跨期选择的认知机制与神经基础

跨期选择是指个体对发生在不同时间的成本与收益进行权衡的决策过程。跨期选择的计算模型从经济学的角度用数学模型来建构时间折扣函数,而认知成分模型则从心理学的角度来研究跨期选择中的心理效应与认知成分。跨期选择的神经基础有三种不同的研究取向：双机制加工取向、单机制加工取向、自我控制取向。未来研究应该在跨期选择的认知机制、神经通路及运行机制、跨期选择的应用,以及从进化的角度对人与动物的跨期选择行为进行更深入的研究。     

Intertemporal Similarity: Discounting as a Last Resort

Standard models of intertemporal choice assume that individuals discount future payoffs by integrating reward amounts and time delays to generate a discounted value. Alternative models propose that, rather than integrate across them, individuals compare within attributes (amounts and delays) to determine if differences in one attribute outweigh differences in another attribute. For instance, the similarity model 1) compares the two reward amounts to determine whether they are similar, 2) compares the similarity of the two time delays, and then 3) makes a decision based on these similarity judgments. Here, I tested discounting models against attribute‐based models that use similarity judgments to make choices. I collected intertemporal choices and similarity judgments for the reward amounts and time delays from participants in three experiments. All experiments tested the ability of discounting and similarity models to predict intertemporal choices. Model generalization analyses showed that the best predicting models started with similarity judgments and then, if similarity failed to make a prediction, resorted to discounting models. Similarity judgments also matched intertemporal choice data demonstrating both the magnitude and sign effects, thereby accounting for behavioral data that contradict many discounting models. These results highlight the possibility that attribute‐based models such as the similarity models provide alternatives to discounting that may offer insights into the process of making intertemporal choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

跨期决策中的负折扣现象及其机制

主流跨期决策模型认为, 跨期决策存在一个时间折扣过程。时间折扣是指人们会根据将来获益或损失的延迟时间对其效用进行折扣, 折扣后的效用小于原来的效用, 而负折扣现象违背了时间折扣过程。负折扣现象出现在金钱、非金钱的获益与损失领域, 其可能的解释机制为预期情绪。目前关于负折扣现象的研究, 较少验证其影响机制, 未来的研究可以结合眼动追踪和fMRI技术探讨其机制, 并丰富对负折扣现象的影响因素研究。     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Integrated versus segregated accounting and the magnitude effect in temporal discounting

Temporal discounting rates in humans generally decrease as the amount of reward increases, a phenomenon known as themagnitude effect. In the present study, we examined whether temporal discounting and the magnitude effect are related to segregation of choices in terms of gains or losses for waiting for or expediting receipt of a reward. Subjects (N = 24) responded to a series of hypothetical choices about amounts of money available either immediately or after a delay. The immediate and delayed amounts either were presented as integrated amounts in the baseline condition or were segregated as differential gains or losses for choosing delayed or expedited consumption (delay and speedup conditions, respectively). Temporal discounting rates decreased in the segregated conditions, in accord with the standard discounted utility model but contrary to the hypothesis that the subjects were choosing on the basis of reward differentials in the baseline condition. The size of the magnitude effect was comparable in the baseline and the delay conditions but decreased in the speed-up condition. These results challenge explanations of the magnitude effect in terms of an increasing proportional sensitivity property of the utility function (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) and the hypothesis that subjects choose on the basis of differentials even when the rewards are presented as integrated amounts.     

Weighing Outcomes by Time or Against Time? Evaluation Rules in Intertemporal Choice

Models of intertemporal choice draw on three evaluation rules, which we compare in the restricted domain of choices between smaller sooner and larger later monetary outcomes. The hyperbolic discounting model proposes an alternative‐based rule, in which options are evaluated separately. The interval discounting model proposes a hybrid rule, in which the outcomes are evaluated separately, but the delays to those outcomes are evaluated in comparison with one another. The tradeoff model proposes an attribute‐based rule, in which both outcomes and delays are evaluated in comparison with one another: People consider both the intervals between the outcomes and the compensations received or paid over those intervals. We compare highly general parametric functional forms of these models by means of a Bayesian analysis, a method of analysis not previously used in intertemporal choice. We find that the hyperbolic discounting model is outperformed by the interval discounting model, which, in turn, is outperformed by the tradeoff model. Our cognitive modeling is among the first to offer quantitative evidence against the conventional view that people make intertemporal choices by discounting the value of future outcomes, and in favor of the view that they directly compare options along the time and outcome attributes.     

时间洞察力对跨期选择偏好的预测

利用津巴多时间洞察力问卷,采用跨期选择经典范式,考察“现在享乐型”和“未来定向型”两类时间洞察力个体在跨期选择上的偏好,从人格特质角度来探究跨期选择的认知机制。结果发现：(1)现在享乐定向组的延迟折扣率显著高于未来定向组;(2)未来定向组在时间洞察力量表“未来维度”得分与延迟折扣率显著负相关。这说明时间洞察力对个体延迟折扣率具有预测作用,支持了跨期选择的时间感知基础模型。     

Time discounting and time preference in animals: A critical review

Animals are an important model for studies of impulsivity and self-control. Many studies have made use of the intertemporal choice task, which pits small rewards available sooner against larger rewards available later (typically several seconds), repeated over many trials. Preference for the sooner reward is often taken to indicate impulsivity and/or a failure of self-control. This review shows that very little evidence supports this assumption; on the contrary, ostensible discounting behavior may reflect a boundedly rational but not necessarily impulsive reward-maximizing strategy. Specifically, animals may discount weakly, or even adopt a long-term rate-maximizing strategy, but fail to fully incorporate postreward delays into their choices. This failure may reflect learning biases. Consequently, tasks that measure animal discounting may greatly overestimate the true discounting and may be confounded by processes unrelated to time preferences. If so, animals may be much more patient than is widely believed; human and animal intertemporal choices may reflect unrelated mental operations; and the shared hyperbolic shape of the human and animal discount curves, which is used to justify cross-species comparisons, may be coincidental. The discussion concludes with a consideration of alternative ways to measure self-control in animals.     

Intertemporal choice--toward an integrative framework

Intertemporal choices are decisions with consequences that play out over time. These choices range from the prosaic--how much food to eat at a meal--to life-changing decisions about education, marriage, fertility, health behaviors and savings. Intertemporal preferences also affect policy debates about long-run challenges, such as global warming. Historically, it was assumed that delayed rewards were discounted at a constant rate over time. Recent theoretical and empirical advances from economic, psychological and neuroscience perspectives, however, have revealed a more complex account of how individuals make intertemporal decisions. We review and integrate these advances. We emphasize three different, occasionally competing, mechanisms that are implemented in the brain: representation, anticipation and self-control.     

Temporal discounting and preference reversals in choice between delayed outcomes

Subjects chose between pairs of hypothetical amounts of money available after different delays. When smaller, more immediate amounts were selected over larger, more delayed amounts, the addition of a constant delay to both outcomes resulted in reversals of preference, contrary to the standard discounted utility model of economics. The delays at which preference reversed were determined for three pairs of amounts ($20 vs. $50, $100 vs. $250, and $500 vs. $1,250). The relation between the delay to the larger amount and the delay to the smaller amount at preference reversal was well fit by both linear and quadratic functions. Intercepts increased with amount, strongly suggesting that rate of discounting decreases with amount. The presence of significant negative curvature in the data from the majority of individual subjects poses problems for exponential and hyperbolic models of temporal discounting in self-control, both of which predict a linear relation between the delays to the larger and smaller amounts.     

PREFERENCE REVERSALS DUE TO MYOPIC DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED REWARD

Abstract— A basic stationarity axiom of economic theory assumes stable preference between two deferred goods separated by a fixed time. To test this assumption, we offered subjects choices between delayed rewards, while manipulating the delays to those rewards. Preferences typically reversed with changes in delay, as predicted by hyperbolic discounting models of impulsiveness. Of 36 subjects, 34 reversed preference from a larger, later reward to a smaller, earlier reward as the delays to both rewards decreased. We conclude that the stationarity axiom is not appropriate in models of human choice.     

Temporal Patterning in Probabilistic Choice

Human subjects making repeated choices between probabilistic and near-certain monetary rewards tended to be less risk-averse the shorter the inter-trial interval. Subjects were also less risk-averse when the choice-outcome sequences were clustered in threes than when each choice-outcome sequence was separated from its neighbors by equal intertrial intervals. These results further extend the analogy between delay discounting and probability discounting. Probability discounting, like delay discounting, may be described by hyperbolic function relating discounted value to expected delay to the next reward.     

A mechanism for reducing delay discounting by altering temporal attention

Rewards that are not immediately available are discounted compared to rewards that are immediately available. The more a person discounts a delayed reward, the more likely that person is to have a range of behavioral problems, including clinical disorders. This latter observation has motivated the search for interventions that reduce discounting. One surprisingly simple method to reduce discounting is an "explicit-zero" reframing that states default or null outcomes. Reframing a classical discounting choice as "something now but nothing later" versus "nothing now but more later" decreases discount rates. However, it is not clear how this "explicit-zero" framing intervention works. The present studies delineate and test two possible mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. One mechanism proposes that the explicit-zero framing creates the impression of an improving sequence, thereby enhancing the present value of the delayed reward. A second possible mechanism posits an increase in attention allocation to temporally distant reward representations. In four experiments, we distinguish between these two hypothesized mechanisms and conclude that the temporal attention hypothesis is superior for explaining our results. We propose a model of temporal attention whereby framing affects intertemporal preferences by modifying present bias.     

On the importance of distinguishing between within- and between-subject effects in intransitive intertemporal choice

Most probabilistic paired comparison models treat inconsistent choices as caused by independent and random errors in the pairwise judgments. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is too restrictive for the analysis of paired comparison data obtained from multiple judges when transitivity violations are systematic. We present a new framework that contains the random error assumption as a special case but also allows for systematic changes in an option's utility assessments over the pairwise comparisons. Accounting for both between- and within-judge sources of variability, we demonstrate in an application on intertemporal choice that the proposed framework can capture systematic transitivity violations as well as individual taste differences.     

A Measure of Delay Discounting Within the Academic Domain

It is important to better understand the decision‐making processes involved in student procrastination, in order to develop interventions that reduce this common problem. Students may procrastinate because studying produces delayed reinforcers; however, no task measuring delay discounting of academic outcomes currently exists. In Experiment 1, we developed and piloted a measure of academic discounting modeled on titrating‐amount tasks successfully used in the discounting literature. Participants made hypothetical choices between working for money (the smaller, sooner reinforcer) and working on an assignment that was due at various times (the larger, later reinforcer). Participants showed systematic decreases in the subjective value of the assignment as a function of delay, and the hyperbolic and hyperboloid models described the shape of this decrease in value well. In general, larger delayed rewards are discounted less steeply than smaller delayed rewards (the magnitude effect). In Experiment 2, we observed the magnitude effect in academic discounting: Participants discounted a “not important” assignment more steeply than an “important” assignment. In the hyperboloid model, this change was captured by an increase in the s parameter. Results provide support for the validity of the academic discounting task. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evidence for a magnitude effect in temporal discounting with pigeons

A magnitude effect in human intertemporal choice is well established-larger rewards or outcomes are discounted over time at a lower rate than are smaller rewards. However, many recent studies have failed to find a corresponding effect in nonhuman animals. Here we report a magnitude effect in temporal discounting for pigeons' choices involving a tradeoff between reward delay and amount. Pigeons chose between a small reward (1-s access to food) after a 2-s delay, and a large reward (4.5-s access to food) after a 28-s delay. Across conditions, the delays to the small and large rewards were increased or decreased, respectively. Temporal discounting functions obtained through a value-estimation procedure showed clear evidence of a magnitude effect: The value of the large reward decreased more slowly with increasing delay than the value of the small reward. We linked this result to a nonlinear relationship between choice and the delays associated with the small and large rewards. The nonlinearity was contrary to the generalized matching law but was predicted by the contextual choice model. Our results confirm the existence of a magnitude effect in nonhuman temporal discounting, showing that this adaptation is not unique to humans.     

Changes in intertemporal choices in deviant behaviors

Delay discounting is the process of devaluing results that happen in the future. We present a comprehensive literature review of changes on intertemporal choices in deviant behaviors, namely in (a) substance-related and addictive disorders, (b) disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct disorders, and (c) eating disorders. We also present studies focused on differences in demographic characteristics of the populations by gender, age, and education/social class. Delay discounting is presented as a process of studying intertemporal choices, resulting from decades of empirical research. Studies indicate that this process may provide explanation as to why individuals will sometimes choose a smaller reward, available sooner, instead of a larger reward available later. When studying populations with the above-mentioned problems, they tend to exhibit more pronounced discounting functions than control groups. The association between discounting and gender is not clear. The relationship between delay discounting and age is relatively clear, where older individuals discount less markedly than younger individuals. Studies suggest that shallower discounting gradients are associated with higher levels of intelligence and academic success. We emphasize the need for more empirical research on delay discounting, especially in regard to deviant behavior that may be associated with impulse-control disorders.