Commentary on Ted Ruffman’s “Belief or not belief: …”

I applaud Ruffman for cautioning us against interpreting early sensitivity to others’ beliefs as evidence for an innate theory of mind and for making room for learning. In turn, however, I caution against his claim that all infants need is to understand that people act depending on what they perceive. Instead, infants may keep experiential records (Perner & Roessler, 2010) for other people or records of what they have registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), which makes it less obvious that all required knowledge can be acquired by statistical learning. As a general criticism I remonstrate with current theory of mind research on its lack of concern that we understand people as acting for reasons which goes beyond detecting lawful regularities in behaviour.     

“This way!”, “No! That way!”—3-year olds know that two people can have mutually incompatible desires

In theory of mind research, there is a long standing dispute about whether children come to understand the subjectivity of both desires and beliefs at the same time (around age 4), or whether there is an asymmetry such that desires are understood earlier. To address this issue, 3-year olds’ understanding of situations in which two persons have mutually incompatible desires was tested in two studies. Results revealed that (i) children were quite proficient at ascribing incompatible desires to two persons, and in simpler scenarios even incompatible desire-dependent emotions; (ii) children showed this proficiency even though they mostly failed the false belief task. Overall, these results suggest that there is an asymmetry such that young children come to understand the subjective nature of desires before they understand the corresponding subjectivity of beliefs. Possible explanations for this asymmetry are discussed in light of conceptual change and information-processing accounts of theory of mind development.     

Does syntax play a role in Theory of Mind development before the age of 3 years?

Language plays an important role in Theory of Mind development. Specifically, longitudinal and training studies indicate that the acquisition of complement syntax has an effect on three- to five-year-old children’s mastery of the concept of false belief. There is evidence for both a beginning explicit understanding of the mind and mastery of complement syntax in children before their third birthday. In the present study, we investigated longitudinally whether an early sensitivity to complement syntax is related to early development of Theory of Mind abilities in a sample of N = 159 German-speaking 27- to 36-month-old children. Children’s sensitivity to formal properties of complement syntax at 33 months was associated with their perspective-taking skills and their metacognition of own ignorance three months later. This relation remained significant when controlling for the effects of general language abilities. Furthermore, children’s sensitivity to complement syntax was concurrently related to their early false belief understanding. These findings support the view that complement syntax shares representational demands with an understanding of epistemic states and that language begins to support the acquisition of epistemic concepts earlier than was previously thought.     

头部朝向在社会性注意转移中的作用

注视指向是非常重要的社会性注意线索,但是在日常情境中,注视指向往往伴随着头部朝向信息,而且两者都包含空间指向信息.已有研究发现头部朝向会影响注视指向知觉的速度和准确性,为注视指向提供参照系,进而会影响注视指向诱发的社会性注意.头部朝向和注视指向加工的神经机制也存在着广泛的重合.因此,除眼睛注视以外,头部朝向也是建构和完善基于心理模型的社会性注意机制的一个关键因素.未来的研究应关注头部朝向与眼睛注视指向共同影响注意转移的作用机制,并且从功能整合的角度开展神经机制研究.     

幼儿心理状态术语的运用与心理理论的发展

本研究目的在于探讨幼儿在假装游戏中心理状态术语的应用,以及与错误信念的理解是否存在相关并具有一定的发展特征。57名3—5岁的幼儿参加了实验。研究程序包括两类标准错误信念任务及假装游戏的拍摄、麦卡锡幼儿言语智力测验。结果发现：(1)幼儿的一般言语能力与错误信念的理解存在显著相关;(2)幼儿心理状态术语的使用存在情境差异,且随年龄的增长具有“指向愿望一指向信念”的维度特征;(3)在控制相关因素之后,幼儿错误信念的理解与心理状态术语的应用及其特定范畴(习惯用语)之间仍然存在显著相关;与“真正涉及心理状态”之间的相关不再显著。     

Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences

Two samples, one gifted, the other “normal,” of 30 children each (11 to 13 years of age) were matched on age, sex, race, and father's occupation. A parent of each child completed the Children's Behavioral Classification Project instrument, and a profile of 30 scaled scores was obtained for each protocol. A discriminant analysis on the basis of the profiles classified 50 of the 60 Ss correctly into their respective sample category, either gifted or normal. Though the results of a multivariate analysis of variance showed no significant differences between the groups when the 30 profile factors were viewed as a whole, univariate analyses on the separate factors yielded significant group differences on several related factors. These were interpreted with caution. Additional factors displayed significant sex differences and one demonstrated a group-by-sex interaction effect.

Coefficients of pattern similarity (the r_p ) were computed among all pairs of the 60 Ss. An unweighted average linkage cluster analysis grouped 34 of the 60 Ss into six clusters which accounted for 26 of 30 possible gifted children.

After an item analysis was performed on the original data, a 42 item subscale of the CBCP questionnaire was constructed which correctly classified 31 of 40 individuals in a cross-validation sample.     

3～6岁儿童信念理解能力的发展研究

研究设计了冲突真实信念任务,用于考察儿童对真实信念的理解;并利用区分信念、冲突真实信念和意外地点的错误信念任务,考察儿童理解信念推理基本规则、真实信念和错误信念的发展顺序。97名3~6岁儿童完成了测试。结果显示,3岁儿童能理解信念推理的基本规则,5岁儿童能理解真实信念,6岁儿童能理解错误信念。结果支持了儿童先理解真实信念,后理解错误信念的发展模式;也说明在理解信念以前儿童已能掌握信念推理的基本规则。     

聋童与正常儿童对多种信念的认知

选取了122名3～12岁聋童,并分别用65名3～5岁的正常儿童作对照,开展了2个实验系列,探讨了儿童的正确信念、一级错误信念及二级错误信念认知的发展特点.结果如下: (1)聋童及正常儿童信念认知的发展过程中,无论是关于正确信念,还是关于一级错误信念,都是先发展自我信念认知,再发展他人信念认知;(2)关于正确信念、一级错误信念和二级错误信念认知的发展,聋童都比正常儿童滞后,但两者的发展趋势一致; (3)手语聋童在信念认知上略好于口语聋童; (4)父母为聋人或父母会手语的聋童,以及兄弟姐妹会手语的聋童,其信念认知水平要比其他聋童好.     

心理理论和语言能力的关系

心理理论和语言能力的关系已日益引起研究者们的关注.文章综述了以非人灵长类动物、正常儿童和特殊人群为对象进行的有关心理理论和语言关系的研究,从比较和发展的角度进行了理论分析.提出一定的语言能力水平也许是通过心理理论测试的前提条件,但二者有着不同的发展规律,并表现为复杂的共存关系.     

Low-Income Preschoolers' False-Belief Performance

A group of 72 preschoolers (36 African Americans, 36 European Americans) enrolled in Head Start programs and other preschools serving low-income children were asked 3 variations of false-belief questions across 3 scenarios and given a language and cognition subtest. Children's performance varied across the questions and tasks, but after covarying for children's language and cognitive scores, those effects were no longer found to be significant. Age effects were still significant even after differences in children's language and cognitive abilities had been accounted for. Although no language and cognitive differences were found among European Americans and African Americans, the European Americans still outperformed African Americans on 1 of the task scenarios. Those results demonstrate (a) the importance of considering testing procedures and language and cognitive abilities when assessing children's social cognitive skills and (b) that age-related changes in false-belief understanding are associated with social cognitive conceptual changes that are independent of language and cognitive skills.     

Developing intelligence: Is a comprehensive theory possible?

This introduction first outlines the main issues and questions about mind and intelligence that need to be dealt with by disciplines such as differential, developmental, and cognitive, psychology. It then summarizes the major findings of the target article, the main points raised by the commentators, and the main points of the rejoinder. It ends up with a set of questions to be followed by future research.     

Machiavellianism and Theory of Mind in people affected by schizophrenia

CONTEXT: People affected by schizophrenia show deficits in social interaction (Cramer, Bowen, & O'Neill, 1992); such a deficit may stem from an alteration in the representation of mental states. OBJECT: In this study we have examined 42 people affected by schizophrenia, diagnosed according to DSM-IV criteria, by testing them with an instrument (the Mach IV scale, Christie & Geis, 1970) assessing "Machiavellian Intelligence" according to Niccolò Machiavelli's assertions. Schizophrenic subjects were compared to a sample of normal controls, matched for age, sex, and education. OBJECTIVE: The aim of our study was to evaluate if there were correlations between the ability to understand other people's mental states and the capacity for interpreting "Machiavellian expressions." RESULTS: Results show that people affected by schizophrenia are less able to use Machiavellian-style "tactical" abilities than controls. CONCLUSION: Such a disability seems to be correlated to poor mentalising abilities.