The Problem of De Se Assertion

It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977; No?s 13: 3–21, 1979, Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan (1989), has it that if Alma says “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said, is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing.     

Parents’ Grief in the Context of Adult Child Mental Illness: A Qualitative Review

Research indicates that parents and other family members often grieve their child or relative’s mental illness. This grief appears resultant from a profound sense of loss, which has been described as complicated and nonfinite (e.g., Atkinson in Am J Psychiatry 151(8):1137–1139, 1994; Davis and Schultz in Soc Sci Med 46(3):369–379, 1998; Jones in Br J Soc Work 34:961–979, 2004; MacGregor in Soc Work 39(2):160–166, 1994; Osborne and Coyle in Couns Psychol Q 15(4):307–323, 2002; Ozgul in Aust N Z J Fam Ther 25(4):183–187, 2004; Tuck et al. in Arch Psychiatric Nurs 11(3):118–125, 1997). This paper reviews existent research in this emerging field, with a focus on parents’ grief experience in relation to their adult child’s mental disorder. Studies that explore parents’ and family members’ grief, using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, are considered. Research evidence for the association between parents’ and family members’ grief and other outcomes are discussed. Findings concerning the prediction of grief in parents and family members who have a child or relative with a mental disorder will be reviewed. Finally, this paper considers methodological and theoretical issues associated with existent research and presents options for further study.     

Computational Theories of Conscious Experience: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, (1989) and Bishop (2002a, b) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in conflict with the very intuitive thesis that conscious experience supervenes on physical activity. Klein in Synthese 165:141–153, (2008) proposes a way for computationalists about experience to avoid panpsychism while still respecting the supervenience of experience on activity. I argue that his attempt to save computational theories of experience from Maudlin’s and Bishop’s critique fails.     

Yet Another Run around the Circle

In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito (2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation 18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson (1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis 31, 113–117), Sorensen (1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis 56, 51–55) and Teng (1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis 57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument.     

The Logic of Theory Assessment

This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper consists in working out the claim that one can have Hempel’s cake and eat it too — in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, α is an acceptable theory for evidence β if and only if α is both sufficiently plausible given β and sufficiently informative about β. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990). It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap’s positive relevance account, thereby shedding new light on Carnap’s analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory. A precursor of this paper has appeared as “The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment” in L. Běhounek & M. Bílková (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2004, Prague: Filosofia, 2005, 161–176.     

Engaging African Americans in Therapy: Integrating a Public Policy and Family Therapy Perspective

The field of marriage and family therapy faces a growing imperative to reach historically underserved populations. African Americans are a prime example of a minority group in the United States that continues to be underserved by the current mental health system. We integrate Andersen’s (1995, Journal of Health and Social behavior, 36, 1–10) public policy model of health service use with Fox et al. (1995, Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, 6, 434–468) revision of the rural de facto mental health services model (Regier and Goldberg, 1978, Archives of General Psychiatry, 35, 685–693) to develop a more inclusive and culturally sensitive framework that captures salient factors influencing African Americans’ entry into and engagement in therapy. Recommendations for overcoming barriers and suggestions for future research are presented.     

Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety’s (Recent) Discontents

Anti-luck epistemology is an approach to analyzing knowledge that takes as a starting point the widely-held assumption that knowledge must exclude luck. Call this the anti-luck platitude. As Duncan Pritchard (2005) has suggested, there are three stages constituent of anti-luck epistemology, each which specifies a different philosophical requirement: these stages call for us to first give an account of luck; second, specify the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck; and finally, show what conditions must be satisfied in order to block the kind of luck with which knowledge was argued to be incompatible. What I’ll show here is that the modal account of luck offers a plausible story at the first stage and leads naturally to equally plausible lines to take at the second and third stages, at which a safety condition on knowledge is squarely motivated. There are, however, recent challenges—advanced by Jonathan Kvanvig (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 272–281, 2008); Kelly Becker (2007); and Jennifer Lackey (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2):255–267, 2008), among others—to the plausibility of the safety-based anti-luck project I’ve sketched here at each of its three stages of development. Once I’ve made precise the challenges, I’ll show why none implies that we abandon the commitments of the safety-based anti-luck project at any of its stages. What we should conclude, then, is that a safety-condition on knowledge is motivated by independently defensible accounts of (1) what luck is; and (2) just how knowledge should be thought incompatible with it.     

Teacher Efficacy In the Context of Teaching Low Achieving Students

This paper focused on the efficacy of Singapore teachers who teach low achieving adolescent students. Three dimensions of self-reported teacher efficacy—instructional strategies, classroom management, and student engagement—were examined in relation to teacher attributes and the teacher–student relationship. Data were obtained from the Teacher Self-Efficacy Scale Tschannen-Moran and Woolfolk Hoy (Teaching and Teacher Education 17:783–805, 2001) and the Teacher–Student Relationship Scale Ang (The Journal of Experimental Education 74:55–73, 2005). Significant differences between novice teachers and experienced teachers emerged in teacher efficacy beliefs in relation to instructional strategies, classroom management, and student engagement. Conflict in teacher–student relationship was found to predict teacher efficacy for teachers of low achieving students. Implications for teachers’ professional development were discussed.     

Conscious machines: Memory,melody and muscular imagination

A great deal of effort has been, and continues to be, devoted to developing consciousness artificially (A small selection of the many authors writing in this area includes: Cotterill (J Conscious Stud 2:290–311, 1995, 1998), Haikonen (2003), Aleksander and Dunmall (J Conscious Stud 10:7–18, 2003), Sloman (2004, 2005), Aleksander (2005), Holland and Knight (2006), and Chella and Manzotti (2007)), and yet a similar amount of effort has gone in to demonstrating the infeasibility of the whole enterprise (Most notably: Dreyfus (1972/1979, 1992, 1998), Searle (1980), Harnad (J Conscious Stud 10:67–75, 2003), and Sternberg (2007), but there are a great many others). My concern in this paper is to steer some navigable channel between the two positions, laying out the necessary pre-conditions for consciousness in an artificial system, and concentrating on what needs to hold for the system to perform as a human being or other phenomenally conscious agent in an intersubjectively-demanding social and moral environment. By adopting a thick notion of embodiment—one that is bound up with the concepts of the lived body and autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela et al. 2003; and Ziemke 2003, 2007a, J Conscious Stud 14(7):167–179, 2007b)—I will argue that machine phenomenology is only possible within an embodied distributed system that possesses a richly affective musculature and a nervous system such that it can, through action and repetition, develop its tactile-kinaesthetic memory, individual kinaesthetic melodies pertaining to habitual practices, and an anticipatory enactive kinaesthetic imagination. Without these capacities the system would remain unconscious, unaware of itself embodied within a world. Finally, and following on from Damasio’s (1991, 1994, 1999, 2003) claims for the necessity of pre-reflective conscious, emotional, bodily responses for the development of an organism’s core and extended consciousness, I will argue that without these capacities any agent would be incapable of developing the sorts of somatic markers or saliency tags that enable affective reactions, and which are indispensable for effective decision-making and subsequent survival. My position, as presented here, remains agnostic about whether or not the creation of artificial consciousness is an attainable goal.     

The redundancy of recursion and infinity for natural language

An influential line of thought claims that natural language and arithmetic processing require recursion, a putative hallmark of human cognitive processing (Chomsky in Evolution of human language: biolinguistic perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 45–61, 2010; Fitch et al. in Cognition 97(2):179–210, 2005; Hauser et al. in Science 298(5598):1569–1579, 2002). First, we question the need for recursion in human cognitive processing by arguing that a generally simpler and less resource demanding process—iteration—is sufficient to account for human natural language and arithmetic performance. We argue that the only motivation for recursion, the infinity in natural language and arithmetic competence, is equally approachable by iteration and recursion. Second, we submit that the infinity in natural language and arithmetic competence reduces to imagining infinite embedding or concatenation, which is completely independent from the ability to implement infinite processing, and thus, independent from both recursion and iteration. Furthermore, we claim that a property of natural language is physically uncountable finity and not discrete infinity.     

WoMMBAT: A user interface for hierarchical Bayesian estimation of working memory capacity

The change detection paradigm has become an important tool for researchers studying working memory. Change detection is especially useful for studying visual working memory, because recall paradigms are difficult to employ in the visual modality. Pashler (Perception & Psychophysics, 44, 369–378, 1988) and Cowan (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87–114, 2001) suggested formulas for estimating working memory capacity from change detection data. Although these formulas have become widely used, Morey (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 55, 8–24, 2011) showed that the formulas suffer from a number of issues, including inefficient use of information, bias, volatility, uninterpretable parameter estimates, and violation of ANOVA assumptions. Morey presented a hierarchical Bayesian extension of Pashler’s and Cowan’s basic models that mitigates these issues. Here, we present WoMMBAT (Working Memory Modeling using Bayesian Analysis Techniques) software for fitting Morey’s model to data. WoMMBAT has a graphical user interface, is freely available, and is cross-platform, running on Windows, Linux, and Mac operating systems.     

More than one kind of happiness: Can we recognize vocal expressions of different positive states?

Several theorists have proposed that distinctions are needed between different positive emotional states, and that these discriminations may be particularly useful in the domain of vocal signals (Ekman, 1992b, Cognition and Emotion, 6, 169–200; Scherer, 1986, Psychological Bulletin, 99, 143–165). We report an investigation into the hypothesis that positive basic emotions have distinct vocal expressions (Ekman, 1992b, Cognition and Emotion, 6, 169–200). Non-verbal vocalisations are used that map onto five putative positive emotions: Achievement/Triumph, Amusement, Contentment, Sensual Pleasure, and Relief. Data from categorisation and rating tasks indicate that each vocal expression is accurately categorised and consistently rated as expressing the intended emotion. This pattern is replicated across two language groups. These data, we conclude, provide evidence for the existence of robustly recognisable expressions of distinct positive emotions.     

Entropy,semantic relatedness and proximity

Although word co-occurrences within a document have been demonstrated to be semantically useful, word interactions over a local range have been largely neglected by psychologists due to practical challenges. Shannon’s (Bell Systems Technical Journal, 27, 379–423, 623–665, 1948) conceptualization of information theory suggests that these interactions should be useful for understanding communication. Computational advances make an examination of local word–word interactions possible for a large text corpus. We used Brants and Franz’s (2006) dataset to generate conditional probabilities for 62,474 word pairs and entropy calculations for 9,917 words in Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber’s (Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36, 402–407, 2004) free association norms. Semantic associativity correlated moderately with the probabilities and was stronger when the two words were not adjacent. The number of semantic associates for a word and the entropy of a word were also correlated. Finally, language entropy decreases from 11 bits for single words to 6 bits per word for four-word sequences. The probabilities and entropies discussed here are included in the supplemental materials for the article.     

Problems for virtue theories in epistemology

This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism and the nature of the self; and problems with pluralism and the goals of epistemology. Moral objections to virtue theory are identified––specifically, both the idea that there can be a radical axiological priority to character and the anti-enlightenment tendencies in virtues approaches. Finally, some strengths to virtue theory are conceded, while the role of epistemic luck is identified as an important topic for future work.     

Quantum logic as a dynamic logic

We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories, with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results (Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the “non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic.     

Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2

In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory. As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations.     

Arguments,Meta-arguments,and Metadialogues: A Reconstruction of Krabbe,Govier, and Woods

Krabbe (2003, in F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 641–644) defined a metadialogue as a dialogue about one or more dialogues, and a ground-level dialogue as a dialogue that is not a metadialogue. Similarly, I define a meta-argument as an argument about one or more arguments, and a ground-level argument as one which is not a meta-argument. Krabbe (1995, in F.H van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 333–344) showed that formal-fallacy criticism (and more generally, fallacy criticism) consists of metadialogues, and that such metadialogues can be profiled in ways that lead to their proper termination or resolution. I reconstruct Krabbe’s metadialogical account into monolectical, meta-argumentative terminology by describing three-types of meta-arguments corresponding to the three ways of proving formal invalidity he studied: the trivial logic-indifferent method; the method of counterexample situation; and the method of formal paraphrase. A fourth type of meta-argument corresponds to what Oliver (1967, Mind 76, 463–478), Govier (1985, Informal Logic 7, 27–33), and Copi (1986) call refutation by logical analogy. A fifth type of meta-argument represents my reconstruction of arguments by parity of reasoning studied by Woods and Hudak (1989, Informal Logic 11, 125–139). Other particular meta-arguments deserving future study are Hume’s critique of the argument from design in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Mill’s initial argument in The Subjection of Women about the importance of established custom and general feeling vis-à-vis argumentation.     

Why Propositions Might be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances

Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this.