Willing and able? Theory of mind,social motivation,and social competence in middle childhood and early adolescence

This study investigated the links between theory of mind, social motivation, and children's social competence in middle childhood and early adolescence. Two hundred and sixty four children (136 girls, 128 boys) aged between 8 and 13 years (M Age = 10.88 years, SD = 1.45) completed theory-of-mind tests and self-report questionnaires measuring social motivation. Teachers rated children's social competence at school. Teacher-rated social competence was associated with individual differences in both theory of mind and children's motivation to develop and maintain social relationships. Results suggest that while individual differences in social motivation and theory of mind are partially overlapping, both theory of mind ability and social motivation contribute to successful social interaction at school.     

Longitudinal associations between children's understanding of emotions and theory of mind

Theory of mind competence and knowledge of emotions were studied longitudinally in a sample of preschoolers aged 3 (n=263) and 4 (n=244) years. Children were assessed using standard measures of theory of mind and emotion knowledge. Three competing hypotheses were tested regarding the developmental associations between children's theory of mind abilities and their knowledge of emotions. First, that an understanding of emotion develops early and informs children's understanding of others’ thinking. Alternatively, having a basic theory of mind may help children learn about emotions. Third, that the two domains are separate aspects of children's social cognitive skills such that each area develops independently. Results of hierarchical regressions supported the first hypothesis that early emotion understanding predicts later theory-of-mind performance, and not the reverse.     

Relationships among parenting practices,parental stress,child behaviour,and children's social‐cognitive development

The present study included observational and self‐report measures to examine associations among parental stress, parental behaviour, child behaviour, and children's theory of mind and emotion understanding. Eighty‐three parents and their 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated. Parents completed measures of parental stress, parenting (laxness, overreactivity), and child behaviour (internalizing, externalizing); children completed language, theory of mind, and emotion understanding measures. Parent–child interactions also were observed (N=47). Laxness and parenting stress predicted children's theory of mind performance and parental usage of imitative gestures and vocalizations accounted for unique variance in emotion understanding. Associations also were found between child behaviour and emotion understanding. Results provide support for direct and indirect associations between parent–child interactions and early social‐cognitive development. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Theory of mind selectively predicts preschoolers’ knowledge‐based selective word learning

Children can selectively attend to various attributes of a model, such as past accuracy or physical strength, to guide their social learning. There is a debate regarding whether a relation exists between theory‐of‐mind skills and selective learning. We hypothesized that high performance on theory‐of‐mind tasks would predict preference for learning new words from accurate informants (an epistemic attribute), but not from physically strong informants (a non‐epistemic attribute). Three‐ and 4‐year‐olds (N = 65) completed two selective learning tasks, and their theory‐of‐mind abilities were assessed. As expected, performance on a theory‐of‐mind battery predicted children's preference to learn from more accurate informants but not from physically stronger informants. Results thus suggest that preschoolers with more advanced theory of mind have a better understanding of knowledge and apply that understanding to guide their selection of informants. This work has important implications for research on children's developing social cognition and early learning.     

Narrative Discourse and Theory of Mind Development

The authors examined experimentally whether exposure to social discourse about concepts related to mental states could promote changes in children's theory of mind understanding. In 2 studies, 3- to 4-year-old children were assigned to either a training or a no training control condition. All children were administered several theory of mind measures at pretest and 2 posttests. Training was not effective in improving performance in Study 1 (n = 37); but in Study 2 (n = 54), modifications of the training procedure led to significant improvements on measures of false belief and deception from pretest to 1st posttest. The findings support the influence of social discourse on children's theory of mind development.     

Group typicality,group loyalty and cognitive development

Over the course of childhood, children's thinking about social groups changes in a variety of ways. Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics (DSGD) theory emphasizes children's understanding of the importance of conforming to group norms. Abrams et al.'s study, which uses DSGD theory as a framework, demonstrates the social cognitive skills underlying young elementary school children's thinking about group norms. Future research on children's thinking about groups and group norms should explore additional elements of this topic, including aspects of typicality beyond loyalty.     

Young children's self‐benefiting lies and their relation to executive functioning and theory of mind

It is well established that children lie in different social contexts for various purposes from the age of 2 years. Surprisingly, little is known about whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain, how self‐benefiting lies emerge, and what cognitive factors affect the emergence of self‐benefiting lies. To bridge this gap in the literature, we situated children between 2 and 4 years of age in a zero‐sum game where children must lie to their opponent if they wanted to win a desirable reward. We found that the majority of young children did not lie even when they experienced personal losses repeatedly. However, some children spontaneously lied during the game; as the game progressed, more children lied. Further, we found that children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning in terms of a combination of inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility had significant positive and unique correlations with how frequently children lied for personal gain. The present results taken together with the existing findings regarding children's lies for self‐protection and politeness purposes suggest that the act of lying begins early in life. Further, its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

Highlights

• The study investigated whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain.
• This study used a zero‐sum game to elicit children's self‐benefiting lies. Results showed the majority of young children did not lie, and it is related to children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.
• The act of lying begins early in life, and its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

     

Simulation (mostly) rules: A commentary

I consider three issues: children's attribution of belief‐based emotions, the contribution of language input to children's developing theory of mind, and the default settings we assume in our dealings with the world. I ask whether the proposals made by Mitchell, Currie and Ziegler can help throw light on each issue ( Mitchell, Currie, & Ziegler, 2009 ).     

Theory of Mind and Sensitivity to Teacher and Peer Criticism Among Japanese Children

This study investigated sensitivity to teacher and peer criticism among 89 Japanese 6‐year‐olds and examined the connection between sensitivity to criticism and first‐order and second‐order theory of mind separately. Participants completed a common test battery that included tasks assessing sensitivity to criticism (teacher or peer condition), the Picture Vocabulary Test—Revised, and theory of mind tasks. The results showed that the children with better understanding of second‐order mental states rated their ability negatively after teacher criticism, but they were motivated to keep trying. This phenomenon was found under only the teacher condition, and peer criticism did not significantly affect children's response, irrespective of theory‐of‐mind level. Cognitive and social factors that may have contributed to the children's responses to criticism are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hegel,British Idealism,and the curious case of the concrete universal

Although it is clear in Schelling's Freiheitsschrift that he takes an agent's atemporal choice between good and evil to be central to understanding human freedom, there is no consensus in the literature and no adequate account of how to understand this choice. Further, the literature fails to render intelligible how existential freedom is possible in the light of this atemporal choice. I demonstrate that, despite their differences, the dominant accounts in the literature are all guilty of these failings and argue that this is due to their misunderstanding of Schelling's conception of the relationship between essence and form. After outlining what I take Schelling's account of this relationship to be, I return to the Freiheitsschrift to demonstrate that with this account in mind we can make intelligible Schelling's claims about the agent's atemporal act, and the possibility of existential freedom on his account.     

Longitudinal Relations Between Theory of Mind and Metacognition and the Impact of Language

This study investigated the longitudinal relation between children's theory of mind and their metacognitive knowledge with a special focus on the impact of language on this relation. Measures of theory-of-mind understanding and metamemory knowledge were assessed in 133 3-year-old children at 4 measurement points separated by half-year intervals. Results revealed a somewhat more pronounced effect of children's early theory of mind on the change in metamemory knowledge than vice versa. This effect was almost independent of the time period under investigation as well as of earlier language and nonverbal competencies and socioeconomic status. Early language competencies had a direct impact on theory-of-mind and metamemory development and moreover indirectly affected metamemory development through children's theory of mind. The results of the study suggest that children's abilities to metarepresent together with their early language competencies are important in the acquisition of metamemory knowledge.     

Television Exposure,Sleep Time,and Neuropsychological Function Among Preschoolers

We explored whether sleep time mediates the relation between preschoolers' television exposure and two indicators of neuropsychological function: executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). With a sample of 107 preschoolers and their parents, we found that heavier background television exposure and nighttime television viewing were related to fewer hours of sleep, which, in turn, was related to weaker ToM. However, sleep time did not mediate the relation between intentional television viewing and EF. In this article, we discuss the importance of understanding the mechanisms by which television exposure can affect children's neuropsychological function and offer several alternative explanations.     

Is Silence Really Golden? The Role of Spiritual Voice in Folk Pedagogy and Folk Psychology

Most recently, considerable attention has been focused on the social construction of knowledge and an internalist, first‐person perspective on learning. Included in this paradigm shift is a particular ‘hybrid’ of both psychology and educational theory often referred to as ‘theory of mind’ (ToM research) or folk psychology. This article outlines models of teaching, learning, and mind in the hopes that such an advance in understanding children's minds will lead to an improved pedagogy. To address the issues of emotion and ‘spiritual voice’ that may constrain learning in the classroom and self‐development, Belenky et al.’sfive epistemological perspectives or ‘Women's Ways of Knowing’ (New York, Basic Books, 1986) are couched within the framework of Olson and Burner's [Folk Psychology and Folk Pedagogy, in: D. Olson & N. Torrance (Eds) Handbook of Education and Human Development: New Models of Learning, Teaching and Schooling, pp. 9‐27 (Oxford, Blackwell)] four models of mind, teaching and learning. At issue is the dialogical relation between folk psychology and folk pedagogy and its contingency on both culture and context.     

Heidegger,Sociality, and Human Agency

According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being‐with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life.     

A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

CAUSALITY, INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY: MIND BODY INTERACTION IN SPINOZA

According to Spinoza mental events and physical events are identical. What makes Spinoza's identity theory tempting is that it solves the problem of mind body interaction rather elegantly: mental events and physical events can be causally related to each other because mental events are physical events. However, Spinoza seems to deny that there is any causal interaction between mental and physical events. My aim is to show that Spinoza's apparent denial of mind body interaction can be reconciled with the identity theory. I argue that Spinoza had both an extensional and an intensional concept of cause and when Spinoza seems to deny mind body interaction he is having in mind the intensional concept of cause. This intensional concept of cause corresponds to that of causal explanation. I will argue that Spinoza anticipated Donald Davidson's view that even though mental events cannot be explained by referring to physical events and vice versa, mental and physical events are causally related to each other.     

The Relation Between Executive Function and Theory of Mind is More Than Skin Deep

A simple “expression” account of the relation between executive function (EF) and children's developing theory of mind (ToM) has difficulty accounting for the generality of the changes occurring in children's mental-state understanding during the preschool years. The current study of preschool children (N = 43) showed that EF—especially conflict EF—related uniformly to ToM measures that imposed either high or low executive demands, independent of verbal ability. These findings can be explained within an emergence account wherein executive skills are implicated in the acquisition of mental-state concepts as opposed to merely the expression of these concepts in task performance.     

The Effects of Mother Participation in Relationship Education on Coparenting,Parenting, and Child Social Competence: Modeling Spillover Effects for Low‐Income Minority Preschool Children

Although suggestions are that benefits of relationship and marriage education (RME) participation extend from the interparental relationship with parenting and child outcomes, few evaluation studies of RME test these assumptions and the relationship among changes in these areas. This quasi‐experimental study focuses on a parallel process growth model that tests a spillover hypothesis of program effects and finds, in a sample of low‐income minority mothers with a child attending a Head Start program, that increases in mother reports of coparenting agreement for RME participants predict decreases in their reports of punitive parenting behaviors. Although improvements in parenting behaviors did not predict increases in teacher reports of children's social competence, improvements in coparenting agreement were associated with increases in children's social competence over time. In addition, comparative tests of outcomes between parents in the program and parents in a comparison group reveal that RME program participants (n = 171) demonstrate significant improvements compared to nonparticipants (n = 143) on coparenting agreement, parenting practices, and teachers' reports of preschool children's social competence over a 1 year period. The findings are offered as a step forward in better understanding the experiences of low‐resource participants in RME. Implications for future research are discussed.