Cognitive mapping approach analyzing societal decision‐making

Cognitive mapping (CM) approach is reviewed, and the method is applied in analyzing an important case of societal decision‐making. It is shown that CM is an effective way of representing argumentation, consequences, and the linkage between the concepts. The method integrates causal modelling and rational choice theory with parts of cognitive psychology. CM allows for a systematic arguing of issues. The decision‐making problem described here concerns building a new nuclear power plant in Finland. There occurred strong proponents representing mainly the industry and technocratic and engineering experts, and an equally strong resistance represented by ordinary citizens, parliamentarians, and experts. The argumentation went ten years pro and cons before the parliament in 1993 decided against building the proposed nuclear power plant. It gives an ideal case to study the argumentation and contradictions there in as a whole by developing and applying a cognitive mapping approach.     

A neural cognitive model of argumentation with application to legal inference and decision making

Formal models of argumentation have been investigated in several areas, from multi-agent systems and artificial intelligence (AI) to decision making, philosophy and law. In artificial intelligence, logic-based models have been the standard for the representation of argumentative reasoning. More recently, the standard logic-based models have been shown equivalent to standard connectionist models. This has created a new line of research where (i) neural networks can be used as a parallel computational model for argumentation and (ii) neural networks can be used to combine argumentation, quantitative reasoning and statistical learning. At the same time, non-standard logic models of argumentation started to emerge. In this paper, we propose a connectionist cognitive model of argumentation that accounts for both standard and non-standard forms of argumentation. The model is shown to be an adequate framework for dealing with standard and non-standard argumentation, including joint-attacks, argument support, ordered attacks, disjunctive attacks, meta-level attacks, self-defeating attacks, argument accrual and uncertainty. We show that the neural cognitive approach offers an adequate way of modelling all of these different aspects of argumentation. We have applied the framework to the modelling of a public prosecution charging decision as part of a real legal decision making case study containing many of the above aspects of argumentation. The results show that the model can be a useful tool in the analysis of legal decision making, including the analysis of what-if questions and the analysis of alternative conclusions. The approach opens up two new perspectives in the short-term: the use of neural networks for computing prevailing arguments efficiently through the propagation in parallel of neuronal activations, and the use of the same networks to evolve the structure of the argumentation network through learning (e.g. to learn the strength of arguments from data).     

The metaphysics of cognitive artefacts

This article looks at some of the metaphysical properties of cognitive artefacts. It first identifies and demarcates the target domain by conceptualizing this class of artefacts as a functional kind. Building on the work of Beth Preston, a pluralist notion of functional kind is developed, one that includes artefacts with proper functions and system functions. Those with proper functions have a history of cultural selection, whereas those with system functions are improvised uses of initially non-cognitive artefacts. Having identified the target domain, it then briefly looks at the multiple usability of physical structures and the multiple realizability of cognitive function. Further developing insights from the “dual nature of artefacts thesis”, the article ends with conceptualizing the structure–function relations of cognitive artefacts. More specifically, it unpacks the relation between physical structure, representational structure, information, and cognitive function.     

The aging decision maker: cognitive aging and the adaptive selection of decision strategies

Are older adults' decision abilities fundamentally compromised by age-related cognitive decline? Or can they adaptively select decision strategies? One study (N = 163) investigated the impact of cognitive aging on the ability to select decision strategies as a function of environment structure. Participants made decisions in either an environment that favored the use of information-intensive strategies or one favoring the use of simple, information-frugal strategies. Older adults tended to (a) look up less information and take longer to process it and (b) use simpler, less cognitively demanding strategies. In accordance with the idea that age-related cognitive decline leads to reliance on simpler strategies, measures of fluid intelligence explained age-related differences in information search and strategy selection. Nevertheless, both young and older adults seem to be equally adapted decision makers in that they adjust their information search and strategy selection as a function of environment structure, suggesting that the aging decision maker is an adaptive one.     

Preference‐based Learning of Ideal Solutions in TOPSIS‐like Decision Models

Combining established modelling techniques from multiple‐criteria decision aiding with recent algorithmic advances in the emerging field of preference learning, we propose a new method that can be seen as an adaptive version of TOPSIS, the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution decision model (or at least a simplified variant of this model). On the basis of exemplary preference information in the form of pairwise comparisons between alternatives, our method seeks to induce an ‘ideal solution’ that, in conjunction with a weight factor for each criterion, represents the preferences of the decision maker. To this end, we resort to probabilistic models of discrete choice and make use of maximum likelihood inference. First experimental results on suitable preference data suggest that our approach is not only intuitively appealing and interesting from an interpretation point of view but also competitive to state‐of‐the‐art preference learning methods in terms of prediction accuracy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rethinking value elicitation for personal consequential decisions

The application of multiattribute decision analysis to personal consequential decision problems can be unhelpful particularly where the analysis fails to help the decision maker to discover new values, or where the decision maker is unable to visualize the experience that may result from choosing a particular course of action. We concur with James March that values are best discovered by the act of choosing and experimenting but acknowledge that the act of choice can lead to irreversible consequences. Both of these problems suggest that techniques which assist the decision maker to envisage the consequences of choice need to be developed and incorporated into the modelling process. We suggest some forms that these techniques might take. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Good judgments do not require complex cognition

What cognitive capabilities allow Homo sapiens to successfully bet on the stock market, to catch balls in baseball games, to accurately predict the outcomes of political elections, or to correctly decide whether a patient needs to be allocated to the coronary care unit? It is a widespread belief in psychology and beyond that complex judgment tasks require complex solutions. Countering this common intuition, in this article, we argue that in an uncertain world actually the opposite is true: Humans do not need complex cognitive strategies to make good inferences, estimations, and other judgments; rather, it is the very simplicity and robustness of our cognitive repertoire that makes Homo sapiens a capable decision maker.     

Bridging the gap between joint and individual decisions: Deconstructing preferences in relationships

Most choice research has studied how people make decisions within a narrowly defined choice context and has not paid sufficient attention to the role of social context. We commend Simpson, Griskevicius, and Rothman for directing the attention of choice researchers to the study of joint decision making and current theories on relationships. Building on SGR, we propose that a relationship partner's influence varies with the type of decision at hand and with situational factors. We propose four possible types of decision episodes, defined by whether the decision stage and the consumption stage each occur singly or jointly, and explore how the decision type impacts the extent to which a decision maker will take a partner's preferences into account. We further discuss how situational factors, such as the environment in which the decision is made, as well as the mindset and cognitive resources of the decision maker, are likely to influence decision outcomes.     

Argumentation in ethics, legal dogmatics and legal practice

The author adopts a coherentist approach to legal argumentation.Ceteris paribus, the degree of coherence of argumentation depends on answers to such questions as: How many statements belonging to the justification are supported by reasons, that is, not arbitrary?, How profound is the justification, that is, how long are the chains of reasons it contains?, How closely interconnected are the reasons, for example in such a way that the same conclusion follows from various independent reasons?, How relevant are the reasons in the context in question?, etc.A reasonable legal argumentation is a special case of a reasonable moral argumentation. Both contain moral substantive reasons and legal authority reasons. On the other hand, some particularities of legal argumentation must be noticed, as well. Among other things, the lawyers take for granted that legal reasoning is based on valid law and that some sources of law, such as statutes, are binding.There exist various juristic roles and corresponding types of argumentation, e.g., judicial and doctrinal ones. Yet, all kinds of legal argumentation must use weighing and balancing in order to make the law coherent and morally acceptable. Consequently, all general principles and criteria of coherence are applicable to all these types but their weight varies between them.     

Why should we try to think like scientists? Scientific reasoning and susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases

This paper examines whether scientific reasoning skills predict people's susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases. We used the recently developed Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS) because it measures the ability to read and evaluate scientific evidence. Alongside the SRS, 317 participants aged 18–30 years completed measures of thinking dispositions and cognitive ability to ascertain whether the SRS contributes specifically to susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases. Scientific reasoning correlated positively with dispositions towards analytic thinking and cognitive ability and negatively with dogmatism, epistemically suspect beliefs, and susceptibility to cognitive biases. Most importantly, it emerged as a significant predictor, contributing to susceptibility to both cognitive biases and epistemically suspect beliefs over and above the other cognitive predictors. These results provide the first empirical evidence that scientific reasoning ability is an important factor in protecting against epistemically suspect beliefs and in aiding better decision making among the non-scientific population.     

Information search and decision making: The effects of information displays

Information display boards may be used to test assumptions about underlying cognitive processes in decision situations. However, the question may be raised whether information processing in a complex decision situation is indepemdent of the structure of the information display board used. In a study employing 96 subjects, the design of the information display board, the number of alternatives, and the number of attributes were varied. Twelve groups of eight subjects were presented with one hypothetical choice among riskless multiattribute decision alternatives (apartments). Results showed that information search patterns were not influenced by the design of the information display board, but that the relative number of attributes included in the decision process was. The number of available attributes appeared to be the strongest determinant of information search patterns. A higher number of attributes induced information search patterns consistent with the noncompensatory conjunctive decision rule. It is suggested that the decision situation employed, which forced the decision maker to remember each piece of information acquired, underlies the difference between the results in the present study and previous findings.     

Processing of indexical information requires time: Evidence from change deafness

Studies of change detection have increased our understanding of attention, perception, and memory. In two innovative experiments we showed that the change detection phenomenon can be used to examine other areas of cognition-specifically, the processing of linguistic and indexical information in spoken words. One hypothesis suggests that cognitive resources must be used to process indexical information, whereas an alternative suggests that it is processed more slowly than linguistic information. Participants performed a lexical decision task and were asked whether the voice presenting the stimuli changed. Nonwords varying in their likeness to real words were used in the lexical decision task to encourage participants to vary the amount of cognitive resources/processing time. More cognitive resources/processing time are required to make a lexical decision with word-like nonwords. Participants who heard word-like nonwords were more likely to detect the change when it occurred (Experiment 1) and were more confident that the voice was the same when it did not change (Experiment 2). These results suggest that indexical information is processed more slowly than linguistic information and demonstrate how change detection can provide insight to other areas of cognition.     

Robustness of Additive Value Function Methods in MCDM

A simulation model is constructed of choice between a discrete number of non-dominated alternatives. The long-run goals of the decision maker are assumed to be consistent with a hypothetical preference structure which satisfies assumptions of completeness, transitivity and additive independence for an ideal set of criteria. The use of additive value functions to aid the decision maker in this choice is simulated for a variety of contexts and under a number of non-idealities such as the omission of criteria, confounding of criteria and inconsistent responses. It is found that ideal preference orderings are well identified by additive value functions provided that the non-idealities are moderate and that sufficient effort is put into modelling changing marginal values for different levels of performance. One of the potentially most sensitive areas is that of shifts in the decision maker's reference points as a result of the types of preference information asked.     

The Influence of Decision Aids on Choice Strategies: An Experimental Analysis of the Role of Cognitive Effort

This paper examines the role of computer-based decision aids in reducing cognitive effort and therefore influencing strategy selection. It extends and complements the works reported in the behavioral decision theory literature on the role of effort and accuracy in choice tasks. The central proposition of this paper is that specific features can be incorporated within a set of decision aids that will alter the effort required to implement a particular choice strategy relative to other strategies, and that this will influence strategy selection by the decision maker. In a laboratory experiment, using a repeated measures design, 48 subjects performed a preferential choice task using different decision aids. Subjects were given different levels of support to reduce the cognitive effort associated with different preferential choice strategies. In particular, the decision aids provided varying levels of support for the processing associated with either elimination by aspects or additive difference strategies. The study examined how information processing strategies were influenced by the decision aids. The results show that decision aids which reduce the effort associated with the elimination by aspects strategy induce behaviors associated with elimination by aspects. More importantly, there was an interaction effect caused by the distinct behavior of the group which was provided support for additive difference but not for elimination by aspects. This group processed the information about available choices in a way that is consistent with an additive difference strategy. These findings indicate that a decision aid can induce additive processing by altering the relative effort requirements of different choice strategies.     

正面自我标签对建议采纳的影响

研究设想给决策者“贴标签”会影响其建议采纳, 即当决策者受到某一词语或文字(标签)的描述, 其往往向标签所预示的方向发展。通过三个依次递进的研究, 探讨在有无获益希望及公开与否三种不同组合的决策场景中, 启动决策者正面自我标签对其建议采纳的影响。实验1采用2(正面自我标签：启动/未启动)×2(获益希望：有/无)组间设计, 实验2和实验3分别进一步研究无获益希望的公开场景和有希望获益的不公开场景, 分别以91、135和96名在校大学生为被试。结果发现：决策者正面自我标签启动使得其更容易采纳建议; 无获益希望公开条件下, 受印象管理或社会赞许性影响而显著提高建议采纳; 有获益希望的公开条件下, 决策者正面自我标签启动使得其积极情绪得到提升, 并进而促进其采纳建议, 而积极意义发现在积极情绪和建议采纳之间起中介作用。     

An information - expectation framework for decisions under uncertainty

Despite being in existence for many decades, normative decision theory has not become a commonly used tool for real-world decisions. This paper considers the reasons for this situation and suggestions for circumventing them. The main suggestion involves a two-stage framework in terms of the information available to the decision maker and his/her expectations under the available acts. This framework is well suited for decisions with incomplete structure, which is typical of real decision situations. Within this framework a specific multiplicative model is also discussed.     

Linking Disjoint Supermatrices and Criteria Clusters

An axiom of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) requires the elements being considered to be strongly connected in order to obtain a meaningful priority vector. A simple example demonstrates the issues that can arise when a decision contains disjoint clusters within the Supermatrix. From the example it can be observed that the necessary information to complete additional linking pin comparisons would have already been collected; and by performing linking pin comparisons a decision maker can convert a disjoint Supermatrix into a strongly connected Supermatrix. The linking process is summarized in five steps and provided in the general form. This linking comparison methodology exploits the fundamental advantages of pairwise comparisons and can also be used to weight the criteria clusters within a decision network. Linking pin comparisons performed at the level of a criterion of a single alternative with respect to another criterion of that same alternative can be used to obtain the criteria cluster weights. Linking pin comparisons at this level can reduce the decision maker's cognitive burden in comparison to totality comparisons. The ability to strongly connect an otherwise disjoint Supermatrix and reduce the decision maker's cognitive burden demonstrates the usefulness of linking pin comparisons in ANP decision models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates

Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.     

“Let Me Tell You Why!”. When Argumentation in Doctor–Patient Interaction Makes a Difference

This paper throws some light on the nature of argumentation, its use and advantages, within the setting of doctor–patient interaction. It claims that argumentation can be used by doctors to offer patients reasons that work as ontological conditions for enhancing the decision making process, as well as to preserve the institutional nature of their relationship with patients. In support of these claims, selected arguments from real-life interactions are presented in the second part of the paper, and analysed by means of a model of argumentation borrowed from classical rhetoric, and refined according to the modern orientation of the pragma-dialectic approach.     

The Rational Reconstruction of Argumentation Referring to Consequences and Purposes in the Application of Legal Rules: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective

In this paper, the author develops an instrument for the rational reconstruction of argumentation in which a judicial decision is justified by referring to the consequences in relation to the purpose of the rule. The instrument is developed by integrating insights from legal theory and legal philosophy about the function and use of arguments from consequences in relation to the purpose of a rule into a pragma-dialectical framework. Then, by applying the instrument to the analysis of examples from legal practice, it is demonstrated that the instrument can offer a heuristic and critical tool for the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation that can ‘bridge’ the gap between more abstract discussions of forms of legal argumentation on the one hand, and legal arguments as they occur in actual legal practice on the other hand.