DO YOU KNOW WHAT YOUR NEIGHBOURS ARE DOING ? A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION IN EUROPE1

After this year's research on scientific communication in Europe, where almost 100 interviews were conducted in 8 European countries, one finding is clear: there is better communication between Europe and America than among European countries. Since space is limited, the analysis of this finding will be made in terms of the communication behavior of the members of the cross-national organization, the European Association of Experimental Social Psychologists. Their behavior indicates communication within a specialty, and in part, a representative case for the overall findings of the research. The Association is a limited membership organization with members in 14 countries. Since its initiation in 1963, the group has increased not only in size but in its cross-national representation. The questionnaire-interview data obtained at the Association's most recent meeting, supplemented by the findings from the general interview sample, provides the basis for the following discussion.     

WHAT IS A SCIENTIFIC WORLD VIEW,AND HOW DOES IT BEAR ON THE INTERPLAY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION?

Abstract. What is a scientific worldview, and why should we care? One worldview can knit together various notions, and therefore understanding a worldview requires analysis of its component parts. Stripped to its minimum, a scientific worldview consists strictly of falsifiable components. Such a worldview, based solely on ideas that can be tested with empirical observation, conforms to the highest levels of objectivity but is severely limited in utility. The limits arise for two reasons: first, many falsifiable ideas cannot be tested adequately until their repercussions already have been felt; second, the reach of science is limited, and ethics, which compose an inevitable part of any useful worldview, are largely unfalsifiable. Thus, a worldview that acts only on scientific components is crippled by a lack of moral relevance. Organized religion traditionally has played a central role in defining moral values, but it lost much of its influence after the discovery that key principles (such as the personal Creator of Genesis) contradict empirical reality. The apparent conundrum is that strictly scientific worldviews are amoral, while many long‐held religious worldviews have proven unscientific. The way out of this conundrum is to recognize that nonscientific ideas, as distinct from unscientific ideas, are acceptable components of a scientific worldview, because they do not contradict science. Nonscientific components of a worldview should draw upon scientific findings to explore traditional religious themes, such as faith and taboo. In contrast, unscientific ideas have been falsified and survive only via ignorance, denial, wishful thinking, blind faith, and institutional inertia. A worldview composed of both scientific components and scientifically informed nonscientific components can be both objective and ethically persuasive.     

A Classical Prejudice?

In this paper, I reassess Floridi’s solution to the Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (the information yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions) and that, unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false), there is no reason to presuppose that there is no such thing like contradictory information.     

WHAT IS A FEMINIST?

This article outlines the evaluation and stereotype of feminists, based on responses to closed-ended semantic differential traits as well as openended, projective responses to a hypothetical male or female feminist. Consistent across both methodologies, undergraduate respondents (Study 1: N = 210; Study 2: N = 135) viewed feminists as politically liberal, assertive/career oriented, and more likely to be heterosexual than lesbian. Most evaluations were neutral to slightly positive, with a few negative areas. However, feminists were seen in less positive terms than the typical woman and were described as much more assertive and politically liberal. Gender, race, birth cohort, gender of target, and feminist-attitude differences are presented. Despite the neutral to slightly positive evaluation, most respondents did not personally identify as feminists, possibly because they misperceive others' attitudes toward feminists as more negative than they actually are.     

Is Everything A World?

This paper discusses “inclusionism” in the context of David Lewis’s modal realism (and in the context of parasitic accounts of modality such as\ John Divers’s agnosticism about possible worlds). This is the doctrine that everything is a world. I argue that this doctrine would be beneficial to Divers-style agnosticism; that it suggests a reconfiguration of the concept of actuality in modal realism; and finally that it suffers from an as-yet unsolved difficulty, the problem of the unmarried husbands. This problem also shows that Stephen Yablo’s analysis of “intrinsic” is inadequate. Thanks to Philip Bricker, Ross Cameron, Daniel Nolan, John Divers, Kit Fine, Kris McDaniel, Augustin Rayo, Steve Yablo, to participants in the Arche modality seminar, University of St Andrews, and to the delegates of the APA Pacific Division Conference 2005.     

A Puzzle for Particulars?

In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red₁—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red₁ is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete particular and its property instances aren’t genuinely related. We argue that Preston’s proffered solution here—to treat property instances as “mental constructs”—is fraught with difficulty. We then go on to show how, by fine-tuning the nature of bare particulars, treating them as abstract modes of things rather than concrete particulars, the traditional realist can neatly evade Preston’s puzzle.