a newly learned verb to events with new objects. In Study 3, children in three age groups were given both comparison and contrast information, not in blocks of trials as in past studies, but in a procedure that interleaved both cues. Results show that while 2.5-year-olds were unable to use these cues when asked to compare and contrast, by 3.5 years old, children are beginning to be able to process these cues and use them to influence their verb extensions, and by 4.5 years, children are proficient at integrating multiple cues when learning and extending new verbs. Together these studies examine children's use of contrast in verb learning, a potentially important source of information that has been rarely studied.     

Attachment and preschool children's understanding of maternal versus non‐maternal psychological states

There is growing evidence that insecurely attached children are less advanced in their social understanding than their secure counterparts. However, attachment may also predict how individual children use their social understanding across different relationships. For instance, the insecure child's social‐cognitive difficulties may be more pronounced when the psychological states of an attachment figure are being considered. In the current study, forty‐eight 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were asked about their mothers' emotions and false beliefs, as well as those of non‐attachment figures. The Separation Anxiety Test (SAT) was administered to assess children's attachment representations. Children's SAT scores predicted their overall performance on the false belief and causes of emotion tasks, even after controlling for age and verbal ability. More interestingly, however, children with high scores on the Avoidance dimension of the SAT experienced greater difficulty understanding maternal false beliefs relative to those of an unfamiliar adult female. Thus, although attachment insecurity may hinder social‐cognitive development in general, the findings suggest that there are more specific effects as well. Attachment representations that are characterized by high levels of avoidance appear to interfere with children's ability to fully engage their social‐cognitive skills when reasoning about maternal mental states.     

“They Danced Around in My Head and I Learned Them”: Children's Developing Conceptions of Learning

Two studies examined how 3–6-year-olds understand the process of learning. In study 1 examined how children spontaneously talk about learning via a CHILDES language analysis. Talk about the learning process increased between the ages of 3–5. Talk specifically about learning in terms of desire decreased during this period. This suggests the possibility that desire is important to children's initial understanding of learning, and children develop an understanding that various mental states including desire, attention, and intention, play a role in the learning process. In Study 2, we presented 4- and 6-year-olds with a set of stories designed to test their understanding of the role of these mental states. In both their judgments about whether someone learns and their justifications of their responses, younger children relied more on the character's desires whereas older children were more likely to integrate desire, attention, and intention together. These data suggest that children's understanding of the process of learning is developing during the early elementary school years.     

The Intelligence of White Foreign Born Criminals

Children's understanding of cognition increases greatly between early childhood and adolescence. This increase provides a developmental bridge between young children's understanding of mental states to adolescents' and adults' epistemological reflection. The author presents a framework for describing developmental changes in children's understanding of cognitive activities. He distinguishes 4 aspects of children's understanding of cognition: (a) knowledge of mental states, (b) knowledge of occurrence of particular activities, (c) knowledge of organization of cognitive activities, and (d) epistemological thought. He discusses phenomenological awareness of cognitive activities and social experience as influences on children's concepts of cognition.     

Parental behaviour and children's creation of imaginary companions: A longitudinal study

This longitudinal study examined whether parenting quality, parental behaviours and children's temperament at 6 months of age predicted children's creations of imaginary companions (ICs) at 44 months of age. At six months, parenting quality and parental behaviours were measured using the Parent-Child Early Relational Assessment, and the frequency of mental-state references made during mother–infant interactions was recorded. Temperament was assessed using the Revised Infant Temperament Questionnaire. Parents then completed questionnaires assessing whether their children had ICs at 44 months of age. The results revealed that only the approach characteristic of temperament marginally predicted children's IC status. Results of the parental measures showed that parents of children with ICs were more likely to attribute mental states to their child and to refrain from intruding in their child's behaviours than parents of children without ICs. The results indicated that parental behaviours are important for children's creation of ICs.     

The Relation between Mind‐mindedness in Mothers with Borderline Personality Disorder and Mental State Understanding in their Children

This study investigated relations between mind‐mindedness in mothers with borderline personality disorder (BPD) and mental state understanding in their children. Participants were 20 mothers with BPD and 19 mothers without personality disorder and their children, aged 39–61 months. Children's mental state understanding was examined via a battery of theory of mind and emotion labelling tasks. Maternal mind‐mindedness was assessed by mothers' use of mental state references to describe their children relative to other attributes. Maternal BPD was associated with fewer references to children's mental states as well as poorer levels of mental state understanding in their children. Findings lend some empirical support to recent theoretical suggestions that BPD is associated with a reduced capacity for mentalization, as well as reduced capacity for mental state understanding in children of mothers with BPD. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The curious incident of the photo that was accused of being false: issues of domain specificity in development, autism, and brain imaging

We resume an exchange of ideas with Uta Frith that started before the turn of the century. The curious incident responsible for this exchange was the finding that children with autism fail tests of false belief, while they pass Zaitchik's (1990) photograph task (Leekam & Perner, 1991). This finding led to the conclusion that children with autism have a domain-specific impairment in Theory of Mind (mental representations), because the photograph task and the false-belief task are structurally equivalent except for the nonmental character of photographs. In this paper we argue that the false-belief task and the false-photograph task are not structurally equivalent and are not empirically associated. Instead a truly structurally equivalent task is the false-sign task. Performance on this task is strongly associated with the false-belief task. A version of this task, the misleading-signal task, also poses severe problems for children with autism (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005). These new findings therefore challenge the earlier interpretation of a domain-specific difficulty in inferring mental states and suggest that children with autism also have difficulty understanding misleading nonmental objects. Brain imaging data using false-belief, "false"-photo, and false-sign scenarios provide further supporting evidence for our conclusions.     

儿童二级错误信念认知与二级情绪理解的发展

以来自两所幼儿园的133名儿童为被试,探讨了3~6岁儿童二级错误信念认知和二级情绪理解的发展分化与联系。结果发现,6岁左右是儿童的二级错误信念认知和二级情绪理解发展的关键期;4岁左右的儿童能够掌握二级未知知识,获得情绪解码能力;儿童的二级未知与二级错误信念认知之间,儿童的情绪解码与二级情绪理解之间,在发展上存在1~2年的差距;二级推理能力是儿童进行二级心理状态认知的关键。     

Preschool‐aged children's understanding of gratitude: Relations with emotion and mental state knowledge

Developmental precursors to children's early understanding of gratitude were examined. A diverse group of 263 children was tested for emotion and mental state knowledge at ages 3 and 4, and their understanding of gratitude was measured at age 5. Children varied widely in their understanding of gratitude, but most understood some aspects of gratitude‐eliciting situations. A model‐building path analysis approach was used to examine longitudinal relations among early emotion and mental state knowledge and later understanding of gratitude. Children with a better early understanding of emotions and mental states understand more about gratitude. Mental state knowledge at age 4 mediated the relation between emotion knowledge at age 3 and gratitude understanding at age 5. The current study contributes to the scant literature on the early emergence of children's understanding of gratitude.     

The Weird World of Cross-Cultural False-Belief Research: A True- and False-Belief Study Among Samoan Children Based on Commands

Previous cross-cultural research using false-belief tasks has explored whether children's theory of mind develops synchronously across cultures. Success on false-belief tasks is usually interpreted as an important indicator of children's mental state understanding, but inconsistent findings have led to questions regarding the interpretation of children's success and failure. Based on the assumptions of perceptual access reasoning (Hedger & Fabricius, 2011 Hedger, J. A., & Fabricius, W. V. (2011). True belief belies false belief: Recent findings of competence in infants and limitations in 5-year-olds, and implications for theory of mind development. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 429–447.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) and reflecting on inconsistencies in cross-cultural false-belief research, we argue for the advantages of the additional use of true-belief tasks, which can help to differentiate between different levels of children's reasoning. Consequently, a false-belief task and a true-belief task were derived from typical Samoan adult–child interactions. The performance of 40 Samoan children aged 5 to 7 years old was compared to the performance of 40 age-matched German children. While German children passed both tasks, Samoan children failed the false-belief task and did not reply above chance level in the true-belief task. According to our knowledge, this is the first study using both a false-belief task and true-belief task in a cross-cultural setting. Our results reveal additional patterns of reasoning that are neither in line with perceptual access reasoning nor with a representational understanding of false beliefs. The study is discussed in terms of a more general problem of experimental research in non-Western settings.