Privacy and Personal Identity

What marks the traditional privacy torts of disclosure, intrusion, false light, and appropriation is that they require an invasion, an intrinsic harm caused by someone doing something to us without our consent. But we are now voluntarily giving up information about ourselves--to our physicians, for instance--that is being gathered into databases that are brought and sold and that can be appropriated by those who wish to assume our identities. The way in which our privacy is put at risk is different, and this leads to a new understanding of the concept of privacy. Others appropriate our identities, treating us as objects; by doing so, our standing as autonomous moral agents, controlling how we present ourselves to the world, is thus denied.     

Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments

Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit's 'fission argument' for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit's argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parfit's conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions.     

Personal Identity and National Identity: An Analogy

Simone Weil writes in one of her notebooks: “When one arrives at the absolute one can only express oneself by identities … – For identity alone expresses the unconditioned” (Cahiers, in Œuvres complètes, t. VI, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), 113). Thus, it is that “the good is the good”, one and the same, unconditionally. Certainly, an individual is unique, a nation is equally so. Nevertheless, personal identity – or “character” – and the identity of a nation are not absolutes. When we wish to treat them as absolutes, we ignore the fact that the “person,” as well as the “nation”, only exists within relationships that they are subject to exterior circumstances and that their identity is situated in time. Is one correct to suppose that the character of an individual or the identity of the nation are “invariables that one continues to find throughout various manifestations”, (“Notes sur le caractère”, Écrits de Marseille, in Œuvres complètes, Op. cit., t. IV, vol. 1 (2008), 87) observed or probable? We hypothesize here that one can apply to national identity what Simone Weil wrote about the notion of character, in notes composed in Marseille and in her commentary on the Our Father (“À propos du Pater”, ibid., 337-345).     

Personal Identity and Dead People

Philosophical Studies -     

On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity

Abstract: There is no such thing as ‘the’ hylemorphic account of personal identity. There are several views that count as hylemorphic, and these views can be grouped into two main families—the corruptionist view, and the survivalist view. The differentiating factor is that the corruptionist view holds that the persistence of the soul is not sufficient for the persistence of the person, while the survivalist view holds that the persistence of the soul is sufficient for the persistence of the person. In this paper, I argue that hylemorphists should prefer the corruptionist view. This project ought to be of interest to anyone working on issues of personal identity, not only because hylemorphic views are historically important, but also because they are currently receiving significant attention in the personal identity literature.     

Thought Experiments and Personal Identity

Philosophical Studies -     

Fission and Personal Identity Over Time

Philosophical Studies -     

人格认同和人格概念

哲学家从两个维度上探讨人格概念.在伦理学和政治哲学中,它经常被看作是基本的,或至少是为人熟知的,并不需要阐明,但当进一步考察时,持续的探索和困难的问题就成为不可避免的.     

生物道德增强中的人格同一性问题

生物道德增强的做法可能会改变人的道德意识和道德行为方式,导致个人身份剧烈的变化,从而对人格同一性问题构成挑战。道德增强之后的人表面上能保持身体和心理的连续性,但这无法为人格同一性问题提供完全的辩护。道德增强可能影响一个人的叙述认同,一是因为道德增强会干扰人的真实性,二是因为造成个性中断。但道德增强依然可以从获得性认同,道德关系的传承等路径进行积极的辩护。道德增强在人格同一性问题上面临很大的争议,未来针对道德增强的讨论需要密切关注它对人格同一性的持续影响以及由此引发的道德责任问题。

     

Occupational Wellness: The Integration of Career Identity and Personal Identity

Historically, career and vocational counseling have served as cornerstones to the counseling profession. Still, there are several survey studies that indicate that interest in career counseling among counseling professionals has eroded. Conversely, there has been an overwhelming response from counselors to the idea of wellness. The intent of this article is to encourage practicing counselors and researchers to consider career development as a key ingredient in the conceptualization of wellness. Furthermore, it is imperative that we begin to assist clients in achieving this aspect of occupational wellness through the integration of career identity and personal identity.     

Divine Incoherence

In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence conflicts with his omniscience.

Personal Identity and the Coherence of Q-Memory

Brian Garrett constructs cases satisfying Andy Hamilton's definition of weak q -memory. This does not establish that a peculiar kind of memory is at least conceptually coherent. Any 'apparent memory experiences' that satisfy the definition turn out not to involve remembering anything at all. This conclusion follows if we accept, as both Hamilton and Garrett do, a variety of first-person authority according to which memory judgements may be false, but not on the ground that someone other than the remembering subject had the remembered experience. Garrett's brain-bisection illustration sounds convincing, but only because we retain the idea that the subjects created by implanting a hemisphere each in two different bodies are entitled to say that they remember experiences before the surgery in the ordinary sense. To that extent the illustration presents a case of ordinary memory, not q -memory.     

Personal Identity, Autonomy and Advance Statements

abstract    Recent legal rulings concerning the status of advance statements have raised interest in the topic but failed to provide any definitive general guidelines for their enforcement. I examine arguments used to justify the moral authority of such statements. The fundamental ethical issue I am concerned with is how accounts of personal identity underpin our account of moral authority through the connection between personal identity and autonomy. I focus on how recent Animalist accounts of personal identity initially appear to provide a sound basis for extending the moral autonomy of an individual — and hence their autonomous wishes expressed through an advance statement — past the point of severe psychological decline. I argue that neither the traditional psychological account nor the more recent Animalist account of personal identity manage to provide a sufficient basis for extending our moral autonomy past the point of incapacity or incompetence. I briefly explore how analogies to similar areas in law designed to facilitate autonomous decision, such as wills and trusts, provide at best only very limited scope for an alternative justification for granting advance statements any legal or moral authority. I conclude that whilst advance statements play a useful role in formulating what treatment is in a patient's best interests, such statements do not ultimately have sufficient moral force to take precedence over paternalistic best interests judgements concerning an individual's care or treatment.