Perception as evidence accumulation and Bayesian inference: insights from masked priming

The authors argue that perception is Bayesian inference based on accumulation of noisy evidence and that, in masked priming, the perceptual system is tricked into treating the prime and the target as a single object. Of the 2 algorithms considered for formalizing how the evidence sampled from a prime and target is combined, only 1 was shown to be consistent with the existing data from the visual word recognition literature. This algorithm was incorporated into the Bayesian Reader model (D. Norris, 2006), and its predictions were confirmed in 3 experiments. The experiments showed that the pattern of masked priming is not a fixed function of the relations between the prime and the target but can be changed radically by changing the task from lexical decision to a same-different judgment. Implications of the Bayesian framework of masked priming for unconscious cognition and visual masking are discussed.     

Expertise and estimating what other people know: the influence of professional experience and type of knowledge

There is ample evidence that estimations of what other people know are often biased in the direction of one's own knowledge. Yet, it is still unclear if this bias is influenced by expertise. In Study 1, computer experts estimated the distribution of Internet concepts and general knowledge concepts among students. These estimations were compared with norm values and with estimations obtained from a sample of laypersons. Laypersons showed a stronger bias than experts. Study 2 revealed that knowledge estimations can be influenced by labeling knowledge items as specialist knowledge. The results are suggestive of ways in which communication between experts and laypersons could be enhanced. Especially in asynchronous communication situations, as for example in the use of e-mail based hot lines, if experts are to communicate effectively, they must make accurate assumptions about laypersons' knowledge of the topic.     

Analogical and category-based inference: a theoretical integration with Bayesian causal models

A fundamental issue for theories of human induction is to specify constraints on potential inferences. For inferences based on shared category membership, an analogy, and/or a relational schema, it appears that the basic goal of induction is to make accurate and goal-relevant inferences that are sensitive to uncertainty. People can use source information at various levels of abstraction (including both specific instances and more general categories), coupled with prior causal knowledge, to build a causal model for a target situation, which in turn constrains inferences about the target. We propose a computational theory in the framework of Bayesian inference and test its predictions (parameter-free for the cases we consider) in a series of experiments in which people were asked to assess the probabilities of various causal predictions and attributions about a target on the basis of source knowledge about generative and preventive causes. The theory proved successful in accounting for systematic patterns of judgments about interrelated types of causal inferences, including evidence that analogical inferences are partially dissociable from overall mapping quality.     

Category dimensionality and feature knowledge: when more features are learned as easily as fewer

Three experiments compared the learning of lower-dimensional family resemblance categories (4 dimensions) with the learning of higher-dimensional ones (8 dimensions). Category-learning models incorporating error-driven learning, hypothesis testing, or limited capacity attention predict that additional dimensions should either increase learning difficulty or decrease learning of individual features. Contrary to these predictions, the experiments showed no slower learning of high-dimensional categories; instead, subjects learned more features from high-dimensional categories than from low-dimensional categories. This result obtained both in standard learning with feedback and in noncontingent, observational learning. These results show that rather than interfering with learning, categories with more dimensions cause individuals to learn more. The authors contrast the learning of family resemblance categories with learning in classical conditioning and probability learning paradigms, in which competition among features is well documented.     

Bayesian inference and the classical test theory model: Reliability and true scores

A general one-way analysis of variance components with unequal replication numbers is used to provide unbiased estimates of the true and error score variance of classical test theory. The inadequacy of the ANOVA theory is noted and the foundations for a Bayesian approach are detailed. The choice of prior distribution is discussed and a justification for the Tiao-Tan prior is found in the particular context of the “n-split” technique. The posterior distributions of reliability, error score variance, observed score variance and true score variance are presented with some extensions of the original work of Tiao and Tan. Special attention is given to simple approximations that are available in important cases and also to the problems that arise when the ANOVA estimate of true score variance is negative. Bayesian methods derived by Box and Tiao and by Lindley are studied numerically in relation to the problem of estimating true score. Each is found to be useful and the advantages and disadvantages of each are discussed and related to the classical test-theoretic methods. Finally, some general relationships between Bayesian inference and classical test theory are discussed. Supported in part by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development under Research Grant 1 PO1 HDO1762. Reproduction, translation, use or disposal by or for the United States Government is permitted.     

Understanding inference as a source of knowledge: children's ability to evaluate the certainty of deduction, perception, and guessing

Three experiments investigated children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge. Children observed a puppet make a statement about the color of one of two hidden toys after the puppet (a) looked directly at the toy (looking), (b) looked at the other toy (inference), or (c) looked at neither toy (guessing). Most 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds did not rate the puppet as being more certain of the toy's color after the puppet looked directly at it or inferred its color than they did after the puppet guessed its color. Most 8 and 9-year-olds distinguished inference and looking from guessing. The tendency to explain the puppet's knowledge by referring to inference increased with age. Children who referred to inference in their explanations were more likely to judge deductive inference as more certain than guessing.     

Predicting the paths of peripherals: the interaction of identification and future possibilities

Two studies investigated how both degree of identification and the individual's position within the group influence aspects of group loyalty. The authors considered ingroup position in terms of both the individual's current position within a group and expectations concerning the likelihood that one's position might change in the future. Peripheral group members learned that their acceptance by other group members would improve in the future or that they could expect rejection by other group members. Various indices of group loyalty (ingroup homogeneity, motivation to work for the group, and evaluation of a motivated group member) showed that when group members anticipated future rejection, the lower the identification the less loyal they were. In contrast, those who expected future acceptance were more loyal (more motivated to work for the group) the lower their identification. Current group behavior depends on both intragroup future expectations and level of identification.     

Violating stereotypes: Eye movements and comprehension processes when text conflicts with world knowledge

We investigated the effect of discourse context on the access of word meaning during reading. Target words were role names (e.g., electrician) for which there was a gender stereotype (e.g., electricians are stereotypically male). Target sentences contained a reflexive pronoun that referred to the role name (e.g., The electrician taught herself ...). Participants read these target sentences with or without paragraph context while their eye movements were monitored. In the absence of discourse context and in neutral discourse contexts, fixation times on the reflexive pronoun and immediately following the pronoun were inflated when the pronoun specified a gender that mismatched the stereotype, indicating that the gender stereotype was activated upon encountering the role name. When prior discourse context indicated the gender of the role-named character, this mismatch effect was eliminated. The mismatch effect indicates that gender stereotypes are automatically activated in the absence of disambiguating information. The lack of an effect when gender has previously been specified is consistent with the lexical reinterpretation model proposed by Hess, Foss, and Carroll (1995).     

心理研究中引入贝叶斯统计推断的必要性、应用思路与领域

本文从科学范式演变和概率统计推断特征分析出发,就贝叶斯统计推断引入心理学的必要性、怎么应用、在哪些领域应用集中进行了论述。首先在分析科学范式演进各阶段统计推断任务需要、经典的频率概率统计推断不足基础上,得出科学范式处于危机和革命阶段时需要对相关理论做可信度检验。然后,在介绍贝叶斯定理及其统计推断的基础上,进一步分析了贝叶斯推断能解决理论可信度的多种假设检验情景。最后本文还就贝叶斯统计推断在心理学理论争鸣与建构、心理技术产品开发与评估具体领域应用做了分析。     

Essentialism and compassion: Predicting preference for noun labels applied to people with mental disorders

Two studies, one correlational and one experimental, examined preference for noun labels applied to people with mental disorders (e.g., John is a schizophrenic) as a function of differences in essentialist thinking and compassion. Study 1 (N = 360) showed that those high in essentialist thinking were more likely than those low in essentialist thinking to endorse noun labels. Study 2 (N = 86) showed that those led to experience state compassion were less likely to endorse noun labels than those in a control condition. This research is discussed with respect to processes underlying these effects, the positive psychology of language, limitations and future research directions, and implications for reducing stigmatizing attitudes towards those with mental disorders.     

人们如何设想未来：未来情景思维对个体心理和行为的影响

未来情景思维(Episodic Future Thinking, EFT)主要指人们基于当前情景或过去经历来思考、想象未来的过程, 是人们对于未来的一种设想。根据已有的行为实验和神经影像学等多个方面的研究结果, 系统论述了未来情景思维的概念和特征, 以及个体过去的生活经历及相应记忆和个体生活目标对其的影响, 通过概括和分析行为和脑神经两方面的证据来论述未来情景思维会对人们具体生活实践产生积极与消极的双向影响。当然, 未来还需要进一步加强未来情景思维研究的广度和深度, 特别是要细化未来情景思维的类型, 探讨未来情景思维可能导致的不适应行为以及影响个体心理和行为的作用机制, 从而为人们如何更积极地适应未来提供更充分的实证证据和理论构想。     

Gender influences as an impediment to knowledge sharing: when men and women fail to seek peer feedback

Little research has considered how work team characteristics influence feedback-seeking behavior among team members. The authors' aim in this research was to identify central sources of influence on feedback-seeking behavior in a mixed-gender context. They placed men and women in work groups of varying gender composition. The participants then participated in a gender-biased (perceived as either male-oriented or female-oriented) negotiation exercise. Findings indicated that the gender of the participant, the team's gender composition, and the gender orientation of the task influenced feedback-seeking behavior among team members.     

Focalism and the underestimation of future emotion: when it's worse than imagined

People typically exaggerate the emotional impact of future events. This occurs because of focalism, the tendency to focus on one event and neglect to consider how emotion will be mitigated by the surrounding context. Neglecting context, however, should lead people to underestimate future emotion when context focuses attention on the event. In Study 1, participants underestimated the intensity of their future negative emotions when they reported reactions to a romantic break-up on Valentine's Day versus 1 week before. This relationship was mediated by how frequently they thought about the break-up. In Study 2, participants underestimated the emotional impact of a lost prize when the experimental context forced them to focus on the prize versus when the prize was less evident. Thus, failing to account for the extent to which context would focus attention on the event, a form of focalism, led to underestimation of emotional reactions to a negative event.     

Knowing in advance: the impact of prior event information on memory and event knowledge

We examined the influence of newly acquired information on children's memory and general representation of a personally experienced event. Thirty-five children between the ages of 5 and 7 years participated in the novel event (Visiting the Pirate). The day before participating, children were: (1) provided with new information specific to the up-coming event; (2) engaged in a discussion generally related to the event topic based on existing knowledge; or (3) discussed an unrelated topic. Advance information specific to the event led to better recall and, in particular, to better integration of the experience into a general event representation both soon after the event and at a follow-up interview 4 months later, whereas general discussion of the topic without the event specific information neither enhanced memory reports nor facilitated the integration of event information. Providing information in advance can have significant effects on memory and knowledge acquisition although many variables, including those relating to the specific content of the information, will affect this relation.     

Eliminating the haptic oblique effect: influence of scanning incongruity and prior knowledge of the standards

Although the oblique effect has been conceptualized as a purely visual phenomenon, recent studies report its occurrence in a haptic matching task and present the hypothesis that differences in haptic orientational sensitivity might be responsible for the results. The possibility that procedural variables could be responsible was investigated. Specifically, the effect of prior knowledge of the stimulus orientation standards and of use of bilateral haptic exploration of standard and comparison orientations was examined. The results indicate that the reported oblique effect is reduced either when subjects are not informed which orientations will be tested, or when a unilateral matching procedure instead of a bilateral one is used. When both conditions are combined, the haptic oblique effect is eliminated. It is concluded that this particular manifestation of the oblique effect is not related to haptic sensitivity, but stems from the use of well-established imagery as referent for a match (imagery for oblique stimulus orientations is inferior) and the inherently different scanning patterns required in bilateral exploration of obliques (percepts of standard and comparison obliques will be necessarily different).     

Belief revision in children: the role of prior knowledge and strategies for generating evidence

Evolving beliefs and reasoning strategies were observed in 22 fifth- and sixth-grade children who worked over 8 weeks for a total of about 5 h on a causal reasoning problem. Children planned, performed, and interpreted experiments to learn about the relations between design features and speed of race cars in a computerized microworld. The group made progress, but by the end of the sessions did not fully understand those features that disconfirmed their initial beliefs. In their activity with the microworld, children often failed to make informative comparisons or valid judgments about the outcomes. Exploratory strategies improved as children exercised them over time, but invalid heuristics that preserved children's favored theories about cars were evident throughout. Those children using more valid strategies achieved more complete, stable comprehension of the microworld's structure. In turn, children used their beliefs to make meaning of the complex patterns of evidence they observed. The most successful children evaluated both the evidence and their changing theories, and were sensitive to the fact that they should be mutually constraining.