Frankfurt and the folk: an experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases

An important disagreement in contemporary debates about free will hinges on whether an agent must have alternative possibilities to be morally responsible. Many assume that notions of alternative possibilities are ubiquitous and reflected in everyday intuitions about moral responsibility: if one lacks alternatives, then one cannot be morally responsible. We explore this issue empirically. In two studies, we find evidence that folk judgments about moral responsibility call into question two popular principles that require some form of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. Survey participants given scenarios involving agents that fail to satisfy these principles nonetheless found these agents to be (1) morally responsible, (2) blameworthy, (3) deserving of blame, and (4) at fault for morally bad actions and consequences. We defend our interpretation of this evidence against objections and explore some implications of these findings for the free will debate.     

The limits of anchoring

Anchoring and adjustment is a pervasive bias in which decision makers are influenced by random or uninformative numbers or starting points. As a means of understanding this effect, we explore two limits on anchoring. In Experiments 1 and 2, implausibly extreme anchors had a proportionally smaller effect than anchors close to the expected value of the lotteries evaluated. In Experiments 2 and 3, anchoring occurred only if the anchor and preference judgment were expressed on the same scale. Incompatible anchors and response modes resulted in no anchoring bias. A confirmatory search mechanism is proposed to account for these results.     

The limits of over-constancy

A number of studies have led to the generalization that there is a tendency to “overconstancy” in the perception of size. The experiments reported here suggest that over-estimation is limited to objects subtending angles of approximately 2° or less, and that objects subtending greater angles are judged fairly accurately. This raises the possibility that foveal diameter (approximately 2°) is involved.     

The limits of non-standard contingency

Philosophical Studies - Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial...     

The limits of psychoanalytic insight

Psychoanalysis has the intellectual power to decipher the inner structure of subjectivity, thus distinguishing itself from neighbouring human sciences. In doing so psychoanalysis is able to show the damages a society does to its individuals. Present-day psychoanalytic practice and thinking however runs counter to these inherent possibilities. The interaction of unresolvable neurotic phenomena and ideological bias in individual psychoanalysts reflect the increasing subsumption of psychoanalysis under the dominating interests of society--a dependency, which characterizes the actual psychoanalytic practice and theories in our time as basically affirmative.     

The moral limits of Feinberg's liberalism

This essay explores Joel Feinberg's conception of liberalism and the moral limits of the criminal law. Feinberg identifies liberty with the absence of law. He defends a strong liberal presumption against law, except where it is necessary to prevent wrongful harm or offense to others. Drawing on Rawlsian, Marxian, and feminist standpoints, I argue that there are injuries to individual liberty rooted not in law, but in civil society. Against Feinberg, I defend a richer account of liberalism and liberty, linking them to human dignity, and a more positive role for law. Feinberg justifies liberty as an instrumental welfare‐interest, valuable in virtue of the way it serves the individual's ulterior goals. Drawing on the example of racism and civil rights, I argue that the value of equal liberty stems from its social role in constituting persons’ sense of their own worth and dignity. Against Feinberg, I claim that liberty's value is grounded in a shared historical ideal of personhood, not in the individual's goals or desires. Feinberg also links liberalism with an extreme anti‐paternalist position, on which individuals should be at liberty to alienate their very own right of personal autonomy. Drawing on the examples of slavery and drug addiction, I argue against this liberty, and the conception of liberalism and paternalism in Feinberg which leads to it. A liberalism founded upon an ideal of human dignity allows, even requires, a use of law to prevent persons from destroying the very conditions of their own autonomy and dignity.     

The limits of perceptual phenomenal content

Philosophical Studies - There is an ongoing debate in philosophy of mind and epistemology about whether perceptual experience only represents those “thin” features of our environment...     

The limits of visual mass perception

The theory of direct perception suggests that observers can accurately judge the mass of a box picked up by a lifter shown in a point-light display. However, accurate perceptual performance may be limited to specific circumstances. The purpose of the present study was to systematically examine the factors that determine perception of mass, including display type, lifting speed, response type, and lifter's strength. In contrast to previous research, a wider range of viewing manipulations of point-light display conditions was investigated. In Experiment 1, we first created a circumstance where observers could accurately judge lifts of five box masses performed by a lifter of average strength. In Experiments 2–5, we manipulated the spatial and temporal aspects of the lift, the judgement type, and lifter's strength, respectively. Results showed that mass judgement gets worse whenever the context deviates from ideal conditions, such as when only the lifted object was shown, when video play speed was changed, or when lifters of different strength performed the same task. In conclusion, observers' perception of kinetic properties is compromised whenever viewing conditions are not ideal.     

The limits of the just-too-different argument

According to moral non-naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non-natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non-naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just-too-different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust normativity cannot be natural, since it is just too different from anything natural. Derek Parfit makes essentially the same claim under the heading of ‘the normativity objection’, and several other non-naturalists have said similar things. While some naturalists may be tempted to reject this argument as methodologically or dialectically illegitimate, we argue instead that there are important limits to what the just-too-different intuition can show, even setting all other worries aside. More specifically, we argue that the just-too-different argument will backfire on any positive, independent specification of the distinction between the natural and the non-natural. The upshot is that the just-too-different argument can show significantly less than non-naturalists have suggested.     

The epistemic limits of shared reasons

Accounts of public reason disagree as to the conditions a reason must meet in order to qualify as public. On one prominent account, a reason is public if, and only if, it is shareable between citizens. The shareability account, I argue, relies on an implausibly demanding assumption regarding the epistemic capabilities of citizens. When more plausible, limited, epistemic capabilities are taken into consideration, the shareability account becomes self‐defeating. Under more limited epistemic conditions, few, if any, reasons will be shareable between all reasonable citizens, making the shareability account so demanding that it precludes public reasoning altogether.     

The limits of fair equality of opportunity

The principle of fair equality of opportunity is regularly used to justify social policies, both in the philosophical literature and in public discourse. However, too often commentators fail to make explicit just what they take the principle to say. A principle of fair equality of opportunity does not say anything at all until certain variables are filled in. I want to draw attention to two variables, timing and currency. I argue that once we identify the few plausible ways we have at our disposal for filling in those variables, it will become apparent that a reasonable version of the principle will be quite narrow. Its usefulness as a justificatory basis for social policies will be limited to those policies that target the distribution of competitive opportunities among people entering majority.