真实模态实在论的分析局限性

真实模态实在论者认为,存在众多的可能世界,每一个可能世界都不过是最大程度地内在关联的时空的和.据称这种观点的一个优点就是为我们提供了分析资源,以不循环的方式来分析模态算子.     

Modal Realism with Modal Tense 1

Modal realists should fashion their theory by postulating and taking seriously the modal equivalent of tense, or modal tense. This will give them a uniform way to respond to five different objections, one each by Skyrms, Quine, and Peacocke, and two by van Inwagen, and suggest a non-Lewisian path to modal realism.     

The Cardinality Objection to David Lewis's Modal Realism

According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every waythat a world could be is a way that some concretely existingphysical world really is. But if the worlds are physicalentities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereasI show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is nota set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of theLewisian framework.     

The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism

Ontic structural realism is the view that structures are what is real in the first place in the domain of fundamental physics. The structures are usually conceived as including a primitive modality. However, it has not been spelled out as yet what exactly that modality amounts to. This paper proposes to fill this lacuna by arguing that the fundamental physical structures possess a causal essence, being powers. Applying the debate about causal vs categorical properties in analytic metaphysics to ontic structural realism, I show that the standard argument against categorical and for causal properties holds for structures as well. Structural realism, as a position in the metaphysics of science that is a form of scientific realism, is committed to causal structures. The metaphysics of causal structures is supported by physics, and it can provide for a complete and coherent view of the world that includes all domains of empirical science.     

Arithmetical Completeness Theorem for Modal Logic $$\mathsf{}$$

We prove that for any recursively axiomatized consistent extension T of Peano Arithmetic, there exists a \(\Sigma _2\) provability predicate of T whose provability logic is precisely the modal logic \(\mathsf{K}\). For this purpose, we introduce a new bimodal logic \(\mathsf{GLK}\), and prove the Kripke completeness theorem and the uniform arithmetical completeness theorem for \(\mathsf{GLK}\).     

Belief-Ful Realism and Scientific Realism

Despite tensions between Tillich's category of belief-ful realism and a view of science that embraces metaphysical and epistemological realism, a constructive relationship can be developed between the two. Both are based on common understandings about reality. Belief-ful or theonomous realism thus affirms scientific realism. On the other hand, scientific realism is open to the ecstatic, self-transcending elements of belief-ful realism. Finally, Tillich's formulation of the relationship between culture and religion can be reformulated specifically to include scientific and technological culture.     

Completeness and super-valuations

This paper uses the notion of Galois-connection to examine the relation between valuation-spaces and logics. Every valuation-space gives rise to a logic, and every logic gives rise to a valuation space, where the resulting pair of functions form a Galois-connection, and the composite functions are closure-operators. A valuation-space (resp., logic) is said to be complete precisely if it is Galois-closed. Two theorems are proven. A logic is complete if and only if it is reflexive and transitive. A valuation-space is complete if and only if it is closed under formation of super-valuations.     

From Standard Scientific Realism and Structural Realism to Best Current Theory Realism

I defend a realist commitment to the truth of our most empirically successful current scientific theories—on the ground that it provides the best explanation of their success and the success of their falsified predecessors. I argue that this Best Current Theory Realism (BCTR) is superior to preservative realism (PR) and the structural realism (SR). I show that PR and SR rest on the implausible assumption that the success of outdated theories requires the realist to hold that these theories possessed truthful components. PR is undone by the fact that past theories succeeded even though their ontological claims about unobservables are false. SR backpeddles to argue that the realist is only committed to the truth about the structure of relations implied by the outdated theory, in order to explain its success. I argue that the structural component of theories is too bare-bones thin to explain the predictive/explanatory success of outdated theories. I conclude that BCTR can meet these objections to PR and SR, and also overcome the pessimistic meta-induction.     

Realism and Realism: Rejoinder to Gare and Smith

This is a response to comments by Gare and Smith (1984) on my critique of humanistic psychology (McMullen, 1982).     

The Immorality of Modal Realism,Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Let the Children Drown

Philosophical Studies -