Truthmaking and fundamentality

Consider the idea that some entities are more fundamental than others, some entities ‘ground’ other, less fundamental, entities. What is it for something to be more fundamental than another, or for something to ‘ground’ something else? This paper urges the rejection of conceptions of grounding and fundamentality according to which reality has a hierarchical structure in which higher-level entities are taken to be distinct from but metaphysically dependent on more fundamental lower-level entities. Truthmaking is offered as an apt replacement for at least some of the many applications of grounding.

     

John Stuart Mill and the Conflicts of Equality

John Stuart Mill commented on the relationship between equality and liberty in general terms, and he also discussed the relationships between equality and four more concrete social goals: equality vs. diversity and individual spontaneity, equality vs. freedom of trade and entrepreneurial activity, equality vs. economic incentives for workpeople, and equality vs. welfare. In his more general statements he wrote off potential conflicts between equality and liberty, claiming that only those liberties that can be enjoyed by all are real liberties—or at least they are the only ones worth defending. However, in several of his more concrete discussions he gave higher priority to various liberty-related goals than to equality. This seeming contradiction can be resolved if we assume that he distinguished between valuing a liberty per se and valuing it as a means to achieve something else.

     

Symbolic functioning in preschool children

An important goal of parents and preschool educators alike is to introduce young children to a variety of symbol systems, and to help children begin to master some of these crucial cultural tools. Our research indicates that, in spite of the importance that adults place on symbolization, adult intuitions about the acquisition of symbolic functioning and how to facilitate it are often poor. In this article we summarize research on toddlers' understanding of two kinds of symbols—models and pictures. We show that the initial insight that something is a symbol or representation of something else is extremely challenging for young children, and it is an insight that must be achieved with each symbol system they encounter. Two factors that contribute to the difficulty children have appreciating symbolic relations are discussed: dual representation (the ability to think about something in two different ways at the same time; specifically, the ability to think of something both as an object itself and a symbol for something else) and representational specificity (understanding that a symbol can stand for a specific reality). Implications of these factors for preschool practice are considered.     

Death and the Meaning of Life

Abstract

Thoughts of mortality sometimes bring on a crisis in confidence in the meaning in one's life. One expression of this collapse is the midlife crisis. In a recent article, Kieran Setiya argues that if one can value activities as opposed to accomplishments as the primary goods in one's life then one might avoid the midlife crisis. I argue that Setiya's advice, rather than safeguarding the meaning in one's life, substitutes for it something else, a kind of happiness. I use Susan Wolf's concept of meaning in order to make this case. Wolf has not written much about the importance of death, but I argue that her account of meaning shares essential features with the theories developed by Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger. Sartre argues that death is an unqualified harm, while Heidegger argues that there is meaning in life only because we are mortal. I conclude by showing how Heidegger's theory of mortality underwrites accounts of meaning like those found in Wolf.     

Beyond Verbal Narratives: Using Timeline Images in the Semiotic Cultural Study of Meaning Making

Contemporary semiotic cultural tradition in psychology views human meaning making as unfolding through the negotiation of multiple real and imagined scenarios and storylines. While emphasising this complex and layered nature of meaning making, this research tradition offers little methodological guidance for appreciating and evidencing this multiplicity in data analysis and interpretation. This paper suggests that a methodological approach that combines visual and verbal ways of representing one’s personal stories might offer a useful alternative for evidencing the multiple meanings that individuals create about their personal journeys. By presenting two examples of drawn timeline images and corresponding interview extracts, the paper discusses how the chosen methodological approach offered opportunities for participants to ‘show and tell’ their complex and layered stories, and gave them freedom and agency to shape the research encounter and data production processes. The paper also highlights how the incorporation of visual methods into the methodology enabled the researcher to find alternative ways of interpreting participants’ stories. The paper argues for a purposeful integration of visual and verbal methods, where the semiotic tensions and clashes between these modes can reveal novel ways of seeing researchers’ and participants’ meanings in the making.     

The welcome wound: emerging from the <Emphasis Type="Italic">il y a</Emphasis> otherwise

This essay is an analysis of the inverted intentionality that is arguably the central notion in the phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas. The primal horizon for all human meaning is the brute fact of undifferentiated being, the il y a experienced impersonally as insomnia and weight. The first exit from this world devoid of meaning, subjectivity, and objectivity is that of the psychism or conatus essendi, the self which places itself at the center and makes everything else a means to its own ends. But there is another exit, subsequent developmentally but more fundamental ontologically, and in this sense more truly first. It is the emergence of the responsible self, decentered by the proximity of the other. With help from St. John of the Cross and Jean-Paul Sartre this emergence, in which meaning is “prior to my Sinngebung” and arises in intentional acts directed toward me rather than arising from me, is explicated.     

Induced emotional interpretation bias and anxiety

Five experiments are reported showing that the interpretation of personally relevant emotional information can be modified by systematic exposure to congruent exemplars. Participants were induced to interpret ambiguous information in a relatively threatening or a benign way. Comparison with a baseline condition suggested that negative and positive induction had similar but opposing effects. Induction of an interpretative bias did not require active generation of personally relevant meanings, but such active processing was necessary before state anxiety changed in parallel with the induced interpretative bias. These findings provide evidence consistent with a causal link between the deployment of interpretative bias and anxiety and reveal something of the processes underlying this association.     

Minds as Connoting Systems: Logic and the Language of Thought

The principal aim of this essay is to discuss some logical features of the so-called Classical model of cognitive architecture as it is advocated by J. Fodor and Z. Pylyshyn in their much discussed article 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis'. It is pointed out that their structural assumptions have consequences of a logical kind which call into question the view that the Classical architecture (in their sense) can be employed to model human cognition. It seems that the consequences have escaped Fodor and Pylyshyn's notice, or else they have failed to appreciate them, since some of their claims evidently conflict with them. It is also investigated whether the human mind can be characterized as being logical in some weaker sense of logic. Furthermore, it is argued that J. H. Fetzer's view that it is a semiotic system is more realistic than the Classical model, but the distinction he suggests between human cognition and other kinds may be problematic.     

Destruction, Alteration, Simples and World Stuff

When a tree is chopped to bits, or a sweater unravelled, its matter still exists. Since antiquity, it has sometimes been inferred that nothing has really been destroyed: what has happened is just that this matter has assumed new form. Contemporary versions hold that apparent destruction of a familiar object is just rearrangement of microparticles or of 'physical simples' or 'world–stuff'. But if destruction of a familiar object is genuinely to be reduced to mere alteration of something else, we must identify an alteration proper to the career, the course of existence, of this something else; relatedly, the alteration must be characterizable without asserting the existence of the familiar object. All contemporary views fail one of these requirements.     

On Brain, Soul, Self, and Freedom: An Essay in Bridging Neuroscience and Faith

The article begins at the intellectual fissure between many statements coming from neuroscience and the language of faith and theology. First I show that some conclusions drawn from neuroscientific research are not as firm as they seem: neuroscientific data leave room for the interpretation that mind matters. I then take a philosophical‐theological look at the notions of soul, self, and freedom, also in the light of modern scientific research (self‐organization, neuronal networks), and present a view in which these theologically important notions are seen in relation both to matter (brain) and to God. I show that religious insights expressed with soul and free will bear a remarkable resemblance to certain insights from neuroscience and the science of complex, self‐organizing systems, including emphasis on corporeality and emphasis on organization as a form of that corporeality, and that they also show an interesting parallel — albeit described in different terms — concerning the crucial role of a valuation principle that generates attraction. With that, the common‐sense idea that freedom simply is the same as indeterminism is refuted: freedom primarily means self‐determination. I bring to the fore that the self is not a static thing but a “longing.” Such longing springs from something, and it is the relationship to this source that constitutes the self. The main concern is to point out the crucial role of attraction with respect to being and to life, and to draw attention not only to the astonishing parallel on this point between Thomas Aquinas and Alfred North Whitehead but also to a surprising — albeit more implicit — analogy between these philosophical‐theological views and scientific theories of self‐organization (such as those concerning neuronal networks). In short, being attracted toward what appears as “good” is what constitutes us as selves and what thereby signifies the primary meaning of our freedom.     

The understanding of die as an object that has numerical functions. A longitudinal study using two children from the ages of 24 to 36 months interacting with an adult / La comprensión del dado como objeto con funciones numéricas. Un estudio longitudinal con dos niños desde los 24 a los 36 meses en interacción con un adulto

Abstract

We investigated the process through which children understand the conventional use of numbers in interaction with an adult. We analysed previous semiotic systems that support, transform and adjust to this new semiotic system — the numerical — and we investigated the communicative-educative basis that makes it possible. We conducted an exploratory and longitudinal study with one boy and one girl at 24, 27, 30, 33 and 36 months of age in a triadic interaction (adult-child-object) with their mothers at home. We adopt the pragmatic-semiotic perspective of the object, which considers that triadic interactions are the unit of analysis of early development. Our results show a great variety of semiotic mediators used by children and adults and both children’s progressive comprehension of the meaning and use of the die as a numerical object.     

Authenticity as meaning validation: An empirical investigation of iconic and indexical cues in a context of “green” products

Authenticity judgments involve how individuals distinguish what appears to be real versus fake, genuine versus phony. In this investigation, we bring authenticity into the laboratory to assess it in a manner quite different from most extant approaches. Taking a Peircian semiotic view in a context of environmentally conscious consumption, we develop and test a set of hypotheses concerning the effects of indexical and iconic cues to an authentic “green” product meaning. Results suggest that effects of these indicators of authenticity can be induced in a controlled manner with products being assessed as more or less “green” on the basis of particular cue arrangements. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these semiotic cues is moderated by a basic distinction among products. Taken together, the results provide evidence supporting a meaning validation process as the basis of authenticity judgments and suggest new directions for theory building in a domain where there is substantial practitioner interest. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Communication and Structured Correlation

Philosophers and social scientists have recently turned to Lewis sender–receiver games to provide an account of how lexical terms can acquire meaning through an evolutionary process. However, the evolution of meaning is contingent on both the particular sender–receiver game played and the choice of evolutionary dynamic. In this paper I explore some differences between models that presume an infinitely large and randomly mixed population and models in which a finite number of agents communicate with their neighbors in a social network. My results show that communication with neighbors is more conducive to the evolution of meaning than communication with strangers. Additionally, I show that the behavior of the system is highly dependent on the topological structure of the social network. I argue that a specific class of networks—small world graphs—is especially conducive to the evolution of meaning. This is because small world graphs have a short characteristic path length while still maintaining a high degree of correlation between neighbors. Since many actual social networks, such as friendship networks and nervous systems, are conjectured to be small world structures, these results indicate that these networks are quite hospitable to the efficient evolution of meaning.     

Even More Than the “Something More”: Tronick’s Dyadic Expansion of Consciousness Model and the Expansion of Child Psychoanalytic Technique

Contemporary psychoanalysis considers itself to be a discipline fundamentally concerned with meaning and meaning-making processes. Ed Tronick’s research provides scientific support for the theoretical position that meaning making is a central process in psychological development and in mental health/illness. His work collaborating with psychoanalysts has made major contributions to the psychoanalytic literature on therapeutic action, with a special emphasis on the means by which implicit meanings are activated and modified in analytic treatment—the something more than interpretation. This article is about a different something more, the even more that psychoanalytic theory and technique can evolve through further incorporating Tronick’s important findings. Tronick’s Dyadic Expansion of Consciousness Model will be briefly reviewed—emphasizing his conceptualization of meanings as being composed of multiple commingling layers (biological, psychological, relational, and social) coming together in a nonlinear “messy” mixture of mutually influencing (both bottom-up and top-down) currents. This multilayered model of meaning opens up the reconsideration of an exciting array of technical options—traditionally considered nonanalytic—to be reunderstood as truly psychoanalytic in that they address one or more of the implicit or explicit levels of meaning that a patient makes of his or her self and world. Examples of these interventions include parent work, work with teachers and schools, as well as interventions adapted from other disciplines such as Occupational Therapy. These technical possibilities are illustrated using case material from the psychoanalytic treatment of a nine-year-old boy.     

IX—On Being Bored Out of Your Mind

The contemporary philosophical debate over practical reasoning—over how one ought to figure out what to do—has been almost entirely focused on whether there is more to it than means-ends reasoning. But a prior and very difficult question has to do with why instrumental deliberation is so important an aspect of our cognitive life (regardless of whether there is anything else). I consider an answer broached by Harry Frankfurt, that having ends is the alternative to being literally bored out of one's mind, and adapt an argument from John Stuart Mill's political and psychological writings to show what more there is to not being bored than just having something to aim for.     

Deconstructing Hermes: A Critique Of The Hermeneutic Turn In Psychoanalysis

In this brief essay, I attempt to critique some of the philosophical problematics inherent with the hermeneutic turn in psychoanalysis. The proposition that “there are only interpretations of interpretations” leads to an inescapable circularity because interpretation ultimately lacks a referent or criterion for which to anchor meaning. If we follow this proposition through to its logical end, this ultimately collapses into relativism because meaning is relative to its interpretive scheme, which further relies on other interpretative schemata for which there are no definitive definitions, conclusive consensus, or universal laws governing interpretation. How can hermeneutics escape the charge of circularity, infinite regress, disavowal of universals, its tacit relativism, and the failure to provide a consensus or criteria for interpretation? How is psychoanalysis able to philosophically justify interpretative truth claims when they potentially inhere to a recalcitrant subjectivism while claiming to be objectively valuative?     

I—From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism

Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia ) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an adverbial construal (if they are modifications of the thing that is conscious because of them, not properties of something else to which the subject of consciousness is related), then the property dualist can be driven to speculative forms of materialism none of which, at this point, looks more likely to be true than the more modest versions of emergent dualism defended by contemporary substance dualists.     

The comprehension of familiar and less familiar idioms

The relationship between idiom familiarity and idiom comprehension was investigated. Familiar and less familiar idioms were presented in three types of sentences. The sentences were biased toward the idiom's literal meaning, biased toward the idiom's idiomatic meaning, or unbiased toward either meaning. Reading times for sentences containing less familiar idioms were longer than for sentences containing familiar idioms, but there was no significant main effect for sentence type. The familiarity by sentence type interaction was significant. In literal sentences, less familiar idioms required more reading time than familiar idioms. In idiomatic sentences, less familiar idioms required more reading time than familiar idioms. The results are interpreted as being consistent with the idiomatic processing model, which proposes that processing of an idiom's idiomatic meaning precedes processing of its literal meaning.     

(Neuro)predictions,Dangerousness, and Retributivism

Through the criminal justice system so-called dangerous offenders are, besides the offence that they are being convicted of and sentenced to, also punished for acts that they have not done but that they are believe to be likely to commit in the future. The aim of this paper is to critically discuss whether some adherents of retributivism give a plausible rationale for punishing offenders more harshly if they, all else being equal, by means of predictions are believed to be more dangerous than other offenders. While consequentialism has no problem, at least in principle, with this use of predictions most retributivists have been opponents of punishing offenders on the basis of predictions. How can an offender deserve to be punished for something that he has not done? But some retributivists like Anthony Duff and Stephen Morse have argued in favor of punishing offenders who are considered to be dangerous in the future more harshly than non-dangerous offenders. After having reconstructed their arguments in detail, it will be argued that both Duff’s and Morse’s attempts to give a retributivistic justification have several shortcomings.