INTERNISTS OF THE MIND OR PHYSICIANS OF THE SOUL: DOES PSYCHIATRY NEED A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY?

Although psychiatry is interested in what both body and mind contribute to behavior, it sometimes emphasizes one more than the other. Since the early 1980s, American psychiatry has shifted its interest from mind and psyche to body and brain. Neuroscience and psychopharmacology are increasingly at the core of psychiatry. Some experts claim that psychiatry is no longer interested in problems in living and positive goals such as mental health, happiness, and morality but rather has narrowed its focus to mental disorders addressed with psychotropic drugs. In view of this trend, psychiatry needs to confront two questions in social philosophy. If it is no longer directly concerned with health and happiness, how does it relate to these positive goals? And how does it relate as a medical institution to religious institutions, schools, and other organizations that directly promote health, happiness, morality, and the purposes of life? It is not enough for psychiatry to renounce its moral role; its practices still shape cultural values. Psychiatry should take more responsibility for developing a public philosophy that addresses these issues.     

GUILT AND THE SCIENCE OF EMOTION: HOW DOES PRAYER FIT?

This article engages sources regarding evolutionary development of guilt (Richard Joyce's The Evolution of Morality, Jesse Prinz's Gut Reactions, and others) and how they can be used to dialogue with material on the alleviation of guilt in the Christian tradition using examples in the work of Anselm of Canterbury and John Chrysostom. This raises a few key questions. If guilt is an evolutionary trait created to build reputation and relationship, how does this mesh with some theological approaches to solutions for guilt? To be more precise, guilt possibly evolved to create a motivation for beneficial communal actions, and necessitates belief in the authority of the rules that one breaks to induce it. That said, does religion play a role in awareness of one's guilt, while also providing a solution to that guilt? The possibilities are explored in this article as they relate to issues of repentance, atonement, and prayer.     

WHAT IS A SCIENTIFIC WORLD VIEW,AND HOW DOES IT BEAR ON THE INTERPLAY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION?

Abstract. What is a scientific worldview, and why should we care? One worldview can knit together various notions, and therefore understanding a worldview requires analysis of its component parts. Stripped to its minimum, a scientific worldview consists strictly of falsifiable components. Such a worldview, based solely on ideas that can be tested with empirical observation, conforms to the highest levels of objectivity but is severely limited in utility. The limits arise for two reasons: first, many falsifiable ideas cannot be tested adequately until their repercussions already have been felt; second, the reach of science is limited, and ethics, which compose an inevitable part of any useful worldview, are largely unfalsifiable. Thus, a worldview that acts only on scientific components is crippled by a lack of moral relevance. Organized religion traditionally has played a central role in defining moral values, but it lost much of its influence after the discovery that key principles (such as the personal Creator of Genesis) contradict empirical reality. The apparent conundrum is that strictly scientific worldviews are amoral, while many long‐held religious worldviews have proven unscientific. The way out of this conundrum is to recognize that nonscientific ideas, as distinct from unscientific ideas, are acceptable components of a scientific worldview, because they do not contradict science. Nonscientific components of a worldview should draw upon scientific findings to explore traditional religious themes, such as faith and taboo. In contrast, unscientific ideas have been falsified and survive only via ignorance, denial, wishful thinking, blind faith, and institutional inertia. A worldview composed of both scientific components and scientifically informed nonscientific components can be both objective and ethically persuasive.     

DOES SENSITIVITY TO MAGNITUDE DEPEND ON THE TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF REINFORCEMENT?

Our research addressed the question of whether sensitivity to relative reinforcer magnitude in concurrent chains depends on the distribution of reinforcer delays when the terminal-link schedules are equal. In Experiment 1, 12 pigeons responded in a two-component procedure. In both components, the initial links were concurrent variable-interval 40-s variable-interval 40-s, and the terminal links were both 20-s interval schedules in which responses were reinforced by either 4-s of grain in one, or 2-s of grain in the other. The only difference between the components was whether the terminal-link schedules were fixed interval or variable intervals. For all subjects, the relative rate of responding in the initial links for the terminal link that produced the 4-s reinforcer was greater when the terminal links were fixed-interval schedules than when they were variable-interval schedules. This result is contrary to the prediction of Grace's (1994) contextual choice model, but is consistent with both Mazur's (2001) hyperbolic value-added model and Killeen's (1985) incentive theory. In Experiment 2, 4 pigeons responded in a concurrent-chains procedure in which 4-s or 2-s reinforcers were provided independently of responding according to equal fixed-time or mixed-time schedules. Preference for the 4-s reinforcer increased as the variability of the intervals comprising the mixed-time schedules was decreased. Generalized-matching sensitivity of initial-link response allocation to relative reinforcer magnitude was proportional to the geometric mean of the terminal-link delays.     

WHAT DOES EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY TELL US ABOUT PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION?

Abstract. Considerations from evolutionary biology lead Michael Ruse, among others, to a naturalistic turn in philosophy. I assess some of the pragmatic and skeptical conclusions concerning ethics, religion, and epistemology that Ruse draws from his evolutionary naturalism. Finally, I argue that there is an essential tension between science and religion which forecloses the possibility of an ultimate reconciliation between the two as they are now understood.     

DOES SCIENCE CLARIFY GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD?

Abstract. Central to the work of Arthur Peacocke on science and religion is the intention to develop a reasonable faith within an intelligible framework of meaning. Showing the inadequacy of reductionism is necessary for this purpose. Knowledge of God is related to what science can tell us about creation. From an evolutionary framework, characterized as a delicate balance that issued in humans, and manifested through contingency and chance, God's actions are expressed as exploring the potentialities of creation. The creation is understood to be in God, but God is more than the world, as in panentheism. God suffers with the creation in love, and the focus of human meaning is expressed in Jesus Christ, the Incarnation, the sacrament of God.     

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THEISTIC BELIEF

Theism is often supposed to be distinguished from atheism by the heavy weight of metaphysical belief that it carries. This paper argues that this is not as illuminating a way of distinguishing the theist's from the atheist's outlook as is often supposed. The key divergence consists not so much in matters of theoretical belief or philosophical argument as in practical differences in affective response and in the adoption of certain models for living. Two characteristically religious virtues, humility and hope, and two distinctively religious responses, awe and thanksgiving, are discussed in order to illustrate this. The paper's conclusion, while not denying a cognitive core to theism, argues that warranted assent to the metaphysical truth of God's existence cannot be a precondition for theistic hermeneusis and praxis. 1     

THE COLLAPSE OF OLIGARCHIC CAPITALISM AND THE RISE OF REGENERATIVE LEARNING: HOW THE SCIENCE OF ENERGY SYSTEMS CLARIFIES WHAT’S HAPPENING TODAY AND WHAT COMES NEXT

We live in a head-spinning, gut-wrenching time of multiplying crises. At home we face outsourced jobs, crumbling cities, underpaid teachers, unaffordable healthcare, endless wars, political corruption, a co-opted corporate media, skyrocketing inequality, and public “austerity” measures whose main purpose is to make tax-breaks for the rich more affordable. Working-class stagnation is producing widespread anxiety, mounting debt, and “despair deaths” from opioid abuse. Fear is fueling populist outrage, along with extremism, authoritarianism, and the conditions for a fascist takeover. Meanwhile, climate change poses an existential threat to humanity itself. All of these calamities spring from the same root cause: an oligarchic capitalism that puts short-term profit for owners over people and planet. While this system seems immutable, upheavals from Occupy Wall Street to the rise of right-wing populism signal a backlash to a political–economic establishment that treats people and planet as resources to be pillaged and expenses to be minimized. Its failures have also been driving the development of new possibilities in the form of more systemic approaches. Still, while systems thinking has improved approaches in fields from agriculture to medicine, so far none of these reforms have been able to channel public frustration into true transformation because none addresses the root problem: oligarchy. The science of systemic vitality we need is also being born, but so far, its findings are diffuse. This article shows how the science of energy systems can galvanize today’s economic reformation by articulating the common sense rules and rigorous measures of systemic vitality, while anchoring them in an evidence-based vision of humanity as a collaborative learning species. The result is a practical path to building systemic socioeconomic vitality by revitalizing human networks, energizing collective learning, and clarifying why oligarchic capitalism is a distortion of our original democratic free-enterprise dream, which is now careening toward collapse.     

A FIELD STUDY OF APPLICANT REACTIONS TO EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES: DOES THE RECRUITER MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

Previous cross-sectional field and laboratory research has provided mixed results as to whether recruiter characteristics and behaviors influence applicant reactions to employment opportunities. The present research was conducted to examine the effect of recruiter characteristics using a pre-post study design in a naturally occurring setting. In addition, the effects of several potential moderators on recruiter influence were tested. Results indicated that recruiter characteristics had an impact on perceived job attributes, regard for job and company, and likelihood of joining the company. There was little evidence that the effect of recruiter characteristics was moderated by selected applicant, job, or interviewer variables.     

EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE REINFORCEMENT: DOES THE SOURCE MATTER?1

In a chamber with a single response key, pigeon's key pecks were reinforced with food according to a variable-interval schedule. In addition, extra reinforcements occurred concurrently according to an independent schedule. In one condition, availability of the extra reinforcements was signalled by a change in key color from white to red. The extra reinforcements occurred after a peck on the red key. In a second condition, the extra reinforcements were unsignalled and occurred only after a 2-sec pause in pecking for one group of subjects and were unsignalled and occurred freely as scheduled for another group of subjects. In the first two conditions, duration of reinforcement was varied. A third condition duplicated the second but varied rate rather than duration of reinforcement. The rate of pecking varied inversely with the amount of extra reinforcement per unit time according to the same function, regardless of the condition regulating occurrence of the extra reinforcements, and regardless of whether or not a 2-sec pause was required for their occurrence. The shape of this function was predicted by Herrnstein's (1970) matching law.     

WHY IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY WORTH OUR STUDY?

Abstract: Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where “doing philosophy” refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of “authorial” propositions, that is, propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments for thinking that doing history of philosophy is valuable—specifically, valuable in such a way that its value does not reduce to the value of doing philosophy. Most such arguments proffered by historians of philosophy fail, as I show. I then offer a proposal about what makes doing history of philosophy uniquely valuable, but it is one that many historians will not find agreeable.