Symbolism and literalism in anthropology

Conclusion We have considered two strategies for using native utterances as evidence for assigning native beliefs. We have shown that each of these two strategies (literalism and symbolism) can avoid the logical difficulties mentioned in section 1 — so long, at least, as we employ an account of the logical form of belief sentences developed by Burdick. We have also considered the methodological principles which provide the basis for translational practice. Based on our consideration of these principles, we then argued that we must prefer the literalist strategy for attributing beliefs. Only the literalist strategy enables us to provide a recursive account of the significance of native utterances, and only the literalist strategy enables us to maximize the truth of our claims about native beliefs.This paper was written mainly by D'Agostino, who supplied the background in philosophy of anthropology, with the assistance of Burdick, chiefly on matters relating to philosophy of language. We are extremely grateful to Susan Haack for substantial help with significant improvements. We also wish to thank J. J. C. Smart and Stanley Benn for comments.     

Rule-governed behavior and behavioral anthropology

According to cultural materialism, cultural practices result from the materialistic outcomes of those practices, not from sociobiological, mentalistic, or mystical predispositions (e.g., Hindus worship cows because, in the long run, that worship results in more food, not less food). However, according to behavior analysis, such materialistic outcomes do not reinforce or punish the cultural practices, because such outcomes are too delayed, too improbable, or individually too small to directly reinforce or punish the cultural practices (e.g., the food increase is too delayed to reinforce the cow worship). Therefore, the molar, materialistic contingencies need the support of molecular, behavioral contingencies. And according to the present theory of rule-governed behavior, the statement of rules describing those molar, materialistic contingencies can establish the needed molecular contingencies. Given the proper behavioral history, such rule statements combine with noncompliance to produce a learned aversive condition (often labeled fear, anxiety, or guilt). The termination of this aversive condition reinforces compliance, just as its presentation punishes noncompliance (e.g., the termination of guilt reinforces the tending to a sick cow). In addition, supernatural rules often supplement these materialistic rules. Furthermore, the production of both materialistic and supernatural rules needs cultural designers who understand the molar, materialistic contingencies.     

Social anthropology and the philosophy of religion

The pursuit of linguistic analysis should mean that philosophers pay attention to the facts: in particular, the philosophy of religion cannot ignore the comparative study of religion, social anthropology, etc. A main aim should be to discover a ‘grammar’ of religious experience, which may help to illuminate the reasons for certain patterns of religious belief, etc. Here it is necessary to resist the functionalist views of some social anthropologists, stemming from the conviction that religion is an illusion and from a conflation of reasons and causes. But in so far as a functionalist approach applies, it can help to exhibit the accidental and ‘non‐religious’ features of a given religion.     

Michael Polanyi: the anthropology of intellectual history

Scientific and political developments of the early twentieth century led Michael Polanyi to study the role of the scientist in research and the interaction between the individual scholar and the surrounding conditions in community and society. In his concept of “personal knowledge” he gave the theory and history of science an anthropological turn. In many instances of the history of sciences, research is driven by a commitment to beliefs and values. Society plays the role of authority and communicative backdrop that presupposes individual liberty. As a system of beliefs science is rooted in community and also in history. However, as soon as fellow humans become the objects of research, their appeal transcends the researcher. Consequently, the history of human endeavor reveals a “firmament” of standards and obligations which represent an ontological reality, for which Polanyi invokes Teilhard de Chardin’s notion of noosphere.     

Postmodern ontology,anthropology, and religion

This article analyses some changes produced in the contemporary ‘postmodern’ self and its consequences for the anthropological study of religion. In this regard, these changes influence deeply the way we westerners represent our ontological structure, and approach other religious systems and ontologies, due to the current processes of globalisation and transnationalisation, the notion of Self often fluctuates between an old stable, autonomous, maximiser (condensed) self and a dispersed, multivocal one. It is argued here that traditional anthropological analyses of religion lack this critical and reflexive awareness. For that reason, cultural phenomena such as shamanism, sorcery, and many forms of religious and cosmological syncretisms, are frequently approached from a distant, naturalistic viewpoint In this paper a more existential view of religion is proposed; it approaches the observer to the observed, opening up his/her assumptions about the ‘order of things’. A collection of notions, such as critical hermeneutics, critical intersubjectivity, dialectics, and ontological language is discussed, to build a fresh inquiry into the realms of numinous life.