Belief attribution despite verbal interference

False-belief (FB) tasks have been widely used to study the ability of individuals to represent the content of their conspecifics' mental states (theory of mind). However, the cognitive processes involved are still poorly understood, and it remains particularly debated whether language and inner speech are necessary for the attribution of beliefs to other agents. We present a completely nonverbal paradigm consisting of silent animated cartoons in five closely related conditions, systematically teasing apart different aspects of scene analysis and allowing the assessment of the attribution of beliefs, goals, and physical causation. In order to test the role of language in belief attribution, we used verbal shadowing as a dual task to inhibit inner speech. Data on 58 healthy adults indicate that verbal interference decreases overall performance, but has no specific effect on belief attribution. Participants remained able to attribute beliefs despite heavy concurrent demands on their verbal abilities. Our results are most consistent with the hypothesis that belief attribution is independent from inner speech.     

Language facilitates introspection: Verbal mind-wandering has privileged access to consciousness

Introspection and language are the cognitive prides of humankind, but their interactions in healthy cognition remain unclear. Episodes of mind-wandering, where personal thoughts often go unnoticed for some time before being introspected, offer a unique opportunity to study the role of language in introspection. In this paper, we show that inner speech facilitates awareness of mind-wandering. In two experiments, we either interfered with verbal working memory, via articulatory suppression (Exp. 1), or entrained it, via presentation of verbal material (Exp. 2), and measured the resulting awareness of mind-wandering. Articulatory suppression decreased the likelihood to spontaneously notice mind-wandering, whereas verbal material increased retrospective awareness of mind-wandering. In addition, an ecological study using smartphones confirmed that inner speech vividness positively predicted mind-wandering awareness (Exp. 3). Together, these findings support the view that inner speech facilitates introspection of one’s thoughts, and therefore provides empirical evidence for a positive relation between language and consciousness.     

Beliefs as inner causes: The (lack of) evidence

Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior.     

A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

Is Language Required to Represent Others’ Mental States? Evidence From Beliefs and Other Representations

An important part of our Theory of Mind—the ability to reason about other people's unobservable mental states—is the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. We investigated whether processing these false beliefs, as well as similar but nonmental representations, is reliant on language. Participants watched videos in which a protagonist hides a gift and either takes a photo of it or writes a text about its location before a second person inadvertently moves the present to a different location, thereby rendering the belief and either the photo or text false. At the same time, participants performed either a concurrent verbal interference task (rehearsing strings of digits) or a visual interference task (remembering a visual pattern). Results showed that performance on false belief trials did not decline under verbal interference relative to visual interference. We interpret these findings as further support for the view that language does not form an essential part of the process of reasoning online (“in the moment”) about false beliefs.     

Belief attribution in deaf and hearing infants

Based on anticipatory looking and reactions to violations of expected events, infants have been credited with 'theory of mind' (ToM) knowledge that a person's search behaviour for an object will be guided by true or false beliefs about the object's location. However, little is known about the preconditions for looking patterns consistent with belief attribution in infants. In this study, we compared the performance of 17- to 26-month-olds on anticipatory looking in ToM tasks. The infants were either hearing or were deaf from hearing families and thus delayed in communicative experience gained from access to language and conversational input. Hearing infants significantly outperformed their deaf counterparts in anticipating the search actions of a cartoon character that held a false belief about a target-object location. By contrast, the performance of the two groups in a true belief condition did not differ significantly. These findings suggest for the first time that access to language and conversational input contributes to early ToM reasoning.     

Matched false-belief performance during verbal and nonverbal interference

Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child's theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference tasks in terms of their effects on spatial working memory. We found equal success on false-belief reasoning during both verbal and nonverbal interference, suggesting that language is not specifically necessary for adult theory of mind.     

Belief in good luck and psychological well-being: the mediating role of optimism and irrational beliefs

The authors examined the relationship of belief in good luck with depression and anxiety within the context of a number of cognitive and personality variables used to explain depression and anxiety. Undergraduate students (46 men, 98 women) were administered measures of belief in good luck, depression, anxiety, optimism, neuroticism, attribution style, self-esteem, and irrational beliefs. The results showed that belief in good luck was significantly related to optimism and irrational beliefs. A number of models were tested to determine whether irrational beliefs or optimism mediated the relationship between belief in good luck and depression and anxiety. The findings suggested that negative relationships between belief in good luck and both depression and anxiety are best addressed by the theory that belief in good luck engenders optimistic traits and a reduced level of irrational beliefs.     

Comparative study of neurolinguistic variables in Alzheimer patients, traumatic aphasias and Korsakoff psychoses and normal control probands

There are few studies of the breakdown of language in specific dementias and there is some dispute that language pathology in brain failure is comparable to that of focal lesions. It is recognized that while aphasic language is a disturbance of receptive and propositional speech, disturbances of "InnerLanguage" disrupt the planning and regulatory basis of behavior. This paper presents a comparison of three pathological groups to match normal controls and suggest that in its initial stages reduced cognitive performances in Alzheimers type Dementia and Korsakow Psychosis on non verbal measures maybe a further of the regulatory role of inner speech comparison with traumatic Aphasia which more clearly exists on a deficit of verbal comprehension and expression.     

How do use and comprehension of mental-state language relate to theory of mind in middle childhood?

This study investigates the relationship between mental-state language and theory of mind in primary school children. The participants were 110 primary school students (mean age = 9 years and 7 months; SD = 12.7 months). They were evenly divided by gender and belonged to two age groups (8- and 10-year-olds). Linguistic, metacognitive and cognitive measures were used to assess the following competencies: verbal ability, use of mental-state terms, understanding of metacognitive language, understanding of second-order false beliefs, and emotion comprehension. Correlations between children’ use of mental-state language and their performance on theory-of-mind tasks were moderate, whereas correlations between children's comprehension of such language and ToM abilities were high. In addition, regression analyses showed that comprehension of metacognitive language was the variable which best explained children's performance on both false belief tasks and an emotion comprehension test when verbal ability and age were controlled for.     

Children’s first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task

We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief tasks. In this study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people.     

Animal Beliefs and Their Contents

This paper investigates whether, or not, the behavior of animals without speech can manifest beliefs and desires. Criteria for the attribution of such beliefs and desires are worked out with reference to Jonathan Bennett's theory of cognitive teleology: A particular ability for learning justifies attributing such beliefs and desires. The conceptual analysis is illustrated by examinations of cognitive ethology and considers higher-order intentionality. It is argued that the behavioral evidence only supports the attribution of first order beliefs and that languageless animals therefore could not possess higher-order intentionality. They are only capable of forming simple, i.e., first-order beliefs about their environment. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Implication and reasoning in mental state attribution: Comments on Jane Heal's theory of co-cognition

Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.     

An informational analysis of actors' and observers' belief attributions in a role-playing situation

An actor's belief in a proposition was inferred by both the actor himself and an observer on the basis of information concerning (a) the actor's preparation and delivery of a speech on the proposition to an unseen audience, and (b) the audience's belief in the proposition. The availability of this information to judges was systematically varied. The position advocated by the actor in his speech and the audience's opinion affected both the actor's belief in the test proposition and the belief attributed to the actor by a disinterested observer. However, neither effect depended upon whether or not other belief-relevant information was also available. These results were interpreted as more consistent with a summative model of information integration than with an averaging model. Actors' behavior had similar effects upon both actors' estimates of how the audience would judge their beliefs and observers' actual estimates of these beliefs. However, these effects were both greater than the effect of their behavior on their own estimates of their beliefs. The apparent strength of the audience's belief in the target proposition had a positive influence upon both actors' beliefs in the proposition and observers' estimates of actors' beliefs, but had a negative, or contrast effect upon actors' expectancies for how the audience would judge their beliefs. Results were more consistent with the differential perspective hypothesis of actor-observer differences proposed by Jones and Nisbett than with the hypothesis that actors and observers differentially weight the implications of their past experience in formulating their judgments. Results had additional implications for the assumptions that persons make when using their behaviors as indications of their beliefs.     

The belief in a negative interdependence of math and verbal abilities as determinant of academic self‐concepts

Background. The internal/external frame of reference (I/E) model by Marsh (1986) assumes intra‐individual dimensional comparisons in which students compare their own achievements in one subject with their achievements in other subjects. These comparison processes should lead to negative paths from achievement in one subject (e.g. maths) on self‐concept in another subject (e.g. verbal domains). Aims. Within this study, we investigated the impact of students' belief in a negative interdependence of maths and verbal abilities, that is, whether students think of maths and verbal abilities as negatively correlated or not, on the impact of dimensional comparisons. Methods. Maths and German grades, academic self‐concepts in maths and German, and a new scale on the beliefs in a negative interdependence of maths and verbal abilities students were assessed (N = 1,443). Results. The importance of the negative interdependence beliefs could be shown: stronger beliefs in a negative interdependence of maths and verbal ability are accompanied by more negative path coefficients from grades in one subject to academic self‐concepts in the other subject. Conclusions. Dimensional comparisons seem to be of particular importance for students with negative interdependence beliefs.     

Substitution and the explanation of action

This paper examines a potential problem area for theories of direct reference: that of the substitution of co-referential names within the belief context of a belief attribution used to explain an action. Of particular interest are action explanations which involve cases of repetition — wherein beliefs are held which, though about one (other) individual, are mistakenly thought to concern two different people. It is argued that, despite the commonly held view to the contrary, no problem is posed by substitution in such circumstances to theories of direct reference.     

THE MORAL BELIEF PROBLEM

The moral belief problem is that of reconciling expressivism in ethics with both minimalism in the philosophy of language and the syntactic discipline of moral sentences. It is argued that the problem can be solved by distinguishing minimal and robust senses of belief, where a minimal belief is any state of mind expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R. Two attempts to specify R are discussed, both based on the thought that beliefs are states that aim at truth. According to the first, robust beliefs are criticisable to the extent that their content fails to match the state of the world. This sense fails to distinguish robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. According to the second, robust beliefs function to have their content match the state of the world. This sense succeeds in distinguishing robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. The conclusion is that the debate concerning the cognitive status of moral convictions needs to address the issue of the function of moral convictions. Evolutionary theorising may be relevant, but will not be decisive, in answering this question.     

Evangelical Elites’ Anti‐Homosexuality Narratives as a Resistance Strategy Against Attribution Effects

While attribution theory expects that beliefs about the origins of homosexuality are directly related to beliefs about the moral acceptability of homosexual behavior, we use content analysis of the popular evangelical magazine Christianity Today to show that evangelical elites have developed a series of anti‐homosexuality narratives that allow them to resist attribution effects. In particular, we find that even when evangelical elites have expressed belief in the physiological origins of homosexuality, such as the influence of genetics and/or prenatal hormones, their negative beliefs about the moral acceptability of homosexual behavior have not varied. We argue, then, that evangelical elites’ anti‐homosexuality narratives provide them with a strategy for influencing rank‐and‐file evangelicals, so that while allowing for a diversity of beliefs about the origins of homosexuality, rank‐and‐file evangelicals still have a viable mechanism for connecting these beliefs—whatever they may be—to negative beliefs about the moral acceptability of homosexual behavior. Our findings thus extend attribution theory, illuminate the potential power of moral narratives, and amplify the need for future research.     

Changing the Speech of Autistic Children and Their Parents

The parents of nine autistic preschool children were trained in behavior modification and operant techniques of teaching speech. The study used a multiple baseline design with Group 1 completing behavior modification training while Group 2 remained on the waiting list. Then, Group 1 entered speech training while Group 2 began behavior modification. Finally, Group 2 received speech training. Videotape assessments of parents and child were made pretreatment and after each stage of training. The tapes were coded reliably for the parents' speech oriented and non-speech oriented language and the childrens' speech and non-speech behaviors. There was no change in parental speech oriented language following behavior modification but a substantial rise in such language was noted after speech training. Both mothers and fathers changed after training, although mothers were consistently more active than fathers. Both before and after training, the parents of the more verbal children emitted more speech oriented language than the parents of the mute children. The children showed changes which paralleled those of the parents. There was no significant change in child speech after behavior modification, but a rise in children's speech was obvious when their parents completed the speech training. The verbal children accounted for the changes in the two groups since the mute children showed Iittle evidence of change. The results suggest that parents of nonverbal chiIdren can learn to modify their language behavior and that this parent training can be done in an economical group setting.