RELIGIOUS REASONS AND POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION

In Evangelium Vitae Pope John Paul II calls for a renewal of culture to combat the culture of death. He criticizes various aspects of a pluralistic, liberal society—a type of society that he claims is based on moral relativism and a view of democracy that becomes a substitute for moral law. He maintains that such a view trivializes moral choice. In this essay I argue that John Rawls's notion of a liberal society as an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines can avoid relativism while allowing for reasonable debate among opposed positions. While Rawls maintains that comprehensive doctrines, including religions, should employ a form of public reason that is not a unique feature of any one comprehensive doctrine, I argue that this requirement is too strong. One is often justified in appealing to features of comprehensive doctrines other than one's own, features that are unique to the doctrines themselves. Such an appeal does not pretend to be neutral as public reason would seem to be. In the final section of the paper I discuss some suggestions made by the Pope regarding actions in civil society that are independent of debates about legal change and suggest some ways in which they might contribute to desired cultural transformation.     

RESTRAINT ON REASONS AND REASONS FOR RESTRAINT: A PROBLEM FOR RAWLS' IDEAL OF PUBLIC REASON

Abstract:  It appears that one of the aims of John Rawls' ideal of public reason is to provide people with good reason for exercising restraint on their nonpublic reasons when they are acting in the public political arena. I will argue, however, that in certain cases Rawls' ideal of public reason is unable to provide a person with good reason for exercising such restraint, even if the person is already committed to Rawls' ideal of public reason. Because it is plausible to believe that such cases are widespread, the issue I am raising represents a serious problem for Rawls' account of public reason. After posing this problem, I consider potential responses on behalf of Rawls' view, and I reply to those responses. The moral of this story, as I see it, is that the kind of duty an ideal of public reason aims to place on citizens must be more modest than Rawls supposes.     

THE AUSTERITY POLICY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RELATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC IN FLEDGLING ISRAEL 1

This article examines the concept of the rule of law as perceived by the Israeli public and decision‐makers during Israel’s early years. The purpose of the article is to examine the relationship between policy‐makers and the general public in the early stages of Israeli statehood. The “rule of law” is employed to facilitate greater understanding of the weaknesses or even failures of the austerity policy and to unveil some of the mechanisms leading to public disobedience, during times of nation‐building fervour. The roles of the public, policy‐makers, law enforcement apparatus and adjudicators in shaping the social order and economic reality is addressed.     

RELIGIOUS SCHEMA AND VALUES*

Past research has consistently shown marked differences between religious believers and non-believers. Such differences were suggested in this study to be due to the presence of religious schema in believers. It was hypothesized that non-believers would be less schematic, or aschematic with respect to religion. This hypothesis was examined by comparing the value system of college student believers (Protestants and Catholics) and non-believers (those indicating no religious faith). Extensive differences were found. Consistent with the hypothesis, the differences were found mainly on the schema-relevant values. In essence, believers showed greater preference for and possession of the moral and relational values, and lesser on the personal-extrinsic, competency, and egoistic values. As predicted, no difference was found on the social and intellectual types of values which are basically schema-irrelevant. The notion of schema availability was also supported. When subjects' religiosity (as indicated by their preference for the salvation value and their self-rated possession of the religiousness value) was controlled for, all the above differences were removed. When high and low religiosity believers were compared, great differences were found. The differences between the high and low religiosity non-believers were however much less extensive.     

RELIGIOUS ETHICS AND EMPIRICAL ETHICS

In recent decades, cognitive and behavioral scientists have learned a great deal about how people think and behave. On the most general level, there is a basic consensus that many judgments, including ethical judgments, are made by intuitive, even unconscious, impulses. This basic insight has opened the door to a wide variety of more particular studies that investigate how judgments are influenced by group identity, self‐conception, emotions, perceptions of risk, and many other factors. When these forms of research engage ethical issues, they are sometimes called empirical ethics. This essay argues that the field of religious ethics would benefit from a more robust engagement with empirical ethics than it has thus far undertaken. In doing so, it offers a brief account of how issues of moral psychology and moral anthropology have been treated in religious ethics, and it highlights ways that the scientific findings challenge some prevailing norms in religious ethics. It ends by suggesting avenues by which religious ethics research could productively engage empirical ethics.     

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

The paper argues that it can be demonstrated that the position of Jacques Dupuis, S.J., a pluralist, is compatible with that of the syllabus on religious pluralism produced by the Roman Catholic Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dominius Iesus. This demonstration provides good reason to believe that at least one form of de jure pluralism, labeled “inclusivist pluralism”, is a theological theory compatible with orthodox Christian belief.     

RELIGIOUS CULTURE AND HISTORICAL CHANGE: VATICAN II ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

At Vatican II and since Vatican II there have been Catholics who have held that the Council's teaching on religious freedom is in contradiction to the Church's earlier teaching and practice. The Council defended it as a legitimate development of doctrine in part through claiming that changing human experience in history shows us only gradually what human dignity entails, and the Church learns from this experience. True, the Council's teaching is in part a denial of its earlier teaching and practice. The present article defends the legitimacy of this development through showing that there is a change of paradigm by which the Church now views this issue, a change that includes both continuity and discontinuity. This reliance on what is revealed to us by changing human experience is accepted by the Church only when it sees it as critically evaluated by an adequate philosophy and as in accord with Christian revelation, but its acceptance moves us to a growth in our understanding of revelation itself.     

BASIC REASONS AND FIRST PHILOSOPHY: A COHERENTIST VIEW OF REASONS

This paper develops and defends a coherentist account of reasons. I develop three core ideas for this defense: a distinction between basic reasons and noninferential justification, the plausibility of the neglected argument against first philosophy, and an emergent account of reasons. These three ideas form the backbone for a credible coherentist view of reasons. I work toward this account by formulating and explaining the basic reasons dilemma. This dilemma reveals a wavering attitude that coherentists have had toward basic reasons. More importantly, the basic reasons dilemma focuses our attention on the central problems that afflict coherentist views of basic beliefs. By reflecting on the basic reasons dilemma, I formulate three desiderata that any viable coherentist account of basic beliefs must satisfy. I argue that the account on offer satisfies these desiderata.