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1.
Phenomenology of the body and the third generation of cognitive science, both of which attribute a central role in human cognition
to the body rather than to the Cartesian notion of representation, face the criticism that higher-level cognition cannot be
fully grasped by those studies. The problem here is how explicit representations, consciousness, and thoughts issue from perception
and the body, and how they cooperate in human cognition. In order to address this problem, we propose a research program,
a cognitive phenomenology of the body, which is basically motivated by the perspective of Merleau-Ponty. We find a substantial clue in developmental psychological
studies on the body and language.
相似文献
Shoji Nagataki (Corresponding author)Email: |
Satoru HiroseEmail: |
2.
Haye AA 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2008,42(2):157-163
One of the main goals of cognitive science is to shed light on human knowledge. This paper states that, if daily conversations,
literature, and private thought, are proper expressions of human behavior, then cognitive sciences ought to elaborate a concept
of knowledge suited to this kind of activities. I draw upon the notion of discourse in Bakhtin to specify the attributes of
knowing needed to account for human behavior, whose manifestations in everyday life are not reduced to representing objects
but essentially oriented toward responding to others. As a central aspect of knowledge, I focus on intentionality and offer
a discussion about different aspects of it. Specifically, I examine the difference between intentionality as the faculty of
representation (aboutness) and intentionality as the subjective positioning toward contextually relevant ideological perspectives
(meaning).
相似文献
Andrés A. HayeEmail: |
3.
Veronica Vasterling 《Human Studies》2007,30(2):79-95
In this essay I compare Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s approach to narrativity. The point of the comparison is to find out which
approach is more adequate for practical philosophy: the approach influenced by cognitive theory (Nussbaum) or the one influenced
by hermeneutic phenomenology (Arendt). I conclude that Nussbaum’s approach is flawed by methodological solipsism, which is
due to her application of cognitive theory.
相似文献
Veronica VasterlingEmail: |
4.
Jonathan Ichikawa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,146(3):435-443
I criticize Timothy Williamson’s characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent
counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.
相似文献
Jonathan IchikawaEmail: |
5.
Richard Fumerton 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):67-76
In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a
foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal
life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of
what we think we know and justifiably believe.
相似文献
Richard FumertonEmail: |
6.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
相似文献
Jeff WisdomEmail: |
7.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
相似文献
Christian MillerEmail: |
8.
Jeremy Gwiazda 《Philosophia》2006,34(4):437-438
When two omnipotent beings are randomly and sequentially selecting positive integers, the being who selects second is almost
certain to select a larger number. I then use the relativity of simultaneity to create a paradox by having omnipotent beings
select positive integers in different orders for different observers.
相似文献
Jeremy GwiazdaEmail: |
9.
Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion
Garry Young 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):177-189
In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed
to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage
account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion,
I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the
phenomenology underlying the disorder, both in terms of the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. This paper
therefore proposes an interactionist two-stage model in which the phenomenal experience of the Capgras patient is examined,
emphasised, and its relation to top-down processing discussed.
相似文献
Garry YoungEmail: |
10.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
11.
Jesse Ramon Steinberg 《Sophia》2008,47(2):193-199
In this paper I discuss a number of problems associated with the suggestion that it is possible for God to randomly select
a possible world for actualization.
相似文献
Jesse Ramon SteinbergEmail: |
12.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
13.
Frank Arntzenius 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):277-297
I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory.
I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
相似文献
Frank ArntzeniusEmail: |
14.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
15.
D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):419-437
I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception?
Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal”
or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections
to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action
in a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for
a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii)
have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for
the product of self-deception.
相似文献
D. S. Neil Van LeeuwenEmail: |
16.
Michael Nelson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):455-471
I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and
the Barcan formulas.
相似文献
Michael NelsonEmail: |
17.
18.
Kenneth P. Winkler 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):507-509
I clarify Locke’s intentionalism and explain what we might gain by paying more attention to the role of linguistic intentions
in the work of the British empiricists.
相似文献
Kenneth P. WinklerEmail: |
19.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
相似文献
Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
20.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
相似文献
Michael MartinEmail: |