The puzzle of the hats

The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and betting rates diverge. Second, there is an analogy between ways of dealing with situations of this kind and different policies for sequential choice. Third, there is an analogy with strategic voting, showing that the common interest is not always served by expressing how things seem to you in social decision-making. And fourth, our analysis of the Puzzle of the Hats casts light on a recent controversy about the Dutch book argument for the Sleeping Beauty.     

The Newxin puzzle

A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer to as the Newxin puzzle—and discuss its implications in relation to the revisionist approach just described. Using the Newxin puzzle, I argue that the approach leads to a more radically revisionist picture of practical rationality than current debate suggests.

The puzzle of language evolution

Linguistics must again concentrate on the evolutionary nature of language, so that language models are more realistic with respect to human natural languages and have a greater explanatory force. Multi-agent systems are proposed as a possible route to develop such evolutionary models and an example is given of a concrete experiment in the origins and evolution of word-meaning based on a multi-agent approach.     

The puzzle of language evolution

Zusammenfassung. Die Sprachwissenschaft muß sich wieder auf den evolutionären Aspekt der Sprache konzentrieren, damit Sprachmodelle in bezug auf menschliche natürliche Sprachen realistischer und überzeugungskräftiger werden. Multiagent-Systeme werden als ein möglicher Weg zur Entwicklung solcher evolutionärer Modelle vorgeschlagen, und es wird ein Beispiel eines konkreten Experiments über Ursprung und Entwicklung der Semantik auf der Grundlage einer Multi-agent-Methode gegeben. Abstract. Linguistics must again concentrate on the evolutionary nature of language, so that language models are more realistic with respect to human natural languages and have a greater explanatory force. Multi-agent systems are proposed as a possible route to develop such evolutionary models and an example is given of a concrete experiment in the origins and evolution of word-meaning based on a multi-agent approach.     

The puzzle of philosophical testimony

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief.     

The unsolved puzzle of trauma

This paper covers the inherent difference between psychoanalysis, which deals with unconscious fantasies, and trauma, which emphasizes the psychic repercussions caused by events in external reality. This distinction has led to variations in the treatment for victims of trauma, which also reflects the duality commonly observed in this group of patients. I suggest that trauma leads to unconscious guilt and the need for exoneration because individuals identify with their fate, and that this guilt can and indeed should be analyzed. Further studies might show that dividedness predates the experience of trauma and that this mode of defense mitigates the impact of trauma.     

The psychological puzzle of Sudoku

Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 × 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty depending on their “relational complexity”, i.e., the number of constraints on which they depend. A major strategic shift is necessary to acquire tactics for more difficult puzzles: solvers have to keep track of possible digits in a cell. We report three experiments corroborating this theory. We also discuss their implications for theories of reasoning that downplay the role of deduction in everyday reasoning.     

The birth order puzzle.

Studies relating intellectual performance to birth order report conflicting results, some finding intellectual scores to increase, others to decrease with birth order. In contrast, the relationship between intellectual performance and family size is stable and consistently replicable. Why do these two highly related variables generate such divergent results? This birth order puzzle is resolved by means of the confluence model that quantifies the influences upon intellectual growth arising within the family context. At the time of a new birth, two opposing influences act upon intellectual growth of the elder sibling: (a) his or her intellectual environment is "diluted" and (b) he or she loses the "last-born's handicap" and begins serving as an intellectual resource to the younger sibling. Since these opposite effects are not equal in magnitude, the differences in intellectual performance among birth ranks are shown to be age dependent. While elder children may surpass their younger siblings in intellectual performance at some ages, they may be overtaken by them at others. Thus when age is taken into consideration, the birth order literature loses its chaotic character and an orderly pattern of results emerges.     

The persuasiveness puzzle about bootstrapping

This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method of settling questions about the reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method for coming to believe that the source is reliable. However, when being initially unaware of a source and its reliability, as in the case of forming beliefs about our sense apparatus, bootstrapping can be eventually persuasive.     

The puzzle of hyper‐change

If there is a second dimension of time – a so‐called ‘hypertime’ – is it logically possible for the past to change? Some have said yes; others have said no. I say yes provided that one has the appropriate ontological view of hypertime. So far, the ontology of hypertime has seldom been discussed. As such, this paper not only defends the logical possibility of a changing past, but aims to start a discussion on what ontological commitments are required to make sense of a changing past.     

The placebo puzzle: putting together the pieces.

This article outlines and assesses the main theories of the placebo effect and suggests how they might sit together in a larger model of placebo etiology. Among the approaches considered are expectancy theory, emotional change theory, classical conditioning, and the biological approach. Although these are sometimes assumed to be competing models, in many cases they shed light on different pans of the placebo puzzle. Expectancies are the core of most placebo effects in human beings. The effects of expectancies are sometimes unmediated but in other cases are mediated by changes in emotional state, immune system function, perception, or behavior. Although expectancies are implicated in most placebo effects, a small number of placebo effects may be solely attributable to nonconscious contingency learning.     

The puzzle of working memory for sign language

Why is immediate-serial-recall (short-term memory) span consistently shorter for sign language than it is for speech? A new study by Boutla et al. shows that neither the length of signs, nor the formational similarity of signed digits, can account for the difference. Their results suggest instead that the answer lies in differences between the auditory and visual systems. At the same time, however, their results show that sign language and spoken language yield equivalent processing spans, suggesting that reliance on immediate-serial-recall measures in clinical and educational testing is misplaced.     

The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle

The “puzzle of the unmarked clock” derives from a conflict between the following: (1) a plausible principle of epistemic modesty, and (2) “Rational Reflection”, a principle saying how one’s beliefs about what it is rational to believe constrain the rest of one’s beliefs. An independently motivated improvement to Rational Reflection preserves its spirit while resolving the conflict.     

The hydra-headed Mueller-Lyer effect: A theoretical puzzle

Three experiments were conducted to examine the effects of multiple fins on the magnitude of the Mueller-Lyer illusion. All studies showed that the multiple form of the elongation illusion was greater than the average of the components and that the multiple form of the shrinkage illusion was smaller than either of the components. The pattern of results failed to support either simple addition models or more complex averaging theories of illusions. A cross-attribute summation hypothesis and a filled space hypothesis were proposed as possible explanations for the results.     

The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it

ABSTRACT

According to the transparency approach, achievement of self-knowledge is a two-stage process: first, the subject arrives at the judgment ‘p’; second, the subject proceeds to the judgment ‘I believe that p.’ The puzzle of transparency is to understand why the transition from the first to the second judgment is rationally permissible. After revisiting the debate between Byrne and Boyle on this matter, I present a novel solution according to which the transition is rationally permissible in virtue of a justifying argument that begins from a premise referring to the mental utterance that is emitted in the course of judging ‘p.’     

Prior's puzzle generalized

Prior's puzzle is standardly taken to be the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of $⌜$the proposition that $P$$⌝$ for $⌜$that $P$$⌝$ within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs is invalid. I show that Prior's puzzle is much more general than is ordinarily supposed. There are two variants on the substitutional form of the puzzle—a quantificational variant and a pronominal variant—and all three forms of the puzzle arise in a wide range of verbal complements, rather than merely in the complements of propositional attitude verbs. The generalized puzzle shows that a range of proposed solutions to the original puzzle fail, or are radically incomplete, and also reveals the connections between Prior's puzzle and debates over the nature of semantic types and higher-order quantification. I go on to develop a novel, higher-order solution to the generalized form of the puzzle, and I argue that this higher-approach is superior to its first-order alternatives.