Response selection in spatial choice reaction: Further evidence against associative models

In a “consistent” spatial choice reaction task the same spatial relationship obtains between each stimulus and its correct response. In an “inconsistent” task this is not so. While Duncan (1977a) found both easy (spatially corresponding) and difficult (spatially opposite) responses to be slowed in inconsistent tasks, Smith (1977) found this only for the corresponding responses, the reverse holding for opposites. Reasons for this discrepancy are examined. The result of Smith (1977) depends on the use of different numbers of alternative responses in consistent and inconsistent tasks, a situation allowing no useful comparison between the two. Effects of consistency are related to others in the literature. The general conclusion is that, in these tasks, response selection is based not on a list of associations between individual stimuli and responses, but on operations or rules each of which will generate a set of stimulus-response pairs.     

Remembering, Familiarity, and Source Monitoring

Two experiments investigated recollective experience in a source monitoring task. Subjects saw an array of objects and performed, watched, or imagined actions involving pairs of objects. In a subsequent recognition test, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements were made on the basis of conscious recollective experience (“remember” responses), or on some other basis such as familiarity (“know” responses). The proportions of correct “remember” responses for both objects and actions decreased from performed, through watched, to imagined actions, whereas the proportions of correct “know” responses were uninfluenced by the source of the memories. In addition, the relationship between recollective experience and accuracy of source judgement varied across sources. Source accuracy for performed actions was obtained only in “remember” responses, whereas source accuracy for imagined actions was obtained only in “know” responses. Source accuracy for watched actions was obtained in both “remember” and “know” responses. The findings suggest that the types of memory attributes available at retrieval determine the quality of subsequent memory experience, and it is proposed that memories with strongly self-referential attributes (arising from performed actions) powerfully cue recollective experience during retrieval.     

Reconnecting interpretation to reasoning through individual differences

Computational theories of mind assume that participants interpret information and then reason from those interpretations. Research on interpretation in deductive reasoning has claimed to show that subjects' interpretation of single syllogistic premises in an “immediate inference” task is radically different from their interpretation of pairs of the same premises in syllogistic reasoning tasks (Newstead, 1989, 1995; Roberts, Newstead, & Griggs, 2001). Narrow appeal to particular Gricean implicatures in this work fails to bridge the gap. Grice's theory taken as a broad framework for credulous discourse processing in which participants construct speakers' “intended models” of discourses can reconcile these results, purchasing continuity of interpretation through variety of logical treatments. We present exploratory experimental data on immediate inference and subsequent syllogistic reasoning. Systematic patterns of interpretation driven by two factors (whether the subject's model of the discourse is credulous, and their degree of reliance on information packaging) are shown to transcend particular quantifier inferences and to drive systematic differences in subjects' subsequent syllogistic reasoning. We conclude that most participants do not understand deductive tasks as experimenters intend, and just as there is no single logical model of reasoning, so there is no reason to expect a single “fundamental human reasoning mechanism”.     

Feedback control of hand-movement and Fitts' law

Fitt's empirical result is stated and its information theoretic interpretation briefly discussed. An alternate derivation from a model assuming continous velocity control of hand position is shown to fit the motion time data equally well. Detailed studies of hand motion trajectories in Fitts' reciprocal tapping task have confirmed the exponential target approach predicted by this model but also revealed systematic fluctuations that it cannot explain. A further alternate model is therefore presented, based on intermittent feedback with target approach by a sequence of discrete positional corrective motion “impulses”. The second model also predicts motion times in accord with Fitts' Law.

Detailed studies of target aimed translational hand and rotary wrist motions have shown that the intermittent corrective impulses are of approximately Gaussian integral form, with minimum s.d. on the order of 30 msec. for wrist rotation, and recurrence rate about 10/s. Mechanical and physiological interactions capable of explaining this corrective impulse trajectory are discussed, and a model based on balance of forces between agonist and antagonist muscles is briefly developed. The interaction between external (visual) and internal (proprioceptive or kinaesthetic) feedback channels determining impulse amplitude is discussed in the light of results obtained using force disturbance and with amplified, attenuated or delayed visual feedback. It seems that an internal “secondary positional reference” must be postulated to explain results obtained when S is deprived of visual feedback.     

An improved technique for monitoring fixation in tachistoscopic tasks

A monocular lens mounted behind a stimulus screen was used to monitor fixation in a tachistoscopic recognition task. This technique was found superior to the often used “sideview technique” and as accurate as the method involving identification of a fixation stimulus. It was found that the “telescope technique” is preferable in those studies where presentation of a fixation stimulus might interfere with recognition or report of the experimental stimulus.     

Short report: Is spatial information encoded automatically in memory?

A dual-task paradigm was used to test Hasher and Zacks' (1979) hypothesis that spatial memory is automatic. Subjects saw two sets of 16 words each, the words being presented singly in random corners of a monitor screen. They were asked to remember the words and the corner in which each word was shown. In addition, subjects were given a concurrent task to perform. This task was either “easy” (counting aloud by ones) or “difficult” (counting aloud by sevens). Attention was focused either on the memory task or on the counting task. Word recognition was better when subjects carried out the easier competing counting task and when subjects concentrated mainly upon remembering the words and their positions. Contingent spatial memory was unaffected by either manipulation, supporting the hypothesis that spatial memory is automatic.     

A physiological model of phobic anxiety and desensitization

The relationship between arousal and phobic anxiety is discussed with regard to recent psychophysiological studies of habituation in normal subjects and in groups of anxious and phobic patients. A physiological model of the mechanisms underlying generalized and phobic anxiety is postulated. Some criticisms of Wolpe's conception of systematic desensitization are offered and an alternative explanation consistent with the above postulate is put forward. This alternative states that the underlying mechanism of systematic desensitization is identical with that of habituation proceeding under optimal conditions (the “maximal habituation” hypothesis). The two accounts of desensitization are compared and contrasted.     

On some limits of hypothetical thinking

Faced with extreme demands, hypothetical thinking runs the danger of total failure. Paradoxical propositions such as the Liar (“I am lying”) provide an opportunity to test it to its limits, while the Liar's nonparadoxical counterpart, the Truthteller (“I am telling the truth”), provides a useful comparison. Two experiments are reported, one with abstract materials (“If I am a knave then I live in Emerald City”) and one with belief-laden materials (a judge says: “If I am a knave then I enjoy pop music”). In both experiments, conditionals with Truthteller-type antecedents were “collapsed” to responses of conditional probability closely resembling estimates of control items. Liar-type antecedents, in contrast, dramatically weakened belief in conditionals in which they were embedded. The results are discussed in the framework of the theory of hypothetical thinking.     

Acoustic similarity and interference in short-term recognition memory: Some results of a decision-theory analysis

The following three studies of single-probe recognition memory set out to show the effect on the signal-detectability measures of d' and β (Tanner and Swets, 1954) of variations in the acoustic similarity of interfering material, which may either precede or follow the item to be remembered (proactive or retroactive interference --PI or RI). The first experiment studies a situation employed by Wickelgren (1966a), who reported that acoustically similar RI substantially reduced d'. It is shown that this effect could have been due to biases in Wickelgren's original designs, and that when a bias-free design is used, the fall in d' is only of borderline significance.

To investigate this problem further, a design was evolved in which two items were presented for memorizing, which varied in acoustic similarity to each other, and (after a distracting task) a probe was presented with one of three questions: Was this the first item of the pair? Was it the second? or, Did it occur in either position? In the first case, recognition-memory with RI of varying acoustic similarity was being studied, and as in the first experiment, it was found that similarity slightly reduced d'. With the second question, PI effects were being studied, and here negligible differences were found. With the third type of question, a “location-free” test, no effects of similarity were found. The last result rules out Posner's (1967) “acid-bath” explanation of similarity effects in interference: an explanation in terms of “differentiation” (or “filtering”) was also invalidated by the results of a third experiment, in which the same effects were found even though similarity varied only between stimulus items and interference, and not between these and the probe. Wickelgren's (1966b) associative model appears to have least difficulty in accommodating these results, though even this needs certain ad hoc assumptions to be able to do so.     

What can functional neuroimaging tell the experimental psychologist?

I argue here that functional neuroimaging data—which I restrict to the haemodynamic techniques of fMRI and PET—can inform psychological theorizing, provided one assumes a “systematic” function-structure mapping in the brain. In this case, imaging data simply comprise another dependent variable, along with behavioural data, that can be used to test competing theories. In particular, I distinguish two types of inference: function-to-structure deduction and structure-to-function induction. With the former inference, a qualitatively different pattern of activity over the brain under two experimental conditions implies at least one different function associated with changes in the independent variable. With the second type of inference, activity of the same brain region(s) under two conditions implies a common function, possibly not predicted a priori. I illustrate these inferences with imaging studies of recognition memory, short-term memory, and repetition priming. I then consider in greater detail what is meant by a “systematic” function-structure mapping and argue that, particularly for structure-to-function induction, this entails a one-to-one mapping between functional and structural units, although the structural unit may be a network of interacting regions and care must be taken over the appropriate level of functional/structural abstraction. Nonetheless, the assumption of a systematic function-structure mapping is a “working hypothesis” that, in common with other scientific fields, cannot be proved on independent grounds and is probably best evaluated by the success of the enterprise as a whole. I also consider statistical issues such as the definition of a qualitative difference and methodological issues such as the relationship between imaging and behavioural data. I finish by reviewing various objections to neuroimaging, including neophrenology, functionalism, and equipotentiality, and by observing some criticisms of current practice in the imaging literature.     

The cholinergic neurotransmitter system in human memory and dementia: A review

The present paper reviews three types of evidence implicating the role of acetylcholine in human memory and dementia: (1) neuropathological evidence that the cholinergic transmitter system is depleted in Alzheimer-type dementia; (2) psychopharmacological studies that have employed “cholinergic blockade” as a model of cholinergic depletion; and (3) clinical studies of cholinergic “replacement” therapy in Alzheimer-type dementia. The evidence that the cholinergic system is depleted in Alzheimer-type dementia has been complemented by the finding that cholinergic blockade in healthy subjects causes a substantial learning (or “acquisition”) deficit in episodic memory. The overall results of studies of replacement therapy have generally been disappointing, but a few have reported benefits in recall and recognition tests. The role of the cholinergic system in many aspects of memory remains to be elucidated; but it seems unlikely that cholinergic depletion accounts for all aspects of the memory disorder in Alzheimer-type dementia, and possibly the depletions of other neurotransmitters also contribute to the memory impairment.     

On the significance of “double encoding” for the superior recall of pictures to names

Ten-year-old children who were shown pictures of objects immediately preceded by the object's name recalled the material no better than those exposed to the names of the stimuli alone. Both conditions yielded significantly poorer retention than those in which pictures alone were presented or pictures followed by their names. A second study replicated this result. In addition this demonstrated, by a picture and name recognition task, that the effects could not be due to subjects in the “name prior to picture” condition ignoring the pictorial component. These results were interpreted as contradicting the “double encoding” explanation of the superiority of pictures to names in free recall. Parallel visual and verbal encoding of a pictured object does not facilitate retention unless the verbal cue is actively elicited from the subject by the stimulus. The implications of this result for other studies which have employed either simultaneous or sequential presentation of pictures and names are briefly discussed.     

Speech—Language clinicians'' and university students'' impressions of women and girls who stutter

To identify impressions speech—language clinicians and university students have of females who stutter, a 47-scale semantic differential form was administered to members of each group to obtain their responses to eight hypothetical constructs, i.e., “A Girl,” “A Girl Who Stutters,” “A Boy,” “A Boy Who Stutters,” “A Woman,” “A Woman Who Stutters,” “A Man,” and “A Man Who Stutters.” Both groups were found to possess negative stereotypes for all four categories of stutterers. The nature of the stereotypes appeared to be influenced by a stutterer's gender and relative age. Clinicians considered stuttering to exert a stronger negative impact on females and on children. Their strongest stereotype was of “A Girl Who Stutters.” University students considered stuttering to exert a stronger negative impact on males. Their stereotypes of stutterers seemed unaffected by the relative age of the stutterer. Their strongest stereotype was of “A Man Who Stutters.” Several theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Response selection errors in spatial choice reaction tasks

In a “Consistent” spatial choice reaction task, the same spatial relationship obtains between each stimulus and its appropriate response. In an “Inconsistent” task this is not so. The present experiment concerns errors in Inconsistent tasks. Duncan (in press) has suggested that, when two spatial S-R relationships are involved in a task, the dominant type of error is a response bearing to the stimulus the wrong one of the two relationships. Duncan's results, however, may be described by a different generalization. Rabbitt and Vyas (1973) have suggested that confusions occur between responses which, when made correctly, bear similar spatial relationships to their stimuli. In the present experiment, a new Inconsistent task is studied. The results support the account of Duncan (in press) but provide no support for that of Rabbitt and Vyas (1973). Partly on the basis of error results, Duncan (in press) proposed a model of response selection in the spatial choice reaction task. Unlike previous accounts, this model is not based on a set of individual “S--R” associations; operations generating sets of S--R pairs are involved.     

Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.     

Semantic errors or statistical flukes? a note on allport's “on knowing the meaning of words we are unable to report”

Allport (1977) has claimed that normal subjects who view briefly a multi-word array, which is then pattern-masked, produce semantic errors analogous to those made by subjects with “deep dyslexia”. We claim that the rate at which normal subjects make such errors is consistent with their arising purely by chance.     

A preliminary study of distinctive features in problem solving

The abstract logical structure of family relationship problems, such as, “What relationship to a man is his mother's father?” was described in terms of a “distinctive-feature-transition count (dft)”, where the answer to the problem was characterized in terms of the distinctive features of descendancy, co-linearity, and sex. On average, it proved possible to predict the difficulty of such problems from such a count; thus tending to support the idea of a relational rather than an associative memory structure.     

Visual pattern recognition: Size preprocessing re-examined

Template theories of visual pattern recognition assume the operation of preprocessing routines to deal with irrelevancies such as discrepancies in stimulus size. In three experiments where size was an irrelevant dimension, observers classified pairs of forms as either “same” or “different”. In Experiment I, the classification “different” was required when the stimuli shared the same form but a different orientation, and “same” when the stimuli shared the same form and orientation. Under these conditions RT was an increasing function of the magnitude of the size disparity between stimuli with equal slopes for “same” and “different” judgements. In Experiment II, “different” classifications were made to stimuli that had different forms, and “same” to figures with the same form. This stimulus set produced a size disparity function that interacted with response type; “different” responses had a shallower slope. Experiment III consisted of a mixed stimulus set drawn from both Experiment I and II. Stimuli that produced additive effects of size disparity and response type in Experiment I now produced an interaction between these two factors similar to the one observed in Experiment II. The results of these experiments are interpreted as evidence that previous contradictory results reported in the literature stem from differences in the way the stimulus set is constructed, and that size transformations can not be a necessary operation, at least when “different” judgements are made. The results are problematic for the view that size disparity effects in matching tasks are easily interpretable in terms of a primitive size normalization stage that precedes any comparison operations.     

Non-random sequences in visual threshold experiments

Responses (i.e. “seen” or “not seen”) to a repeated stimulus of constant intensity are shown to be grouped in runs of the same response. It is suggested that there are only two possible explanations of this non-randomness: spontaneous fluctuations of threshold and the direct influence of a response on succeeding responses. Experiments designed to distinguish between these two explanations have shown that the latter is the more important and that a response affects directly, though with diminishing intensity, the three immediately following responses.