Biology as Politics: The Direct and Indirect Effects of Lewontin and Levins

Lewontin and Levins's contributions are viewed from four angles: a more vigorous culture of science criticism; a visible college of Marxist scientists in the USA; inquiries into the diverse social influences shaping science; and motivating readers who want to pursue their science as a political project. Indirect contributions—influences on and appropriations by other actors in the wider realm of biology as politics—are discussed as well as the more direct effects.     

Emergence,Naturally!

The prevailing common assumptions about how nature behaves have their origins in the early Enlightenment. The notion of emergence does not sit comfortably within this framework. Emergence appears virtually impossible within a world determined by ineluctable and unwavering natural laws. But the variety and combinations inherent in living systems render physical laws indeterminate. The study of ecological dynamics suggests that processes rather than laws are what accounts for most order seen in the living realm. As a consequence, there are aspects of ecological dynamics that violate each of the Newtonian postulates. The dynamics of ecosystems suggest a smaller set of rational assumptions through which to view nature—an “ecological metaphysic.” Emergence appears as a rare but wholly natural phenomenon within the new rational platform. In addition, several apparent conflicts between science and theism that arose under the Newtonian framework simply vanish under the new perspective.     

Prior Publication and Redundancy in Contemporary Science: Are Authors and Editors at the Crossroads?

We discuss prior publication and redundancy in contemporary science in the context of changing perceptions of originality in the communication of research results. These perceptions have been changing in the publication realm, particularly in the last 15 years. Presenting a brief overview of the literature, we address some of the conflicts that are likely to arise between authors and editors. We illustrate our approach with conference presentations that are later published as journal articles and focus on a recent retraction of an article that had been previously published as a conference proceedings. Although we do not make definitive pronouncements on the matter—as many concepts are evolving—we do argue that conference papers that contain sufficient details for others to attempt a replication and are indexed in scientific databases such as PubMed, challenge some currently held assumptions of prior publication and originality in the sciences. Our view is that these important issues are in need of further clarification and harmonization within the science publishing community. This need is more evident when we consider current notions of research integrity when it comes to communication to peers. Revisiting long-standing views about what constitutes prior publication and developing a clearer set of guidelines for authors and editors to follow should reduce conflicts in the research environment, which already exerts considerable pressure, especially on newcomers in academia. However, while clearer guidelines are timely, developing them is only part of the challenge. The present times seem to call for deeper changes in the research and publication systems.     

Metaphor and Thinking in Science and Religion

Excerpts from Chapters 1 and 3 of New Maps for Old: Explorations in Science and Religion (Gerhart and Russell 2001) explore the ramifications of metaphoric process for changes in thinking, especially those changes that lead to a new understanding of our world. Examples are provided from science, from religion, and from science and religion together. In excerpts from Chapter 8, a double analogy—theology is to science as science is to mathematics—is proposed for better understanding the contemporary relationship between science and religion. A conservation of epistemological sufficiency is disclosed as one moves from mathematics to empirical science to theology—a move from one discipline to another that involves a sacrifice of one aspect of thought to gain another.     

A grand theory of motivation: Why not?

Baumeister asks what a grand theory of motivation might look like, and he identifies the key problems, challenges, and opportunities that need to be considered in its pursuit. I address four of these challenges—how to define motivation, whether motivation is a state or a trait, the primacy of motivation in psychology, and the necessity to not only manage motivational conflict but also to vitalize motivational assets. I focus primarily, however, on the key obstacle that prevents a grand theory—our non-shared assumptions about the nature and dynamics of motivation. I suggest we capitalize on new advances in statistics, methodology, and technology to test what used to be untestable assumptions about motivation. Shared assumptions are necessary for a coherent science, and only a coherent science is capable of constructing a general theory.     

INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

Abstract. I explore the contributions of Ibrahim Moosa, a Muslim legal scholar, to a Muslim‐Christian dialogue on religion and science. Moosa begins from the context of Shari'a, Islamic law, and not from the usual issues of the religion‐science dialogue. Beginning as it does from a legal tradition, the approach suggests a perspective on science and religion that is particular to Islam and provides insight into how an authentic dialogue between Muslims and Christians would proceed—and thereby an alternative model for a religion‐science dialogue.     

Two approaches to natural kinds

Philosophical treatments of natural kinds are embedded in two distinct projects. I call these the philosophy of science approach and the philosophy of language approach. Each is characterized by its own set of philosophical questions, concerns, and assumptions. The kinds studied in the philosophy of science approach are projectible categories that can ground inductive inferences and scientific explanation. The kinds studied in the philosophy of language approach are the referential objects of a special linguistic category—natural kind terms—thought to refer directly. Philosophers may hope for a unified account addresses both sets of concerns. This paper argues that this cannot be done successfully. No single account can satisfy both the semantic objectives of the philosophy of language approach and the explanatory projects of the philosophy of science approach. After analyzing where the tensions arise, I make recommendations about assumptions and projects that are best abandoned, those that should be retained, and those that should go their separate ways. I also recommend adopting the disambiguating terminology of “scientific kinds” and “natural kinds” for the different notions of kinds developed in these different approaches.

     

Cybersemiotics and the Question of Semiotic and Informational Thresholds

The present article discusses various suggestions for a philosophical framework for a transdisciplinary information science or a semiotic doctrine. These are: the mechanical materialistic, the pan-informational, the Luhmanian second order cybernetic approach, Peircian biosemiotics and finally the pan-semiotic approach. The limitations of each are analyzed. The conclusion is that we will not have to choose between either a cybernetic-informational or a semiotic approach. A combination of a Peircian-based biosemiotics with autopoiesis theory, second order cybernetics and information science is suggested in a five-leveled cybersemiotic framework. The five levels are 1) a level of Firstness, 2) a level of mechanical matter, energy and force as Secondness, 3) a cybernetic and thermodynamic level of information and signal, 4) a level of sign games in living systems, and 5) a level of conscious language games in self-conscious social humans.     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

FROM PESSIMISM TO HOPE: A NATURAL PROGRESSION

Mutual critique by scientists and religious believers mostly entails the pruning of untenable religious beliefs by scientists and warnings against scientific minimalism on the part of believers. John F. Haught has been prominent in formulating religious apologetics in response to the challenges posed by evolutionary theory. Haught's work also resonates with a parallel criticism of the conventional scientific metaphysics undergirding neo‐Darwinian theory. Contemporary systems ecology seems to indicate that nothing short of a complete reversal of the Enlightenment assumptions about nature is capable of repositioning science to deal adequately with the origin and dynamics of living systems. A process‐based alternative metaphysics substantially mitigates several ostensible conflicts between science and religion.     

Religions in a Secular World

The task of astrotheology is to speculate on the theological, cultural, and ethical implications of space exploration, especially the exploration of astrobiologists into the (1) origin of life; (2) a second genesis of life; and (3) expansion of life beyond earth. When assumptions within the field of astrobiology are examined, we find that the Darwinian model of evolutionary development is imaginatively projected onto extrasolar planets; and this model includes a built-in doctrine of progress. The assumption of progress within evolution permits astrobiologists to look forward to contact with an extraterrestrial civilization that is more intelligent and more advanced than that on earth. Such an extraterrestrial civilization will allegedly have an advanced science that can save earth from its primitive and under-evolved propensity for violence. However, no empirical evidence for a more highly evolved or advanced civilization currently exists, despite these beliefs. The theologian labels the constellation of scientific assumptions here the “ETI myth.” Astrotheology celebrates hard-nosed empirical science and even encourages space exploration; but the mythical assumptions regarding the doctrine of progress within evolution are here given critical analysis.     

The rise of information in an evolutionary universe

This paper outlines the grand scenario of cosmic evolution by examining the ongoing changes among radiation, matter and life in standard, big‐bang cosmology. Using aspects of non‐equilibrium thermodynamics and information science, we argue that it is the contrasting temporal behavior of various energy densities that have given rise to the environments needed for the emergence of galaxies, stars, planets, and life forms. We furthermore argue that a necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) condition—a veritable prime mover—for the emergence of such ordered structures of growing complexity is the expansion of the Universe itself. Neither demon‐strably new science nor appeals to non‐science are needed to explain the impressive hierarchy of developmental change, from quark to quasar, from microbe to mind.     

THE LIMITS TO PARTICIPATION IN DIS‐EQUILIBRIUM ECOLOGY: Maori involvement in habitat restoration within Te Urewera National Park

In this paper, we explore conceptualizations of ‘ordinary’ citizens common in public engagement forums on emerging technologies and assumptions from deliberative theory that ordinary people are more likely to be appropriately ‘changed’ through deliberative processes facilitated by experts. Looking at a large US public forum event [the National Citizens Technology Forum (NCTF)], we asked: What were the goals for this exercise and how did they shape conceptualizations of ordinariness and representativeness? Whose goals and conceptualizations were they? Were the engaged citizens ordinary and representative—and were they changed by the exercise? Our exploration revealed that exercise organizers conceived of ordinary citizens as people lacking science and technology backgrounds, without advocacy or business connections to the technologies at hand, and demographically reflecting the US population. Exercise materials also implied that ideal ordinary participants would lack strong opinions and emotions about these technologies. Actual NCTF participants, however, tended to be more educated, have higher incomes, and to be more liberal than the US public, and participants from all backgrounds had a range of relevant knowledge, experiences and opinions about science and technology. They were changed by the exercise in complex and conflicting ways—based as much on their own knowledge and reflections on relational dynamics as on exercise processes, interactions with experts, and information provided in the exercise. We argue that inadequately explored ideas about ordinary citizens are highly problematic. Further, invisible assumptions about what is ‘normal’ among experts and status quo institutions serve to reify the lay–expert divide that engagement exercises are intended to counteract.     

DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF BIOSEMIOTICS

Kalevi Kull and colleagues recently proposed eight theses as a conceptual basis for the field of biosemiotics. We use these theses as a framework for discussing important current areas of debate in biosemiotics with particular reference to the articles collected in this issue of Zygon.     

Meta—Realization in Horney and the Teaching of Psychoanalysis

Horney was the first psychoanalyst to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding character structure and character pathology, and the first to do so in experience-near terms. She uncovered the often hidden metapsychological assumptions of classical analysis and created a deeper meta-level thinking about psychological splits, including how splits can develop between assumed opposites. In the clinical moment, insight into meta-level process rests on an epistemological change in the relation between subjective and objective. Horney was an early pioneer in examining the dialectical unity of these presumed opposites. A specific proposal for training and teaching candidates in the science of subjectivity will be advanced. Systemic clinical insights in the assessment and treatment of patients are offered, as well as systemic uncovering of cultural assumptions of Western society which can impede analytic exploration of psychic conflict.     

Questioning the Virtual Friendship Debate: Fuzzy Analogical Arguments from Classification and Definition

Arguments from analogy are pervasive in everyday reasoning, mathematics, philosophy, and science. Informal logic studies everyday argumentation in ordinary language. A branch of fuzzy logic, approximate reasoning, seeks to model facets of everyday reasoning with vague concepts in ill-defined situations. Ways of combining the results from these fields will be suggested by introducing a new argumentation scheme—a fuzzy analogical argument from classification—with the associated critical questions. This will be motivated by a case study of analogical reasoning in the virtual friendship debate within information ethics. The virtual friendship debate is a disagreement over whether virtual friendships are genuine friendships. It will be argued that the debate could move away from its current impasse, caused by unproductive metaphysical and logical assumptions, if extant arguments are reinterpreted as fuzzy analogical arguments from classification, and subjected to a new set of critical questions which would replace the quest for facts of essence about friendship with an emphasis on empirical data, persuasion, and definitional power.     

Reviewing Reduction in a Preferential Model‐Theoretic Context

In this article, we redefine classical notions of theory reduction in such a way that model‐theoretic preferential semantics becomes part of a realist depiction of this aspect of science. We offer a model‐theoretic reconstruction of science in which theory succession or reduction is often better—or at a finer level of analysis—interpreted as the result of model succession or reduction. This analysis leads to ‘defeasible reduction’, defined as follows: The conjunction of the assumptions of a reducing theory T with the definitions translating the vocabulary of a reduced theory T′ to the vocabulary of T, defeasibly entails the assumptions of reduced T′. This relation of defeasible reduction offers, in the context of additional knowledge becoming available, articulation of a more flexible kind of reduction in theory development than in the classical case. Also, defeasible reduction is shown to solve the problems of entailment that classical homogeneous reduction encounters. Reduction in the defeasible sense is a practical device for studying the processes of science, since it is about highlighting different aspects of the same theory at different times of application, rather than about naive dreams concerning a metaphysical unity of science.     

Narrating and Navigating Authorities: Evangelical and Mainline Protestant Interpretations of the Bible and Science

Research on the way Protestants interpret the Bible in relationship to science has tended to focus on biblical literalists; less research, however, has examined the heterogeneity of how nonliteralists interpret the Bible. Utilizing data from semi‐structured interviews with 77 evangelical and mainline Protestants who attend high‐SES congregations, we find that members of both groups draw on similar interpretation strategies in discussing the Bible and evolution. Both eschew literal interpretations of the Bible, demarcate boundaries between the Bible and science, and subsume evolution under broader theological beliefs. Mainline Protestants and evangelicals differ in the way they interpret miracles, with mainline Protestants revealing more openness to scientific and social interpretations of the Bible's miracles, while evangelicals emphasize God's authority over nature. Findings show that different strategies are evoked depending on the issue discussed, revealing implications for a deeper understanding of the way different traditions provide resources for interpreting the Bible and its relationship to scientific issues. Finally, findings contribute to a more robust knowledge of boundary work between the Bible and science as institutional and epistemic authorities.