Emotion emphasis effects in moral judgment are moderated by mindsets

Motivation and Emotion - In two studies, emotion emphasis effects on moral judgment are demonstrated. The studies indicate that emphasizing negative consequences in trolley-type dilemmas with...     

Cognitive and affective consequences of repressive coping

This investigation examined whether repressors, individuals who seem especially reactive to emotional stimuli, would attempt to control their emotional reactions to unpleasant events, and whether such attempts would impair repressors’ recall for those stimuli. Participants viewed either an unpleasant or an emotionally neutral film and then reported their mood following the film and their recall memory for details in the film. Repressors reported a more pleasant mood than nonrepressors after the unpleasant film. Repressors did not, however, differ from non-repressors in their memory for details in the film. The results suggest that while repressors are efficient regulators of emotion, the cognitive effects of the repressive coping style are less clear. This research was supported by a University of Plymouth QR grant to the first author.     

Cognitive and affective consequences of repressive coping

This investigation examined whether repressors, individuals who seem especially reactive to emotional stimuli, would attempt to control their emotional reactions to unpleasant events, and whether such attempts would impair repressors’ recall for those stimuli. Participants viewed either an unpleasant or an emotionally neutral film and then reported their mood following the film and their recall memory for details in the film. Repressors reported a more pleasant mood than nonrepressors after the unpleasant film. Repressors did not, however, differ from non-repressors in their memory for details in the film. The results suggest that while repressors are efficient regulators of emotion, the cognitive effects of the repressive coping style are less clear. This research was supported by a University of Plymouth QR grant to the first author.     

Self-corrected elaboration effects on incidental memory

Subjects performed an orienting task involving 3 conditions followed by an unexpected free recall test. The conditions were designed to force 3 types of corrected elaborations: Generated Correction, Chosen Correction, and No Correction. In the Generated Correction condition the subjects were presented with a target word (e.g., Baby) and a bizarre sentence frame (e.g., "____drinks beer.") and asked to correct the target to a congruous word (e.g., Uncle) to make a common sentence. In the Chosen Correction condition, the subjects were presented with a target and its bizarre sentence frame and asked to choose one of the alternative congruous words (e.g., Uncle, Aunt) to make a common sentence. In the No Correction condition, the subjects were presented with a target and its bizarre sentence frame and asked to rate the congruity of each target to its sentence frame. Generated Correction led to a better performance than Chosen Correction and No Correction, but a difference between the last two correction types was not found. These results were interpreted as showing that, by generating correct information, self-corrected elaboration led to facilitation of incidental memory.     

The affective consequences of expected and unexpected outcomes

How do people feel about unexpected positive and negative outcomes? Decision affect theory (DAT) proposes that people feel displeasure when their outcomes fall short of the counterfactual alternative and elated when their outcomes exceed the counterfactual alternative. Because disconfirmed expectations provide a counterfactual alternative, DAT predicts that bad outcomes feel worse when unexpected than when expected, yet good outcomes feel better when unexpected than when expected. Consistency theories propose that people experience displeasure when their expectations are disconfirmed because the disconfirmation suggests an inability to predict. According to consistency theories, both good and bad outcomes feel worse when unexpected than when expected. These two theoretical approaches were tested in three studies. The results consistently support DAT     

Comparison processes in social judgment: mechanisms and consequences

This article proposes an informational perspective on comparison consequences in social judgment. It is argued that to understand the variable consequences of comparison, one has to examine what target knowledge is activated during the comparison process. These informational underpinnings are conceptualized in a selective accessibility model that distinguishes 2 fundamental comparison processes. Similarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard similarity, whereas dissimilarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard dissimilarity. These respective subsets of target knowledge build the basis for subsequent target evaluations, so that similarity testing typically leads to assimilation whereas dissimilarity testing typically leads to contrast. The model is proposed as a unifying conceptual framework that integrates diverse findings on comparison consequences in social judgment.     

Effects of incidental positive emotion and cognitive reappraisal on affective responses to negative stimuli

Previous studies have identified two powerful ways to regulate emotional responses to a stressor: experiencing incidental positive emotions and using cognitive reappraisal to reframe the stressor. Several cognitive and motivational theories of positive emotion support the formulation that incidental positive emotions may facilitate cognitive reappraisal. To test the separate and interacting effects of positive emotions and cognitive reappraisal, we first adapted an established picture-based reappraisal paradigm by interspersing blocks of positive emotion inducing and neutral pictures. Across two pre-registered studies (Studies 1, 2), reappraisal effectively decreased self-reported negative emotions and increased self-reported positive emotions; however, experiencing incidental positive emotions did not facilitate reappraisal success. In another preregistered study (Study 3), we employed a more powerful positive emotion induction via virtual reality (VR), used a social stress anticipation task, and instructed participants to reappraise the anticipated stressor positively. Although there was a robust effect of the positive emotion induction (relative to the neutral induction) on feeling more positive emotions throughout stress anticipation, the results again indicated that incidental positive emotions did not facilitate cognitive reappraisal. We propose that incidental positive emotions and cognitive reappraisal may constitute separate pathways of influence when regulating one's responses to negative events.     

The affective consequences of artistic and scientific problem solving

Abstract

Although the influence of affect on creativity has received some theoretical and empirical attention, the role of affect as a consequence of creative problem solving has been neglected. This study is the one of the first to examine empirically the affect that results from creative problem solving. In a 2 (group) × 3 (time period) × 2 (task) factorial design, 122 art and science students were randomly assigned to complete an art or science task and to report on the kind and intensity of affect before, during, and after creative problem solving. It was predicted that art and science students would report different levels of affect only after the insight, not before or during, and that the effects of task, not just group, would contribute to affective variability between art and science students. Science students reported similar levels of (positive) affective intensity before and during creative insight as art students. It was only after the insight that art students reported more intense affective experiences than science students. Task differences accounted for a significant amount of variance in affective intensities, but primarily for art-oriented subjects. These findings suggest that viewing affect as a dependent variable of cognition, rather than primarily as an independent variable, is a direction that would benefit the field of empirical work on cognition and emotion. Current cognitive theories of emotion offer much potential in understanding the affective consequences of creative problem solving.     

Sex-related patient and therapist effects on clinical judgment

The purpose of this investigation was to submit the claim of sex-related bias in clinical judgment to more thorough empirical testing than had been the case in previous research. Patient sex and stereotypic sex-role were factorially varied in a clinical protocol that was sent with related materials to 640 sex-stratified, randomly selected Members and Fellows of APA Division 29 (Psychotherapy). Approximately 30% (N=182) of those contacted returned usable data, including information about their own sex-role traditionalism and evaluation of the hypothetical patients' psychological well-being. Results confirmed the effectiveness of the stereotypic sex-role manipulation. However, no consistent effects were found for any of the four variables of interest considered in isolation or in combination, thereby refuting allegations of covert sex-related discrimination perpetrated under the aegis of psychological appraisal. Favorableness of clinical impressions was not mediated by therapists' self-reported attitudes toward the patients. The study's generally unexpected outcome was tentatively attributed to enhanced professional sensitization to the sociocultural barriers to full psychological functioning in women.This report is based on a master's thesis written by the first author under the sponsorship of the second and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the MA degree at Vanderbilt University, 1974. The research was supported in part by the Vanderbilt University Research Council. The contributions of Stephen Amira and Joseph M. Schwartz are gratefully acknowledged.     

If you have a choice,you have trouble: Stimulus valence modulates presentation‐order effects in preference judgment

It is well known that the presentation order of choice options often affects decision outcomes to a significant degree. However, despite the significance and wide occurrence of the effects, they are ignored in most preference models. Furthermore, psychophysical findings of stimulus‐magnitude dependent presentation‐order effects have not been acknowledged previously in the cognitive literature on preference judgments. Thus, the potential moderating effect of the level of stimulus magnitude (here, valence) on the direction and size of order effects in preference judgment has not been investigated previously. In two experiments, participants (117 and 204, respectively) rated their preference for pairs of everyday‐type objects and phenomena (e.g., apple–pear, headache–stomachache). Stimuli were spaced horizontally, and each participant received them in one of two opposite within‐pair presentation orders. Participants also rated the stimuli's valence on a scale from very bad to very good. The results showed a positive correlation between the rated valence and the tendency to prefer the first‐mentioned (left) stimulus; that is, the effect was greatest, and opposite, for choices between the most attractive and the most unattractive options, respectively. In terms of Hellström's ( 1979 ) sensation‐weighting model, the positive correlation is caused by a higher weight (i.e., impact on the preference judgment) for the left stimulus than for the right, which is possibly due to the left stimulus being compared to the right. The results suggest that researchers may have failed previously to find important moderators of presentation‐order effects in preference judgment due to the failure to use sufficiently attractive or unattractive stimuli. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Positive and negative compatibility effects

This paper reports a series of four experiments that established a negative compatibility effect (NCE) by which compatible distractors led to slower and less accurate target performance than did incompatible ones (Experiment 1). This effect is interpreted as an early perceptual effect that delays the attribution of visual attention over the target location in the compatible condition. This view predicted that the NCE should be observed only when attention has to be selectively attributed to the target location. In Experiments 2 and 3, this prediction was tested by manipulating the perceptual load in the display. High perceptual load displays are known to require selective attention (Lavie, 1995). Accordingly, reliable NCEs were observed when high-load displays were used. In contrast, reduced NCEs were found in displays that did not require selective attention. Experiment 4 established that the manifestation of the NCE was influenced by low-level visual cues, such as brightness and contrast. Overall, these experiments indicated that the NCE can be understood as an early perceptual effect, which arises from a conflict between the cues that guide the distribution of attention when the task requires selective attention.     

Justification effects on the judgment of analogy

Many of us share a strong intuition that justification forces us to better understand the situations we face. And there is substantial evidence indicating that this is often the case. However, there is a growing body of research showing that, under certain circumstances, explanation and justification can impair performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. In the present research, the effects of justification on judgment of the soundness of analogies were examined. Subjects judged the quality of the match between pairs of stories with varying degrees of superficial and analogical similarity. Experimental subjects either provided reasons for their judgments or wrote recollections of the target stimuli. These subjects rated the match between stimulus pairs as more sound than did control subjects. Also, providing reasons led to poorer discrimination between superficially similar aspects of the stimuli and analogous aspects. Explanations of these findings are proposed, and implications for problem solving and confidence judgment are discussed.     

Preferences as expectation-driven inferences: effects of affective expectations on affective experience

Presents a model arguing that affect and emotion are often formed in an expectation-driven fashion. A pilot study and 2 experiments manipulated undergraduate Ss' affective expectations (e.g., how funny they expected a set of cartoons to be) and whether Ss' expectations were confirmed (e.g., whether the cartoons really were funny). When the value of a stimulus was consistent with an affective expectation, people formed evaluations relatively quickly. Even when the value of a stimulus was discrepant from an affective expectation, people sometimes assimilated the value of the stimulus to their expectations. Other times, such as when making a more fine-grained evaluation of the cartoons, people noticed that they were discrepant from their affective expectations. Under these conditions, people appeared to have more difficulty forming preferences. They took longer to evaluate and spent more time thinking about the cartoons.     

The effects of ordinal load on incidental temporal learning

How can we grasp the temporal structure of events? A few studies have indicated that representations of temporal structure are acquired when there is an intention to learn, but not when learning is incidental. Response-to-stimulus intervals, uncorrelated temporal structures, unpredictable ordinal information, and lack of metrical organization have been pointed out as key obstacles to incidental temporal learning, but the literature includes piecemeal demonstrations of learning under all these circumstances. We suggest that the unacknowledged effects of ordinal load may help reconcile these conflicting findings, ordinal load referring to the cost of identifying the sequence of events (e.g., tones, locations) where a temporal pattern is embedded. In a first experiment, we manipulated ordinal load into simple and complex levels. Participants learned ordinal-simple sequences, despite their uncorrelated temporal structure and lack of metrical organization. They did not learn ordinal-complex sequences, even though there were no response-to-stimulus intervals nor unpredictable ordinal information. In a second experiment, we probed learning of ordinal-complex sequences with strong metrical organization, and again there was no learning. We conclude that ordinal load is a key obstacle to incidental temporal learning. Further analyses showed that the effect of ordinal load is to mask the expression of temporal knowledge, rather than to prevent learning.