Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of Langton on Kant

This paper argues that there is an important respect in which Rae Langton's recent interpretation of Kant is correct: Kant's claim that we cannot know things in themselves should be understood as the claim that we cannot know the intrinsic nature of things. However, I dispute Langton's account of intrinsic properties, and therefore her version of what this claim amounts to. Langton's distinction between intrinsic, causally inert properties and causal powers is problematic, both as an interpretation of Kant, and as an independent metaphysical position. I propose a different reading of the claim that we cannot know things intrinsically. I distinguish between two ways of knowing things: in terms of their effects on other things, and as they are apart from these. 1 argue that knowing things' powers is knowing things in terms of effects on other things, and therefore is not knowing them as they are in themselves, and that there are textual grounds for attributing this position to Kant.     

Overall Lifelong Fortune: A Critique of the Intrinsic Potential Account

It seems clear that a fortunate life for a human being is very different from a fortunate life for a dog. But it is not clear what the appropriate measure is for determining whether a life is fortunate or not. Jeff McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account and defends the Intrinsic Potential Account of overall lifelong fortune. In this article, I argue that the Intrinsic Potential Account fails. More specifically, I will argue that it is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples; fails for the same basic reason that McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account; and is insensitive to a consideration that is morally significant.     

Surviving Deadness in the Analytic Experience

The transference/countertransference (third space) analysis is considered to be central in the therapeutic effectiveness of the analytic process. Less emphasis has been placed on the actual experiences of analyst and analysand in the conflictual reenactment of third space experience and its resolution. This paper recounts the shared experience of a patient who was silent throughout most of the analysis, and my reaction, in fantasy and enactment, to this disturbing experience—both for him and for myself. I argue that it is the affective re-experiencing of past repressed trauma in the analytic space that has a therapeutic impact, leading to growth in the patient and also the therapist. I contrast Freud’s emphasis on insight, making the unconscious conscious, with Ferenczi’s suggestion that the therapeutic impact lies in the repetition of past traumatic experience in the analysis but with the possibility of a different outcome with a more benign object, leading to symbolic representation of repressed trauma. Re-experiencing and symbolization, in the third space, of past traumatic experience can be an exit point from the endless repetition of trauma in internal and external object relations, leading to a new beginning in the patient’s life. Immersed in the experience of deadness in the analysis, which had become a dead womb, the struggle to remain alive and thinking led to a rupture out of the dead womb, like the Caesura of birth, into aliveness and the ability to mentalize what had previously remained unmentalized.     

The Batson-Schoenrade-Ventis Model of Religious Experience: Critique and Reformulation

A critique is offered of the 4-stage model of religious experience sketched by Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993). Drawing inspiration from Wallas's (1926) classic work on creative thinking, the Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (BSV) model of religious experience states that religious experiences go through 4 stages-existential questioning, self-surrender, new vision, and new life. Shortcomings of this model include the possibility that only the first 3 stages are really needed to describe religious experience; the need for the model to be more specific about the content of each stage, especially the second (self-surrender) stage; and the need for the model to take more cognizance of emotional factors in religious experience. In response to these criticisms, a revised model is proposed. This revised version of the BSV model describes only 3 stages-a stage of moral questioning; a stage of renunciation of worldly pleasures, in which intrapunitive behaviors are engaged in at a conscious and controlled level, but in which-one may hypothesize-positive self-evaluations are taking place at a more automatic, nonconscious level; and a stage of new vision, in which new patterns of mentation articulated at a nonconscious level during the second stage may gain ascendancy into consciousness as abrupt, intense experiences. Suggestions for empirical research predictions derived from the revised model are outlined.     

Phenomenology and the Poststructural Critique of Experience

Abstract

Phenomenology is considered a philosophy of experience. But in the wake of French post‐structuralism beginning in the 1970s, the concept of experience within phenomenology has fallen under heavy critique. Even today, in the context of feminist philosophy the phenomenological concept of experience has yet to recover from the poststructuralist critique.

In this article, I will closely examine the poststructuralist critique of the concept of experience within the context of feminist theory. I will thereby refer first and foremost to the poststructuralist theorist Joan Scott, and her influential text “‘Experience’”. In my examination of the poststructuralist critique of experience, the leading question will be whether or not this critique, down to its details, can in fact be applied to phenomenology. My thesis is that phenomenology is able to withstand the poststructuralist critique of experience. Further, I will argue that post‐structuralism and phenomenology have more in common as regards the concept of experience than is usually admitted. For several reasons, it seems – as I will maintain – that both poststructuralist feminism and phenomenology are equally interested in a strong concept of experience and thus do not promote doing away with the concept.     

A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox

There is widespread agreement that we cannot know of a lottery ticket we own that it is a loser prior to the drawing of the lottery. At the same time we appear to have knowledge of events that will occur only if our ticket is a loser. Supposing any plausible closure principle for knowledge, the foregoing seems to yield a paradox. Appealing to some broadly Gricean insights, the present paper argues that this paradox is apparent only.     

Critique,Ethics, and the Apparatus of Experience: A Foucauldian Framework

The paper explores examples of contemporary experience in order to demonstrate the moralisation of new areas of behaviour (especially in relation to environmental issues).It sketches a Foucauldian framework for understanding the historical transformation of experience,in terms of the "apparatus of experience." On that basis,it presents a novel account of critique,in which critique is seen as the potentially transformational,experiential practice of re-experiencing the contemporary apparatuses of experience.In other words,critique is "experience squared." It is this re-experiencing of our everyday experience that permits us,to a certain extent,to "get over ourselves" and thus to reflect critically on the processes of moralisation and de-moralisation in which we participate.     

Kantian Schemata: A Critique Consistent with the Critique

Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third‐man regress. Siding with those who think that the mid‐way posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyse a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed at respecting this primitivity.     

Meritocracy: A Critique

Herpes Simplex, by T. Natasha Posner, The Experience of Illness Series, London: Routledge, 1998, 143 pages, paperback £13.99     

Openness to Experience Enhances Creativity: The Mediating Role of Intrinsic Motivation and the Creative Process Engagement

Studies indicate that there is a positive relationship between openness to experience and creativity. However, relatively little attention has been given to the mechanism of this relationship. On the basis of previous findings, we hypothesized a conceptual model and tested the mediating role of intrinsic motivation and the creative process engagement in the relationship between openness to experience and creativity. One hundred and ninety‐eight undergraduates in Malaysia participated in the study and completed an online measure of openness to new experience, creativity, intrinsic motivation, and the creative process engagement. Consistent with the hypothesis, people who scored high on openness reported high intrinsic motivation. The high motivation enhanced engagement in creativity‐related activities, which in turn, improved self‐rated creativity. The findings not only shed light on mechanisms that underlie in the openness‐creativity linkage but they also highlight the importance of intrinsic motivation and creative process engagement in the linkage. Together, the study extends the effect of personality trait on creativity and offers a new direction for future studies.