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1.
Robin Durie 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(1):73-88
The essay on Husserl’s phenomenology of touch in Derrida’s recent On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy represents his only substantial re-engagement with Husserlian phenomenology to be published following the series of texts
dating from the period marked by his Mémoire of 1955 through to the essay ‘Form and Meaning’ included in Margins (1972). The essay, devoted to some key sections of Husserl’s Ideas II, appears to break new ground in Derrida’s readings
of Husserl, but in fact demonstrates a profound continuity with his earlier readings. In fact, I argue that this continuity
is in a part an effect of Derrida’s ongoing commitment to the ‘methodology’ of deconstruction. I show how this commitment
leads Derrida to conflate three separate distinctions within Husserl’s discussion, a conflation that obliges Derrida to misread
the letter of Husserl’s text, and which, in turn, blinds him to a certain radical potentiality within Husserl’s phenomenology
of sensibility.
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Robin DurieEmail: |
2.
Daniel W. Smith 《Continental Philosophy Review》2005,38(1-2):89-123
This article examines Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum, which Deleuze formulated in the context of his reading of Nietzsche’s project of “overturning Platonism.” The essential
Platonic distinction, Deleuze argues, is more profound than the speculative distinction between model and copy, original and
image. The deeper, practical distinction moves between two kinds of images or eidolon, for which the Platonic Idea is meant to provide a concrete criterion of selection “Copies” or icons (eikones) are well-grounded claimants to the transcendent Idea, authenticated by their internal resemblance to the Idea, whereas “simulacra”
(phantasmata) are like false claimants, built on a dissimilarity and implying an essential perversion or deviation from the Idea. If the
goal of Platonism is the triumph of icons over simulacra, the inversion of Platonism would entail an affirmation of the simulacrum as such, which must thus be given its own concept. Deleuze consequently defines the simulacrum in terms
of an internal dissimilitude or “disparateness,” which in turn implies a new conception of Ideas, no longer as self-identical
qualities (the auto kath’hauto), but rather as constituting a pure concept of difference. An inverted Platonism would necessarily be based on a purely immanent and differential conception of Ideas. Starting from
this new conception of the Idea, Deleuze proposes to take up the Platonic project anew, rethinking the fundamental figures
of Platonism (selection, repetition, ungrounding, the question-problem complex) on a purely differential basis. In this sense,
Deleuze’s inverted Platonism can at the same time be seen as a rejuvenated Platonism and even a completed Platonism. 相似文献
3.
Roger Harris 《Axiomathes》2010,20(4):461-478
There are, broadly, three sorts of account of intrinsicality: ‘self-sufficiency’, ‘essentiality’ and ‘pure qualitativeness’.
I argue for the last of these, and urge that we take intrinsic properties of concrete objects to be all and only those shared
by actual or possible duplicates, which only differ extrinsically. This approach gains support from Francescotti’s approach:
defining ‘intrinsic’ in contradistinction to extrinsic properties which ‘consist in’ relations which rule out intrinsicality.
I answer Weatherson’s criticisms of Francescotti, but, to answer criticisms of my own, I amend his account, proposing that
possession of an extrinsic property consists in a relation to one or more actual or possible distinct concrete objects. Finally I indicate ways to avoid some apparent objections to this account. 相似文献
4.
William S. Sax 《International Journal of Hindu Studies》2000,4(1):39-60
Conclusion Our understanding of South Asian society and history is sometimes muddled by the rigid distinctions we make between ‘religion’
and ‘politics.’ The resurgent appeal of Hindu nationalism, the involvement of Hindu renouncers in contemporary Indian politics,
and the continuing relevance of religious issues to political discourse throughout South Asia, show that such a distinction
is of limited utility. In this essay, I have examined the notion of digvijaya in some detail, in an attempt to show that this ‘most important Indian concept with regard to sovereignty’ was always both
a ‘religious’ and a ‘political’ phenomenon. When it was performed by Hindu kings in the classical period, the ‘political’
dimension of digvijaya was foregrounded, while in the medieval and modern periods, when it was associated primarily with Hindu renouncers, its ‘religious’
aspects were paramount. But neither ‘political’ nor ‘religious’ aspects were ever absent from any of the digvijayas discussed here because religion and politics were mutually entailed in the digvijaya at all times, just as kings and renouncers were—and still are—alter-egos of each other. I am tempted to conclude that the
digvijaya melded religious and political domains. Yet perhaps even to speak of ‘melding’ religion and politics is a peculiarly modern
kind of discourse. Perhaps we need to rethink our categories and recognize that politics always has a religious element, while
religion is always a political force. 相似文献
5.
Noel Gough 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(3):279-294
This essay juxtaposes concepts created by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari with worlds imagined by Ursula Le Guin in a performance
of ‘rhizosemiotic play’ that explores some possible ways of generating and sustaining what William Pinar calls ‘complicated
conversation’ within the regime of signs that constitutes an increasingly internationalized curriculum field. Deleuze and
Guattari analyze thinking as flows or movements across space. They argue, for example, that every mode of intellectual inquiry
needs to account for the plane of immanence upon which it operates—the preconceptual field presupposed by the concepts that inquiry creates. Curriculum inquiry currently
operates on numerous nationally distinctive planes of immanence. I argue that the internationalization of curriculum studies
should not presume a singular transnational plane of immanence but, rather, envisage a process performed by curriculum scholars
with the capacities and competencies to change planes—to move between one plane of immanence and another and/or to transform their own planes. My essay is a ‘narrative experiment’
that takes seriously Deleuze’s argument that a work of philosophy should be, in part, a kind of science fiction, and also
takes inspiration from Le Guin’s science fictional stories of ‘changing planes’ to generate productive and disruptive transnational
agendas in curriculum inquiry.
Noel Gough is a Foundation Professor of Outdoor and Environmental Education and Head of the School of Outdoor Education and Environment at La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia. His current research focuses on the diverse implications of globalization, internationalization and multiculturalism for education, and on refining poststructuralist research methodologies in education, with particular reference to curriculum inquiry, environmental education, and science education. He is coeditor (with William Doll) of Curriculum Visions (Peter Lang 2002) and the founding editor of Transnational Curriculum Inquiry, the journal of the International Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies. 相似文献
Noel GoughEmail: |
Noel Gough is a Foundation Professor of Outdoor and Environmental Education and Head of the School of Outdoor Education and Environment at La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia. His current research focuses on the diverse implications of globalization, internationalization and multiculturalism for education, and on refining poststructuralist research methodologies in education, with particular reference to curriculum inquiry, environmental education, and science education. He is coeditor (with William Doll) of Curriculum Visions (Peter Lang 2002) and the founding editor of Transnational Curriculum Inquiry, the journal of the International Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies. 相似文献
6.
Edward Thornton 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2017,55(4):454-474
In this paper, I offer an account of the conceptual shift that occurs between the work completed by Gilles Deleuze prior to 1969 and his later work with Félix Guattari, beginning in 1972 with Anti‐Oedipus. Against previous interpretations, which have concentrated on the developments initiated by Deleuze, I argue for the primary importance of Guattari's influence, especially his insistence on a theory of “machinic processes.” The importance of these processes is made manifest in Deleuze and Guattari's move away from theories of structuralism. In order to carry out this task, I offer a close reading of Guattari's essay “Machine and Structure.” This essay was first written as a review of Deleuze's acclaimed work in Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense and formed the basis for Deleuze and Guattari's first meeting. In the concluding sections of the paper, I show how the integration of the concept of the machine allows Deleuze and Guattari to develop a theory of the unconscious that operates outside of the boundaries traditionally set by structuralist analysis. 相似文献
7.
Through the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze, my paper explores a different theory of time. I reconstitute Deleuze’s paradoxes of the past in Difference and Repetition and Bergsonism to reveal a theory of time in which the relation between past and present is one of coexistence rather than succession. The theory of memory implied here is a non-representational one. To elaborate this theory, I ask: what is the role of the “virtual image” in Bergson’s Matter and Memory? Far from representing the simple afterimage of a present perception, the “virtual image” carries multiple senses. Contracting the immediate past for the present, or expanding virtually to hold the whole of memory (and even the whole of the universe), the virtual image can form a bridge between the present and the non-representational past. This non-representational account of memory sheds light not only on the structure of time for Bergson, but also on his concepts of pure memory and virtuality. The rereading of memory also opens the way for Bergsonian intuition to play an intersubjective role; intuition becomes a means for navigating the resonances and dissonances that can be felt between different rhythms of becoming or planes of memory, which constitute different subjects. 相似文献
8.
Paul Crowther 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):151-170
Heidegger’s paper ‘Art and Space’ (1969, Man and world 6. Bloomington: Indiana university Press) is the place where he gives his fullest discussion of a major art medium which is
somewhat neglected in aesthetics, namely sculpture. The structure of argument in ‘Art and Space’ is cryptic even by Heidegger’s
standards. The small amount of literature tends to focus on the paper’s role within Heidegger’s own oeuvre as an expression of changes in his understanding of space. This is ironic; for Heidegger’s main thematic in the essay is
the way in which space is overcome in the creation of sculpture. Of course, by virtue of its three-dimensional character, sculpture seems to be a spatial medium,
par excellence. The counter-intuitive character of Heidegger’s position requires, accordingly, that his argumentative strategy be scrutinized
very closely. In this paper, therefore, I will examine closely the structure of Heidegger’s argument, with the aim of understanding,
rectifying, and then developing his most important insights. My ultimate aim is to show the subtle, but radical points which
are at issue in Heidegger’s arguments, and to develop them much further in the clarification of sculpture’s key philosophical
significance.
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Paul CrowtherEmail: |
9.
Matthew Ratcliffe 《Synthese》2011,178(1):121-130
This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds
of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s
claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of
the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This
latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility
serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and
propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique. 相似文献
10.
Matthew Joel Sharpe 《Sophia》2011,50(3):413-427
In the second half of this essay (begun in Sophia 50:141–158), we continue our reading of Leo Strauss’ important later essay
on Maimonides, ‘How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Perplexed’. Our method is to try, as best as we are able, to read this essay as Strauss directs us to read esoteric texts in Persecution
and the Art of Writing. As a means of testing and attempting to confirm our reading of this difficult later essay on Maimonides,
we will close by situating our reading of ‘How to Begin to Study’ and Strauss’ partly concealed positions there on philosophy, prophecy and the Torah alongside the claims of his earlier,
much less esoteric, but also rarely studied 1930s essay: ‘Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi’. Because of the widely recognised foundational importance of Maimonides in understanding Leo Strauss’ own lasting positions,
this work aims at making a contribution to the continuing, and presently highly contentious, task of trying to understand
Strauss’ thoughts on Athens and Jerusalem, reason and revelation, the city and man. 相似文献
11.
Alan Haworth 《Res Publica》2007,13(1):77-100
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’.
I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections
fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the
liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that
Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public
interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit,
if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard
against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. 相似文献
12.
Jack Reynolds 《Sophia》2008,47(3):311-325
This essay raises some critical questions about the interpretation that Derrida offers of Merleau-Ponty in his recent book,
On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy, where Derrida implies that the latter’s work remains mired in theological prejudices. As well as defending Merleau-Ponty’s
analyses of the senses and inter-subjectivity against such claims, this essay is also concerned to examine Derrida’s transcendental
philosophy of time (or philosophy of the contretemps that breaks open time but nonetheless pertains to it) that undergirds
and motivates his engagement with various philosophies of touch. In this latter respect, I will argue that Derrida’s philosophy
is itself ‘touched’ by time, in the peculiar sense of ‘touched’ that connotes affected and wounded. His work instantiates
an ethics of non-presentist time (which is also the transcendental condition for any event of touch) and I ask whether there
is reason to look for a different understanding of both time and the transcendental to Derrida’s.
相似文献
Jack ReynoldsEmail: |
13.
14.
Stefano Predelli 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(1):5-21
In this essay, I propose an analysis of Quine’s example ’Giorgione was so-called because of his size’, grounded on the idea
of an obstinate demonstrative. In the first sections, I discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the demonstrative and logophoric
treatments of ‘so called’, I highlight certain parallelisms with Davidson’s paratactic view of quotation, and I introduce
independent considerations in favor of the idea of an obstinate demonstrative. In the second half of my essay, I apply this
notion to Quine’s example, and I discuss its consequences with respect to the principle of substitutivity of coreferential
singular terms. 相似文献
15.
Matthew Joel Sharpe 《Sophia》2011,50(1):141-158
This essay, which will be divided between two SOPHIA editions, proposes to test the consensus in Maimonidean scholarship on
the alleged intellectualism of Leo Strauss’ Maimonides by making a close interpretive study of Strauss’ 1963 essay ‘How to
Begin to Study the Guide for the Perplexed’. While the importance of this essay, which is Strauss’ last extended piece on the Guide, is established in Maimonidean scholarship, its recognised esotericism has been matched by a dearth of detailed studies of
the piece. We aim in this essay to try to rectify this situation, by reading ‘How to Begin to Study’ as Strauss directs us
to read esoteric texts in Persecution and the Art of Writing. As one control on our exegetical claims, we will close by situating our reading of ‘How to Begin to Study’ and Strauss’
positions there on philosophy, prophecy and the Torah alongside the claims of his earlier, much less esoteric, but also rarely
studied: ‘Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi’. Because of the now widely recognised foundational
importance of Maimonides in understanding Leo Strauss’ own lasting positions, this work will have wider importance in Strauss
scholarship, and hopefully make a contribution to the continuing task of trying to understand Strauss’ important thoughts
on Athens and Jerusalem, reason and revelation, the city and man. 相似文献
16.
Shane Mackinlay 《Sophia》2010,49(4):499-507
In his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Martin Heidegger discusses three examples of artworks: a painting by Van Gogh of peasant shoes, a poem about a Roman fountain,
and a Greek temple. The new entry on Heidegger’s aesthetics in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, written by Iain Thomson, focuses on this essay, and Van Gogh’s painting in particular. It argues that Heidegger uses Van
Gogh’s painting to set art, as the happening of truth, in relation to ‘nothing’, which is a key term in Heidegger’s essays
leading up to The Origin of the Work of Art. This paper extends a similar analysis to the Greek temple as a way of offering an exposition of Heidegger’s concerns in
the essay. It begins by briefly outlining Thomson’s argument that Heidegger relates Van Gogh’s painting to ‘nothing’, and
indicating the way this argument can be extended to the Greek temple. It then discusses three ways in which ‘nothing’ can
open up the significance of the temple as a work of art in which truth happens: (1) it is not concerned with objective representation;
(2) it depicts the primal strife of earth and world, concealing and unconcealing; (3) it is fundamentally historical. 相似文献
17.
Liisa Steinby 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(3):227-249
In this article, Bakhtin’s early aesthetics is reread in the context of Hermann Cohen’s system of philosophy, especially his
aesthetics. Bakhtin’s thinking from the early ethical writing Toward a Philosophy of Act to Author and Hero in Artistic Activity and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics is followed. In Author and Hero, an individual is in his life conceived as involved in cognitive and ethical action but as remaining without a consummative
form; the form, or the ‘soul’, is bestowed upon a person by the creative activity of the artist alone. In his understanding
of artistic creativity and the relationship between the ‘hero’ and the author, Bakhtin closely follows Cohen, with the exception
that for Cohen the object of artistic form-giving is the universal, idealized man, whereas for Bakhtin it is an individual.
In the concept of a ‘polyphonic novel’ as developed in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin, however, considers this view of the activity of the artist (or the novelist) to apply to the “traditional” novel
only, while in a Dostoevskyean novel the characters are not subordinated to any defining power of the author. Bakhtin’s theory
of the Dostoevskyean novel is thus a return to the emphasis of the cognitive and ethical autonomy of the individual. His understanding
of the encounter between persons as a ‘subject’—‘subject’ or an ‘I’—‘thou’ relation has a predecessor, among others, in Cohen. 相似文献
18.
Greg Novack 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(6):655-678
The principle of indifference (hereafter ‘Poi’) says that if one has no more reason to believe A than B (and vice versa), then one ought not to believe A more than B (nor vice versa). Many think it’s demonstrably false despite its intuitive plausibility, because of a particular style of thought experiment
that generates counterexamples. Roger White (2008) defends Poi by arguing that its antecedent is false in these thought experiments. Like White I believe Poi, but I find his
defense unsatisfactory for two reasons: it appeals to false premises, and it saves Poi only at the expense of something that
Poi’s believers likely find just as important. So in this essay I defend Poi by arguing that its antecedent does hold in the
relevant thought experiments, and that the further propositions needed to reject Poi are false. I play only defense in this
essay; I don’t argue that Poi is true (even though I think it is), but rather that one popular refutation is faulty. In showing
this, I also note something that has to my knowledge gone unnoticed: given some innocuous-looking assumptions the denial of
Poi is equivalent to a version of epistemic permissivism, and Poi itself is equivalent to a version of epistemic uniqueness. 相似文献
19.
William H. Hanson 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(3):437-459
The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary
claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not
necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus
independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it
strikes close to the heart of the traditional view. I begin this paper by discussing and refuting Zalta’s argument in the
context of a language for propositional modal logic with an actuality connective (section 1). This involves showing that his
argument in favor of real world validity his preferred explication of logical truth, is fallacious. Next (section 2) I argue
for an alternative explication of logical truth called general validity. Since the rule of necessitation preserves general
validity, the argument of section 2 provides a reason for affirming the traditional view. Finally (section 3) I show that
the intuitive idea behind the discredited notion of real world validity finds legitimate expression in an object language
connective for deep necessity.
Earlier versions of this paper were read at the universities of Graz,
Maribor, and Salzburg, and at a workshop on the philosophy of logic at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City. My
thanks to those present at these events for many helpful suggestions. Thanks
are also due to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies. 相似文献