Analysis of the Talmudic Argumentum A Fortiori Inference Rule (Kal Vachomer) using Matrix Abduction

We motivate and introduce a new method of abduction, Matrix Abduction, and apply it to modelling the use of non-deductive inferences in the Talmud such as Analogy and the rule of Argumentum A Fortiori. Given a matrix \({\mathbb {A}}\) with entries in {0, 1}, we allow for one or more blank squares in the matrix, say a _i,j =?. The method allows us to decide whether to declare a _i,j = 0 or a _i,j = 1 or a _i,j =? undecided. This algorithmic method is then applied to modelling several legal and practical reasoning situations including the Talmudic rule of Kal-Vachomer. We add an Appendix showing that this new rule of Matrix Abduction, arising from the Talmud, can also be applied to the analysis of paradoxes in voting and judgement aggregation. In fact we have here a general method for executing non-deductive inferences.     

‘You Wouldn’t have Your Granny Using Them’: Drawing Boundaries Between Acceptable and Unacceptable Applications of Civil Drones

Some industry and policy actors are concerned about public opposition to civil drones, in particular because of their association with military drones. However, very little is understood about public reactions to the technology. Strategies to ‘manage public acceptance’ have so far relied upon several untested assumptions. We conducted public engagement activities to explore citizens’ visions of civil drones. Several insights counteracted the prevailing assumptions. Rejecting the notion of blanket support for or opposition to civil drones, we found that citizens make nuanced decisions about the acceptability of civil drones depending upon the purpose of the flight and the actors involved. The results are positioned in support for calls to strengthen the role of citizens in civil drone development and, in particular, to shift away from the current focus on citizens’ acceptance of civil drone development towards the development of civil drones that are acceptable to citizens.     

Natural,Artifactual, and Moral Goodness

In Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot (2001) aims to provide an account of moral evaluation that is both naturalistic and cognitivist. She argues that moral evaluation is a variety of natural evaluation in the sense that moral judgments of human action and character have the same “grammar” or “conceptual structure” as natural judgments of the goodness (e.g., health) of plants and animals. We argue that Foot’s naturalist project can succeed, but not in the way she envisions, because her central thesis that moral evaluation is a variety of natural evaluation is not entirely correct. We show that both moral and natural evaluation are species of kind evaluation, which encompasses moral, natural, and artifact evaluation. Kind evaluation is a form of evaluation, according to which things are evaluated qua members of a kind, in such a way that the kind into which something is classified informs the standards of evaluation (or norms) for things of that kind. Because the source of the normative standards for moral evaluation is different from the source of the normative standards for natural evaluation, moral evaluation is not a species of natural evaluation. However, both are varieties of kind evaluation. This account of moral evaluation as a variety of kind evaluation is still an effective response to non-naturalism and to non-cognitivism.     

Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga

We (2013, 2014) argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr(H | O & E) = Pr(H | O). We defended this screening-off thesis (SOT) by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga (Philos Sci, forthcoming) argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here reply to Climenhaga’s arguments and suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation”.     

Grammatical Aspect in Early Child Mandarin: Evidence from a Preferential Looking Experiment

The study assessed 30-month-old Mandarin-speaking children’s awareness of aspectual distinctions involving the perfective marker le and the imperfective marker zhe in a preferential looking experiment. In the experiment, we presented our child subjects with a choice between two video clips (one depicting a closed event and the other depicting an on-going event), in the presence of an auditory stimulus (either the le sentence, the zhe sentence or the control sentence without any aspect marker). Children’s looking behavior in the task was recorded and analyzed. The results revealed 30-month-old children’s emerging sensitivity to the aspectual contrast between le and zhe. This was manifest by an increase in looking to the closed event when hearing the le sentence and an increase in looking to the on-going event when hearing the zhe sentence. The absence of le or zhe in the control sentence did not result in any increase or decrease in looking to either event. We also found that the effect of le on children’s looking behavior was immediate whereas the effect of zhe was late. We attributed this difference to the facilitative role of le in children’s sentence processing as well as their preference for the event boundary. The results lend support to the continuity view that functional morphemes like aspect markers are available to children early in language development.     

Relationship between Disabilities and Adoption Outcomes in African American Children

Although many children adopted from the public child welfare system have special needs, little is known about the experiences of African American adopted children with disabilities and their families. The purpose of this study is to explore different categories of disabilities, including chronic health issues; emotional, mental, or behavioral (EMB) disorders; and intellectual or developmental disabilities (IDDs) on adoption outcomes in a sample of African American children. Data were from the Post-Permanency Round II Survey collected in 2008. A random sample of 412 adoptive parents or legal guardians self-reported their children’s disability diagnoses and family caregiving experiences. Hierarchical regression modelling was used to investigate the relationship between child disability and child and parental outcomes. Results indicated that chronic health issues (β?=?.10, p?<?.05), EMB disorders (β?=?.16, p?<?.01), and IDDs (β?=?.12, p?<?.05) were positively associated with parental burden. In addition, asthma (β?=?.10, p?<?.05), from the larger physical health issue category, was also associated with parental burden. However, none of the disability categories was significantly related with caregiver commitment or adoption dissolution. Future research should disentangle the definitions of special needs or disabilities.     

Choices or Rights? Charter Schools and the Politics of Choice-Based Education Policy Reform

Simply put, charter schools have not lived up to their advocates’ promise of equity. Using examples of tangible civil rights gains of the twentieth century (e.g. Brown v. Board, Lau v. Nichols) and extending feminist theories of invisible labor to include the labor of democracy, the authors argue that the charter movement renders invisible the labor that secured civil protections for historically marginalized groups. The charter movement hangs a quality public education—previously recognized as a universal guarantee—on the education consumer’s ability to navigate a marketplace. The authors conclude that the neoliberal agenda of positioning choice as the best mechanism for securing an education rolls back the rights that were already secured through the labor of democracy.     

Exploration of Male Attitudes on Partnerships and Sexuality with Female <Emphasis Type="Italic">BRCA1/2</Emphasis> Mutation Carriers

Women with BRCA mutations are inundated with decisions about managing cancer risks and childbearing considerations. Decisions become more complicated when women face disclosing their mutation and risk-reduction options to a romantic partner. This study identifies the concerns and perspectives of male romantic partners regarding these unique decisions. Twenty-five male participants completed an online survey posted to cancer support group message boards. Participants reported relationship changes regarding intimacy levels (n?=?9), attraction (n?=?2), and communication (n?=?22) after mutation disclosure. Participants whose partners had not undergone prophylactic mastectomy (n?=?14) reported concerns regarding sexual relations (n?=?5), post-surgical appearance (n?=?2), post-surgical attraction (n?=?5), and health/lifespan (n?=?9). Participants did not express attitude changes toward childbearing. While mutation disclosure conversations and surgical options are concerns for many BRCA mutation carriers in relationships, male partners share these concerns. Aspects of the relationship may change, but male study participants continued to support their partners. This information can benefit female BRCA mutation carriers, their current or future partners, and genetic counselors working with this particular population.     

The Modal Logic of Gödel Sentences

The modal logic of Gödel sentences, termed as GS, is introduced to analyze the logical properties of ‘true but unprovable’ sentences in formal arithmetic. The logic GS is, in a sense, dual to Grzegorczyk’s Logic, where modality can be interpreted as ‘true and provable’. As we show, GS and Grzegorczyk’s Logic are, in fact, mutually embeddable. We prove Kripke completeness and arithmetical completeness for GS. GS is also an extended system of the logic of ‘Essence and Accident’ proposed by Marcos (Bull Sect Log 34(1):43–56, 2005). We also clarify the relationships between GS and the provability logic GL and between GS and Intuitionistic Propositional Logic.     

Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application.     

On (the) nothing: Heidegger and Nishida

Two major twentieth century philosophers, of East and West, for whom the nothing is a significant concept are Nishida Kitarō and Martin Heidegger. Nishida’s basic concept is the absolute nothing (zettai mu) upon which the being of all is predicated. Heidegger, on the other hand, thematizes the nothing (Nichts) as the ulterior aspect of being. Both are responding to Western metaphysics that tends to substantialize being and dichotomize the real. Ironically, however, while Nishida regarded Heidegger as still trapped within the confines of Western metaphysics with its tendency to objectify, Heidegger’s impression of Nishida was that he is too Western, that is, metaphysical. Yet neither was too familiar with the other’s philosophical work as a whole. I thus compare and assess Nishida’s and Heidegger’s discussions of the nothing in their attempts to undermine traditional metaphysics while examining lingering assumptions about the Nishida–Heidegger relationship. Neither Nishida nor Heidegger means by “nothing” a literal nothing, but rather that which permits beings in their relative determinacy to be what they are and wherein or whereby we find ourselves always already in our comportment to beings. Nishida characterizes this as a place (basho) that negates itself to give rise to, or make room for, beings. For Heidegger, being as an event (Ereignis) that clears room for beings, releasing each into its own, is not a being, hence nothing. We may also contrast them on the basis of the language they employ in discussing the nothing. Yet each seemed to have had an intuitive grasp of an un/ground, foundational to experience and being. And in fact their paths cross in their respective critiques of Western substantialism, where they offer as an alterantive to that substantialist ontology, in different ways, what I call anontology.     

Spatial term apprehension with a reference object’s rotation in three-dimensional space

It has been reported that the overall shapes of spatial categorical patterns of projective spatial terms such as above and below are not influenced by the rotation of a reference object on a two-dimensional (2D) upright plane. However, is this also true in three-dimensional (3D) space? This study shows the dynamic aspects of the apprehension of projective spatial terms in 3D space by detailing how the rotation of a reference object with an inherent front influences the apprehension of projective spatial terms on a level plane by mapping their spatial categorical patterns. The experiment was designed to examine how spatial categorical patterns on a level plane changed with the rotation of a reference object with an inherent front in 3D computer graphics space. We manipulated the rotation of a reference object with an inherent front at three levels (0°, 90°, and 180° rotations) and examined how such manipulation changed the overall spatial categorical patterns of four basic Japanese projective spatial terms: mae, ushiro, hidari, and migi (similar to in front of, behind, to the left of, and to the right of in English, respectively). The results show that spatial term apprehension was affected by the rotation of the reference object in 3D space. In particular, rotation influenced the mae–ushiro and hidari–migi systems differently. The results also imply that our understanding of projective spatial terms on a level plane in 3D space is affected dynamically by visual information from 3D cues.     

Contextual-Hierarchical Reconstructions of the Strengthened Liar Problem

In this paper we shall introduce two types of contextual-hierarchical (from now on abbreviated by ‘ch’) approaches to the strengthened liar problem. These approaches, which we call the ‘standard’ and the ‘alternative’ ch-reconstructions of the strengthened liar problem, differ in their philosophical view regarding the nature of truth and the relation between the truth predicates T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ of different hierarchy-levels. The basic idea of the standard ch-reconstruction is that the T r ⁿ⁺¹-schema should hold for all sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\). In contrast, the alternative ch-reconstruction, for which we shall argue in section four, is motivated by the idea that T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ are coherent in the sense that the same sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\) should be true according to T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹. We show that instances of the standard ch-reconstruction can be obtained by iterating Kripke’s strong Kleene jump operator. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how instances of the alternative ch-reconstruction can be obtained by a slight modification of the iterated axiom system KF and of the iterated strong Kleene jump operator.     

ExpTime Tableau Decision Procedures for Regular Grammar Logics with Converse

Grammar logics were introduced by Fariñas del Cerro and Penttonen in 1988 and have been widely studied. In this paper we consider regular grammar logics with converse (REG ^c logics) and present sound and complete tableau calculi for the general satisfiability problem of REG ^c logics and the problem of checking consistency of an ABox w.r.t. a TBox in a REG ^c logic. Using our calculi we develop ExpTime (optimal) tableau decision procedures for the mentioned problems, to which various optimization techniques can be applied. We also prove a new result that the data complexity of the instance checking problem in REG ^c logics is coNP-complete.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">Facet Satisfaction Scale</Emphasis>: an Effective Affective Measure of Job Satisfaction Facets

Purpose

Job satisfaction facets are theoretically and practically important variables. Most existing facet satisfaction scales, however, have two noteworthy limitations—they often do not clearly assess affective content, and they use non-parallel items. In the current paper, we examined the measurement qualities of the Facet Satisfaction Scale (FSS; [Beehr et al. (Journal of Applied Social Psychology 36:1523–1547, 2006)], a measure that may address the limitations of existing facet satisfaction measures.

Design/Methodology/Approach

We conducted four studies to examine the measurement qualities of the FSS: (a) Study 1 examined the FSS’s factor structure, (b) Study 2 examined its test-retest reliability and construct validity, (c) Study 3 further examined its construct validity, and (d) Study 4 examined the extent to which the FSS assesses the affective and cognitive components of job satisfaction.

Findings

We found that the FSS produced the hypothesized five-factor structure and that the FSS subscales each yielded high levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability. We also found evidence of the construct validity of the FSS subscales, and we found that the FSS subscales are generally effective measures of the affective component of their respective job satisfaction facets.

Implications

As a result of the current findings, we recommend the FSS when researchers wish to measure the affective component of job satisfaction facets.

Originality/Value

Little previous research has examined the FSS’s measurement qualities. The current studies address this gap by providing evidence for the reliability and validity of the FSS. This is of value because the FSS addresses some limitations inherent to other facet satisfaction measures.

     

Emotion Regulation in Families of Children with Behavior Problems and Nonclinical Comparisons

The current study compared parents’ emotion regulation (ER) in clinical (those with a child with externalizing behavioral problems) and low-risk comparison families. Additionally, mediation models were explored with parent ER predicting child behavior problems through child ER. Participants were 60 families with children (71.7% boys; 73% Caucasian) ages 2 through 8 years (M?=?4.62; SD?=?1.69) from a rural population in the United States: 34 clinical families referred for parent training and 26 nonclinical families. A blocking design was used to balance the two groups on key demographic characteristics. Parents’ and children’s ER was assessed using parent-report surveys and structured behavioral observations. Analyses indicated higher rates of parental emotion dysregulation (specifically, more difficulty when upset with achieving goal-directed behaviors, p?=?.01, d?=?0.67; controlling impulses, p?=?.01, d?=?0.64; limited use of ER strategies, p?=?.02, d?=?0.62; and more negative verbalizations to their child during the observed task, p?<?.01, d?=?0.73) and child emotion dysregulation (specifically, more difficulty as reported by parents, p?<?.01, d?=??2.42) in the clinical group. Mediational analyses indicated there were indirect paths from parental ER to children’s behavioral problems through child ER. Findings from this research suggest a need to measure and target ER in both parents and their children when working with families who are referred for treatment of child behavior problems.     

The Concept of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Krisis</Emphasis> in Husserl’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology</Emphasis>

In The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl argues that the only way to respond to the scientific Krisis of which he speaks is with phenomenological reflections on the history, method, and task of philosophy. On the assumption that an accurate diagnosis of a malady is a necessary condition for an effective remedy, this paper aims to formulate a precise concept of the Krisis of the European sciences with which Husserl operates in this work. Thus it seeks an answer to the question: What exactly, according to Husserl, is “the ‘crisis’ [Krisis] of the European sciences”? There are two different tendencies in the literature on this question. According to the traditional interpretation, the Krisis of the European sciences lies not in the inadequacy of their scientificity but in the loss of their meaningfulness for life. According to an innovative suggestion, the Krisis lies not in the loss of their meaningfulness for life but in the inadequacy of their scientificity. These readings are mutually exclusive because each claims that the other misidentifies the Krisis as something that it is not. The argument of this paper, however, is that, given the many different senses of Krisis in The Crisis, an adequate understanding of the Krisis that Husserl identifies requires not a disjunctive but an inclusive approach. Therefore the paper proposes that Husserl’s Krisis of the European sciences is both a crisis of their scientificity and a crisis of their meaningfulness for life. The relevance of this result to Husserl’s philosophical and historical sense-investigations in The Crisis—as well as to the present critical situation of philosophy—is self-evident.     

Grounding and the argument from explanatoriness

In recent years, metaphysics has undergone what some describe as a revolution: it has become standard to understand a vast array of questions as questions about grounding, a metaphysical notion of determination. Why should we believe in grounding, though? Supporters of the revolution often gesture at what I call the Argument from Explanatoriness: the notion of grounding is somehow indispensable to a metaphysical type of explanation. I challenge this argument and along the way develop a “reactionary” view, according to which there is no interesting sense in which the notion of grounding is explanatorily indispensable. I begin with a distinction between two conceptions of grounding, a distinction which extant critiques of the revolution have usually failed to take into consideration: grounding qua that which underlies metaphysical explanation and grounding qua metaphysical explanation itself. Accordingly, I distinguish between two versions of the Argument from Explanatoriness: the Unexplained Explanations Version for the first conception of grounding, and the Expressive Power Version for the second. The paper’s conclusion is that no version of the Argument from Explanatoriness is successful.     

Consequence Mining

The standard semantic definition of consequence with respect to a selected set X of symbols, in terms of truth preservation under replacement (Bolzano) or reinterpretation (Tarski) of symbols outside X, yields a function mapping X to a consequence relation \(\Rightarrow_X\). We investigate a function going in the other direction, thus extracting the constants of a given consequence relation, and we show that this function (a) retrieves the usual logical constants from the usual logical consequence relations, and (b) is an inverse to—more precisely, forms a Galois connection with—the Bolzano–Tarski function.