Skinner and the rise of behavior modification and behavior therapy

Skinner is, without a doubt, one of the most predominant figures in the development of Behavior Modification and Behavior Therapy. Skinners' work is essential to the development of Behavior Modification and Behavior Therapy. Beginning with the social need for efficient psychotherapy, and after having generated a solid theoretical body of behavioral laws, Skinner indicated and also developed the appropriate path towards efficient interventions for unadaptive behavior. He developed a new theory regarding abnormal behavior (psychopathology), as well as a procedural model for evaluation (diagnosis) and intervention: "The functional analysis of behavior". His applications for this kind of work are pioneering and at the same time, he is the agglutinant figure of what we today call "Behavior Modification and/or Therapy". It is remarkable that a scientist could change the theories and practices of a discipline as radically as Skinner and his work did. His work, however, still has its limitations. The best way to acknowledge and pay tribute to Skinners' work is to overcome these limitations.     

Cognitive theories as reinforcement history surrogates: the case of likelihood ratio models of human recognition memory

B. F. Skinner (1977) once argued that cognitive theories are essentially surrogates for the organism's (usually unknown) reinforcement history. In this article, we argue that this notion applies rather directly to a class of likelihood ratio models of human recognition memory. The point is not that such models are fundamentally flawed or that they are not useful and should be abandoned. Instead, the point is that the role of reinforcement history in shaping memory decisions could help to explain what otherwise must be explained by assuming that subjects are inexplicably endowed with the relevant distributional information and computational abilities. To the degree that a role for an organism's reinforcement history is appreciated, the importance of animal memory research in understanding human memory comes into clearer focus. As Skinner was also fond of pointing out, it is only in the animal laboratory that an organism's history of reinforcement can be precisely controlled and its effects on behavior clearly understood.     

SKINNER AS MISSIONARY AND PROPHET: A REVIEW OF BURRHUS F. SKINNER: SHAPER OF BEHAVIOUR

Do we need another book about B. F. Skinner? According to Frederick Toates, the answer is “yes” because “there is still much to be said” (p. vii) about Skinner. In his recent biography, Burrhus F. Skinner: Shaper of Behaviour (2009), Toates attempts to integrate Skinner into the mainstream of psychology by showing areas of commonality between Skinner''s radical behaviorism and subdisciplines within psychology such as cognitive, social, and biological psychology. Admirably, although in some instances understandably naively, Toates attempts to demonstrate the power of positive reinforcement to explain myriad complex behaviors, including a fairly lengthy interpretation of religious behavior. In addition, Toates credits Skinner for being ahead of his time on both social and environmental issues. Toates falters, however, in his insistence that behavior analysis still needs and can benefit from cognitive concepts. He nevertheless provides an otherwise objective and sympathetic view of Skinner the person and the behavioral science he helped to create in a book that should be informative for both behavior analysts and those outside the field.     

What is Radical Behaviorism? A Review of Jay Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism

B. F. Skinner founded both radical behaviorism and behavior analysis. His founding innovations included: a versatile preparation for studying behavior; explicating the generic nature of stimulus and response; a pragmatic criterion for defining behavioral units; response rate as a datum; the concept of stimulus control; the concept of verbal behavior; and explicating the explanatory power of contingencies. Besides these achievements, however, Skinner also made some mistakes. Subsequent developments in radical behaviorist thought have attempted to remedy these mistakes. Moore's book presents a “party line” version of radical behaviorism. It focuses narrowly on a few of Skinner's concepts (mostly mentalism and verbal behavior) and contains no criticism of his mistakes. In fact, Moore adds a few mistakes of his own manufacture; for example, he insists that the mental realm does not exist—an unprovable and distracting assertion. The book's portrayal of behavior analysis would have been current around 1960; it mentions almost none of the developments since then. It also includes almost no developments in radical behaviorism since Skinner. Moore's book would give an unwary reader a highly distorted picture of contemporary behavior analysis and radical behaviorism.     

On the origins of naming and other symbolic behavior

We identify naming as the basic unit of verbal behavior, describe the conditions under which it is learned, and outline its crucial role in the development of stimulus classes and, hence, of symbolic behavior. Drawing upon B. F. Skinner's functional analysis and the theoretical work of G. H. Mead and L. S. Vygotsky, we chart how a child, through learning listener behavior and then echoic responding, learns bidirectional relations between classes of objects or events and his or her own speaker-listener behavior, thus acquiring naming-a higher order behavioral relation. Once established, the bidirectionality incorporated in naming extends across behavior classes such as those identified by Skinner as the mand, tact, and intraverbal so that each becomes a variant of the name relation. We indicate how our account informs the specification of rule-governed behavior and provides the basis for an experimental analysis of symbolic behavior. Furthermore, because naming is both evoked by, and itself evokes, classes of events it brings about new or emergent behavior such as that reported in studies of stimulus equivalence. This account is supported by data from a wide range of match-to-sample studies that also provide evidence that stimulus equivalence in humans is not a unitary phenomenon but the outcome of a number of different types of naming behavior.     

B. F. Skinner and G. H. Mead: on biological science and social science.

Skinner's contributions to psychology provide a unique bridge between psychology conceptualized as a biological science and psychology conceptualized as a social science. Skinner focused on behavior as a naturally occurring biological phenomenon of interest in its own right, functionally related to surrounding events and, in particular (like phylogenesis), subject to selection by its consequences. This essentially biological orientation was further enhanced by Skinner's emphasis on the empirical foundations provided by laboratory-based experimental analyses of behavior, often with nonhuman subjects. Skinner's theoretical writings, however, also have affinity with the traditions of constructionist social science. The verbal behavior of humans is said to be subject, like other behavior, to functional analyses in terms of its environment, in this case its social context. Verbal behavior in turn makes it possible for us to relate to private events, a process that ultimately allows for the development of consciousness, which is thus said to be a social product. Such ideas make contact with aspects of G. H. Mead's social behaviorism and, perhaps of more contemporary impact in psychology, L. Vygotsky's general genetic law of cultural development. Failure to articulate both the biological and the social science aspects of Skinner's theoretical approach to psychology does a disservice to his unique contribution to a discipline that remains fragmented between two intellectual traditions.     

Observing ben wyckoff: from basic research to programmed instruction and social issues

L. Benjamin Wyckoff's seminal contributions to both psychological theory and application are the subject of this review. Wyckoff started his academic career as a graduate student at Indiana University, where he developed the observing-response procedure under the guidance of B. F. Skinner and C. J. Burke. At the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wyckoff refined his mathematical theory of secondary reinforcement. This theory was the impetus for his creation of an electronic simulation of a rat running a T maze, one of the first "computer models" of learning. Wyckoff next went to Emory University, leaving there to help create two of the most successful companies dedicated to the advancement of programmed instruction and teaching machines: Teaching Machines, Inc. and the Human Development Institute. Wyckoff's involvement in these companies epitomizes the application of basic behavior-analytic principles in the development of technology to improve education and human relationships. The emergent picture of Wyckoff is that of a man who, through his research, professional work in educational applications of behavioral principles, and active involvement in the civil rights movement of the 1960s, was strongly committed to applying behavioral science to positively influence human behavior change.     

Jacques Loeb, B. F. Skinner, and the legacy of prediction and control

The biologist Jacques Loeb is an important figure in the history of behavior analysis. Between 1890 and 1915, Loeb championed an approach to experimental biology that would later exert substantial influence on the work of B. F. Skinner and behavior analysis. This paper examines some of these sources of influence, with a particular emphasis on Loeb's firm commitment to prediction and control as fundamental goals of an experimental life science, and how these goals were extended and broadened by Skinner. Both Loeb and Skinner adopted a pragmatic approach to science that put practical control of their subject matter above formal theory testing, both based their research programs on analyses of reproducible units involving the intact organism, and both strongly endorsed technological applications of basic laboratory science. For Loeb, but especially for Skinner, control came to mean something more than mere experimental or technological control for its own sake; it became synonomous with scientific understanding. This view follows from (a) the successful working model of science Loeb and Skinner inherited from Ernst Mach, in which science is viewed as human social activity, and effective practical action is taken as the basis of scientific knowledge, and (b) Skinner's analysis of scientific activity, situated in the world of direct experience and related to practices arranged by scientific verbal communities. From this perspective, prediction and control are human acts that arise from and are maintained by social circumstances in which such acts meet with effective consequences.     

Toward a Spinozistic modification of skinner's theory of man

B. F. Skinner argues in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York 1971) that only his theory of man is compatible with a ‘scientific’ approach to human behavior. I argue that Skinner's entirely open‐ended view of man is inadequate for his own purposes in that it leaves no room for the claim that certain value judgments are universally valid, something I argue Skinner is committed to despite an explicit avowal in one place of cultural relativism. I then go on to show that a modification of Skinner's theory of man which builds on Spinoza's notion of conatus would provide one with a theory‐based rationale for universally valid judgments without involving one in a ‘non‐scientific’ approach to human behavior. Specifically, I argue that such a Spinozistic modification would provide one with a theory‐based guarantee that man will not evolve in such a way that a truly scientific observer would deem a totalitarian state good.     

A note on Skinner and Pavlov's physiology

These short notes describe the way in which Skinner considers and resolves his differences with Pavlov in the question of the relation between psychology and physiology as forms of knowledge. After establishing his viewpoint in the general epistemological issue, Skinner is concerned about linking his study of behavior to the work of Pavlov, who considered it to be of a physiological nature. Skinner contrasts Pavlov's empirical and theoretical work and characterizes the latter in terms of the notion of the "Conceptual Nervous System."     

COOPER,HERON, AND HEWARD'S APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS (2ND ED.): CHECKERED FLAG FOR STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS,YELLOW FLAG FOR THE FIELD

At last, the field of applied behavior analysis has a beautifully crafted, true textbook that can proudly stand cover to cover and spine to spine beside any of the expensive, imposing, and ornately designed textbooks used by college instructors who teach courses in conventional areas of education or psychology. In this review, I fully laud this development, credit Cooper, Heron, and Heward for making it happen, argue that it signifies a checkered flag for students and professors, and recommend the book for classes in applied behavior analysis everywhere. Subsequently, I review its chapters, each of which could easily stand alone as publications in their own right. Finally, I supply a cautionary note, a yellow flag to accompany the well‐earned checkered flag, by pointing out that, as is true with all general textbooks on applied behavior analysis, a major portion of the references involves research on persons who occupy only a tail of the normal distribution. To attain the mainstream role Skinner envisioned and most (if not all) behavior analysts desire, the field will have to increase its focus on persons who reside under the dome of that distribution.     

A Functional Analysis of Psychological Terms Redux

In his seminal paper, “An Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms,” Skinner (1945) offered the revolutionary suggestion that, rather than endlessly debating the meanings of psychological terms, psychologists should analyze the variables that control their occurrence as verbal behavior. Skinner''s suggestion reflected the essence of his 1957 book, Verbal Behavior, wherein he argued that the behaviors of which language is composed (i.e., speaking and listening) are controlled by variables found in the social environment (which he called the verbal community), and that analyzing those variables would lead to an understanding of the behaviors. Although Skinner formally introduced his radical approach to language in 1945, it has yet to be fully realized. The result is that psychologists, including behavior analysts, still debate the definitions of terms. In the present paper, I review Skinner''s functional approach to language and describe ways in which behavior analysts have already applied it to traditional psychological terms. I conclude by looking at other current terms in behavior analysis that engender some confusion and encourage behavior analysts to apply a functional analytic approach to their own verbal behavior.     

Acquisition, learning, or development of language? Skinner's "Verbal Behavior" revisited

In 1957, Skinner, in his "Verbal Behavior", proposed an explanation on how a language is learned. In 1959, Chomsky strongly argued the non-learnability of language, establishing in the field of developmental psycholinguistics the substitution of the term "learning" for that of "acquisition". Currently, the constructivist models describe language acquisition as a process of ontogenetic, gradual, complex, and adaptive change. This new theoretical framework has been especially useful for rereading Verbal Behavior because it facilitates recovering the Skinnerian learning mechanisms. This can be observed in the recent research trends that recapture reinforcement and imitation (echoic responses), although they are now located in the initial phases of the process and are included in a cognitive dynamic that, by gradually increasing its complexity, can achieve grammar. The new constructivist theoretical framework, by retrieving the functional and referential aspects of language, can also take advantage of the classic Skinnerian proposal about the pragmatic types of verbal behavior, providing it with new meaning.     

On the origin and preservation of cumulative record in its struggle for life as a favored term

This paper offers a case study of the origins, emergence, and evolution of the term cumulative record as the name for the means by which B. F. Skinner brought his behavior under the control of his subject matter. Our methods included on-line searches, reviews of Skinner's publications, and journal codings and counts. The results reveal that the term is not originally attributable to Skinner, but emerged earlier in ordinary language and in another discipline--education. It was not even original to Skinner in print in his own science. Still, the term was once original to him, which we address with additional analyses of his having originated and advanced it. We conclude with a discussion the constraints of our methods, suggestions for future research, and the variable appreciation of technology and terminology in science studies.     

Up with this I shall not put: 10 reasons why I disagree with Branch and Vollmer on behavior used as a count noun

Branch and Vollmer (2004) argue that use of the word behavior as a count noun is ungrammatical and, worse, mischaracterizes and ultimately degrades the concept of the operant. In this paper I argue that use of behavior as a count noun is a reflection of its grammatical status as a hybrid of count and mass noun. I show that such usage is widespread across colloquial, referential, and scientific documents including the writings of major figures in behavior analysis (most notably B. F. Skinner), books describing its applications, and its major journals. Finally, I argue against the assertion that such usage degrades the concept of the operant, at least in any meaningful way, and argue instead that employing eccentric definitions for ordinary words and using arcane terms to describe everyday human behavior risks diminishing the influence of behavior analysis on human affairs.     

Sources for Skinner's pragmatic selectionism in 1945

Skinner's pragmatic selectionism shows up strongly in his 1945 publication, "The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms," in which he introduced a probabilistic three-term contingency for verbal behavior. This probabilism was accompanied by an expanded contextualism and an increased emphasis on consequences with a clear alignment to pragmatism. In total, these changes represent Skinner's most striking shift from mechanistic and necessitarian values to pragmatic selectionism, and these changes may be indebted more to the conceptual contributions of others than Skinner acknowledged. Before 1945, Skinner made at least some positive associations with the views of Watson, Russell, and Carnap. From 1945 and afterwards, he strongly disassociated his views on verbal behavior from theirs. Before 1945, Skinner did not associate his views with those of Darwin or Peirce. After 1945, he strongly associated his views with those of Darwin and Peirce (in one published interview). No sources for his pragmatic selectionism, however, were referred to in 1945.