Problems and possibilities of cross-cultural supervision

Supervision across cultural boundaries has problems and possibilities. Culture plays a role in the teaching, learning, and helping processes. In one international Swiss setting certain observations are noted: (1) The use of one's culture is described as a major defense mechanism; (2) Cultural stereotyping can become a means to avoid engagement; (3) A supposed cultural neutrality encourages cultural confusion which, like role confusion, complicates interpersonal relationships; (4) Some students are intimidated by other cultural groups and unable to recognize or deal with their feelings; (5) Body language and other nonverbal expressions play an important role in cross-cultural counseling and supervision; (6) Culture Shock in its various stages can be indicated as a major stress item and is comparable to grief and shock reactions; (7) The given piety of a culture sometimes means that cultural differences are often greater from one country to another than denominational or religious differences, even within one denominational group.He is a member of the German Society for Pastoral Psychology.     

Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: a Reply to Wallbridge

Philosophia - In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia (2016b). I...     

Multiple Imputation for Multivariate Missing-Data Problems: A Data Analyst's Perspective

Analyses of multivariate data are frequently hampered by missing values. Until recently, the only missing-data methods available to most data analysts have been relatively ad1 hoc practices such as listwise deletion. Recent dramatic advances in theoretical and computational statistics, however, have produced anew generation of flexible procedures with a sound statistical basis. These procedures involve multiple imputation (Rubin, 1987), a simulation technique that replaces each missing datum with a set of m > 1 plausible values. The rn versions of the complete data are analyzed by standard complete-data methods, and the results are combined using simple rules to yield estimates, standard errors, and p-values that formally incorporate missing-data uncertainty. New computational algorithms and software described in a recent book (Schafer, 1997a) allow us to create proper multiple imputations in complex multivariate settings. This article reviews the key ideas of multiple imputation, discusses the software programs currently available, and demonstrates their use on data from the Adolescent Alcohol Prevention Trial (Hansen & Graham, 199 I).     

Perceptions and possibilities

Not only do black students need assistance in solving the problems that are peculiar to them, but so do the school personnel with whom they come in daily contact. Counselors must realize how influential they are in helping youth form images of themselves and attitudes about their world. These students need help in channeling their energies toward constructive ends and in developing positive outlooks about life.     

Unstable Interaction in Multiple Criteria Decision Problems

In this paper, we present a decision‐aid method with interacting criteria. The fuzzy measures used to aggregate the criteria depend on the considered alternatives. Pairwise comparisons on the importance of criteria and some levels of veto (or favor) degrees, specified by the decision maker, are taken into consideration. For each alternative, we search for the fuzzy measure that makes it the best. The orness degrees of the resulting fuzzy measures are compared and the alternative associated with the minimum orness degree is selected. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Paradigms and possibilities

This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ‘paradigms’, is almost ubiquitous.

These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport – faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science – must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport.     

Late capitalism and postmodernism: Educational problems and possibilities

This work analyzes certain aspects of postmodernist thought in terms of the challenges it presents to the secular, radical democratic project to which the author subscribes. It is argued that much of postmodernist thought has been effective in attacking foundationalism, as well as supporting marginalized persons and ideas, but holds little promise with regard to building an integrative democratic community. Postmodernist radicalism has not usually been directed against capitalist power; therefore, it is not clear how this form of radicalism can be useful to a project that is predicated upon the incompatibilities between capitalism and bona fide democracy.     

医源性多胎妊娠的伦理问题及对策

1　医源性多胎妊娠的概念、现状和趋势医源性多胎妊娠是经医疗干预 (主要指辅助生殖技术 )获得的多胎妊娠 ,孕妇单次妊娠孕育的胎儿数≥ 2 ,隶属医源性疾病。人类生殖活动中 ,自然多胎妊娠非常稀少。若将单次妊娠的胎儿数用n表示 ,则自然多胎妊娠机会可用 1/ 80 (n - 1)公式粗略估算。就双胞胎妊娠而言 ,80次自然妊娠中仅有 1次双胞胎妊娠的机会 ;就三胞胎妊娠而言 ,6 40 0次自然妊娠中仅约 1次三胞胎妊娠的机会 ;以此类推 ,5 12 0 0 0次自然妊娠中只有 1次四胞胎妊娠的机会。更多胎数的自然妊娠机会则更为罕见。文献中有一次多达 7个胎儿的…     

Ultimacy and alternative possibilities

I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.

Relevant possibilities

There are a number of relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge in the literature, including those by contextualists (like Lewis and Cohen), and invariantists (like Dretske). Despite widespread discussion of such views, an explication of the notion of relevance is conspicuously absent from the literature. Without a careful explication of that notion, relevant alternatives accounts resist evaluation. This paper attempts to aid in the evaluation of those accounts, by providing an account of relevance. The account rejects two common presuppositions about the notion of relevance. The account holds that worlds, rather than alternatives, are relevant, and that distant worlds can be relevant. Relevant worlds turn out to be those worlds at which an alternative to one’s belief obtains, and is such that one’s epistemic position (with respect to what one believes at the actual world) is worse than it is at the actual world.     

Alternative possibilities and asymmetry

It has often been noted that many of our intuitive assessments of particular actions suggest that there is an asymmetry between blameworthy and praiseworthy actions with regard to the question of whether moral responsibility requires that the agent could have acted otherwise. It is a quite different question, though, whether such an asymmetry between good and bad cases can be supported by more systematic considerations. In this paper, I will develop a new argument for a restricted version of the asymmetry, by showing that in cases of praiseworthy actions responsibility cannot generally presuppose that the agent could have acted otherwise. This argument will be based on a distinction between two different kinds of roles that moral norms can play in determining whether an action is right and in guiding our deliberation. That agents can sometimes be responsible for their praiseworthy actions even though they cannot act otherwise is best seen as a reflection of the fact that moral norms can prohibit treating certain courses of action as genuine options at all.

     

Generating possibilities

Our knowledge of the most basic alternative possibilities can be thought of as generated recursively from what we know about the actual world. But what are the generating principles? According to one view, they are recombinational: roughly, alternative possibilities are generated by “patching together” parts of distinct worlds or “blotting out” parts of worlds to yield new worlds. I argue that this view is inadequate. It is difficult to state in a way that is true and non-trivial, and anyway fails to account for our knowledge that there might have been other things, properties, relations, and combinations of these than there actually are. I sketch and defend an alternative view based on the distinction between determinable and determinate properties: roughly, alternative possibilities are generated by “intra-determinable” variation, variation from one determinate to another of the same determinable.     

Transparency and self-disclosure in family therapy: dangers and possibilities

Therapy is a paid intimate relationship that thrusts clients and therapists into navigating personal and professional boundaries. When, where, why, and how is it appropriate and ethical for family therapists to be transparent, and when is it damaging? Theorists take varied stances from Haley's position of tight boundaries around therapist disclosure—whether in treatment or training—to the narrative viewpoint that therapists should be transparent about models of therapy, personal values, and life experiences that inform their practice and beliefs. However, these positions are not research based, and theorists who support disclosure offer few guidelines other than general statements. This article examines the history of ideas about disclosure in six major family therapy models, and the dangers and possibilities of transparency. It looks at the research on self‐disclosure in individual therapy and whether and how it could apply to family therapy. Guidelines are proposed that take into account the multiple social identities of therapists and clients, and issues of safety and transparency.     

Hedonic possibilities and heritability statistics

Several influential psychologists have attempted to estimate to what extent human happiness levels are directly controlled by genes by comparing the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart. If we discover that the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart tend to be closer than the happiness levels of fraternal twins raised apart, this is taken as evidence that average happiness levels are largely controlled by genes. However, if it turns out that identical twins' happiness levels tend to be substantially different, as different as fraternal twins raised apart, it has been argued that this implies that the environment largely determines happiness levels. I contend that this interpretation of the data rests on a set of questionable, closely related assumptions: a) that pairs of identical twins raised apart are raised in substantially different environments; b) that genetically identical twins aren't identical in other pertinent ways; and c) that average levels of affect that are correlated with certain sets of genes in the environments the twin studies were conducted in will be correlated with those genes in other relevant environments because those genes govern average affect levels. In this paper, I will show that these assumptions are false and explain how to properly go about investigating the contingent causal links between genes and happiness. In the end, I argue that there is no good evidence that our genes delimit our hedonic potential and that the fact that this misinterpretation of the data has been widely disseminated is potentially harmful to human well-being.