“易得性启发式”与决策框架对风险决策倾向的影响

研究目的:探讨易得性启发式对风险决策认知过程的影响,以及易得性启发式与决策框架相互作用下的风险投资行为特点。方法:采用2×2×7混合实验设计和情境实验。结果:成功结果的易得性启发式导致对风险决策问题采用自上而下加工,失败结果为自下而上加工;成功结果时投资倾向为风险趋向,失败结果为风险规避;易得性启发式与决策框架共同影响风险投资倾向。结论:易得性启发式影响风险决策的认知加工过程,并与决策框架对风险投资倾向产生交互作用。     

Turn right or turn left? Heuristic of adhering to the direction of destination

It has been found that humans not only tend to avoid the middle routes and prefer the peripheral routes among multiple choices, but also rely on the ‘initial segment strategy’ to select the route. In this paper, we propose a new heuristic which humans apply during route selection: Participants prefer the route whose initial direction lies in the direction of their final destination, while avoiding the route whose initial direction does not. Four maps were designed. The pathways, on different maps, constituted a parallelogram, a rectangle and a square. Pedestrians were instructed to select a route from an origin to a destination on one of the maps. The results confirm the application of the newly proposed heuristic. Other possible factors, such as handedness, route angles and occurrence of turns were excluded. Moreover, the heuristics of deferring decision and relying on initial straightness are not supported. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who will win Wimbledon? The recognition heuristic in predicting sports events

Goldstein and Gigerenzer ( 2002 ) described the recognition heuristic as a fast, frugal, and effective decision strategy. However, most studies concerning the recognition heuristic have been conducted in static domains, that is, in domains where it could plausibly be argued that relevant variables stay relatively constant. Yet the question is whether the heuristic would also work in dynamic environments where the quality of the actors rises and falls, such as in sports. We tested performance of the recognition heuristic in a dynamic environment and used it to predict the outcomes of tennis matches in Wimbledon 2003. Recognition data of amateur tennis players and laypeople was used to build recognition rankings. These rankings correlated with official rankings and led to at least as good predictions. Simulations of individual choices showed high recognition validities of both amateurs (0.73) and laypeople (0.67). In a second study the recognition heuristic correctly predicted 90% of actual individual choices. Overall, the recognition heuristic may be effectively generalized to dynamic environments. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The recognition heuristic in memory‐based inference: is recognition a non‐compensatory cue?

The recognition heuristic makes the strong claim that probabilistic inferences in which a recognized object is compared to an unrecognized one are made solely on the basis of whether the objects are recognized or not, ignoring all other available cues. This claim has been seriously challenged by a number of studies that have shown a clear effect of additional cue knowledge. In most of these studies, either recognition knowledge was acquired during the experiment, and/or additional cues were provided to participants. However, the recognition heuristic is more likely to be a tool for exploiting natural (rather than induced) recognition when inferences have to be made from memory. In our study on natural recognition and inferences from memory, around 85% of the inferences followed recognition information even when participants had learned three cues that contradicted recognition and when some of the contradictory cues were deemed more valid than recognition. Nevertheless, there were strong individual differences in the use of recognition. Whereas about half of the participants chose the recognized object regardless of the number of conflicting cues—suggestive of the hypothesized noncompensatory processing of recognition—the remaining participants were influenced by the additional knowledge. The former group of participants also tended to give higher estimates of recognition's validity. In addition, we found that the use of recognition for an inference may be affected by whether additional cue knowledge has been learned outside or within the experimental setting. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

幼儿元认知"乐观主义现象"研究述评

儿童元认知发展是当代发展心理学研究的热点领域之一,其中儿童对自身能力的认识与评估又是研究者很感兴趣的课题。大量研究表明,与年长儿童和成人相比,年幼儿童特别是学龄前儿童往往对自己的能力和在各种任务中的成绩作出不切实际的高估,这种高估具有跨领域的一致性,并且具有内在固执性,即通常不受过去失败经验的影响。这就是所谓幼儿元认知“乐观主义现象”。本文对这一领域的相关研究进行整体回顾与分析,并在此基础上尝试对这一现象产生的原因及影响因素作出解释和说明。     

Counter‐intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter‐intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.     

The Secrecy Heuristic: Inferring Quality from Secrecy in Foreign Policy Contexts

Three experiments demonstrate that in the context of U.S. foreign policy decision making, people infer informational quality from secrecy. In Experiment 1, people weighed secret information more heavily than public information when making recommendations about foreign political candidates. In Experiment 2, people judged information presented in documents ostensibly produced by the Department of State and the National Security Council as being of relatively higher quality when those documents were secret rather than public. Finally, in Experiment 3, people judged a National Security Council document as being of higher quality when presented as a secret document rather than a public document and evaluated others' decisions more favorably when those decisions were based on secret information. Discussion centers on the mediators, moderators, and broader implications of this secrecy heuristic in foreign policy contexts.     

Criterion knowledge: A moderator of using the recognition heuristic?

The recognition heuristic (RH) claims that people base inferences on recognition only. This has been questioned by several studies which found that additional knowledge was influential. However, in some of these studies, participants' additional knowledge might have encompassed criterion knowledge thus rendering any inferential strategy superfluous. The present study was therefore designed to test the effect of criterion knowledge on use or non‐use of the RH. Eighty‐one participants made pair‐wise comparisons with respect to the size of Belgian cities and also provided estimates of the cities' actual size. We found that relative criterion knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the relative position of an object on the criterion dimension) did indeed play some role, but its exclusion left the main critical findings intact, nonetheless. We thus conclude that previous studies conducted in the paradigm of natural recognition should not be generally refuted by the argument of participants possessing criterion knowledge. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

愿望采择发展水平对幼儿情感决策的影响

选取148名4岁儿童, 运用实验法考察了幼儿的愿望采择发展水平对其情感决策的影响。结果表明: (1) 幼儿的愿望采择水平对其情感决策具有显著影响。情境中他人愿望信息充足时, 幼儿会采择他人愿望并以此为线索为他人决策, 但对线索的利用程度受其愿望采择水平的制约。(2) 在无关于他人愿望信息提示的条件下, 4岁儿童为他人与为自己的情感决策不存在显著差异。(3) 4岁儿童能够采择他人的单一愿望, 但其冲突愿望采择能力还不成熟。