Information search and attribution: Cognitive processes mediating the effect of false autonomic feedback

All published experiments using false autonomic feedback are reviewed and four sets of necessary conditions mediating its effects are proposed. These conditions convern (a) search for an explanation of the feedback, (b) availability of potentially explanatory context features, (c) causal attribution of the feedback, and (d) salience of the perceived causes. Conflicting results, including outcomes of cognitive desensitization, are explicable by reference to these conditions. Evidence supports the attributional theory of emotional behaviour and the assumed equivalence of actual and fictitious arousal although the boundary conditions of the latter postulate need still be explored.     

Effects of food deprivation on free-operant avoidance behavior

Lever pressing was maintained by Sidman's shock-postponement procedure and Herrnstein and Hineline's shock-frequency-reduction procedure with rats. Food deprivation to 80% and 70% of the animals' body weights on free feeding resulted in decreased response rates in both avoidance paradigms tested. Reinstatement of free-feeding conditions increased body weights and response rates and decreased shock rates. The effects of food deprivation were not dependent upon any particular avoidance parameters, or types, intensities, or durations of electric shock. These results mean that weight control is essential in long-term studies of avoidance behavior, and in studies of the effects on avoidance behavior of physiological interventions, such as hypothalamic lesions, that themselves may produce weight changes.     

Optimism, pessimism, and false failure feedback: Effects on vigilance performance

Following the logic of a prior experiment (Seligman et al., 1990) with varsity collegiate swimmers, sixty student volunteers performed a brief, but highly stressful vigilance task. Half were then given false feedback indicating poor performance; the others experienced a non-evaluative display at that point. All were then asked to repeat the vigil. Half the observers were assessed as high optimists and half as high pessimists. The pessimists showed a steeper vigilance decrement than the optimists, consistent with a model (Scheier and Carver, 1987) that proposes that pessimists are more emotion-focused under stress than optimists, and hence would be less attentive to the vigilance display, regardless of feedback condition. The false negative feedback actually turned out to be ineffective; hence, based on Seligman's account of the swimmer study, which requires effective negative feedback, there should have been no vigilance performance difference between optimists and pessimists, either pre- or post-feedback.     

Optimism, pessimism, and false failure feedback: Effects on vigilance performance

Following the logic of a prior experiment (Seligman et al., 1990) with varsity collegiate swimmers, sixty student volunteers performed a brief, but highly stressful vigilance task. Half were then given false feedback indicating poor performance; the others experienced a non-evaluative display at that point. All were then asked to repeat the vigil. Half the observers were assessed as high optimists and half as high pessimists. The pessimists showed a steeper vigilance decrement than the optimists, consistent with a model (Scheier and Carver, 1987) that proposes that pessimists are more emotion-focused under stress than optimists, and hence would be less attentive to the vigilance display, regardless of feedback condition. The false negative feedback actually turned out to be ineffective; hence, based on Seligman's account of the swimmer study, which requires effective negative feedback, there should have been no vigilance performance difference between optimists and pessimists, either pre- or post-feedback.     

An investigation of false memory in perceptual implicit tasks

Reports of critical lure priming in perceptual implicit tasks [e.g., McKone, E., & Murphy, B. (2000). Implicit false memory: Effects of modality and multiple study presentations on long-lived semantic priming. Journal of Memory and Language, 43, 89-109] using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott [Roediger, H. L., III, & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 803-814] procedure have suggested availability of the lexical form of lure items at study. Three experiments were conducted to further explore "false" implicit priming in perceptual tests. In Experiments 1 and 3, implicit and explicit stem completion tests were given in the DRM procedure with semantic lists; in Experiment 2, a graphemic response test was used in a similar design. For all experiments, explicit instructions resulted in reliable false memory, while implicit instructions resulted in priming for list items and no priming for lure items. Priming for lure items was evident for "test-aware" subjects only in Experiment 1 and in a combined analysis for all three experiments. These results establish boundary conditions for priming for critical lures and indicate that access to the lexical form of critical lures may not occur under incidental learning conditions when strong controls against explicit retrieval are implemented.     

“Watch out!”: Effects of instructed threat and avoidance on human free‐operant approach–avoidance behavior

Approach–avoidance paradigms create a competition between appetitive and aversive contingencies and are widely used in nonhuman research on anxiety. Here, we examined how instructions about threat and avoidance impact control by competing contingencies over human approach–avoidance behavior. Additionally, Experiment 1 examined the effects of threat magnitude (money loss amount) and avoidance cost (fixed ratio requirements), whereas Experiment 2 examined the effects of threat information (available, unavailable and inaccurate) on approach–avoidance. During the task, approach responding was modeled by reinforcing responding with money on a FR schedule. By performing an observing response, participants produced an escalating “threat meter”. Instructions stated that the threat meter levels displayed the current probability of losing money, when in fact loss only occurred when the level reached the maximum. Instructions also stated pressing an avoidance button lowered the threat level. Overall, instructions produced cycles of approach and avoidance responding with transitions from approach to avoidance when threat was high and transitions back to approach after avoidance reduced threat. Experiment 1 revealed increasing avoidance cost, but not threat magnitude, shifted approach–avoidance transitions to higher threat levels and increased anxiety ratings, but did not influence the frequency of approach–avoidance cycles. Experiment 2 revealed when threat level information was available or absent earnings were high, but earnings decreased when inaccurate threat information was incompatible with contingencies. Our findings build on prior nonhuman and human approach–avoidance research by highlighting how instructed threat and avoidance can impact human AA behavior and self‐reported anxiety.