STEPS TOWARD A COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

The article chronicles the different panels devoted tothe cognitive science of religion at the meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) in Tampa, Florida, in November 2007. The aim is to verify the state of this subdiscipline and to check how much this work‐in‐progress affects the present state of the dialogue between science and religion. Several signs point to a positive development in this scientific branch and favor a sound reception in theology, which should not ignore the new research.     

THE IMPACT OF RELIGION ON GENDER-ROLE ATTITUDES

Given the apparently growing significance of religion in American life, the general problem addressed in this paper was the relation between religious orientation and gender-related attitudes and behaviors. More specifically, this study examined variation over a range of dimensions of gender-role attitudes held by women in predominantly female and predominantly male college majors using religious devoutness and other variables as predictors. Five dimensions of gender-role attitudes were used familial roles, extrafamilial roles, male/female stereotypes, social change, and gender-role preference. No significanct difference was found between women in the two types of majors on any dimension of gender-role attitudes. Multiple regression revealed that religious devoutness was the most important variable among all those utilized in consistently predicting all five dimensions of gender-role attitudes.     

RELIGIOUS COGNITION AS INTERPRETED EXPERIENCE: AN EXAMINATION OF IAN BARBOUR'S COMPARISON OF THE EPISTEMIC STRUCTURES OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Abstract. Using as a model contemporary analyses of scientific cognition, Ian Harbour has claimed that religious cognition is neither immediate nor inferential but has the structure of interpreted experience. Although I contend that Barbour has failed to establish his claim, I believe his views about the similarities between scientific and religious cognition are well founded. Thus on that basis I offer an alternative proposal that theistic religious cognition is essentially inferential and that religious experience is in fact the use of inferentially acquired religious beliefs to interpret ordinary nonreligious experiences.     

CHALLENGES,OPPORTUNITIES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A RENEWED PROGRAM IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

This is an introduction to the Symposium on “The New Scientific Study of Religion Moving On.” The introduction briefly indicates why the cognitive science of religion (CSR) needs re-evaluation. It subsequently gives an overview of the contributions of the symposium's articles.     

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by-product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or “adaptivism” concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only secondary. The article concludes that the study of religion—as the study of cultural evolution in general—should include a pluralistic methodology combining cognitive and evolutionary accounts with the specificity of cultural evolution.     

ON SCIENCE AS A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE ORDER AMIDST THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE

This paper is the reprinting under a new title of the “Foreword” of Paul A. Weiss's Life, Order, and Understanding: A Theme in Three Variations, published in 1970 as volume 8 supplement of The Graduate Journal of the University of Texas (Austin, Texas, #5.00 [hardcover], #2.50 [paperback], 157 pages). We reprint this paper here for two reasons. The first is that its beautiful, scientifically grounded imagery of living systems in relation to wave dynamics provides a significant supplement to this issue of Zygon on human values in the context of thermodynamics. The second is that it is hoped this foreword will serve better than would a book review to introduce Zygon readers to the philosophical and scientific wisdom contained in Life, Order, and Understanding.–Editor.     

社会认知中印象形成的记忆和认知表征研究

本文以社会认知为出发点,考察印象形成记忆和认知表征;采用具体行为描述作为刺激材料,通过三个实验,160名被试,系统考察了印象形成中行为信息加工的方式。结果表明：（1）印象形成过程中,我们对行为信息进行精致加工编码,行为信息与品质相关,但它们是独立存贮在记忆中;（2）项目增加和项目丢失技术是区别精致加工和组织加工的有效工具。     

STIMULUS CONTROL IN THE CLASSROOM AS A FUNCTION OF THE BEHAVIOR REINFORCED

Eight fifth- and sixth-grade children with behavior problems performed in a classroom under three conditions: (1) unreinforced baseline, (2) reinforcement for being on task, and (3) reinforcement for the accuracy and rate of math problems solved. The teacher was absent for a portion of the class session under each of these conditions. In the teacher's absence, on-task behavior declined markedly and disruption markedly increased, regardless of the reinforcement condition in operation. In addition, the teacher's absence resulted in fewer problems attempted and decreased accuracy. However, the extent to which the children became disruptive was reduced and the number of problems attempted increased when reinforcement was contingent on academic accuracy and rate, instead of being contingent on being on task. The results suggest that by providing contingencies for the products of a child's classroom activities, rather than for being on task, the child will become more independent of the teacher's presence, and more under the control of the academic materials.     

认知控制对基于位置和颜色返回抑制的影响

采用带颜色的字母为靶刺激.通过操纵被试任务.考察辨别任务中认知控制对基于位置和颜色IoR的影响.结果发现:要求被试辨别带颜色的字母,没有出现基于颜色的IoR;要求被试辨别颜色.出现了基于颜色的IoR.说明.自上而下的认知控制是基于颜色IoR产生的关键因素之一.其内在机制可用抑制模型和注意资源分配理论从不同角度解释.同时,两种任务均未要求被试辨别靶刺激的位置,却都出现了基于位置的IoR,验证了Russell"注意可能存在对位置信息自动加工"的假说.     

A NEOPRAGMATIST PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Abstract. Pragmatists, most notably John Dewey and Richard Rorty, propose overcoming the modern split between science and values with a new image of ourselves as language users. In this new self-understanding, both our scientific and evaluative vocabularies are integral parts of self-reliant human problem solving and coping with the larger natural environment. Our language is not the medium of any higher power from which it derives its legitimacy. On this view, the principal matter at issue between pragmatists and realists so far as interaction between religion and science is concerned is the moral one of human self-reliance.     

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS ACQUIRED SECOND NATURE

Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases. I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more flexibility.     

EVOLUTION AS A RELIGION: A COMPARISON OF PROPHECIES

Abstract. The idea of evolution functions today as a myth as well as a scientific theory. This use distorts it in some surprising ways. In particular, predictions of the predestined future development of superhumans (Omega Man) are sometimes treated by scientists as if they were an established part of the theory of evolution. Since they rest on the endless–escalator model of evolution, incompatible with Darwinian methods and not separately argued for, they have no standing at all. This phenomenon, and others like it, seem to indicate spiritual needs which are being ignored and thus finding illicit satisfaction. The position is dangerous and needs more attention.     

幼儿对数的认知及其策略

该研究探查幼儿对基数、数序、运算和解应用题的认知发展过程及其认知策略。着重探查：(1)不同认知任务对幼儿数认知发展的影响;(2)幼儿对基数和数序两者认知发展的顺序;(3)从幼儿主动解决问题的策略探究其认知发展水平。该研究采用定性和定量相结合的研究方法。被试为4、5、6岁城市幼儿园儿童,共92人,男女约各半。全部实验以个别方式进行。主要研究结果表明：(1)幼儿对基数、数序、运算和解应用题的认知成绩均有随年龄发展的趋势,但快速发展的年龄阶段因任务的难度而异;(2)幼儿对基数和数序的认知在4—5岁显示出不同步的发展,对基数的认知成绩优于对数序的认知,而到6岁两者具有同步发展的趋势;(3)幼儿解决问题的策略水平随年龄发展,显示了由外化水平的智力活动向完全内化的智力操作的发展过程,并具有明显的层次性。该研究结果为幼儿数能力的培养和促进提供参考依据。     

THE ROLE OF COGNITION AND FEELING IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Abstract Inquiry into religious experience is informed by conceptualizations of emotion. Although a long history of theoretical and empirical work has provided considerable insight into the philosophical, psychological, and (more recently) neurobiological structure of emotion, the role of cognition and feeling in religious emotional states remains poorly conceived, and, hence, so does the concept of religious experience. The lack of a clear understanding of the role of emotion in religious experience is a consequence of a lack of an adequate interdisciplinary account of emotions. Our primary aim here is to examine the consequences of a properly interdisciplinary understanding of emotions for the analysis of religious experience. To this end, we note points of convergence between psychological, philosophical, and neuroscientific accounts of emotion and between such accounts and reports on the neurobiology of religious experience, in particular two recent human brain imaging studies. We conclude that emotions are richer phenomena than either pure feeling or pure thought and that, rightly understood, emotion affords religious experience its distinctive content and quality. Accordingly, we argue that religious experience cannot be reduced to pure feeling or pure thought. Rather, on our analysis, religious experience emerges as “thinking that feels like something.”     

THE RELEVANCE OF EMERGENCE THEORY IN THE SCIENCE–RELIGION DIALOGUE

In this article, I call into question the relevance of emergence theories as presently used by thinkers in the science–religion discussion. Specifically, I discuss theories of emergence that have been used by both religious naturalists and proponents of panentheism. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) If we take the background theory to be metaphysical realism, then there seems to be no positive connection between the reality of emergent properties and the validity of providing reality with a religious interpretation, though one could perhaps construe an argument for the positive ontological status of emergence as a negative case for a religious worldview. (2) To be considered more plausible, religious naturalism should interpret religious discourse from the perspective of pragmatic realism. (3) Panentheistic models of divine causality are unable to avoid ontological dualism. (4) It is not obvious that emergent phenomena and/or properties are nonreducible in the ontological sense of the terms; indeed, the tension between weak and strong emergence makes it difficult for the emergentist to make ontological judgments. My general conclusion is that the concept of emergence has little metaphysical significance in the dialogue between science and theology.     

小学儿童奖赏公平性的认知发展

采用信息加工研究途径并假设故事情境探索小学儿童对奖赏公平性的社会认知发展,并将儿童的发展与成人作对比。研究结果表明,７,９岁儿童容易将＂均等＂与＂公平＂混淆,还没形成一个稳定的分配模式,而１２岁儿童已能运用＂努力＂、＂成果＂、＂能力＂等规则较为稳定地作出公平奖赏决定或评价,但还没达到对更高层次的社会准则的理解和掌握。儿童这一发展制约于他们的信息加工能力以及获得有关社会价值观的社会化过程。     

SCIENCE AND RELIGION AS LANGUAGES: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE–RELIGION RELATIONSHIP USING METAPHORS,ANALOGIES, AND MODELS

Many scholars often use the terms “metaphors,” “analogies,” and “models” interchangeably and inadvertently overlook the uniqueness of each word. According to recent cognitive studies, the three terms involve distinct cognitive processes using features from a familiar concept and applying them to an abstract, complicated concept. In the field of science and religion, there have been various objects or ideas used as metaphors, analogies, or models to describe the science–religion relationship. Although these heuristic tools provided some understanding of the complex interaction, they failed to address the broad nature of science and religion as well as the multifarious relationship between the two in a sociocultural context. Unlike the previous candidates, the concept of language, including the notions of linguistic worldview, linguistic identity, dialects, power, and bilingualism, offers a unique and comprehensive window through which science, religion, and the relationship between the two are seen with clarity.     

RELIGION AS A LANGUAGE: EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE PATHS IN CONVERSATION WITH POSTREDUCTIONIST ANTHROPOLOGIES

New scientific approaches to religion have delivered a considerable number of theories aimed at explaining it, despite its cognitive and adaptive oddities. These efforts were built on available theoretical frameworks, including those from cognitive science, biology, and anthropology. Many voices have raised criticism against several aspects in the cognitive and evolutionist program, even if recognizing their legitimacy and the fruits collected to date. A pressing issue is whether the problem with the new scientific study of religion is related, to some extent, to the use of outdated views on human evolution, mind, and behavior. If this is the case, then a deep revision concerning current models is required. The new direction proposed should account for more complex aspects of human nature following multilevel models, and a specific human feature—language—that could better explain religion as a meaning system. Understanding religion as a language might open an alternative path inside cognitive studies that is closer to how it is lived by believers.     

THE FRUITS OF PLURALISM: A VISION FOR THE NEXT SEVEN YEARS IN RELIGION/SCIENCE

This article offers a vision for work at the intersection of science and religion over the coming seven years. Because predictions are inherently risky and are more often than not false, the text first offers an assessment of the current state of the science‐religion discussion and a quick survey of the last 50 years of work in this field. The implications of the six features of this vision for the future of the field are then presented in some detail. Rather than bemoaning the current diversity of approaches and conclusions as a negative result, I endorse it as a healthy sign—if acknowledged honestly and managed well.