组织中的正念：基于认知的动态衍生过程及干预

正念是个体、团队和组织共有的属性。认知过程取向的正念在个体、团队及组织层面表现为对信息的加工处理。依托信息加工理论, 基于认知的正念在组织中各层面的衍生过程可从4个阶段(刺激-觉知-识别-反应)进行解析, 其干预可依据衍生过程中的注意力与互动等关键要素入手。未来研究可发掘儒释道传统文化以发展认知取向正念的心理学内涵, 检验不同层面正念衍生过程及基于认知干预的有效性, 并尝试构建个体-团队-组织正念递进补充与反哺机制。     

正念训练提升3~4岁幼儿注意力和执行功能

正念训练是指个体将注意力集中于当下体验的一种心理干预方法。先前研究表明正念训练可以促进其注意力、执行功能、情绪调节等的发展, 而正念训练对幼儿心理发展的作用机制并不清楚。因此, 为了考察正念训练对3~4岁幼儿注意力和执行功能的影响。采用前后测设计, 对正念组进行每周2次, 每次20~30分钟, 共12次的正念训练; 对照组不进行任何训练。结果发现：(1) 在注意力方面, 正念组与对照组前测差异不显著, 训练后正念组幼儿持续性注意力得分显著高于对照组。(2) 在执行功能方面, 正念组和实验组在抑制控制、认知灵活性以及工作记忆上前测得分差异不显著, 训练后正念组幼儿抑制控制和认知灵活性得分显著优于对照组, 而两组幼儿工作记忆差异不显著。研究表明, 正念训练促进了3~4岁幼儿注意力和执行功能的发展, 且在执行功能方面主要表现为对抑制控制和认知灵活性的提升。     

个体冲动性对物质滥用与成瘾的影响及脑机制

冲动性是一多维的概念,一般指个体缺乏足够预见性或对自身的行为结果缺乏考虑和判断。个体冲动性和物质滥用与成瘾之间存在双重关系,即个体特质冲动性是物质滥用与成瘾的重要危险因素,而滥用成瘾性物质又会进一步损害个体的冲动控制功能。本文将论述个体冲动性和物质滥用与成瘾之间的相关性及冲动性增加潜在的神经机制。了解个体的冲动特质和物质滥用与成瘾者冲动性的改变,研究物质滥用与成瘾者冲动障碍的神经生物学机制,不仅有助于我们揭示物质滥用与成瘾的发生、发展,以及脱毒后复发的脑机制,而且有助于我们探索药物疗法以外的行为干预手段。     

冲动性对不同成瘾行为发展的调控及其神经机制

近年来越来越多的研究证据提示, 个体冲动性在成瘾疾患发生发展机制中具有关键作用, 可能成为成瘾行为的潜在易感标记以及早期识别和干预的重要靶点, 但冲动性对不同成瘾行为变化发展的调控机制尚不明确。项目拟综合跨成瘾谱系比较、纵向追踪设计、冲动行为干预等研究途径, 采用人格测量、神经认知、神经影像等技术, 首先比较尼古丁依赖者与网络游戏成瘾者的冲动性结构及其在前额叶–纹状体环路的结构功能改变; 然后采用混合分组设计筛选出具有高低冲动性的非成瘾青少年进行连续追踪研究, 考察冲动性对尼古丁依赖与网络游戏成瘾的预测效力; 并采用认知行为训练, 对吸烟成瘾者与网络游戏成瘾者进行冲动干预, 考察行为干预对冲动性水平及前额叶–纹状体环路功能的改变, 以及对不同成瘾行为发展的抑制后效。旨在探索冲动性作为成瘾的潜在易感标记及干预靶点的效力。     

冲动特质对青少年认知控制的影响——基于双重认知控制理论

根据双重认知控制理论,抑制控制分为主动性控制和反应性控制。为了探索冲动特质青少年究竟在哪个抑制控制成分存在不足,本研究用冲动性人格量表(BIS-11)选取了高冲动特质和低冲动特质青少年,并记录了他们在完成AX-CPT任务时的反应时和正确率。结果显示:与低冲动个体相比,高冲动个体在BX试次(主动性控制)上的反应时和正确率以及线索辨别力指数上的表现均差于低冲动个体,而在AY试次(反应性控制)上的反应时和正确率以及探测敏感性指标上的表现与低冲动个体没有显著差异。这些结果说明,与低冲动特质青少年相比,高冲动特质青少年的反应性控制保存较好,但主动性控制能力表现出不足。     

正念冥想训练水平对情绪加工的影响

越来越多的研究表明,正念冥想训练影响情绪加工。本文从正念冥想训练水平（包括临时训练、短时训练和长期训练）角度出发,系统回顾了不同水平的正念冥想训练对情绪加工的调节效应。综述发现,不同水平正念冥想训练都能够提高个体情绪调节能力,临时正念冥想训练作为一种有效的情绪调节方法影响情绪加工,而短期正念冥想训练和长期禅修训练通过增加个体正念意识,增强个体情绪接受力影响情绪加工。未来的研究需进一步在区分正念冥想训练时间和正念冥想训练类别基础上,探讨正念冥想训练影响情绪加工的认知神经机制。     

远离“诱惑”:预先承诺对跨期决策的调控机制及其神经基础

预先承诺作为一种有效的自我控制策略,主要通过提前排除那些在未来决策中可能会诱使个体做出冲动决策的选项,以达到降低决策冲动性的目的。预先承诺调控跨期决策主要是通过侧额极皮层(LFPC)、背外侧前额叶(DLPFC)、腹内侧前额叶(vmPFC)、后顶叶皮层(PPC)等脑区的共同激活,在自我控制、价值估算、特质冲动性、惩罚敏感度等心理变量的影响下发挥作用。本研究分别从认知机制和神经基础两个方面提出预先承诺降低冲动决策的整合模型,为干预和降低个体决策冲动性提供理论借鉴。未来研究可进一步探究预先承诺调控跨期决策的心理与神经机制,并加强预先承诺在决策领域的应用研究。     

正念冥想对情绪的调节作用:理论与神经机制

正念冥想可调节个体的负性情绪、促进个体正性情绪,对于心身疾病具有显著的干预效用.正念冥想的再感知模型、正念应对模型、推动性上升螺旋模型以及正念情绪调节模型都强调了正念冥想对情绪的调节作用.认知神经科学的研究发现,正念冥想可促进左侧前额叶脑区激活增强,涉及的脑区主要包括背外侧前额叶皮层(DLPFC)和背内侧前额叶皮层(DMPFC).研究者进一步发现,正念特质是通过改善前额叶对边缘系统反应的调节来实现对情绪的调节作用.而且,这种调节作用还有可能体现为通过冥想训练分离联结在一起的两种自我参照神经机制,从而加强体验性神经机制.另外,研究者还发现,正念冥想训练还可以改变与情绪加工相关的大脑结构.进一步澄清冥想训练与大脑偏侧化的关系和不同类型被试之间的比较研究将成为该领域日后研究的重点.     

药物成瘾者决策缺陷的特征、机制及干预

药物成瘾者存在决策缺陷, 并表现出冲动性、风险寻求、奖赏失调、躯体内感信号缺失等特征。神经影像学研究表明药物滥用导致成瘾者背外侧前额皮层、前扣带回、眶额叶皮层、腹内侧前额皮层、杏仁核、脑岛等脑区受损, 这些损伤是引发其决策缺陷的主要原因。认知训练有利于提高个体的决策能力, 如目标管理训练和正念冥想等可以增强个体工作记忆、促进自我觉察和以目标为导向的行为; 而非侵入性脑刺激则可以直接改变与成瘾者决策相关脑区的激活状态, 从而提升与决策相关的认知功能。总体而言, 未来认知训练和非侵入性脑刺激在成瘾干预方面仍有广阔的拓展空间。     

“冷”/“热”执行功能缺陷影响ADHD儿童核心症状的作用机制

注意缺陷多动障碍(ADHD)是一种以注意缺陷和(或)多动、冲动为核心症状的神经发育障碍,与前额叶发育异常所致的执行功能缺陷密切相关。基于此,从神经-认知-行为的发展途径提出执行功能缺陷可能是认知层面上导致ADHD核心症状的发病机理,其中与背侧前额叶相关的“冷”执行功能缺陷可能是导致注意缺陷核心症状的主导因素,而与腹内侧前额叶相关的“热”执行功能缺陷可能是导致多动、冲动核心症状的主导因素。一方面,“冷”执行功能缺陷主要引起工作记忆表征维持失败、抑制控制能力不足、认知转换困难等方面,这些缺陷进一步导致了个体在注意持续、注意选择和注意转移上受到限制;另一方面,“热”执行功能缺陷则带来厌恶延迟、奖赏加工异常、动机失调等问题,使得个体行为抑制失败,更容易做出冲动性选择,从而表现出多动、冲动等核心症状。未来研究应进一步检验和完善“冷”、“热”执行功能缺陷影响ADHD核心症状的理论模型以及从认知神经层面上提供更多的实证证据,同时还需从生态层面考察“冷”和“热”执行功能缺陷对ADHD核心症状的交互影响,并基于执行功能开发对ADHD核心症状具有个性化、精准化、长效化的干预方案。     

道德直觉合乎道义却不客观

面对道德困境, 道德直觉倾向于促使人们做出道义论的判断。但是, 道德直觉易受情绪因素影响, 具有较强的主观性。道德直觉警惕有意图地使用个人力量造成的伤害, 却会接受由非个人力量或连带作用引发的伤害。“模块近视假说”认为, 大脑中存在一个预警系统, 能快速地对主动伤害的想法发出情绪警报。但该系统的审查机制是一种简单的“单通道”加工, 这种加工局限使连带作用造成的伤害避开了审查机制的监控。道德直觉的不客观提示, 面对现实生活中的道德争议, 不应该仅听凭直觉作为行动的依据。     

Applying a dual process model of self-regulation: The association between executive working memory capacity,negative urgency,and negative mood induction on pre-potent response inhibition

This study tested a dual-process model of self-control where the combination of high impulsivity (negative urgency – NU), weak reflective/control processes (low executive working memory capacity – E-WMC), and a cognitive load is associated with increased failures to inhibit pre-potent responses on a cued go/no-go task. Using a within-subjects design, a cognitive load with and without negative emotional load was implemented to consider situational factors. Results suggested that: (1) high NU was associated with low E-WMC; (2) low E-WMC significantly predicted more inhibitory control failures across tasks; and (3) there was a significant interaction of E-WMC and NU, revealing those with low E-WMC and high NU had the highest rates of inhibitory control failures on all conditions of the task. In conclusion, results suggest that while E-WMC is a strong independent predictor of inhibitory control, NU provides additional information for vulnerability to problems associated with self-regulation.     

What should we expect from a dual-process theory of preference construction in choice?

Dhar and Gorlin (2013) proposed a dual-process framework for understanding the effects of preference construction in choice. Drawing on the distinction operating principles and operating conditions, it is argued that their emphasis on cognitive elaboration fails to specify the mental operations involved in preference construction. This limitation makes their dual-process framework circular and susceptible to the criticism of single-process alternatives. The distinction between associative and propositional processes has the potential to fill this conceptual gap, thereby providing a more thorough understanding of preference construction effects in choice.     

The dual-process turn: How recent defenses of dual-process theories of reasoning fail

In response to the claim that the properties typically used to distinguish System 1 from System 2 crosscut one another, Carruthers, Evans, and Stanovich have abandoned the System 1/System 2 distinction. Evans and Stanovich both opt for a dual-process theory, according to which Type-1 processes are autonomous and Type-2 processes use working memory and involve cognitive decoupling. Carruthers maintains a two-system account, according to which there is an intuitive system and a reflective system. I argue that these defenses of dual-process theory face two problems. First, as pointed out by Sloman, these new dual-process theories cast the net of “reasoning” too wide. Second, and more importantly, this singular distinction cannot accomplish the explanatory work needed to support dual-process theory. These theorists must fall back on using various properties from the Standard Menu in explanations, thereby committing these accounts to a “Standard View” that they had hoped to avoid. Thus, these theorists face a dilemma: either the distinction between intuitive and reflective (or autonomous and working memory involving) falls back on using the properties of the Standard Menu, or it lacks the explanatory promise that made dual-process theory attractive.     

社会不平等如何影响低地位者的系统合理信念

系统合理信念反映了人们的系统支持态度,即对社会系统公正性、合理性、正当性的感知,以及相应的支持和维护社会系统的态度。以往关于社会不平等与低地位者系统合理信念的关系形成了两种对立的理论观点。一方面,社会认同理论等自利取向的理论认为,严重的不平等不利于低地位者维护自我及内群体利益,因此会损害其系统合理信念;另一方面,系统合理化理论却提出,在不平等更极端（而非平等）的社会中,人们（甚至是低地位者）反而更可能合理化不平等,表现出更高的系统合理信念。实证研究中,两种观点分别得到了一些研究的支持,但同时也面临很多质疑。 面对上述分歧,本文提出了一个整合性的解释框架,即“社会不平等影响低地位者系统合理信念的双路径模型”。该模型认为,自利取向理论与系统合理化理论其实并不矛盾,而是共同解释了不平等与低地位者系统合理信念关系的“全貌”。因此,理论争议的焦点不在于不平等究竟增强还是减弱低地位者的系统合理信念,而在于分析不平等增强或减弱低地位者系统合理信念的不同条件（即认知基础）及其内在机制（即动机基础）。 第一,在认知基础方面,不同于以往研究仅关注不平等“量”的程度及其与系统合理信念的线性关系,该模型认为还应关注不平等“质”的差异及其不同效应,即关注低地位者对不平等的认知过程。一方面,严重的不平等损害低地位者个人或群体的现实利益,构成一种现实威胁;另一方面,严重不平等的社会现状与人们关于社会系统公正性、合理性的信念相冲突,构成一种象征威胁。 第二,在动机基础方面,低地位者的自利动机与系统合理化动机分别使其反对或维护不平等现状,且两种动机彼此冲突;不同于以往研究采用对立视角考察两种动机,或是过于强调二者之一的作用;该模型认为,两种动机是并存的,相互之间并非全或无的关系。因此有必要厘清二者发挥作用的条件,即什么影响二者孰强孰弱,又是什么决定了何者发挥主导作用。 第三,区分不平等“质”的差异是厘清自利动机与系统合理化动机如何发挥作用的关键。换言之,不同动机为低地位者反对或维护不平等现状提供了动力,而何种动机发挥主导作用则取决于低地位者如何对不平等进行认知。具体而言,当凸显不平等在个体或群体水平的现实威胁时,更可能激活低地位者的自利动机（进而抑制其系统合理化动机）,继而损害其系统合理信念;而当凸显不平等在系统水平的象征威胁时,更可能激活其系统合理化动机（进而抑制其自利动机）,继而增强其系统合理信念。 “双路径模型”通过分析不平等影响低地位者系统合理信念的不同认知基础,进而厘清不同动机的作用,将以往研究中看似矛盾的结论整合于一,为理解不平等对低地位者系统合理信念的影响、解释两种理论的“分歧”提供了一种整合框架,需要未来研究进一步检验和发展。     

Human recognition memory: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

For many years the cognitive processes underlying recognition memory have been the subject of considerable interest in experimental psychology. To account for a broad range of behavioral findings, psychologists have put forward a variety of 'dual-process' models, all of which propose that recognition memory is supported by two forms of memory - familiarity and recollection - that differ in their speed of operation and the specificity of the retrieved information. More recently, the dual-process framework has been extended to encompass findings from studies investigating the neural basis of recognition memory. Results from neuropsychological, ERP and functional neuroimaging studies can be accommodated within the framework, and suggest that familiarity and recollection are supported by distinct neural mechanisms.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

Relationships between trait impulsivity and cognitive control: the effect of attention switching on response inhibition and conflict resolution

This study examined the relationship between trait impulsivity and cognitive control, as measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) and a focused attention dichotic listening to words task, respectively. In the task, attention was manipulated in two attention conditions differing in their cognitive control demands: one in which attention was directed to one ear at a time for a whole block of trials (blocked condition) and another in which attention was switched pseudo-randomly between the two ears from trial to trial (mixed condition). Results showed that high impulsivity participants exhibited more false alarm and intrusion errors as well as a lesser ability to distinguish between stimuli in the mixed condition, as compared to low impulsivity participants. In the blocked condition, the performance levels of the two groups were comparable with respect to these measures. In addition, total BIS scores were correlated with intrusions and laterality index in the mixed but not the blocked condition. The findings suggest that high impulsivity individuals may be less prone to attentional difficulties when cognitive load is relatively low. In contrast, when attention switching is involved, high impulsivity is associated with greater difficulty in inhibiting responses and resolving cognitive conflict than is low impulsivity, as reflected in error-prone information processing. The conclusion is that trait impulsivity in a non-clinical population is manifested more strongly when attention switching is required than during maintained attention. This may have important implications for the conceptualization and treatment of impulsivity in both non-clinical and clinical populations.