The concept of mental disorder. On the boundary between biological facts and social values.

Although the concept of mental disorder is fundamental to theory and practice in the mental health field, no agreed on and adequate analysis of this concept currently exists. I argue that a disorder is a harmful dysfunction, wherein harmful is a value term based on social norms, and dysfunction is a scientific term referring to the failure of a mental mechanism to perform a natural function for which it was designed by evolution. Thus, the concept of disorder combines value and scientific components. Six other accounts of disorder are evaluated, including the skeptical antipsychiatric view, the value approach, disorder as whatever professionals treat, two scientific approaches (statistical deviance and biological disadvantage), and the operational definition of disorder as "unexpectable distress or disability" in the revised third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). The harmful dysfunction analysis is shown to avoid the problems while preserving the insights of these other approaches.     

Conceptual Clarification and the Task of Improving Research on Academic Ethics

What does the term academic ethics mean? How does this term relate to others in the academic integrity literature, such as research misconduct? Does conceptual confusion in the study of academic ethics complicate development of valid analyses of ethical behavior in an academic setting? The intended goal of many empirical projects on academic ethics is to draw causal conclusions about the factors that lead to faculty or students possessing or disregarding academic integrity. Yet, it is not clear that scholars using the concept academic ethics are measuring the same phenomenon when they use associated concepts, such as responsible conduct of research. The purpose of this paper is to develop a taxonomy of concepts for the empirical study of academic ethics. Based in research on comparative analysis of democracy, another normatively preferable but multifaceted concept, I argue for a taxonomy of concepts for the study of academic integrity that reduces problems of “conceptual stretching” and challenges to the validity of empirical research in this field.     

The concept of disorder as a foundation for the DSM's theory-neutral nosology: response to Follette and Houts, Part 2.

Follette and Houts [Follette, W. C., Houts, A. C. (1996). Models of scientific progress and the role of theory in taxonomy development: a case study of the DSM. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 1120-1132] argue that 'mental disorder' and 'function' are value concepts that offer no scientific basis for the DSM's theory-neutral nosology or for distinguishing disorders from other behavioral problems. They also claim that the DSM presupposes a biological theory of etiology, thus is not really theory-neutral. They recommend replacing the DSM by theory-laden diagnostic manuals. I argue: (1) DSM criteria do not imply a biological model of disorder, (2) 'mental disorder' and 'function' have scientific content that allows one to distinguish disorder from nondisorder, (3) the evolutionary 'harmful dysfunction' analysis of disorder [Wakefield, J. C. (1992a). The concept of mental disorder: on the boundary between biological facts and social values. American Psychologist, 47, 373-388] coherently demarcates disorder from nondisorder, (4) the proposed behaviorist alternative to the DSM illustrated by the articles in Follette's special section [Follette, W. C. (Ed.) (1996a). Special section on the development of theoretically coherent alternatives to the DSM system. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 1117-1201] is incoherent because it does not distinguish disorder from nondisorder.     

A mathematical analysis of a natural class of partitions of a graph

Any finite graph (nondirected, no loops) can be coupled with its complementary graph producing what we term a completed graph. This paper studies completed graphs in the context of a structural concept called stratification that is motivated by theoretical work in social psychology and sociology. A completed graph is stratified in case its node (vertex) set can be divided into two nonempty subsets with exactly one of the two types of ties holding between every pair of nodes from distinct sets. A completed graph is totally stratified in case every one of its nontrivial completed subgraphs is stratified. The first part of the paper relates the concept of stratification to the familiar graph property of connectedness. In particular, a completed graph is totally stratified if and only if it does not have a four point completed subgraph that is connected in both the original graph relation and its complementary relation. Using the concept of stratification, completed graphs can be decomposed uniquely into taxonomic structures, that is, nested sets of partitions. An algorithm for the decomposition based on the work with the concept of stratification is developed. The relationship between the notion of stratification and the ideas in balance theory is examined, and stratification is viewed as a generalization of Davis' notion of clustering. It turns out that the concepts of clique, status, and structural equivalence used throughout the social networks literature can be defined in an interesting way for completed graphs. Cliques are sets of nodes with similar internal links and statuses are sets of nodes with similar external links. Structurally equivalent sets are both cliques and statuses. The concepts of status and structural equivalence are closely related to the decomposition algorithm. In particular, for any totally stratified completed graph, the set of all statuses and the set of all maximal structurally equivalent sets can be generated by mathematical operations performed on the taxonomic decomposition of the completed graph. Finally some of our resuls are informally related to the blockmodeling approach to analyzing social network data discussed in several previous Journal of Mathematical Psychology articles.     

Patient's surface, clinical surface, and workable surface

Surface is a term often used in clinical theory, which seems to have eluded a reliable definition. Freud used the term mostly to denote the analysand's consciousness. This patient's surface does not always coincide with the data the analyst can observe, i.e., the clinical surface. It is proposed that clinical surface be understood, in contrast to other psychoanalytic concepts, as the clinical evidence that does not need conjecture to be grasped cognitively. The concept of "average expectable apperception" is introduced. Workable surface is defined as those aspects of the clinical surface that lend themselves well to the exploration of unconscious dynamics or genesis. Ideas about which surfaces are optimally workable vary according to different schools of technique. The advantages of considering clinical surface the objective anchorage of psychoanalysis as a positive science and of differentiating it from patient's surface and workable surface are discussed.     

The social concept of disease

In the discussion of such social questions as “how should alcoholics be treated by society?” and “what kind of people are responsible in the face of the law?”, is “disease” a value-free or value-laden notion, a natural or a normative one? It seems, for example, that by the utterance ‘alcoholism should be classified as a disease’ we mean something like the following: the condition called alcoholism is similar in morally relevant respects to conditions that we uncontroversially label diseases, and therefore we have a moral obligation to consider alcoholism a disease. So there are grounds to think that, in the discussion of social questions, our concept of disease is strongly value-laden. However, it does not follow that the medical concept of disease is likewise value-laden. In this paper I distinguish between the medical and social concepts of disease, arguing that the naturalist-normativist debate is concerned with the former, but not the latter. Therefore, we need not settle the naturalist-normativist debate in order to conclude that the social concept of disease is value-laden.     

Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: II. Method variables and construct validity

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) assesses relative strengths of four associations involving two pairs of contrasted concepts (e.g., male-female and family-career). In four studies, analyses of data from 11 Web IATs, averaging 12,000 respondents per data set, supported the following conclusions: (a) sorting IAT trials into subsets does not yield conceptually distinct measures; (b) valid IAT measures can be produced using as few as two items to represent each concept; (c) there are conditions for which the administration order of IAT and self-report measures does not alter psychometric properties of either measure; and (d) a known extraneous effect of IAT task block order was sharply reduced by using extra practice trials. Together, these analyses provide additional construct validation for the IAT and suggest practical guidelines to users of the IAT.     

The Epistemic Integrity of Scientific Research

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.     

Psychology and Culture: Back to the Future?

Psychology has a poor record in addressing cultural phenomena. One response is to turn to ancient concepts from local traditions and to use these as alternative analytic categories to explain behavior. However, there are problems with such an approach. These concepts will be read from the vantage point of the present and interpreted differently so as to propose different diagnoses (and solutions) for contemporary social problems. As an alternative, rather than using ancient resources as analytic categories in the explanation of behavior, we could instead examine how they are used as categories of practice as people actively make sense of their social context and themselves. Attending to such contemporary ‘lay’ usage (and the contestation it entails) allows for a more dynamic conception of cultural processes than is typical in psychology. More generally, I believe that it is possible to use our psychological constructs so that we can see the distinctive particularities of the phenomena before us in new and interesting ways, and in ways that respect their cultural specificity. This claim is illustrated through reference to recent work using the concept of social identity to illuminate aspects of Hindu pilgrimage.     

CONCEPTIONS OF SELF/NO-SELF AND MODES OF CONNECTION Comparative Soteriological Structures in Classical Chinese Thought

This essay examines the ways that the terms “self” and “no‐self” can illuminate the views of classical Chinese thinkers, particularly Confucians such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, and the Daoist thinker Zhuangzi. In particular, the use of the term “no‐self ” to describe Zhuangzi's position is defended. The concepts of self and no‐self are analyzed in relation to other terms within the thinkers' “concept clusters”—specifically temporality, nature, and social roles—and suggestions are given for constructing typologies that sort out the range of meanings of self and no‐self based on the characteristics of the relations among terms within the concept clusters. The essay focuses on the way that the Confucians and Zhuangzi use concepts of self and no‐self, respectively, as soteriological strategies that aim at making connections with larger systems or wholes, and it concludes that different connections are emphasized by the Confucians and Zhuangzi precisely because the various connections are made possible and sustained by different conceptions of self, temporality, nature, and social roles.     

Sztompka's philosophy of social Science

It is argued in this article that the concept of practice is one of the key concepts in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It partly replaces his earlier talk about the inexpressible. ‘The practice has to speak for itself, as Wittgenstein succinctly puts it. The concept of practice not only points to the ways in which the unity of our concepts are underpinned, as Gordon Baker has it, it also comprises the skills involved in handling the conceptualized phenomena, our prereflective familiarity with them, expressed in the sureness in our behaviour towards them, and the judgmental power exercised in applying or withholding a given concept on a particular occasion. These factors are all relevant to the establishment of knowledge, but they cannot themselves be fully and straightforwardly articulated by verbal means. Nevertheless, they represent what we go by when we apply concepts and other types of rules. To follow a rule is what Wittgenstein calls a practice. The sketched analysis of this concept makes us understand better how it is possible to apply a rule without the support of another rule. It also makes us realize in what sense one is justified in talking about tacit knowledge in connection with the application of concepts and rule‐following in general. Quite a lot hangs on seeing the world aright at this point.     

Colloquy: Do Interacting Groups Perform Better Than Aggregates of Individuals?

Recent examples of research about group processes melding individual‐cognitive and social communicative factors have resulted in the application of concepts relevant to individual cognition to groups as a whole. Although based on a helpful metaphor, the practice risks resurrecting discredited “group mind” concepts. One particular concept, “transactive memory system,” implies that a group can “know” all of the knowledge of its individual members. Several studies showing that groups remember more information than do its individual members appear on their face to support this notion. However, a reanalysis of the results of these studies using Lorge‐Solomon (1955) Model B reveals that the groups were not successful at pooling their members' knowledge. This conclusion implies that group interaction does not lead to efficient group information exchange.     

What's so funny? Modelling incongruity in humour production†

Finding something humorous is intrinsically rewarding and may facilitate emotion regulation, but what creates humour has been underexplored. The present experimental study examined humour generated under controlled conditions with varying social, affective, and cognitive factors. Participants listed five ways in which a set of concept pairs (e.g. MONEY and CHOCOLATE) were similar or different in either a funny way (intentional humour elicitation) or a “catchy” way (incidental humour elicitation). Results showed that more funny responses were produced under the incidental condition, and particularly more for affectively charged than neutral concepts, for semantically unrelated than related concepts, and for responses highlighting differences rather than similarities between concepts. Further analyses revealed that funny responses showed a relative divergence in output dominance of the properties typically associated with each concept in the pair (that is, funny responses frequently highlighted a property high in output dominance for one concept but simultaneously low in output dominance for the other concept); by contrast, responses judged not funny did not show this pattern. These findings reinforce the centrality of incongruity resolution as a key cognitive ingredient for some pleasurable emotional elements arising from humour and demonstrate how it may operate within the context of humour generation.     

Risk and Responsibility: A Complex and Evolving Relationship

This paper analyses the nature of the relationship between risk and responsibility. Since neither the concept of risk nor the concept of responsibility has an unequivocal definition, it is obvious that there is no single interpretation of their relationship. After introducing the different meanings of responsibility used in this paper, we analyse four conceptions of risk. This allows us to make their link with responsibility explicit and to determine if a shift in the connection between risk and responsibility can be outlined. (1) In the engineer’s paradigm, the quantitative conception of risk does not include any concept of responsibility. Their relationship is indirect, the locus of responsibility being risk management. (2) In Mary Douglas’ cultural theory, risks are constructed through the responsibilities they engage. (3) Rayner and (4) Wolff go further by integrating forms of responsibility in the definition of risk itself. Analysis of these four frameworks shows that the concepts of risk and responsibility are increasingly intertwined. This tendency is reinforced by increasing public awareness and a call for the integration of a moral dimension in risk management. Therefore, we suggest that a form of virtue-responsibility should also be integrated in the concept of risk.     

The plurality of concepts

Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, with the particular kind of concept used on an occasion being determined by the context. I argue that endorsing pluralism does not lead to eliminativism about concepts as an object of scientific interest.     

Psychotherapie und die Anerkennung des Fremden

The aim of the present paper is three-fold: it reveals the inherent limitations of the concept of disorder in psychopathology and psychotherapy. It argues that characteristics of the person such as individuality, subjectivity and identity, have to be considered in psychiatric and psychotherapeutic concepts. And it shows that psychotherapy is dependent on cultural, social and socio-economic factors that are neglected in many theories. The paper uses clinical and epistemological arguments. It arrives at the conclusion that the above mentioned limitations have a common ground. They could be overcome, if psychiatry and psychotherapy were self-reflective and self-critical in respect to the inherent limitations of theory and practice and if they integrated concepts of being different in their basic theories so that symptoms, persons and cultural or societal peculiarities could be recognised and acknowledged.—The paper has been written as a comment to D. Orlinsky's statements considering disorder-specific psychotherapies from the viewpoint of psychotherapy research.     

Why using “consciousness” in psychotherapy? Insight,metacognition and self-consciousness

Since its early development, clinical psychology has questioned the impact of “consciousness” on the determination of human responsibility across psychiatric disorders. In recent years, specific clinical approaches have focused on “consciousness” work that could play a key role in psychotherapy. We focused our research on clinical psychology's consciousness-related concepts of insight, self-consciousness, and metacognition. Insight and metacognition, for example, have prompted increased interest in schizophrenia (SZ), bipolar disorder (BD), and, more recently, borderline personality disorder (BPD) treatments as representative of the latest advances in the cognitive and behavioral therapy field. Here we review cognitive, social, and clinical psychology research measuring “consciousness” in BPD, SZ, and BD, exploring the implications of different conceptualizations of consciousness-like concepts for treatment adherence, symptom evolution, and related aspects of psychotherapy. Our results show the overall relevance of using measures of clinical and cognitive insight, emphasizing the more central role of cognitive insight and metacognition in psychotherapy, as it appears that consciousness can remain useful if understood as a cognitive skill. The inclusion of a conceptualization of self-consciousness is important in order to address the social component of psychotherapy, as it does in biopsychosocial approaches. We discuss the implications of such results for global efficacy, for the relevance of the “consciousness” concept to clinical psychology, and for the potential need to keep operationalizing different conceptualizations of it in psychotherapy. We open the debate on the definition of consciousness to motivational aspects of change and to general considerations of both legal and ethical aspects.     

ADHD and delinquency--a developmental perspective

Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is one of the most prevalent psychiatric disorders of childhood and adolescence. Until now, it has been unclear whether ADHD by itself constitutes a risk factor for later delinquency or does so only in combination with other disruptive symptoms. This article seeks to give a comprehensive account of the literature to shed light on the developmental pathway from childhood ADHD to adult criminality. Comorbid ADHD and conduct disorder (CD) are significantly related to a range of biological and environmental risk factors such as neurocognitive impairment, high parental psychopathology, poor social functioning, and other comorbid mental disorders, particularly substance abuse, that are described in this review. In addition, the results of treatment studies are presented, with a special focus on the results of the Multimodal Treatment Study of Children with ADHD (MTA). Although treatment programs, including medication and psychosocial treatment, can be very effective in improving the functioning of children with ADHD in the social and academic domains in the short term, there is no conclusive evidence that such treatments lower the risk for developing delinquency in adulthood.     

Quality of Life in Old Age: Problematic Issues

Quality of Life (QoL) is a concept widely used in gerontology, as well as in other fields such as anthropology, health sciences, psychology, sociology and political sciences. Historically, although Aristotle is considered as an antecedent, the term QoL emerged in about the sixties in scientific literature. In the field of ageing, it is considered as an outcome of projects, programmes, services or policies and is used for describing populations, contexts and individuals. QoL is considered by most experts as a multidimensional concept involving multiple domains (health, psychological, social and environmental), containing objective and subjective components. Nevertheless, in recent years, QoL has been reduced to the subjective appraisal, to health or to subjective psychological attributes such as well-being, happiness or life satisfaction. Moreover, conceptual confusions can be found between QoL and other concepts related to positive ageing. In this conceptually-driven paper, after reviewing a set of expert and lay conceptualizations of QoL and identifying the diversity of its components, three critical issues will be discussed: its reduction to health or to the subjective appraisal of a set of domains, the confusion of QoL with other subjective or positive concepts and, finally, its methodological reductionism to self-reports as an exclusive procedure for QoL data collection. From these criticisms some conceptual and methodological suggestions are proposed.