Environmental Refugees: What Rights? Which Duties?

It is estimated that there could be 200 million‘environmental refugees’ by the middle of this century. One major environmental cause of population displacement is likely to be global climate change. As the situation is likely to become more pressing, it is vital to consider now the rights of environmental refugees and the duties of the rest of the world. However, this is not an issue that has been addressed in mainstream theories of global justice. This paper considers the potential of two leading liberal theories of international justice to address the particular issues raised by the plight of potential and actual environmental refugees. I argue that neither John Rawls’s ‘Law of Peoples’ approach nor Charles Beitz’s `cosmopolitanism' is capable of providing an adequate account of justice in this context. Beitz’s theory does have some advantages over Rawls’s approach but it fails to take proper account of the attachment that some people have to their own ‘home’. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Which variability?

Drai and Grodzinsky provide a valuable analysis that offers a way of disentangling the effects of Movement and Mood in agrammatic comprehension. However, their mathematical implementation (Beta model) hides theoretically relevant information, i.e., qualitative heterogeneities of performance within the patient sample. This heterogeneity is crucial in the variability debate.     

Whose harm? Which metaphysic?

Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements (as they are for Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists), it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema’s harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children’s lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated.

     

Parenting Scale: Which Version Should We Use?

Factor analytic studies of one of the widely used measurements of parental discipline, the Parenting Scale (PS), have yielded ambiguous results. The purpose of this study was to compare various forms of the PS in terms of factor structure and other psychometric properties. The sample consisted of 617 mothers and 430 fathers of 2 to 5-year-olds. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that shorter structural models provided a better fit compared to the original model; however, none led to an optimal fit. Other psychometric properties such as internal consistency, test-retest reliability, concurrent and predictive validity were slightly higher for the original Laxness and Overreactivity subscales. The findings from this study and previous studies suggest that the inter-item relationship in the scale might be too sensitive to sample characteristics, implying that factor analysis might not be the best way to measure the scale’s validity. Nevertheless, other psychometric properties support the use of the Parenting Scale in the assessment of dysfunctional parenting practices. We recommend using the original Laxness and Overreactivity subscales rather than the later models, especially for research purposes.     

Which Is Better: Simultaneous or Sequential Choice?

The term "diversification bias" refers to the tendency for people to take more variety when choosing several items simultaneously than when choosing them sequentially. In this article, we investigate whether this really is a bias by measuring evaluations of sets chosen simultaneously or sequentially. In Experiment 1 participants made two choices between audio tracks for consecutive consumption. Participants liked low-variety sets most and were more likely to choose high-variety sets in simultaneous choice. In Experiment 2 participants chose between three gambles which varied in the probability of winning and their expected value. Again, simultaneous choices seemed worse than sequential ones: The simultaneous-choice groups took far more low expected value gambles than did sequential-choice subjects and rated their enjoyment as lower. We conclude that simultaneous choice often leads to outcomes that are worse than sequential choice and discuss the circumstances when this is likely to be true.     

Awareness Versus Un-Clinging: Which Matters in Mindfulness?

Awareness and un-clinging have been emphasised in Buddhist discourse as important facets of mindfulness practice for over 2500 years. However, there is a lack of rigorous research examining the relationship between these two elements and their importance to well-being. To evaluate these abstract constructs, the current study adopted multiple assessment modalities; namely, a self-report scale, experience sampling (assessing ‘momentary mindfulness’), and semi-structured interviews (assessing ‘rater-rated mindfulness’). A total of 415 participants completed the questionnaire survey. Among them, 71 participants further took part in the experience sampling procedure and semi-structured interviews. The findings reveal that self-reported awareness was mildly correlated with momentary mindfulness (r = .35) but was not significantly correlated with rater-rated mindfulness. Self-reported un-clinging was moderately correlated with rater-rated mindfulness (r = .53) but was not significantly correlated with momentary mindfulness. Un-clinging, but not awareness, can distinguish meditators from non-meditators. Lastly, based on the Buddha’s mindfulness discourse, a path analysis model illustrates that the effects of un-clinging and awareness on stress reduction are mediated by emotional intelligence and non-attachment. Practical implications and future research designs are discussed.     

Which Comes First: Consciousness or Aspartate Receptors?

This paper is a critique of Karl Jansen's hypothesis that near-death and ketamine experiences are caused by blockade of N-methyl-D-aspartate receptors. An assumption that consciousness and its alterations are merely the product of neuronal activity is only one of many possible beliefs about reality. An alternative, which can be verified through one's own direct experience, is that consciousness is always a subject and body is only its object. The objects come and go; consciousness remains.     

Whose Evolution? Which Theology?

The importance of scientific conflicts for theology andphilosophy is difficult to judge. In many disputes of significance, prominent scientists can be found on both sides. Profound philosophical and religious implications are sometimes said to be implied by the new theory as well. This article examines the dispute over natural selection between Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould as a contemporary instance of such a conflict. While both claim that profound philosophical conclusions flow from their own alternativeaccount of evolution, I suggest that the implication is not as great as is claimed and that the alleged implications have as much to do with their own perceptions of theology as with the actual theories themselves. Nevertheless, evolutionary theory is not irrelevant for theology. Theologians should be aware of the possible implications of evolutionary theory and at the same time theextent and limits of such implications.     

Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which are Basic and Which are Derived?

Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This construal of naturalism forces Armstrong to say that universals are abstractions from a certain class of particulars; they are abstractions from first-order states of affairs, to be more precise. It is here argued that these two tendencies in Armstrong cannot be reconciled: To say that universals are abstractions from first-order states of affairs is not compatible with saying that universals fix causal relations between particulars. Causal relations are themselves states of affairs of a sort, and Armstrong’s claim that a law is a kind of structural universal is best understood as the view that any given law logically supervenes on its corresponding causal relations. The result is an inconsistency, Armstrong having to say that laws do not supervene on particular causal relations while also being committed to the view that they do so supervene. The inconsistency is perhaps best resolved by denying that universals are abstractions from states of affairs.

The cerebral balance of power: confrontation or cooperation?

Two visual search experiments were carried out using as stimuli large letters made of small identical letters presented in right, or left, or central visual fields. Considering the spatial frequency contents of the stimuli as the critical variable, Experiment 1 showed that a left-field superiority could be obtained whenever a decision had to be made on a large (low frequency) letter alone, and a right-field advantage emerged when a small (high frequency) letter had to be processed. Experiment 2 showed that the two levels of structure of the stimulus were not encoded at the same rate and that at very brief exposure, only the large letter could be accurately identified. This was accompanied by a left-field superiority, whether or not the stimulus contained the target. These results are interpreted as revealing a differential sensitivity of the hemispheres to the spatial frequency contents of a visual image, the right hemisphere being more adept at processing early-available low frequencies and the left hemisphere operating more efficiently on later-available low frequencies. From these and other experiments reviewed, it is suggested that (a) cerebral lateralization of cognitive functions results from differences in sensorimotor resolution capacities of the hemispheres; (b) both hemispheres can process verbal and visuospatial information, analytically and holistically; (c) respective hemispheric competence is a function of the level of sensorimotor resolution required for processing the information available.     

Guest Editorial: Who's Afraid of Life After Death?

The evidence for an afterlife is sufficiently strong and compelling that an unbiased person ought to conclude that materialism is a false theory. Yet the academy refuses to examine the evidence, and clings to materialism as if it were a priori true, instead of a posteriori false. I suggest several explanations for the monumental failure of curiosity on the part of academia. First, there is deep confusion between the concepts of evidence and proof. Second, materialism functions as a powerful paradigm that structures the shape of scientific explanations, but is not itself open to question. The third explanation is intellectual arrogance, as the possible existence of disembodied intelligence threatens the materialistic belief that the educated human brain is the highest form of intelligence in existence. Finally, there is a social taboo against belief in an afterlife, as our whole way of life is predicated on materialism and might collapse if near-death experiences, particularly the life review, were accepted as fact.     

The Dialogue Between Religion and Science: Which God?

As exemplified by three cases, difficulties in the dialogue between religion and science not infrequently arise from differing views of God's omnipotence and omniscience. From the side of theology, reflections on the biblical and church-related sources of those views, on Auschwitz and theproblem of theodicy, on God as Creator of the universe, and on how to read and interpret the Bible show that a view of a God who self-limits almightiness and all-knowing in order to grant freedom and functional integrity to a Creation about which God cares can be multiply justified. Such a view is not dissonant with regard to a self-organized, open universe, producing "unexpected" emergent features as seen by science