Expectation of outgroup behaviour: can you trust the outgroup?

Outgroups are usually viewed with suspicion and expected to discriminate against the ingroup. The present study demonstrated that ingroup members attributed past discriminatory behaviour committed by individuals of unknown group membership more to outgroup members than to either ingroup members or members of a neutral group. In contrast, past egalitarian behaviour was attributed less to outgroup members than to members of a neutral group. Ingroup members also expected more discrimination from a future outgroup allocator than from a future neutral group allocator. Finally, the study showed that ingroup members' own behaviour in allocating money became more biased in favour of ingroup members vis-á-vis outgroup members when the future allocator was from an outgroup rather than from a neutral group and when they had witnessed the discriminatory behaviour of an allocator in the past.     

When can we trust theF-approximation of the box-test?

Consider a multivariate context withp variates andk independent samples, each of sizen. To test equality of thek population covariance matrices, the likelihood ratio test is commonly employed. Box'sF-approximation to the null distribution of the test statistic can be used to computep-values, if sample sizes are not too small. It is suggested to regard theF-approximation as accurate if the sample sizesn are greater than or equal to 1+0.0613p ²+2.7265p-1.4182p ^0.5+0.235p ^1.4* In (k), for 5p30,k20.This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through Ste 405/2-1.     

Betting on a brand: How can trust game experiments inform a brand trust research agenda?

For brands to succeed, they often need consumers to trust them. This has prompted marketing and consumer behaviour researchers to examine what makes certain brands more trusted and how brands can identify themselves as trustworthy. For over 25 years, experimental economists, behavioural scientists and others have examined interpersonal trust using an exercise — the trust game — where participants put money at risk based on how trustworthy they think other people are. This research has remained largely separate from work on brand trust, but this critical review aims to identify findings and concepts from trust game-based research that are relevant to brand trust, and starts to develop an integrated research agenda for the future. In particular, it looks at how brand trust is measured, how brand trust might (or might not) be distinguished from transactional risk, and the heuristics and biases behind brand trust judgements and how these relate to brands' attempts to signal their trustworthiness.     

The beginning of the end for chimpanzee experiments?

The advanced sensory, psychological and social abilities of chimpanzees confer upon them a profound ability to suffer when born into unnatural captive environments, or captured from the wild – as many older research chimpanzees once were – and when subsequently subjected to confinement, social disruption, and involuntary participation in potentially harmful biomedical research. Justifications for such research depend primarily on the important contributions advocates claim it has made toward medical advancements. However, a recent large-scale systematic review indicates that invasive chimpanzee experiments rarely provide benefits in excess of their profound animal welfare, bioethical and financial costs. The approval of large numbers of these experiments – particularly within the US – therefore indicates a failure of the ethics committee system. By 2008, legislative or policy bans or restrictions on invasive great ape experimentation existed in seven European countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In continuing to conduct such experiments on chimpanzees and other great apes, the US was almost completely isolated internationally. In 2007, however, the US National Institutes of Health National Center for Research Resources implemented a permanent funding moratorium on chimpanzee breeding, which is expected to result in a major decline in laboratory chimpanzee numbers over the next 30 years, as most are retired or die. Additionally, in 2008, The Great Ape Protection Act was introduced to Congress. The bill proposed to end invasive research and testing on an estimated 1,200 chimpanzees confined within US laboratories, and, for approximately 600 federally-owned, to ensure their permanent retirement to sanctuaries. These events have created an unprecedented opportunity for US legislators, researchers, and others, to consider a global ban on invasive chimpanzee research. Such a ban would not only uphold the best interests of chimpanzees, and other research fields presently deprived of funding, but would also increase the compliance of US animal researchers with internationally-accepted animal welfare and bioethical standards. It could even result in the first global moratorium on invasive research, for any non-human species, unless conducted in the best interests of the individual or species.     

Who do you trust? The impact of facial emotion and behaviour on decision making

During social interactions, we use available information to guide our decisions, including behaviour and emotional displays. In some situations, behaviour and emotional displays may be incongruent, complicating decision making. This study had two main aims: first, to investigate the independent contributions of behaviour and facial displays of emotion on decisions to trust, and, second, to examine what happens when the information being signalled by a facial display is incongruent with behaviour. Participants played a modified version of the Trust Game in which they learned simulated players’ behaviour with or without concurrent displays of facial emotion. Results indicated that displays of anger, but not happiness, influenced decisions to trust during initial encounters. Over the course of repeated interactions, however, emotional displays consistent with an established pattern of behaviour made independent contributions to decision making, strengthening decisions to trust. When facial display and behaviour were incongruent, participants used current behaviour to inform decision making.     

In money we trust? The use of financial compensations to repair trust in the aftermath of distributive harm

Trust is vital yet vulnerable in economic exchange relations. In these relations, a widely used strategy in response to distributive harm consists of having the transgressor pay a financial compensation to the victim. This research examines whether financial compensations can increase trust towards a transgressor, and whether the size of the compensation is relevant to this process. We hypothesized and found that whether larger compensations will elicit more trust, depends on how clear the perpetrator’s intention to transgress was. Experiment 1 revealed that trust perceptions increased more by a slight overcompensation of the inflicted harm as compared to an exact or a partial compensation, but not if the transgressor’s bad intentions became clear through the use of deception in the violation. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated these findings and further showed that it is not the use of deception per se, but rather the attribution of bad intent that moderates the effect of compensation size. Experiment 4, using a trust game paradigm revealed that this effect not only occurs for small overcompensations, but also for larger overcompensations.     

The emerging debate over the shape of informed consent: can the doctrine bear the weight?

Informed consent has traditionally focused on treatment-related issues. However, since the mid-1990s, courts have debated whether informed consent should be stretched to accommodate other concerns. For example, some courts have considered whether economic limitations on treatment availability must be made known to a patient as part of the informed consent process. Other courts have considered whether characteristics of the treatment provider (e.g., experience with a particular procedure) should be disclosed as part of informed consent. Consideration of these issues turns in large part on whether the information in question would be considered "material" to a decision to accept or reject treatment. This article discusses these developments, and suggests that expanding informed consent beyond treatment-related issues in some circumstances may erode trust in the clinical relationship, thus undermining one of the central values of the informed consent doctrine. It concludes with some suggestions on how research could inform this debate.     

Emotions and appraisals: can you have one without the other?

In his commentary on M. Siemer and R. Reisenzein (2007), B. Parkinson (2007) raised a number of important questions concerning the process of emotion inference and the scope of appraisal theories. Siemer and Reisenzein first examine the alternative explanations of their findings proposed by Parkinson and then look at the alternative "situated" view of emotions proposed by him. The main conclusion is that the issues raised by Parkinson can be dealt with by (suitable extensions of) appraisal theory.     

The credibility of children's testimony: can children control the accuracy of their memory reports?

In previous work with adults (A. Koriat & M. Goldsmith, 1994, 1996c), it was shown that people can enhance the accuracy of their testimony substantially when they (a) are effective in monitoring the correctness of their answers, (b) are free to control their reporting accordingly (i.e., to decide which pieces of information to volunteer and which to withhold), and (c) are given incentives for accurate reporting. A theoretical model was developed, which specifies the critical role of metacognitive monitoring and control processes in mediating free-report memory accuracy. The present study applies that model to examine the strategic regulation of memory accuracy by children. Three experiments indicate that both younger (ages 7 to 9) and older (ages 10 to 12) children can enhance the accuracy of their testimony by screening out wrong answers under free-report conditions but suggest a developmental trend in the level of memory accuracy that is thereby achieved. The implications of the results for the dependability of children's testimony in legal settings are discussed.     

Accurate by way of aggregation: Should you trust your intuition-based first impressions?

How much should you trust your intuition about other people's job performance? Different literatures provide different answers to this question. Social psychological research on “thin slices” suggests that untrained observers can predict a person's job performance based on a few moments of observation. Industrial/organizational psychologists have found a weaker relationship between job performance and the intuitive judgments that people make following employment interviews. This paper argues that interviewers' intuitive judgments appear to be weaker predictors than intuitive judgments of thin slices because thin slices research measures predictive validity at the aggregate-level of analysis. Intuition-based first impressions will not usually be valid predictors of job performance unless people have an opportunity to collect and combine the judgments of multiple independent raters.     

How can we tell the Dancer from the Dance?: The Subject of Dance and the Subject of Philosophy

One of the most important aspects of Gilles Deleuzes philosophy is his criticism of the traditional concept of praxis. In Aristotelian philosophy praxis is properly oriented towards some end, and in the case of human action the ends of praxis are oriented towards the agents good life. Human goods are, for both Aristotle and contemporary neo-Aristotelians, determined by the potentials of human life such as rationality, communality, and speech. Deleuzes account of action, by contrast, liberates movement from an external end. In his books on cinema Deleuze argues that we need to think of events in terms of their power, and not as movements within an already determined image of life. In order to think events as such we need to confront the power of the virtual. This is achieved by a philosophy of life in which becoming is not a means towards the realisation of some end. Rather, becomings are best seen as counter-actualisations: ways in which the already-constituted actual world always bears a power to become other than it already is. If we consider dance in this new context, then dance is neither expressive of an already existing life, nor a pure act that is self-sufficient and self-constituting. Rather, dance is a confrontation with life as a plane of open and divergent becomings.     

Action understanding: How low can you go?

This paper begins by reminding the reader of the standard arguments that sceptics offer for doubting that mirror neurons could constitute any kind of action understanding (Section 2). It then outlines the usual response to these sceptical worries made by believers (Section 3). An attempt to put flesh on this idea in terms of what brains understand is critically examined and found wanting (Section 4). The ensuing analysis shows that it is prima facie possible to develop a more tenable account of enactive understanding that would fit the bill (Section 5). However, a second look raises further questions about (A) what mirror neurons target and (B) what such targeting involves (Section 6). Finally it is concluded that while mirror neurons may play a central role in enabling non-mentalistic forms of intersubjective engagement this falls short of action understanding (Section 7).     

The Rorschach and traumatic loss: can the presence of traumatic loss be detected from the Rorschach?

Loss, an expected part of everyone's life, can be a catalyst promoting significant growth. But all losses are not the same or affect everyone in like manner. Some losses are of such magnitude and intensity that individuals cannot cope, and, therefore, they keep reliving them (posttraumatic stress syndrome) as if through repeated attempts (Freud, 1923-1922/1961) they might master what had been initially so overwhelming. This study, using an inpatient hospital sample, examines the Rorschach protocols of individuals who had experienced traumatic loss in childhood or early adolescence and compares them with a control group of individuals who appear to have no such history. Our hypotheses that victims of early trauma have a distinguishing Rorschach profile was validated in the exploratory study. Further study is needed to clarify whether factors other than traumatic loss may be contributing to this profile.     

How can you patent genes?

What accounts for the continued lack of clarity over the legal procedures for the patenting of DNA sequences? The patenting system was built for a "bricks-and-mortar" world rather than an information economy. The fact that genes are both material molecules and informational systems helps explain the difficulty that the patent system is going to continue to have.     

How lucky can you get?

In this paper, I apply Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck epistemology to the case of knowledge through testimony. I claim (1) that Pritchard’s distinction between veritic and reflective luck provides a nice taxonomy of testimony cases, (2) that the taxonomic categories that emerge can be used to suggest precisely what epistemic statuses are transmissible through testimony, and (3) that the resulting picture can make clear how testimony can actually be knowledge-generating.     

Reciprocity of trust in the supervisor–subordinate relationship: The mediating role of autonomy and the sense of power

This article develops and tests a model of reciprocal trust between supervisor and subordinate. Drawing from literature on trust and control and on the approach/inhibition theory of power, the authors present a model in which supervisor trust is suggested to enhance subordinate reciprocal trust through increased work-related autonomy and a heightened sense of power. The mediator analysis using the two-level full structural model confirmed that the relationship between supervisor trust and subordinate trust was partially mediated by the suggested chain of variables. The article responds to a call for empirical studies on reciprocal trust and offers a complementary mechanism for trust building beside characteristics and relationship-based approaches.     

The role of attention in the affordance effect: can we afford to ignore it?

It has been established that the task-irrelevant orientation of an object's graspable handle produces a stimulus-response compatibility effect, resulting in faster reaction times when the location of the response corresponds to that of the object's handle. There is ongoing debate whether to attribute this affordance effect to motoric or to attentional components. In an attempt to reconcile these two viewpoints, we employed a novel experimental approach for investigating the relationship between attention and affordance. Using 3-D positional sound, auditory spatial attention was manipulated in order to explore its effects on affordance. Subjects were presented images of everyday graspable objects and had to respond bimanually (left or right) whether the object (featuring a leftward or rightward handle) was presented upright or upside-down. Prior to each affording object, sound localization cues were manipulated so as to orient auditory attention to the left, or to the right of the interaural axis (control). We obtained a peculiar pattern of results, which not only appears to provide support for an attention-shift account of affordance but does so in a cross-modal context.     

How internal can you get?

This paper examines Laurence BonJour's defense of internalism inThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge with an eye toward better understanding the issues which separate internalists from externalists. It is argued that BonJour's Doxastic Presumption cannot play the role which is required of it to make his internalism work. It is further argued that BonJour's internalism, and, indeed, all other internalisms, are motivated by a Cartesian view of an agent's access to her own mental states. This Caretsian view is argued to be untenable, and, accordingly, so is internalism.