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1.
Lynne Rudder Baker 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(1):47-59
Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the
thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails
only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to
Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like
the Resurrection of the Body, the Incarnation, and the “intermediate state” (if there is one). 相似文献
2.
Summary In this paper I address some shortcomings in Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism. I make it clear that Laudan’s rejection of the “meta-methodology thesis”, or MMT is unnecessary, and that a reformulated version MMT can be sustained. I contend that a major difficulty that attends Laudan’s account is his contention that a naturalistic philosophy of science cannot accommodate any a priori justification of methodological rules, and consider what sort of naturalism might best replace Laudan’s. To do this, I discuss Michael Friedman’s account of a relativised a priori and show that it is consistent with naturalistic philosophy of science and that it can help form the basis of a plausible normative naturalism. In particular, this discussion shows that Laudan’s rejection of any a priori justification of methodological rules is unjustified and inconsistent with scientific practice. Finally, I point the way to a version of normative naturalism that includes MMT and accounts for the role of constitutive a priori principles within science. 相似文献
3.
J. C. Pinto de Oliveira 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):147-157
In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap’s work.
In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap “would have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I claim that Kuhn’s book, from Carnap’s point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather
in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery–justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that,
despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn’s book in his work in philosophy of science. 相似文献
4.
5.
Matthew I. Burch 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(3):157-171
In this paper I challenge Merold Westphal’s claim that Jean-Luc Marion’s hermeneutical phenomenology is especially useful
for theology. I argue that in spite of his explicit allegiance to Husserl’s “principle of all principles,” Marion fails to
embody a commitment to phenomenological seeing in his analyses of revelation. In the sections of Being Given where he discusses revelation, Marion allows faith-based claims to bleed into his phenomenological analyses, resulting in
what I call his ‘blurred vision’—the pretension that phenomenological seeing can be extended to theological matters. This
pretension undermines Marion’s phenomenological aspirations, because it invests his analyses with a theological content that
phenomenological intuition cannot account for or clarify. At the same time, this blurring of the line between theology and
phenomenology also makes Marion’s work theologically ineffective. For it furnishes the theologian and believer with the false
assurance that faith-based commitments can be grounded in phenomenological knowledge—a claim that he simply cannot make good
on. In light of these problems, I propose an alternative Heideggerian approach that maintains the boundary between philosophical
and theological discourse and thereby safeguards the integrity of both. 相似文献
6.
Joshua Gert 《The Journal of Ethics》2012,16(1):15-34
Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s
main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as
objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox
externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that rational people will be motivated by any reason they have
of which they are aware. Goldman himself embraces (I), and deploys it frequently in his criticisms of orthodox externalism.
But there is logical space for an externalist view that includes a commitment to (O) and (E), but that denies (I). The resulting
“hyperexternalist” view holds that some reasons need not motivate us, even if we are rational. In this paper I argue that
Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism leave hyperexternalism untouched, and that his specific criticisms of my own
version of hyperexternalism do not work. In light of Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism and my own criticisms of
Goldman’s view, hyperexternalism emerges as the favored option. 相似文献
7.
Kevin Schilbrack 《Sophia》2009,48(4):399-412
Many point to Peter Winch’s discussion of rationality, relativism, and religion as a paradigmatic example of cultural relativism.
In this paper, I argue that Winch’s relationship to relativism is widely misinterpreted in that, despite his pluralistic understanding
of rationality, Winch does allow for universal features of culture in virtue of which cross-cultural understanding and even
critique is possible. Nevertheless, I also argue that given the kind of cultural universals that Winch produces, he fails
to avoid relativism. This is because in order to provide the standards without which relativism ensues, one requires a certain
kind of criteria of rationality, namely, what I here call substantive universals, a kind of criteria which Winch rejects. 相似文献
8.
Anders Schinkel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):267-277
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed
cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only
difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue
that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts,
and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings
from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality
of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.
相似文献
Anders SchinkelEmail: |
9.
J. P. Laraudogoitia 《Synthese》2011,178(3):429-435
In this article I propose what I call the inverse spaceship paradox. The article’s interest lies in the fact that, contrary
to what appears to be an implicit agreement in the literature on indeterminism, it shows that coming from infinity can be
a perfectly predictable and therefore deterministic process in a classical universe. 相似文献
10.
Anjan Chakravartty 《Synthese》2010,172(2):197-213
Recent work in the philosophy of science has generated an apparent conflict between theories attempting to explicate the nature
of scientific representation. On one side, there are what one might call ‘informational’ views, which emphasize objective
relations (such as similarity, isomorphism, and homomorphism) between representations (theories, models, simulations, diagrams,
etc.) and their target systems. On the other side, there are what one might call ‘functional’ views, which emphasize cognitive
activities performed in connection with these targets, such as interpretation and inference. The main sources of the impression
of conflict here are arguments by some functionalists to the effect that informational theories are flawed: it is suggested
that relations typically championed by informational theories are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific representation,
and that any theory excluding functions is inadequate. In this paper I critically examine these arguments, and contend that,
as it turns out, informational and functional theories are importantly complementary. 相似文献
11.
K. Romdenh-Romluc 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(2):257-283
It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict
with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical
reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before
offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on
any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing
the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s
suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these
two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways,
whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand.
I develop an account based around these two requirements. 相似文献
12.
Mariano Rojas 《Applied research in quality of life》2011,6(3):265-276
This commentary to Carol Graham’s paper deals with the nature of the relationship between income and happiness. Carol Graham
focuses her contribution on what I call the positive-coefficient hypothesis in economic theory; which states that, on average,
well-being rises with income. The hypothesis was first questioned by Richard Easterlin’s pioneering work and it has captured
a lot of attention from happiness researchers during the last decade. My contribution deals with a related hypothesis, which
I call the close-relationship hypothesis in economic theory. The hypothesis states that a person’s income is a good predictor
of his or her well-being. I show that this hypothesis is rejected by happiness research, and I discuss the implications of
this rejection. 相似文献
13.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
14.
Summary In 1997, five decades after the publication of the landmark Hempel-Oppenheim article “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”([1948], 1970) Wesley Salmon published Causality and Explanation, a book that re-addresses the issue of scientific explanation. He provided an overview of the basic approaches to scientific explanation, stressed their weaknesses, and offered novel insights. However, he failed to mention Mary Hesse’s approach to the topic and analyze her standpoint. This essay brings front and center Hesse’s approach to scientific explanation formulated in the 1960s and argues that rereading Hesse’s account one can overcome the criticisms addressed towards another influential theory of explanation that of Bas van Fraassen’s. Furthermore, it could bring the traditional philosophy of science into a fruitful conversation with science and technology studies and gender studies in science, technology and medicine. 相似文献
15.
Søren Riis 《Continental Philosophy Review》2011,44(1):103-117
Martin Heidegger’s radical critique of technology has fundamentally stigmatized modern technology and paved the way for a
comprehensive critique of contemporary Western society. However, the following reassessment of Heidegger’s most elaborate
and influential interpretation of technology, “The Question Concerning Technology,” sheds a very different light on his critique.
In fact, Heidegger’s phenomenological line of thinking concerning technology also implies a radical critique of ancient technology
and the fundamental being-in-the-world of humans. This revision of Heidegger’s arguments claims that “The Question Concerning
Technology” indicates a previous unseen ambiguity with respect to the origin of the rule of das Gestell. The following inquiry departs from Heidegger’s critique of modern technology and connects it to a reassessment of ancient
technology and Aristotle’s justification of slavery. The last part of the paper unfolds Heidegger’s underlying arguments in
favor of continuity within the history of technology. According to these interpretations, humans have always strived to develop
“modern” technology and to become truly “modern” in the Heideggerian sense. The danger stemming from the rule of das Gestell is thus not only transient and solely directed toward contemporary Western society, but also I will argue that humans can
only be humans as the ones challenged by the rule of das Gestell. 相似文献
16.
Gang Liu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(1):95-114
The research programme of the philosophy of information (PI) proposed in 2002 made it an independent area or discipline in
philosophical research. The scientific concept of ‘information’ is formally accepted in philosophical inquiry. Hence a new
and tool-driven philosophical discipline of PI with its interdisciplinary nature has been established. Philosophy of information
is an ‘orientative’ rather than ‘cognitive’ philosophy. When PI is under consideration in the history of Western philosophy,
it can be regarded as a shift of large tradition. There are three large traditions at large, known as Platonic, Kantian and
Leibniz-Russellian. In the discussion of the position of the possible worlds, we have modal Platonism and modal realism, but
both of the theories are made in the framework of Western philosophy. In this essay, it is argued that possible worlds could
be seen as worlds in information, which is then an interpretation of modal information theory (MIT). Our interpretation is
made on the basis of Leibniz’s lifelong connection with China, a fact often overlooked by the Western philosophers. Possible
world theory was influenced by the Neo-Confucianism flourishing since the Song Dynasty of China, the foundation of which is
Yijing. It could be argued that Leibniz’s possible world theory was formulated in respect to the impact of the thoughts reflected
in Yijing, in that one of the prominent features is the model-theoretic construction of theories. There are two approaches to theory
construction, i.e., axiom-theoretic and model-theoretic. The origin of the former is from ancient Greece and the latter from
ancient China. And they determined the different features of theoretic structures between the oriental and occidental traditions
of science and technology. The tendency of the future development of science and technology is changing from the axiom-theoretic
to the model-theoretic orientation, at least the two approaches being complementary each other. To some extent, this means
the retrospective of tradition in the turning point of history, and some of the China’s cultural traditions might become the
starting points in formulating the future Chinese philosophy of science and technology. 相似文献
17.
James A. Anderson 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(4):269-288
Since its introduction in 1987, Benjamin Freedman’s principle of clinical equipoise has enjoyed widespread uptake in bioethics
discourse. Recent years, however, have witnessed a growing consensus that the principle is fundamentally flawed. One of the
most vocal critics has undoubtedly been Franklin Miller. In a 2008 paper, Steven Joffe and Miller build on this critical work,
offering a new conception of clinical research ethics based on science, taking what they call a “scientific orientation” toward
the ethics of clinical research. Though there is much to recommend Joffe and Miller’s scientifically oriented conception of
clinical research ethics, I believe that both the critical and constructive projects suffer from the same basic mistake: inattention
to context. The internal norms of science cannot be fully specified, let alone satisfied, independently of contextual (external)
factors that only come into view when we are attentive to the particular context of that form of inquiry. 相似文献
18.
Sandra Lapointe 《Synthese》2010,174(2):263-281
This paper is aimed at understanding one central aspect of Bolzano’s views on deductive knowledge: what it means for a proposition
and for a term to be known a priori. I argue that, for Bolzano, a priori knowledge is knowledge by virtue of meaning and that Bolzano has substantial views about meaning and what it is to know the
latter. In particular, Bolzano believes that meaning is determined by implicit definition, i.e. the fundamental propositions
in a deductive system. I go into some detail in presenting and discussing Bolzano’s views on grounding, a priori knowledge and implicit definition. I explain why other aspects of Bolzano’s theory and, in particular, his peculiar understanding
of analyticity and the related notion of Ableitbarkeit might, as it has invariably in the past, mislead one to believe that Bolzano lacks a significant account of a priori knowledge. Throughout the paper, I point out to the ways in which, in this respect, Bolzano’s antagonistic relationship to
Kant directly shaped his own views. 相似文献
19.
Kimberley Brownlee 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(3):433-444
This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point
two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies, by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer
argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable
to do when we can get closer to success but cannot have reason to try to do what we are unable to do when we cannot get closer to success. In this paper, I reject both positions as they are presented,
on the grounds that neither can accommodate an important category of reasons, which are the reasons to realise and to try
to realise dimensions of value that lie at the boundary of what is realisable, specifically, genuinely valuable ideals. I
defend a third view that we can have reason to do and to try to do what we are unable to do even when we cannot, in Heuer’s
sense, get closer to success. Moreover, I argue that we can have reason to realise and to try to realise genuinely valuable
ideals for their own sake and not simply for the sake of achieving mundane, realisable ends. 相似文献
20.
Aaron Rizzieri 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(2):235-242
Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation
between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base one’s beliefs
on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced
belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition. 相似文献