共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Michael Hand 《Synthese》2010,173(1):25-39
Truth’s universal knowability entails its discovery. This threatens antirealism, which is thought to require it. Fortunately,
antirealism is not committed to it. Avoiding it requires adoption (and extension) of Dag Prawitz’s position in his long-term
disagreement with Michael Dummett on the notion of provability involved in intuitionism’s identification of it with truth.
Antirealism (intuitionism generalized) must accommodate a notion of lost-opportunity truth (a kind of recognition-transcendent
truth), and even truth consisting in the presence of unperformable verifications. Dummett’s position cannot abide this, while
Prawitz’s can. Antirealism’s epistemic notion of truth derives from general features of its meaning theory, not from a universal
knowability principle. 相似文献
2.
Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz 《Studia Logica》2008,90(2):211-247
The intention here is that of giving a formal underpinning to the idea of ‘meaning-is-use’ which, even if based on proofs,
it is rather different from proof-theoretic semantics as in the Dummett–Prawitz tradition. Instead, it is based on the idea
that the meaning of logical constants are given by the explanation of immediate consequences, which in formalistic terms means
the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules, i.e. the so-called reduction rules. For that we suggest
an extension to the Curry– Howard interpretation which draws on the idea of labelled deduction, and brings back Frege’s device
of variable-abstraction to operate on the labels (i.e., proof-terms) alongside formulas of predicate logic.
Presented by Heinrich Wansing 相似文献
3.
Kevin Falvey 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):297-312
Years ago, Michael Dummett defended McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, arguing that it cannot be dismissed as
guilty of an “indexical fallacy.” Recently, E. J. Lowe has disputed Dummett’s claims for the cogency of the argument. I offer
an elaboration and defense of Dummett’s interpretation of the argument (though not of its soundness). I bring to bear some
work on tense from the philosophy of language, and some recent work on the concept of the past as it occurs in memory, in
an effort to support the claim that McTaggart is not guilty of any simple indexical fallacy. Along the way I criticize an
account of what is at stake in disputes about the reality of tense due to A. W. Moore, and I argue for the superiority of
the conception of tense-realism that is implicit in McTaggart’s work. The paper is intended to prepare the ground for a substantive
defense of the reality of tense. 相似文献
4.
Luca Tranchini 《Topoi》2012,31(1):47-57
Validity, the central concept of the so-called ‘proof-theoretic semantics’ is described as correctly applying to the arguments
that denote proofs. In terms of validity, I propose an anti-realist characterization of the notions of truth and correct assertion,
at the core of which is the idea that valid arguments may fail to be recognized as such. The proposed account is compared
with Dummett’s and Prawitz’s views on the matter. 相似文献
5.
WANG Lu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2008,3(1):83-98
Research into logical syntax provides us the knowledge of the structure of sentences, while logical semantics provides a window
into uncovering the truth of sentences. Therefore, it is natural to make sentences and truth the central concern when one
deals with the theory of meaning logically. Although their theories of meaning differ greatly, both Michael Dummett’s theory
and Donald Davidson’s theory are concerned with sentences and truth and developed in terms of truth. Logical theories and
methods first introduced by G. Frege underwent great developments during the past century and have played an important role
in expanding these two scholars’ theories of meaning.
Translated by Ma Minghui from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (7): 53–61 相似文献
6.
Peter Marton 《Synthese》2006,151(1):81-98
Verificationism is the doctrine stating that all truths are knowable. Fitch’s knowability paradox, however, demonstrates that
the verificationist claim (all truths are knowable) leads to “epistemic collapse”, i.e., everything which is true is (actually)
known. The aim of this article is to investigate whether or not verificationism can be saved from the effects of Fitch’s paradox.
First, I will examine different strategies used to resolve Fitch’s paradox, such as Edgington’s and Kvanvig’s modal strategy,
Dummett’s and Tennant’s restriction strategy, Beall’s paraconsistent strategy, and Williamson’s intuitionistic strategy. After
considering these strategies I will propose a solution that remains within the scope of classical logic. This solution is
based on the introduction of a truth operator. Though this solution avoids the shortcomings of the non-standard (intuitionistic)
solution, it has its own problems. Truth, on this approach, is not closed under the rule of conjunction-introduction. I will
conclude that verificationism is defensible, though only at a rather great expense. 相似文献
7.
Patricia Hanna 《Philosophia》2006,34(3):267-285
The dominant view of the status of knowledge of language is that it is theoretical or what Gilbert Ryle called knowledge-that. Defenders of this thesis may differ among themselves over the precise nature of the knowledge which underlies language, as for example, Michael Dummett and Noam Chomsky differ over the issue of unconscious knowledge; however, they all agree that acquisition, understanding and use of language require that the speaker have access to a theory of language. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. Knowledge of language is properly seen as practical knowledge, knowledge-how. My target is Michael Dummett’s treatment of theory of meaning in The Seas of Language. If my argument goes through, underlying assumptions about the nature of cognition as computational must be adjusted to allow for other forms of knowledge, which are arguably more basic, and which underlie knowledge-that. 相似文献
8.
Henning Peucker 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):135-146
This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from
the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory
of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary
categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s
search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be
reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To
reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories
can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this
article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts
are given to us in a categorical abstraction. 相似文献
9.
Andrea Guardo 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(2):195-209
This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions
to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The
first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of
meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on
Lewis’ work in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions
that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call ‘Actuality Constraint’. The third section of the
paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional
analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian).
This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a
possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show
(1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible
to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not
exist. 相似文献
10.
Cheng-hung Tsai 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):331-341
One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is
a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that. In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a knowledge-how
view in which knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of practical knowledge, like an agent’s non-propositional knowledge
of counting. In this paper I argue, first, that Hanna misunderstands Dummett’s conception of knowledge of linguistic rules,
and, second, that Dummett’s considerations of practical knowledge of language pose a problem for Hanna’s knowledge-how view.
At the end of the paper, I briefly sketch an account of practical knowledge of language that meets the requirements set by
Dummett. 相似文献
11.
B. Brogaard 《Synthese》2006,152(1):47-79
Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’
argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by
Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then
the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust
Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that
it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even
though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely
denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires
a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting
concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked. 相似文献
12.
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen 《Axiomathes》2005,15(4):513-540
Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatist theory of logic teaches us to take the context of utterances as an indispensable logical notion
without which there is no meaning. This is not a spat against compositionality per se , since it is possible to posit extra arguments to the meaning function that composes complex meaning. However, that method
would be inappropriate for a realistic notion of the meaning of assertions. To accomplish a realistic notion of meaning (as
opposed e.g. to algebraic meaning), Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (RT) may be applied in the spirit of Peirce’s Pragmatic
Maxim (PM): the weighing of information depends on (i) the practical consequences of accommodating the chosen piece of information
introduced in communication, and (ii) what will ensue in actually using that piece in further cycles of discourse. Peirce’s
unpublished papers suggest a relevance-like approach to meaning. Contextual features influenced his logic of Existential Graphs
(EG). Arguments are presented pro and con the view in which EGs endorse non-compositionality of meaning. 相似文献
13.
Maria van der Schaar 《Synthese》2007,159(1):61-82
The meaning of a declarative sentence and that of an interrogative sentence differ in their aspect of mood. A semantics of mood has to account for the differences in meaning between these sentences, and it also has to explain that sentences in different moods may have a common core. The meaning of the declarative mood is to be explained not in terms of actual force (contra Dummett), but in terms of potential force. The meaning of the declarative sentence (including its mood) is called the assertion-candidate, which is explained by what one must know in order to be entitled to utter the declarative with assertive force. Both a cognitive notion (knowledge) and a pragmatic notion (assertive force) are thus part of the explanation of the assertion-candidate. Davidson’s criticism that such a theory is in need of an account of the distinction between standard and non-standard uses of the declarative is answered: without counter-indications an utterance of a declarative sentence is understood as having assertive force. The meaning of an interrogative sentence, the question-candidate, and that of the other sentence types can ultimately be explained in terms of their specific relations to the assertion-candidate. Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory is used to show the philosophical relevance of a semantics of mood. The constructivist notion of proposition needs to be embedded in a theory of the assertion-candidate, which fulfils the offices of being the meaning of the declarative sentence, the content of judgement and assertion and the bearer of epistemic truth. 相似文献
14.
Zeynep Soysal 《Philosophical Studies》2018,175(11):2791-2811
In this paper, I introduce and defend a notion of analyticity for formal languages. I first uncover a crucial flaw in Timothy Williamson’s famous argument template against analyticity, when it is applied to sentences of formal mathematical languages. Williamson’s argument targets the popular idea that a necessary condition for analyticity is that whoever understands an analytic sentence assents to it. Williamson argues that for any given candidate analytic sentence, there can be people who understand that sentence and yet who fail to assent to it. I argue that, on the most natural understanding of the notion of assent when it is applied to sentences of formal mathematical languages, Williamson’s argument fails. Formal analyticity is the notion of analyticity that is based on this natural understanding of assent. I go on to develop the notion of formal analyticity and defend the claim that there are formally analytic sentences and rules of inference. I conclude by showing the potential payoffs of recognizing formal analyticity. 相似文献
15.
The Universal Right to Education: Freedom,Equality and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Fraternity</Emphasis>
Ylva Bergström 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(2):167-182
The overall aim of the article is to analyse how the universal right to education have been built, legitimized and used. And
more specifically ask who is addressed by the universal right to education, and who is given access to rights and to education.
The first part of the article focus on the history of declarations, the notion of the universal right to education, emphasizing
differences in matters of detail—for example, the meaning of ‘compulsory’, ‘children’s rights’ or ‘parents’ rights’—and critically
examining the right of the child and the right of the parent in terms of tensions between ‘social rights’ and ‘private autonomy
rights’. Despite differences in detail, the iterations of the universal right to education do share to the full in the idea
of education as such. In the second part the attempt to scrutinize the underlying assumptions legitimizing the consensus on
education, focusing again on the notion of the child. In conclusion I argue that a certain notion of what it is to be a human
being is inscribed within the circle of access to rights and education. These notions of what it means to be a child, a parent,
a citizen or a member of the ‘human family’ are notions of enlightenment and humanity and, to my understanding, aspects of
how democracy is configured around freedom, equality and fraternity. 相似文献
16.
17.
Mark Textor 《Synthese》2009,167(1):105-123
Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are
strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while
Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. Thoughts are supposed to do work that
requires that they be structured and work that requires that they be unstructured. But this cannot be! While the standard
response to this problem is to reject either (i) or (ii), I propose a charitable repair in the spirit of Frege’s theory that
accepts both. The key idea can be found in Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic(BL, GGA). Frege argues that the thought expressed by a sentence is determined by the truth-conditions that can be derived
from the semantic axioms for the sentence constituents. The fact that the same axiomatic truth-condition can be derived in
different ways from different semantic axioms suggests a Fregean solution of the dilemma: A thought is a type that is instantiated
by all sequences of senses (decomposed thoughts) that have the same axiomatic truth-conditions. This allows for multiple decomposability
of the same thought (for different decomposed thoughts can have the same axiomatic truth-conditions) and for a notion of containment
(the decomposed thought contains those senses whose semantic axioms are needed in the derivation of the truth-conditions).
My proposal combines the virtues of (i) and (ii) without inheriting their vices. 相似文献
18.
Bengt Brülde 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2007,8(1):15-49
The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality of a person’s life is dependent
on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the
standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the
theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine different types of epistemic modifications
of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of
her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether
the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present
and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory. 相似文献
19.
Philippe Schlenker 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):115-142
Stalnaker (1978) made two seminal claims about presuppositions. The most influential one was that presupposition projection is computed by a pragmatic mechanism based on a notion of ‘local context’. Due to conceptual and technical difficulties, however, the latter notion was reinterpreted in purely semantic terms within
‘dynamic semantics’ (Heim 1983). The second claim was that some instances of presupposition generation should also be explained in pragmatic terms. But despite various attempts, the definition of a precise ‘triggering algorithm’ has remained somewhat elusive. We discuss
possible extensions of both claims. First, we offer a reconstruction of ‘local contexts’ which circumvents some of the difficulties
faced by Stalnaker’s original analysis. We preserve the idea that local contexts are computed by a pragmatic mechanism that
aggregates the information that follows from an incomplete sentence given the global context; but we crucially rely on a modified
notion of entailment (‘R-entailment’), whose plausibility should be assessed on independent grounds. Second, we speculate
that local contexts might prove necessary (though by no means sufficient) to understand how some presuppositions are triggered.
In a nutshell, we suggest that a presupposition is triggered when the semantic contribution of an expression to its local
context is in some sense ‘heterogeneous’. Without giving an analysis of the latter notion, we note that this architecture
implies that presuppositions should be triggered on the basis of the meaning that an expression has relative to its local context (what we call its ‘local meaning’); we sketch some possible consequences of this analysis. 相似文献
20.
Leszek Koczanowicz 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(2):141-149
The aim of my paper is to show the discussion concerning the idea of cosmopolitan society. I intend to examine the structure
and content of the argumentation which put into question the very notion of cosmopolitanism, as well as the contemporary content
of this concept. I will look at nationalistic discourse as presented, for instance, by Gertrude Himmelfarb, which puts emphasis
on national values as an indispensable part of group and individual identity. On the other hand, I am going to analyze left-wing
evaluation of cosmopolitanism (for instance, that of Chantal Mouffe) as an ideologically motivated attempt to hide the real
contradictions of the contemporary world. Finally, I will prove that these critiques cannot undermine the concept of cosmopolitanism,
but they force us to rethink a way in which cosmopolitan society can be achieved. If cosmopolitan society is to emerge, we
need to reconstruct the idea of democracy and the notion of multi-cultural pluralistic society. I propose such rethinking
of cosmopolitanism by the introduction of the notion of “dialogical cosmopolitanism,” which refers to M.M. Bakhtin’s concept
of dialogue and G.H. Mead’s idea of “taking the role of the other.” 相似文献