Affective facilitation and inhibition of cultural influences on reasoning

Research in South Korea and the United States examined how affective states facilitate or inhibit culturally dominant styles of reasoning. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis, affective cues of mood influence judgements by serving as embodied information about the value of accessible inclinations and cognitions. Extending this line of research to culture, we hypothesised that positive affect should promote (and negative affect should inhibit) culturally normative reasoning. The results of two studies of causal reasoning supported this hypothesis. Positive and negative affect functioned like “go” and “stop” signals, respectively, for culturally typical reasoning styles. Thus, in happy (compared to sad) moods, Koreans engaged in more holistic reasoning, whereas Americans engaged in more analytic reasoning.     

Sometimes happy people focus on the trees and sad people focus on the forest: context-dependent effects of mood in impression formation

Research indicates that affect influences whether people focus on categorical or behavioral information during impression formation. One explanation is that affect confers its value on whatever cognitive inclinations are most accessible in a given situation. Three studies tested this malleable mood effects hypothesis, predicting that happy moods should maintain and unhappy moods should inhibit situationally dominant thinking styles. Participants completed an impression formation task that included categorical and behavioral information. Consistent with the proposed hypothesis, no fixed relation between mood and processing emerged. Whether happy moods led to judgments reflecting category-level or behavior-level information depended on whether participants were led to focus on the their immediate psychological state (i.e., current affective experience; Studies 1 and 2) or physical environment (i.e., an unexpected odor; Study 3). Consistent with research on socially situated cognition, these results demonstrate that the same affective state can trigger entirely different thinking styles depending on the context.     

Attributions of responsibility and affective reactions to decision outcomes

Immediate affective reactions to outcomes are more intense following decisions to act than following decisions not to act. This finding holds for both positive and negative outcomes. We relate this "actor-effect" to attribution theory and argue that decision makers are seen as more responsible for outcomes when these are the result of a decision to act as compared to a decision not to act. Experiment 1 (N = 80) tests the main assumption underlying our reasoning and shows that affective reactions to decision outcomes are indeed more intense when the decision maker is seen as more responsible. Experiment 2 (N = 40) tests whether the actor effect can be predicted on the basis of differential attributions following action and inaction. Participants read vignettes in which active and passive actors obtained a positive or negative outcome. Action resulted in more intense affect than inaction, and positive outcomes resulted in more intense affect than negative outcomes. Experiment 2 further shows that responsibility attributions and affective reactions to outcomes are highly correlated; that is, more extreme affective reactions are associated with more internal attributions. We discuss the implications for research on post-decisional reactions.     

Affect‐as‐Information about Processing Styles: A Cognitive Malleability Approach

Over the past three decades research has overwhelmingly supported the notion that positive affect promotes global, abstract, heuristic information processing whereas negative affect promotes local, detailed, and systematic processing. Yet despite the weight of the evidence, recent work suggests that such a direct relationship may be highly tenuous. In line with the affect‐as‐information account, we maintain that affective cues are adaptive and serve to provide individuals with information about their current psychological environment. We argue that these cues do not directly produce specific processing styles, but instead confer value on whatever processing inclination is dominant at the time. Positive affect (e.g., happiness) tends to promote reliance on currently dominant processing inclinations, whereas negative affect (e.g., sadness) tends to inhibit such reliance. Thus the impact of affect on processing is highly malleable and depends on both the type of processing that is currently active and the information provided by affective cues.     

情绪评价任务中抑郁个体的分心抑制机制实验研究

本实验使用情绪负启动技术,在情绪评价任务中考察了抑郁个体和正常被试对正、负情绪词分心抑制方面的差异。结果显示,与控制条件下相比,非抑郁控制组被试在负启动条件下对探测显示中正、负性靶子词的反应时间更长;抑郁个体只表现在对探测显示中正性靶子词反应时的延长,负性靶子词未出现负启动效应。结果说明,抑郁个体对负性信息存在抑制机制障碍,对负性信息的偏向与选择性注意中的维持成分有关。这提示心理治疗家应该注重训练抑郁个体对负性信息的抑制能力,预防抑郁复发的目标应集中在注意持续的控制上。     

The affective consequences of cognitive inhibition: devaluation or neutralization?

Affective evaluations of previously ignored visual stimuli are more negative than those of novel items or prior targets of attention or response. This has been taken as evidence that inhibition has negative affective consequences. But inhibition could act instead to attenuate or "neutralize" preexisting affective salience, predicting opposite effects for stimuli that were initially positive or negative in valence. We tested this hypothesis by presenting trustworthy and untrustworthy faces (Experiment 1), strongly positive and negative photographs (Experiment 2), and monetary gain- and loss-associated patterns (Experiment 3) in a Go/No-Go task and assessing subsequent affective ratings. Evaluations of prior No-Go (inhibited) stimuli were more negative than of prior Go (noninhibited) stimuli, regardless of a priori affective valence. Ratings of No-Go stimuli also became increasingly negative (vs. increasingly neutral) when preexisting salience was increased via stimulus repetition (Experiment 4). Our results suggest inhibition leads to affective devaluation, not affective neutralization.     

Sex,sex roles,and response styles for negative affect: Selectivity in a free recall task

Study 1 examined how responses to negative affect may be influenced by sex differences in response styles [S. Nolen-Hoeksema (1987), “Sex Differences in Unipolar Depression: Evidence and Theory,” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 101, pp. 259–282] and situational norms. Male and female experimental subjects were led to experience negative affect by reading and rating sad stories, and were then given either nonnormative or normative feedback. Nonnormative subjects were informed that their story ratings were more negative than other participants' ratings. Normative subjects were informed that their ratings were similar to others' ratings. For nonnormative subjects, men recalled less negative material than women, suggesting that response styles are most apparent when negative affect is considered inappropriate. As both sex and sex role orientation are predictive of response styles, Study 2 examined the hypothesis that both sex and sex role orientation are predictive of recall in a manner similar to sex in Study 1. Male and female subjects high and low in masculinity and femininity were assigned to negative-nonnormative and neutral affect conditions. In addition to a marginally significant sex effect consistent with Study 1, results revealed that high-masculinity individuals tended to recall more positive material in the negative-nonnormative condition than in the neutral affect condition. In contrast, low-masculinity individuals recalled less positive material in the negative-nonnormative condition than in the neutral affect condition. The implications of this research for the impact of negative affect on recall are addressed.     

When threats and encouragements are effective in bargaining: The case of credit collectors

We hypothesise that the effectiveness of threats and encouragements is contingent on the intended recipient's level of negative affect, as evidenced by his/her negative affective display. Therefore, bargainers can be more effective if, as they make offers, they condition any threats or encouragements on the recipient's affective display. We test this hypothesis using 5561 verbal exchanges that occurred during 192 telephone conversations between credit collectors and debtors. Collectors were most effective in motivating debtors to discuss terms to resolve their debt if they: (1) threatened recipients who were nonresponsive and did not show any negative affect; and (2) encouraged recipients who displayed negative affect. This result suggests that making threats and encouragements contingent on a recipient's displays of negative affect may be an important but frequently overlooked component of bargaining.     

Thinking styles and risky decision‐making: Further exploration of the affect–probability weighting link

People usually overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities leading to the familiar inverse S‐shaped weighting function. This research explores the link between affect and the structure of probability weighting from the perspective of thinking dispositions, a concept central to dual system theories of reasoning. The effects of affective priming and cognitive load on both probability weighting and the value function are also examined. The evidence suggests that thinking styles do have predictive implications for risky decision‐making. Participants with a more affective thinking style tend to be more risk‐seeking in small probability gambles. However, increasing access to the affective system by affective priming or cognitive load manipulations tend to reduce risk‐seeking behavior in small probability gambles as well as reduce risk averse behavior in large probability gambles. Previous research, manipulating the affective nature of lottery outcomes, found evidence for an increase in curvature (more overweighting of small probabilities and more underweighting of large probabilities) of the weighting function for affect‐rich outcomes, lending support to a hope‐and‐fear deconstruction of probability weighting. The present research suggests that increased anticipatory emotions characterized by the elevation of the weighting function (more overweighting at all probabilities) is also important and could sometimes be more significant than hope‐and‐fear in decision‐making under risk. An integrated approach incorporating the impact of affect on all three, the elevation and curvature of probability weighting as well as the curvature of the value function explains the empirical findings. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Affective Arousal as Information: How Affective Arousal Influences Judgments,Learning, and Memory

The affect‐as‐information framework posits that affect is embodied information about value and importance. The valence dimension of affect provides evaluative information about stimulus objects, which plays a role in judgment and decision‐making. Affect can also provide evaluative information about one's own cognitions and response inclinations, information that guides thinking and reasoning. In particular, positive affect often promotes, and negative affect inhibits, accessible responses or dominant modes of thinking. Affect thus moderates many of the textbook phenomena in cognitive psychology. In the current review, we suggest additionally that the arousal dimension of affect amplifies reactions, leading to intensified evaluations, increased reliance on particular styles of learning, and enhanced long‐term memory for events. We conclude that whereas valenced affective cues serve as information about value, the arousal dimension provides information about urgency or importance.     

Mood and judgments based on sequential sampling

Different adaptive styles characterize cognition and behavior in different affective states. Whereas negative affect supports accommodation (i.e., stimulus‐driven bottom‐up processing), positive affect supports assimilation (i.e., self‐determined top‐down processing). Applying this well‐established rule to binary choices after self‐truncated information sampling, we predicted that positive mood should render choices less dependent on large samples than negative mood. Consequently, the potential primacy advantage underlying Wald's ( 1947 ) sequential testing (i.e., quick and correct decisions from the first few items in a sample) was exploited more efficiently when participants were in positive rather than negative mood. This efficient utilization of small samples in positive mood was obtained under the very conditions derived on a priori ground from a statistical model, namely, when a response criterion or threshold was high and when the true difference between choice options was relatively small. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotional intelligence predicts components of subjective well-being beyond personality: A two-country study using self- and informant reports

This study aimed to examine the ability of overall emotional intelligence (EI) to predict cognitive and affective components of subjective well-being. University students in Germany and Turkey responded to self-report measures of EI, Big Five personality traits, life satisfaction, and positive and negative affect. Multiple informant ratings on subjective well-being measures were obtained to further support the validity of the findings. Results indicated a positive relationship between EI and affective as well as cognitive facets of well-being, with a closer association on part of the affective aspect. The incremental validity of EI was established in that EI predicted both affect balance and life satisfaction when controlling for the Big Five. Whereas participants in Germany reported better well-being than those in Turkey, personality traits and EI explained more variance in well-being measures in Germany than in Turkey. However, the relationship between EI and well-being did not appear to be culturally bound.     

Fading Affect Bias in the Philippines: Confirmation of the FAB in Positive and Negative Memories but Not for Death Memories

Emotions associated with memories for the loss of a loved one and for negative events in general decrease in intensity more than memories associated with positive events, a phenomenon known as the fading affect bias (FAB). We tested whether FAB was cross‐culturally evident by collecting positive, negative, and memories for the deaths of loved ones from Filipinos. Memories were coded as violent/nonviolent and resolved/unresolved, and we predicted that resolved memories should show greater fading and that affective details should be lower in those memory accounts. FAB analyses revealed that negative affective intensity faded while positive affect remained constant, supporting FAB for positive and negative memories. However, there was no evidence of FAB in Filipinos' death memories. Filipinos' positive memories were distributed from the period of the reminiscence bump and focused on themes of childbirth and marriage, while negative and death memories did not cluster at any period of life.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the nature of the conjunction fallacy

In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and philosophy have engaged in important controversies around the conjunction fallacy. The goal of this paper is to explore the most important of these controversies, namely, the controversy about the nature of the conjunction fallacy. Is the conjunction fallacy mainly due to a misunderstanding of the problem by participants (misunderstanding hypothesis) or is it mainly due to a genuine reasoning bias (reasoning bias hypothesis)? A substantial portion of research on the topic has been directed to test the misunderstanding hypothesis. I review this literature and argue that a stronger case can be made against the misunderstanding hypothesis. Thus, I indirectly provide support for the reasoning bias hypothesis.     

The augment effect of negative affective background on positive stimulus: Two randomized controlled trials

Based on the affective endowment-contrast theory, negative affect (NA) is hypothesized to augment positive affect (PA). Study 1 examined this contrast effect (augment effect) in a laboratory setting. Participants (n?=?94) were assigned into positive, negative or neutral affective background conditions through false feedback procedure, and then a same positive stimulus was given to all participants. Results indicated that participants in negative condition experienced more feelings of PA and less NA after receiving the positive stimulus compared to the other two conditions. Study 2 investigated this augment effect under naturalistic context. Participants (n?=?150) were classified into high positive, high negative, or mild positive affective background groups based on their naturally occurred affects. Then a positive manipulation was giving to all participants. Results indicated that participants in the high negative group experienced the most decrease in feelings of NA after receiving the positive manipulation. Results from the two studies provided evidence to the endowment-contrast theory, indicating that the valance of positive stimulus was augmented under negative affective background.     

Affective modulation of recognition bias

A correspondence of processing on the familiarity-novelty and positive-negative dimensions, particularly in the earliest processing stages, is proposed. Familiarity manipulations should, therefore, not only influence affective evaluations (e.g., the mere exposure effect), but affective manipulations should also bias familiarity judgments (e.g., in recognition). In Experiment 1, both previously presented and new recognition test words were primed by matching, nonmatching, positive, or negative context words. In Experiment 2, more diffuse affective states were induced during recognition test trials by contracting facial muscles that corresponded to positive and negative expressions. Particularly when participants were less aware of the familiarity and affective manipulations, corresponding effects were found. Positive affect led to a more liberal recognition bias, and negative affect led to more cautious tendencies.     

Who I Am Depends on How I Feel: The Role of Affect in the Expression of Culture

ABSTRACT— We present a novel role of affect in the expression of culture. Four experiments tested whether individuals' affective states moderate the expression of culturally normative cognitions and behaviors. We consistently found that value expressions, self-construals, and behaviors were less consistent with cultural norms when individuals were experiencing positive rather than negative affect. Positive affect allowed individuals to explore novel thoughts and behaviors that departed from cultural constraints, whereas negative affect bound people to cultural norms. As a result, when Westerners experienced positive rather than negative affect, they valued self-expression less, showed a greater preference for objects that reflected conformity, viewed the self in more interdependent terms, and sat closer to other people. East Asians showed the reverse pattern for each of these measures, valuing and expressing individuality and independence more when experiencing positive than when experiencing negative affect. The results suggest that affect serves an important functional purpose of attuning individuals more or less closely to their cultural heritage.     

Screen-based and non-screen-based sedentary behaviors are differentially associated with affective states in older adults

Excessive sedentary behavior (SB) contributes to poor affective and physical feeling states, which is particularly concerning for older adults who are the most sedentary sector of the population. Specific types of SB have been shown to differentially impact health in cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, with screen-based SB more negatively impacting aspects of mental health. This study used Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA), a real-time, intensive longitudinal data capture methodology, to examine the differential impact of screen-based behaviors on momentary affective responses during SB in naturalistic settings. A diverse sample of older adults (pooled across 2 studies) completed an EMA protocol for 8–10 days with six randomly delivered, smartphone assessments per day. At each EMA prompt, participants reported their current activity, whether they were sitting while doing that activity, and affective states. Multilevel models assessed whether screen-based (vs. non-screen-based) behavior moderated affective response during SB.At the within-person level, older adults experienced less positive affect during SB when engaged in a screen-based behavior compared to a non-screen-based SB (B = −0.10, p < 0.01). At the between-person level, positive associations between SB and negative affect (B = 0.79, p = 0.03) were stronger if participants reported engaging in screen-based behaviors for a greater proportion of prompts. Among older adults, screen-based SB may lead to poorer affective states compared to non-screen-based SB. Interventions aiming to reduce SB in this population should consider targeting reductions in screen-based SB as means to improve affective states.     

Affective and attributional features of acculturative stress among ethnic minority college students

Little is known about the affective features of acculturative stress or its relation to attributional styles for negative events. The authors examined associations among acculturative stress, attributional style, and positive and negative affect among 96 ethnic minority college students. They hypothesized that acculturative stress would be characterized by elevated negative affect and global and stable attributions for negative events. Consistent with prediction, acculturative stress was significantly associated with negative affect and global attributions, even when controlling for other relevant predictors. Attributional style did not account for the association between negative affect and acculturative stress. Positive affect and stable and internal attributional styles were not related to acculturative stress. The authors discuss implications for reducing stress associated with acculturation.     

How emotions inform judgment and regulate thought

Being happy or sad influences the content and style of thought. One explanation is that affect serves as information about the value of whatever comes to mind. Thus, when a person makes evaluative judgments or engages in a task, positive affect can enhance evaluations and empower potential responses. Rather than affect itself, the information conveyed by affect is crucial. Tests of the hypothesis find that affective influences can be made to disappear by changing the source to which the affect is attributed. In tasks, positive affect validates and negative affect invalidates accessible cognitions, leading to relational processing and item-specific processing, respectively. Positive affect is found to promote, and negative affect to inhibit, many textbook phenomena from cognitive psychology.