Attributions restore consistency in bargaining with liked/disliked partners

The experiment deals with the impact of self-esteem and liking for the partner on the attribution of agreement and deadlock in bargaining. Fifty-eight male and 70 female students played the Harsanyi-Selten bargaining game with incomplete information eight times, allegedly each time with a randomly selected partner. In fact in four games a computer program simulated the partner. Combining an experimental variation of liking (liking—disliking), own costs (low, high), partner costs (low, high) the experiment followed a 2×2×2 repeated measures design. As predicted by a path model from balance theory (a) failure (deadlock) was attributed more to the partner and less to self than success (agreement), (b) success was attributed more to the liked than the disliked partner, whereas failure was attributed more to the disliked than the liked partner.     

Friend versus foe: Neural correlates of prosocial decisions for liked and disliked peers

Although the majority of our social interactions are with people we know, few studies have investigated the neural correlates of sharing valuable resources with familiar others. Using an ecologically valid research paradigm, this functional magnetic resonance imaging study examined the neural correlates of prosocial and selfish behavior in interactions with real-life friends and disliked peers in young adults. Participants (N = 27) distributed coins between themselves and another person, where they could make selfish choices that maximized their own gains or prosocial choices that maximized outcomes of the other. Participants were more prosocial toward friends and more selfish toward disliked peers. Individual prosociality levels toward friends were associated negatively with supplementary motor area and anterior insula activity. Further preliminary analyses showed that prosocial decisions involving friends were associated with heightened activity in the bilateral posterior temporoparietal junction, and selfish decisions involving disliked peers were associated with heightened superior temporal sulcus activity, which are brain regions consistently shown to be involved in mentalizing and perspective taking in prior studies. Further, activation of the putamen was observed during prosocial choices involving friends and selfish choices involving disliked peers. These findings provide insights into the modulation of neural processes that underlie prosocial behavior as a function of a positive or negative relationship with the interaction partner.     

Affective priming with liked and disliked persons: Prime visibility determines congruency and incongruency effects

The present research investigated whether the affective priming paradigm from Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986) can be used as an implicit measure of person schemata. Names and faces of friends or romantic partners and of a disliked person were used as primes. It was explored whether: (1) stimuli relating to liked and disliked persons elicit congruency priming effects similar to those reported for words; (2) masked and unmasked priming procedures had similar effects; and (3) whether individual differences in the implicit measure were related to explicit measures of relationship quality. For clearly visible primes the expected congruence priming effects were found across names and faces. For marginally visible primes, however, unexpected reverse priming effects were observed for the disliked person. In a second experiment, a confound of the familiarity and evaluation of the significant other primes was removed. Now a reverse priming effect could be demonstrated for masked primes in both liked and disliked person conditions. On the group level, effects were consistent across name and face primes, thus providing strong evidence that priming effects were caused by the activation of person schemata. The reliability of inter-individual differences in person-specific priming effects was found to be unsatisfactory, and correlations with explicit measures were not consistent across name and face priming conditions. An explanation of reverse priming effects is discussed, and measures to improve the psychometric quality of individual affective priming indices are suggested.     

Color preferences change after experience with liked/disliked colored objects

How are color preferences formed, and can they be changed by affective experiences with correspondingly colored objects? We examined these questions by testing whether affectively polarized experiences with images of colored objects would cause changes in color preferences. Such changes are implied by the ecological valence theory (EVT), which posits that color preferences are determined by people’s average affective responses to correspondingly colored objects (Palmer & Schloss, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 8877–8882, 2010). Seeing images of strongly liked (and disliked) red and green objects, therefore, should lead to increased (and decreased) preferences for correspondingly colored red and green color patches. Experiment 1 showed that this crossover interaction did occur, but only if participants were required to evaluate their preferences for the colored objects when they saw them. Experiment 2 showed that these overall changes decreased substantially over a 24-h delay, but the degree to which the effect lasted for individuals covaried with the magnitude of the effects immediately after object exposure. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar, but weaker, effect of affectively biased changes in color preferences when participants did not see, but only imagined, the colored objects. The overall pattern of results indicated that color preferences are not fixed, but rather are shaped by affective experiences with colored objects. Possible explanations for the observed changes in color preferences were considered in terms of associative learning through evaluative conditioning and/or priming of prior knowledge in memory.     

How emotions expressed by adults’ faces affect the desire to eat liked and disliked foods in children compared to adults

The aim of this study was to determine whether or not pleasure, neutrality, and disgust expressed by eaters in photographs could affect the desire to eat food products to a greater extent in children than in adults. Children of 5 and 8 years of age, as well as adults, were presented with photographs of liked and disliked foods. These foods were presented either alone or with an eater who expressed three different emotions: pleasure, neutrality, or disgust. Results showed that, compared with food presented alone, food presented with a pleasant face increased the desire to eat disliked foods, particularly in children, and increased the desire to eat liked foods only in the 5‐year‐old children. In contrast, with a disgusted face, the desire to eat the liked foods decreased in all participants, although to a greater extent in children, while it had no effect on the desire to eat the disliked foods. Finally, food presented with a neutral face also increased and decreased the desire to eat disliked and liked foods, respectively, and in each case more for the 5‐year‐olds than for the older participants. In sum, the facial expressions of others influence the desire to eat liked and disliked foods and, to a greater extent, in younger children.     

On the categorization of admired and disliked exemplars of admired and disliked racial groups

The present work examined the influence of affective fit in the racial categorization process. Study 1 tested whether famous exemplars of stigmatized and nonstigmatized racial groups are categorized by race at differential rates, depending on whether they are admired or disliked. Using an inverted-face paradigm, Study 2 examined whether racial categorization accuracy differs for admired and disliked exemplars of these groups. Study 3 examined the influence of collective self-esteem on Whites' tendency to differentially categorize admired and disliked Black and White exemplars. Last, Study 4 replicated the pattern of results found in the previous studies for White participants, making use of unknown exemplars about whom participants learned either positive or negative information prior to categorizing them. Taken together, the results suggested that phenotypically irrelevant affective information regarding exemplars and their social group memberships influences the racial categorization process. Implications for prejudice and stereotyping are discussed.     

The Correspondence between Human Intelligibility and Physical Intelligibility: The View of Jean Ladrière

This article seeks to explain the correspondence between human intelligibility and that of the physical world by synthesizing the contributions of Jean Ladrière. Ladrière shows that the objectification function of formal symbolism in mathematics as an artificial language has operative power acquired through algorithm to represent physical reality. In physical theories, mathematics relates to observations through theoretic and empirical languages mutually interacting in a methodological circle, and nonmathematical anticipatory intention guides mathematical algorithmic exploration. Ladrière reasons that mathematics can make the physical world comprehensible because of the presence of a rational principle in both kinds of intelligibility.     

Lonergan and Bhaskar: The Intelligibility of Experiment

The aim of this paper is to note the convergence between two critical realist philosophies of science, namely, that of Roy Bhaskar and Bernard Lonergan with regard to the intelligibility of experimental activity. Bhaskar very explicitly argues that ‘differentiation implies stratification.’ The idea is that because the situations produced in laboratories are special instances of closure (like the solar system in the open universe, they do not represent the general case) the significance of experimental activity is that it brings about regularities with a view to understanding scientific laws at a deeper level. This is to say, when experiment is properly understood, the weaknesses of empiricism are exposed. Although he is not as explicit, Lonergan also has recourse to this argument. The parallels between Bhaskar and Lonergan are not surprising given the Aristotelian heritage that is manifest in their common concern for a realist ontology. Nevertheless, some differences between the two emerge, for example, in Lonergan's concern with the development of statistical science, and as well, a firm commitment to substance (rather than to powers, simply). Some attention to the significance of experimental activity for the debate surrounding realism is explored; it is suggested that Lonergan has something to offer in the subsequent conversation associated with Maxwell, van Fraassen, Hacking and Cartwright.     

The personality traits of liked people

There is surprisingly little understanding of how personality traits are associated with being generally liked by others after adolescence (Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006). We examined the relationship between self-reported personality traits and being generally liked in young adulthood in Greek organizations and freshman dormitories. We found a high level of consistency in which traits were associated with being liked. We examined the relationship between liked and socially desirable traits, using a recent theory on agency and communion (Wojciszke, Abele, & Baryla, 2009). Results help to create a personality profile of the person who is more liked by others, especially pointing to the importance of communal characteristics that are associated with behavior benefiting others.     

Sources of respect: the effects of being liked by ingroups and outgroups

We investigated the effects of ingroup and outgroup sources of respect, defined as positive social evaluations of self, on group members' emotional reactions and collective self‐esteem. We used both natural group memberships (Studies 1 and 2) and laboratory groups (Study 3). We expected that the positive effects of respect derived from an ingroup would not hold when derived from an outgroup source. In Study 1 (N = 294) respect was manipulated as deriving either from ingroup or outgroup. Although respect produced a positive emotional reaction irrespective of source, collective self‐esteem was only enhanced by an ingroup source. In Study 2 (N = 248), we investigated the concurrent effects of ingroup respect and outgroup respect. As in Study 1, ingroup and outgroup respect both produced positive emotional reactions, but collective self‐esteem was only affected by ingroup respect. Additionally, outgroup respect intensified the shame people experienced due to lack of ingroup respect. In Study 3 (N = 66), participants were immersed in experimental groups and ingroup and outgroup respect were manipulated orthogonally. Interactive effects of the two sources of respect indicated that high outgroup respect could not compensate for low ingroup respect, and if anything had an adverse effect. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Being and feeling liked by others: How social inclusion impacts health

This study examined the effects of perceived and actual social inclusion on health across and within individuals from a network perspective. During the first semester, 75 freshmen students provided bi-weekly ratings on their perceived social inclusion and health. To capture actual social inclusion, each student nominated liked and disliked fellow students. Perceived social inclusion mediated the effect of actual social inclusion on health. Specifically, students with more ‘likes’ perceived more social inclusion and those with higher perceived inclusion reported a better health status (between-person effect). In addition, at time points, when students received more ‘likes’ they also perceived more social inclusion. They reported better health at times when they felt more included (within-person effect). Thus, the perception of social inclusion is rooted in reality and actual social inclusion has an impact on health when passing the filter of perception.     

Intuition beyond recognition: when less familiar events are liked more

In a laboratory experiment, we compare the relative impact of two possible determinants of intuitive evaluative judgments: ease of recognition and total value of prior encounters with a target. Participants encode daily return values of shares on the stock market while watching videotaped ads on the computer screen. This dual-task procedure ensures that participants subsequently lack relevant event memories and thus have to rely on their intuition when evaluating the targets. In the presentation, the share appearing least frequently produced the highest sum of returns. In contrast, the share appearing most frequently produced the lowest sum of returns. Evaluative judgments reveal a preference for the share with the highest sum of returns, although, as evident from recognition latencies, it was the one that was more difficult to recognize. The results provide evidence for the value-account model of implicit attitude formation (Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001), which predicts that intuitive evaluative judgments reflect the total value of prior encounters.     

Intelligibility,Moral Loss and Injustice

In Liberalism's Religion, I analyse the specific conception of religion that liberalism relies upon. I argue that the concept of religion should be disaggregated into its normatively salient features. When deciding whether to avert undue impingements on religious observances, or to avoid any untoward support of such observances, liberal states should not deal with ‘religion’ as such but, rather, with relevant dimensions of religious phenomena. States should avoid religious entanglement when ‘religion’ is epistemically inaccessible, socially divisive and/or comprehensive in scope. In turn, states should show special deference to religious observances insofar as they exhibit what I call integrity – whether personal or collective. The upshot of this interpretive strategy is that liberal law need not recognise religion as such. As a result, there are gaps between the liberal construal of disaggregated religion and the lived experience of religion as a uniquely integrated experience. Are these gaps morally regrettable? Are they unjust?